G.R. No. L-6522. May 24, 1954
LUIS B. UVERO, GREGORIA U. ORIAS, HENRICO M. UVERO, TITA U. DINERO, VIRGINIA U. PORNILLOS, JUVENAL B. UVERO, AND ELEUTERIO B. UVERO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIO A…
REYES, J.:
rendered judgment in civil case No. 1424, entitled Emiliana Beltrano de
Uvero et al., vs. Rosalio Azada et al., for recovery of real
property, declaring plaintiffs owners of the land described in the
reamended complaint and ordering defendants to deliver the possession
thereof to the plaintiffs and to pay damages and costs.
Defendants gave notice of appeal on October 3 and filed their record
on appeal seven days later. Pending approval of said record, plaintiffs
filed a motion for immediate execution, which the court granted in its
order of October 15, copy of which was received by defendants on
October 18. The order says:
“It appearing that the defendants in this case have
no property, and according to the plaintiffs, are insolvent, upon
motion of the plaintiffs, and upon filing of a bond in the sum of
P2,000, let a writ of execution be issued against the defendants,
which, however, may be suspended upon the filing of a supersedeas bond
in the same amount.”
Implementing the order, the clerk of court issued the corresponding
writ of execution on October 30 after plaintiffs had filed the required
bond, and the writ was served by the sheriff on defendants on November
6.
On the following day (November 7) defendants filed an urgent motion,
stating that they had filed a supersedeas bond of P2,000 on the day
before and praying “that the writ of execution be dissolved and the
premises be given back to the defendants.” At that time the court had
already lost its jurisdiction over the case, the appeal having been
perfected 4 days before with the approval of the record on appeal and
the appeal bond on November 3. (Section 9, Rule 41.) The court denied
the motion, however, on the ground that section 2 of Rule 39 authorizes
a stay of execution upon the filing of a supersedeas bond but not “the
dissolution of an execution which had already been served upon the
appellant.” Taken to the Court of Appeals on a petition for a writ of
certiorari, this ruling was reversed and the respondent Judge was
ordered to dissolve the execution which he had previously authorized.
From this order plaintiffs have appealed to this Court by certiorari.
The appeal appears to be well taken.
There is no question that execution issued on the authority of
section 2 of Rule 39, may, as therein also authorized, be stayed upon
the approval by the court of sufficient supersedeas bond. But, as the
respondent Court of Appeals itself says, the stay may be ordered “as
long as the court retains its jurisdiction over the case.” Such,
however, is not the situation here, where the petition for the
dissolution of the writ of execution was filed when the trial court,
because of the perfection of the appeal, had already lost its
jurisdiction over the case and had therefore no more authority to grant
the petition.
It is true that section 9 of Rule 41 also provides that the trial
court, notwithstanding the appeal, retains the authority “to issue
orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties
which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal.” But as was
said in the case of Vda. de Syquia vs. Judge of First Instance et al.,
60 Phil., 186, “The execution of a judgment is a proceeding affecting
the rights of the parties, which are the subject matter thereof, and
from which appeal is taken, and its purpose is not to protect and
preserve the subject matter of the litigation. Therefore, the
perfecting of an appeal taken from said judgment deprives the trial
court of its jurisdiction over said judgment and said jurisdiction is
transferred to the appellate court, and the trial court cannot modify
or revoke any order of execution of the said judgment after the appeal
taken therefrom is perfected.” It appears in that case that the trial
court, pending approval of the bill of exceptions, had ordered
execution against the defeated party unless a bond was filed within a
certain period, but, on a motion for reconsideration and after approval
of the bill of exceptions, revoked the order on the ground that there
was no legal justification for its issuance. On a petition for
certiorari this Court annulled the order revoking the execution,
holding that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction because the
appeal had already been perfected.
To the same effect is the ruling laid down in the case of Burke et al., vs. Devera,[1]
46 Off. Gaz., No. 10, p. 4936. In that case judgment was rendered
requiring defendants to surrender possession of a building to
plaintiffs, but after appeal had been perfected the trial court issued
an order allowing defendant to continue occupying a portion of the
building. This Court held the order void. The syllabus says:
“A modifying order allowing defendant to occupy the
portion of the building he is actually holding which was not for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties is
conspicuously null and void; having been entered after the records on
appeal had been approved and, accordingly, after the Court of First
Instance had lost jurisdiction over the case.”
Our attention has been called to the case of Naredo vs. Judge Yatco,[2]
45 Off. Gaz., No. 8, p. 3390, where this Court upheld an order of
execution issued by the trial judge after approval of the record on
appeal. But as this Court has taken pains to point out in that case,
the order for the issuance of the writ was merely an implementation of
a previous order for the issuance of execution which was promulgated
before the perfection of the appeal so that it could be stated that the
approval of the record on appeal by the trial judge was subordinated to
the said previous order of execution.
To refute respondent’s contention that they were not given a
reasonable time to file a supersedeas bond, it is sufficient to quote
the following from the order of the trial judge.
“* * * It is not denied that before the issuance and
service of the writ of execution, Atty. Ramon Felipe, Jr. had inquired
from counsel for the defendants whether they were going to file a
supersedeas bond. Between receipt of the order authorizing the issuance
of the writ of execution by Atty. Perfecto Tabora for the defendants on
October 18, 1951, to the service of the writ of execution upon the
defendants on November 6, 1951, 19 days had elapsed. Sufficient time,
therefore, had elapsed before the writ of execution was served upon the
defendants to enable them to file a supersedeas bond. Not until,
however, was the writ of execution served upon them did they file the
supersedeas bond to stay execution.”
On the assumption that the trial court had, with the perfection of
the appeal, already lost its jurisdiction to dissolve the writ of
execution previously issued, respondents seek to justify the order
herein appealed from as an exercise by the Court of Appeals of a power
incident to its supervisory and appellate jurisdiction. But it is
obvious that the exercise of any such incidental power should be
invoked in the main case, which has already been elevated to the Court
of Appeals, and not in the separate case of certiorari, where the only
issue involved was whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction or
gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dissolve the
execution, an issue which has to be resolved in the negative for the
reason that the trial court had no power to grant such a motion after
it had already lost jurisdiction over the case.
The order of the Court of Appeals requiring the trial judge to
dissolve the order of execution when the said judge had already lost
jurisdiction over the case being illegal and improper, the same must be
as it is hereby revoked, with costs against the respondents other than
the Court of Appeals.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
[1] 83 Phil., 382 and 88 Phil., 762. [2] 80 Phil. 220.