LEONARDO SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANGEL H. MOJICA, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASAY CITY BRANCH, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, PASAY CITY BRANCH, TEODORICO,…

Santos versus Mojica

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Leonardo Santos against Judge Angel H. Mojica of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and the private respondents, who are the Allanigue brothers and sisters. Leonardo Santos asks the Supreme Court to strike down the trial judge's order directing the sheriff to demolish his house, which stood on a lot that the Allanigue family had won in a partition suit. The case matters because it teaches two enduring lessons: a judgment binds not only the parties but also their successors-in-interest who claim under them, and a builder in bad faith loses what he built without any right to indemnity, subject to the landowner's option to demand demolition at the builder's expense.

Procedural History

The story begins in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where eleven Allanigue brothers and sisters sued their sister Lorenza Allanigue, her husband Simeon Santos, and two other defendants for partition of a lot in Parañaque and for annulment of certain conveyances. The defendants were declared in default, and after hearing the plaintiffs' evidence the trial court ordered the lot partitioned among the eleven plaintiffs and Lorenza Allanigue. A writ of execution followed, ordering the defendants to vacate the lot and deliver possession to the plaintiffs.

Leonardo Santos, son of Simeon Santos and Lorenza Allanigue, filed a third-party claim with the sheriff and a motion to recall the writ insofar as his house was concerned. The motion was denied, and the court later ordered the sheriff to demolish the houses. Leonardo and the defendants then went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition, which the Court denied in its decision of February 28, 1964, because Leonardo did not follow the procedure sanctioned by law to vindicate his alleged ownership. After that decision became final, the trial judge ordered demolition; the defendants removed their houses voluntarily, leaving only Leonardo's. On motion of the plaintiffs, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 9, 1965, directing the sheriff to demolish Leonardo's house. Leonardo then filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Supreme Court.

Facts

In 1959, eleven Allanigue brothers and sisters sued their sister Lorenza Allanigue and her husband Simeon Santos, among others, for partition of a 360-square-meter lot in San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, and for annulment of certain conveyances. The defendants were declared in default, and the trial court ordered the lot partitioned among the eleven plaintiffs and Lorenza Allanigue.

A writ of execution issued, ordering the defendants to vacate the lot and deliver possession to the plaintiffs. Leonardo Santos, son of Simeon Santos and Lorenza Allanigue, owned a house standing on the lot. He filed a third-party claim with the sheriff and a motion to recall the writ insofar as his house was concerned, but the motion was denied. On March 15, 1962, the defendants and Leonardo having failed to remove their houses within the period given, the court ordered the sheriff to demolish them.

Leonardo and the defendants sought relief from the Supreme Court, which denied the petition on February 28, 1964, finding that Leonardo did not follow the procedure sanctioned by law to vindicate his alleged ownership. After that decision became final, the trial judge ordered demolition; the defendants removed their houses voluntarily, leaving only Leonardo's. On motion of the plaintiffs, the respondent judge issued the order of December 9, 1965, directing the sheriff to demolish Leonardo's house. Hence this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge had jurisdiction to order the demolition of Leonardo Santos's house.
• Whether or not Leonardo Santos is bound by the judgment in the partition case as a successor-in-interest of his parents.
• Whether or not Leonardo Santos is a builder in bad faith who lost his improvement without right to indemnity.
• Whether or not the present petition is barred by the prior judgment of the Supreme Court denying the earlier petition.

Applicable Provisions

Article 449 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.

This provision governs Leonardo's status as a builder in bad faith and strips him of any right to indemnity for the reconstructed house.

Article 450 of the Civil Code provides, in part:

Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed.

This provision supplies the landowner's option to demand demolition at the builder's expense, which the Allanigue owners exercised when they moved for demolition.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge had jurisdiction to order the demolition. Leonardo is bound by the judgment in the partition case because he is a successor-in-interest of his parents, Simeon Santos and Lorenza Allanigue, and his right, if any, is claimed under them. The registration of the sale to him is of no moment because he is bound by the judgment against his parents.

On the second issue, the Court held that Leonardo is a builder in bad faith. His house was built and reconstructed into a bigger one after his parents had been summoned in 1959, so he must be deemed a builder in bad faith. As such, he lost the improvement to the owners of the land without right to indemnity under Article 449. The Allanigue brothers and sisters became owners of the improvement if they chose to appropriate the accession, but they could instead choose demolition at the builder's expense under Article 450. The record shows the owners chose demolition, and the respondent judge granted their motion on December 9, 1965.

On the third issue, the Court held that the present petition is barred by the prior judgment in the earlier case. There is identity of subject matter, namely, the portion of the lot and the house standing on it, and identity of cause of action, namely, the order for removal or demolition of the houses. The prior decision was on the merits and had become final, so it is res adjudicata on the validity of the order of demolition of December 9, 1965.

Doctrine

A judgment binds not only the parties but also their successors-in-interest who claim their right under them. A person who builds on another's land after the landowner has already been summoned in a case affecting the land is a builder in bad faith. Under Article 449 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith loses what he built without right to indemnity. Under Article 450, the landowner may instead demand demolition of the work at the builder's expense. A final judgment on the merits bars a subsequent petition raising the same subject matter and cause of action under the principle of res adjudicata.

Disposition

The petition was denied, with treble costs against Leonardo Santos, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court was dissolved.

Remember This

A builder in bad faith loses what he built without right to indemnity, and the landowner may instead demand demolition at the builder's expense. Examiners use this case to test the rights of the landowner and builder in bad faith under Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code, and the binding effect of judgments on successors-in-interest.