BRUNO B. PACOLI, REPRESENTING AUREA PACOLI CAGURING (DECEASED), PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (BUREAU OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS), RESPONDENT.

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Bruno Pacoli as grandfather of the minor children of deceased Aurea Pacoli Caguring,
for review of the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in
R09-WC-Case No. 13924, reversing the outright award of WCC Regional Office No.
9.

The deceased Aurea Pacoli
Caguring had her first assignment as public school
teacher at Barrio Mancares, Tarangnan,
School District, Tarangnan, Samar, on August 27, 1962. 
From Catbalogan, Samar, where the deceased was residing, to her
station at Barrio Mancares, she had to negotiate the
distance by small motorized bancas, for no land
transportation plies between these two places.

Sometime on June 5, 1969,
when the deceased was travelling from Catbalogan to her station at Barrio Mancares,
the motor banca she was riding capsized because of
big waves.  From that tragedy the
deceased developed a phobia — fear of sea travel.  From then on, she was compelled to hike on
foot from Catbalogan to Barrio Mancares,
a distance of 18 mountainous kilometers every weekend.  These long hikes sapped her strength little
by little.  At her request, she was
transferred on July 1, 1971
from her station at Barrio Mancares to Barrio Bahay, Tarangnan, Samar.

While teaching in her new station at Barrio Bahay,
Tarangnan, Samar, the
deceased had to go home to Catbalogan, Samar every Friday and return the following Monday.  As a result of such strenuous travels from Catbalogan, Samar
to her station, she became thinner and thinner everyday
until she finally succumbed to pulmonary tuberculosis on May 23, 1974.

On August 16, 1974
the claimant filed his claim for compensation in behalf of the minor children
of the late Aurea Pacoli Caguring with Unit of Regional Office No. 9 Workmen’s
Compensation Office, Tacloban
City.

On October 19, 1974,
the claim was heard at the Office of the Bureau of Labor, Catbalogan,
Samar
where the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar,
Justo M. Sultan appeared in behalf of the Solicitor
General.  On August 7, 1975 an award was issued in favor of the
claimant ordering respondent Republic of the Philippines
to pay:

(1)    P5,400.00 as
compensation;

(2)    P260.00 as attorney’s fee, pursuant to
Section 31 of the Act; and

(3)    P53.00 as fee pursuant to the provisions of
Section 55 of the Act.

Upon motion for reconsideration filed by respondent the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission en banc rendered the following decision:

“On August 7, 1975
an award was issued by Acting Referee ALFONSO E. PAA of Regional Office No. 9, Tacloban City,
granting claimants death compensation benefits in the amount of P5,200.00 for the death of Aureau Caguring, who, during her lifetime was employed with the
Bureau of Public Schools and assigned in the Division of Samar.

“Assailing the award, respondent filed its Motion to Set Aside
the same and contended that the Regional Office did not acquire jurisdiction
over the respondent for the reason that the Office of the Solicitor General was
not furnished with a copy of the Notice and Claim for Compensation.  Respondent further contended that the Hearing
Officer of the Regional Office committed fatal procedural error in issuing the
present Award without first serving the Office of the Solicitor General with a
copy of the Notice and Claim for Compensation in this case (Celia Ligan vs. Republic, RO-X, WCC, Case No. 10823, April 4, 1973).  Hence, this review.

“An examination of the records shows that claimant filed this
claim with the Unit of Regional Office No. 9, Tacloban City,
on August 16, 1974.  On August
30, 1974, a letter of transmittal with the Notice and Claim for
Compensation was prepared addressed to the Office of the Solicitor
General.  No copy was transmitted to the
Bureau of Public Schools.  Clear from the
records, there is no proof that the Office of the Solicitor General ever
received the copy of the Notice and Claim. 
Despite lack of proper joinder of issues, the
Acting Chief of Unit set the case for hearing on October 19, 1974, at the Samar
Labor Office, Catbalogan, Samar.  Apparently, notices of hearing were sent to
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Division Superintendent of
Schools.  Similarly, there is no proof of
service that respondent has been sufficiently notified of such hearing.  Nevertheless, the referee proceeded with the
reception of evidence for the claimant ex-parte and
issued an Award.  The Award was
prematurely issued.  Failure, therefore,
of the Regional Office to transmit copy of the Notice and Claim for
Compensation to the Office of the Solicitor General has not vested the Hearing
Unit with jurisdiction over this case. 
There was, therefore, no justification for the hearing officer in
conducting an ex-parte reception of claimant’s
evidence, without first assuring himself that a copy of the Notice and Claim
for Compensation was transmitted and received by the Office of the Solicitor
General and that subsequent notices of hearing have been received by the
respondent.  Obviously, the Hearing
Officer proceeded with the ex-parte reception of
claimant’s evidence in violation of procedural process and devoid of
jurisdiction.

“We find merit in the respondent’s Motion to Set Aside the
Award and that the Hearing Officer committed error in issuing the Award despite
lack of jurisdiction.

“In the light of all the foregoing, the Award appealed from is
hereby set aside and this case is hereby ordered dismissed” (pp. 7-8, WCC
rec.).

Hence,
this petition.

WE rule that respondent
Commission acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in setting aside the August 7,
1975 Award of the
Hearing Officer, which We find in order as it is
supported by law and the controlling jurisprudence on work compensation cases.

I.   It must be underscored that, as found by the
Hearing Officer, the claimant’s right to compensation was not controverted by the respondent employer.  And as a matter of fact, until this very late
stage, respondent employer has not complied with its mandatory duty under
Sections 37 and 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, of filing
with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission a report or notice of the death of
its employee (Aurea Pacoli Caguring) and of controverting
the right to compensation either on or before the fourteenth day of disability
or within ten days after it had knowledge of the death.

The aforesaid duty of controverting the
right to compensation, it must be stressed, lies on the employer or the Heads
of the Departments, Bureaus or Offices concerned (Memo-Circular No. 210, Office
of the President [1968]; Lizardo vs. WCC, L-42995,
March 14, 1979; Francisco vs. WCC, 83 SCRA 536 [1978]); not on their counsel (Lizardo vs. WCC, supra; Francisco vs. WCC, supra;
and Republic vs. WCC, 45 SCRA 60[1972]). 
Consequently, such duty arises immediately upon actual knowledge
of the illness or death of the employee by the employer or its agents (Republic
vs. WCC, 37 SCRA 619, 620, 624 [1971]), not from its counsel’s knowledge or
notice, even without any formal notice given by the claimant to the employer
under Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended; because Section
27 of the same Act dispenses with such formal notice where the employer, like
herein respondent employer, had actual knowledge of the death or illness
basis of the compensation claim (Gallemit vs.
Republic, 75 SCRA 382, 383, 385, 386 [1977]; Pangasinan
Trans. Co., Inc. vs. WCC, 8 SCRA 352, 355 [1963]; and Luzon Stevedoring Co. vs.
de Leon, 106 Phil. 562, 565, 566 [1959]).

That respondent employer through its agents — principal,
supervisor and superintendent — had actual knowledge of the death of Aurea Pacoli Caguring
is manifested by its undisputed act of hiring a substitute teacher to take her
place for the school year 1974-75 (p. 34, rec.).  Moreover, the allegation of petitioner that
the fact of death of Aurea Pacoli
Caguring was immediately relayed to her immediate
superiors in the office of the Division Superintendent of Schools, at Catbalogan, Samar (pp. 34, 60,
rec.) was never disputed by respondent employer.  As aforestated,
that knowledge was sufficient to charge respondent employer with its duty under
Sections 37 and 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended; failure of
which results in the renunciation of its right to controvert the claim; as a
consequence of which all its defenses are deemed barred and the compensability
of the claim considered admitted by the employer.

II. Consequently,
the defense of the respondent employer that no copy of the claim for
compensation was ever furnished to the Solicitor General was barred.  Hence, the respondent Commission was in clear
error in entertaining and sustaining that defense.

III. Even on the merits of that defense,
respondent employer’s position, as sustained by the respondent Commission,
cannot be maintained.

1.  Both the Solicitor
General and the respondent employer submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Regional Office when they appeared at the initial hearing of the death
compensation claim on October 19, 1974 before the Hearing Officer, with the
Solicitor General represented by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Justo M. Sultan of Samar (pp.
21-22, WCC rec.; pp. 33, 34, 45, 61, 75-76, rollo)
and respondent employer, by Atty. Hilario C. Carpina, District Supervisor of Catbalogan,
Samar (ibid); and neither of them raised the
issue of non-service of a copy of the claim for compensation to their
respective offices.  Verily, that
omission then to raise or plead the issue (at that earliest opportunity)
amounts to a waiver thereof; and consequently, the same can no longer be
successfully invoked at any subsequent stage of the proceedings.  Hence, the respondent Commission, in the
exercise of its power to review the Award of the Hearing Officer of the
Regional Office, gravely abused its discretion when it still entertained and
favorably considered the said issue. 
Parenthetically, the aforesaid appearances negate, as the same is
inconsistent with, the finding of the respondent Commission in its questioned
order that the respondent employer and the Solicitor General were not served
copies of the notice of hearing and its characterization of the hearing
of October 19, 1974 as ex
parte. 
In his memorandum, the Solicitor General admitted receipt of the notice
of hearing (pp. 75-76, rollo) and
that he authorized the abovenamed Fiscal to appear at
that hearing by reason thereof (ibid). 
As a matter of fact, a stipulation of facts –?
1.  Employer-Employee
relationship admitted; 2.  Filing
within the reglementary period admitted — was made
by the parties in that October 19, 1974 hearing (see pp. 21-22, WCC rec.); and
petitioner thereafter testified thereat and was cross-examined (ibid.)

2.  The fact that no copy of the compensation claim was
furnished to and received by the Solicitor General and the respondent employer
before the initial hearing as required by GAO Circular No. 68, dated October 6,
1959, may not be taken against petitioner because the duty of
transmitting a copy of the claim
to them devolves not on the petitioner, but on the Workmen’s Compensation Unit
or Agency pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 8 of the 1973 Workmen’s Compensation
Rules and the Workmen’s Compensation Circular (10), Series of 1973.  WE have ruled that such failure will not
render the decision of the Regional Office Hearing Officer invalid for want of
jurisdiction (Pantoja vs. WCC, L-43317, December 28,
1978; Paraiso vs. Castelo-Sotto,
85 SCRA 419 [1978]; Francisco vs. WCC, 83 SCRA 536, 539 [1978]; Solite vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 388 [1977]; Gallemit
vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 382 [1977]; and Dinaro vs. WCC, 70
SCRA 292 [1976]).  Certainly, that
omission cannot be the instrument of injustice against the petitioner (Dinaro vs. WCC, supra, pp. 292-293, 296), who
undoubtedly has no control over said agency or unit (Pantoja
vs. WCC, supra; Paraiso vs. Castelo-Sotto,
supra); nor override the statutory sanction for non-controversion,
which has been consistently applied by Our doctrinal jurisprudence (Dinaro vs. WCC, supra).

IV. Finally,
the records support petitioner’s claim for compensation.

According to claimant (1st par., p. 26, rec.), due to the
strenuous travels from Catbalogan, Samar, to the teaching station of Aurea
Pacoli Caguring, the latter
became thinner and thinner everyday until she finally succumbed to pulmonary
tuberculosis despite her taking of all prescribed medical treatment.

The physician’s Report of Sickness issued by Modesto Villareal, Jr., attending physician, of Catbalogan, Samar, shows that the illness of the late Aurea Caguring started as of December, 1972.  She complained of dizziness
accompanied by occasional nausea and vomitting,
general body weakness and malaise. 
Although treated by injections and tablets, her condition showed no
improvement.  One year after, she
complained of difficulty of urination. 
Sometimes she had occasional chills and fever, posterior lumbar pains
radiating to the lower extremity.  It
shows that the deceased suffered a long lingering illness before she died.

With such condition of health of Aurea Caguring as of 1972,
her continuous reporting for duty as a classroom teacher hiking 18
mountainous kilometers more or less every weekend from her residence to her
teaching station, would certainly be very taxing for
her body.  As a result, she became
thinner and thinner until she died on May
23, 1974.

In their memorandum, the Solicitor General claims that the
deceased did not die of tuberculosis but of septicemia or blood poisoning.  The death certi­ficate of Aurea
Caguring shows that the cause of her death is
septicemia.  The fact remains that when
she entered the service in 1962, ten
years before she complained of her first sickness, she was in good health.

In a line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that once
the illness supervened in the course of employment, a rebuttable
presumption arises that such illness arose out of or was at least aggravated by
such employment and that the burden to overthrow such presumption shifts to the
employer.  This the employer did not do,
even in this late stage of the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM
IS HEREBY REVERSED AND ANOTHER ONE IS ENTERED ORDERING RESPONDENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(BUREAU OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS:

1)   TO PAY THE FOUR SURVIVING CHILDREN OF THE
DECEASED AUREA PACOLI CAGURING, THROUGH THEIR GRANDFATHER, THE PETITIONER HEREIN,
THE SUM OF FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED [P5,400.00] PESOS AS DEATH COMPENSATION;

2)   TO REIMBURSE THE AFORESAID CHILDREN MEDICAL
AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES OF THE DECEASED DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS;

3)   TO PAY ATTY. MATEO LEANDA FIVE HUNDRED FORTY
[P540.00] PESOS AS ATTORNEY’S FEES; AND

4)   TO PAY SIXTY-ONE [P61.00] PESOS AS
ADMINISTRATIVE FEES.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.