G.R. No. L-25450. January 31, 1969
LEONARDO SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANGEL H. MOJICA, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASAY CITY BRANCH, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, PASAY CITY BRANCH, TEODORICO,…
CAPISTRANO, J.:
On March 19, 1959, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, eleven brothers and sisters,
all surnamed Allanigue, brought an action (Civil Case
No. 217-R) against their sister, Lorenza Allanigue, her husband, Simeon Santos, Maria San Agustin
and Felicidad San Agustin, for partition of a
360-square-meter lot situated at San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, and for the
annulment of certain conveyances involving the same. Defendants having been declared in default,
the trial court, after hearing the plaintiffs’ evidence, rendered judgment
ordering the partition of the lot among the eleven plaintiffs and the defendant
Lorenza Allanigue. In a subsequent order the court set off Lorenza Allanigue’s share against
the amount that she had failed to pay as rents to the plaintiffs as directed
in the decision.
A writ of execution was issued on the judgment ordering the
defendants to vacate the lot and deliver its possession to the plaintiffs. Leonardo Santos, not a party defendant but a
son of defendants Simeon Santos and Lorenza Allanigue, owned a house standing on the lot. He filed with the sheriff a third-party
claim, and with the court, a motion to recall the writ of execution insofar as
his house was concerned. The motion was
denied. On March 15, 1962, the
defendants and movant Leonardo Santos having failed
to remove their houses from the lot within the period given them, the court
ordered the sheriff to demolish said houses.
On April 2, 1962, Leonardo Santos and the defendants in the case
as petitioners, filed in the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, G.R. No.L-19618, against Judge Angel H. Mojica,
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal and the plaintiffs in
the case, as respondents. Among the
issues raised therein was whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to
order the demolition of petitioners’ houses in that special civil action. In its decision of February 28, 1964, the
Supreme Court denied the petition after finding that Leonardo Santos, who
claimed to be the owner of a house and the portion of land on which it stood by
purchase from his parents, did not follow the procedure sanctioned by law in
vindicating his alleged ownership, i.e., he should have filed an ordinary
civil action to vindicate his alleged ownership of the house and the portion
of land on which it was built.
After the said decision of the Supreme Court had become final,
the respondent Judge, Angel H. Mojica, on motion of
the plaintiffs in the same Civil Case No. 217-R, ordered the demolition of the
defendants’ houses. The defendants
having voluntarily removed their houses, the only house that remained standing
on the lot was that belonging to Leonardo Santos. Subsequently, the respondent Judge, on
motion of the plaintiffs, issued an order dated December 9, 1965, directing the
sheriff to demolish the house of Leonardo Santos. Hence, the present petition for certiorari
and prohibition in this Court where Leonardo Santos, petitioner, questions the
jurisdiction of the respondent Judge in issuing the order of demolition of his
house.
The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition should be denied
in view of the following considerations:
1. Petitioner Leonardo
Santos is bound by the judgment in Civil Case No. 217-R because he is a
successor-in-interest of his parents, Simeon Santos and Lorenza
Allanigue, defendants in Civil Case No. 217-R, and
his right, if any, is claimed under them.
Hence, the judgment in said civil case binds not only Simeon Santos and Lorenza Allanigue but also their
son, Leonardo Santos, who is their successor-in-interest and who claims under
them. The fact that the sale to Leonardo
Santos from his parents was registered, is of no
moment because, as pointed out, he is bound by the judgment against them.
Leonardo Santos’ house having been built and reconstructed
(after March, 1962) into a bigger one after his predecessors-in-interest, his
parents, had been summoned in 1959 in Civil Case No. 217-R, he must be deemed a
builder in bad faith. As builder in bad
faith he lost the improvement made by him consisting of the reconstructed house
to the owners of the land without right to indemnity, pursuant to Article 449
of the Civil Code, which provides:
“ART. 449. He who
builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
The Allanigue
brothers and sisters therefore became owners of the improvement consisting of
the house built in bad faith by Leonardo Santos if they chose to appropriate
the accession. (Articles
445 and 449, Civil Code.)
However, said owners could choose instead the demolition of the improvement
or building at the expense of the builder, pursuant to Article 450 of the Civil
Code, which, in part, provides:
“ART. 450. The owner of
the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed,
in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the
person who built, planted or sowed * * *.”
It is of record in Civil Case No. 217-R
that the owners of the land chose to have the house or improvement demolished
pursuant to their motion for demolition which was granted by respondent Judge Mojica on December 9, 1965.
2. The present petition is barred by the prior judgment of this
Court in G.R. No. L-19618. Herein petitioner, Leonardo
Santos, was one of the petitioners in that case against the same official and
private respondents in the instant petition.
In the two cases there is identity of subject-matter, namely, the
portion of the lot and the house standing on said portion alleged by petitioner
to belong to him. There is also identity
of cause of action, to wit: the order of the respondent Judge for the removal
or demolition of the houses standing on the lot. In the previous case this Court had
jurisdiction, and its decision, which was on the merits, had become final. It is evident that the judgment of this Court
in G.R. No.L-19618 is res adjudicata
in the instant case on the question of the validity of the order of demolition
of December 9, 1965.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is denied, with treble
costs against the petitioner. The writ
of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby dissolved.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
Zaldivar, J., no part.