THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. EPIFANIO CARULASDULASAN AND NICASIO BECAREL, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Epifanio Carulasdulasan and Nicasio Becarel were accused in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu of the crime of estafa committed,
according to the information, as follows:

“That during the month of December, 1950, in the
municipality of Dalaguete, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, being then
tenants of Crispin Almagro, and as such had the express obligation to
share one-half of whatever product they could harvest from the land of
the latter, conspiring together and helping each other and with deliberate intent to defraud said Crispin Almagro, the accused herein
having stripped 600 kilos of abaca planted on their landlord’s land, of
which he was entitled to one-half of this quantity or 300 kilos sold
them all without giving said Crispin Almagro his corresponding share
and appropriated the proceeds thereof for their own use and benefit and
despite several demands with the aid of the police authorities of the
aforesaid municipality the accused, refused and still refuse to give
the offended party his share and to his damage and prejudice in the
amount of P330, the value of 300 kilos as his rightful share.” Upon
arraignment the accused asked for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that the facts alleged in the information did not constitute
estafa. As the trial court granted the motion, the provincial fiscal
interposed the present appeal.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the facts alleged in the
information make up the crime of estafa defined in subsection 1(6) of
article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which refers to fraud committed—

“By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice
of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by
the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods,
or other property.” From the facts alleged it is clear that the accused
received from the sale of the abaca harvested by them a sum of money
which did not all belong to them because one-half of it corresponds to
the landlord’s share of the abaca under the tenancy agreement. This
half the accused were under obligation to deliver to the landlord. They
therefore held it in trust for him. But instead of turning it over to
him, they appropriated it to their own use and refused to give it to
him notwithstanding repeated demands. In other words, the accused are
charged with having committed fraud by misappropriating or converting
to the prejudice of another money received by them in trust or under
circumstances which made it their duty to deliver it to its owner.
Obviously, this is a form of fraud specially covered by the penal
provision above cited.

The learned trial Judge held the provision inapplicable on the
theory that “the abaca in question was not received by the accused from
anybody but had been harvested by them, as tenants, from the plantation
of the complainant.” His Honor has obviously overlooked the fact that
what the accused are charged with having misappropriated is the
landlord’s share of the purchase price received by them for the abaca
which they sold.

As authority for holding that upon the facts alleged in the
information the accused could not be held guilty of estafa, the trial
court cites the case of U. S. vs. Reyes, 6 Phil., 441, which is clearly
inapplicable to the case at bar. In that case the lessee of several
parcels of land entered into an agreement with one Julian Reyes for the
cultivation of said land under certain conditions, one of which was
that the harvest was to be divided between them share and share alike.
But when the crop was harvested Reyes sold it without giving his
partner his share. Convicted of theft in the court of first instance,
Reyes was, upon appeal to this Court, acquitted of that crime, this
Court holding that the unlawful disposal of his partner’s share of the
crop by Reyes “was undoubtedly a violation of their contract and a
trespass upon the rights of another and not an act constituting the
crime of theft.” It should be noted, however, that while Reyes was
acquitted of the charge of theft this Court did not hold that he was
not guilty of estafa. On the contrary, this Court seems to have given
thought to the suggestion of the Solicitor General that the crime
committed by Reyes was not theft but estafa, on which reason this
Court, in acquitting Reyes of theft, did so ‘”without prejudice to the
institution of any other action that may be proper” and remanded the
case to the court below “for proper procedure.”

Applying the corresponding provision of the Spanish Penal Code, the
Spanish Supreme Court, in its decision of December 20, 1930, sustained
the conviction for estafa of a tenant (aparcero) who sold crop gathered
from the land held by him as tenant without giving the landlord his
share thereof.

In any event, supposing that subsection l(b) of article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable, still the information alleges
sufficient facts to make the accused criminally liable under the first
paragraph of article 318, which punishes “any person who shall defraud
or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding
articles of this chapter,” it being averred that the accused “with
deliberate intent to defraud” their landlord sold all the abaca
harvested by them from his plantation without giving the latter his
share and appropriated the proceeds thereof to their own use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of the landlord in the amount of
P330.

In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal is revoked and the case remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.