EUFEMIO T. CORREA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN (BRANCH II), CITY SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, MUNICIPALITY OF NORZAGARAY, BULACAN, HON. ARMANDO ENRIQUEZ, AS TH…

Petition for certiorari,
prohibition and declaratory relief assailing the Order dated April 22, 1977 of
respondent Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch
II, denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash Writ of Execution issued in Civil Case
No. 3621-M.  The following are the
relevant facts:

On December 13, 1968,
respondent Court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 3621-M in favor of therein
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) and adversely against therein
defendants Eufemio T. Correa (petitioner herein) and Virgilio Sarmiento.  The pertinent portions of the decision read
as follows:

“This Court finds that defendants Eufemio
T. Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento,
municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of Norzagaray,
Bulacan respectively, should be ordered personally to
pay the salaries which the plaintiffs failed to receive by reason of their
illegal removal from office until they are actually reinstated.

* * *                                              *
* *                                          *
* *

“WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered:

1.  Permanently enjoining the defendants from
enforcing and/or implementing the Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968;

2.  Declaring
the termination of the services of the plaintiffs illegal and of no legal effect;

3. Ordering the
defendant Eufemio T. Correa to reinstate the plaintiffs
to their former position as policemen in the Police Force of Norzagaray, Bulacan;

4. Ordering the
defendants Eufemio T. Correa and Virgilio
Sarmiento to pay, jointly and severally to the
plaintiff Juanito Sarmiento
his salary for the period beginning January 15, 1968, plaintiff Melanio Esteban his salary for the period beginning
February 1, 1968; and plaintiffs Candido Cruz, Isabelo Saplala, Tomas Palad, Antonio Ancheta, Antonio Silverio, Eligio Punzal and Celedonio Principe
their salaries for the period beginning January 23, 1968, until they are
actually reinstated to their former positions;

5.  Ordering defendant Eufemio
T. Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento
to pay, jointly and severally, the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.”

The aforesaid decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March 22, 1976, and the motion for reconsideration of the
Appellate Court’s decision was denied on May 11, 1976.  On August
24, 1976, the
decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory.^[1]

It is in connection with
the efforts of the petitioner to quash the writ of execution issued to enforce
the aforestated final judgment that the present
proceedings arose.  Thus, on March 8,
1977, petitioner
filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and to Direct Execution to the Municipality of Norzagaray, Bulacan, alleging
that at the time the writ was served on him, he was no longer mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan.  Petitioner invoked the principle that when
judgment is rendered against an officer of the municipal corporation who is
sued in his official capacity for the payment of back salaries of officers
illegally removed, the judgment is binding upon the corporation, whether or not
the same is included as party to the action.^[2]

On April
22, 1977, respondent
Court issued the Order denying the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution.  Petitioner thus came to this Court,
maintaining that he could no longer be required to pay the back salaries of the
private respondents because payment on his part presupposes his continuance in
office, which is not the case.  He contends
that it is the Municipality of Norzagaray that is liable for said payment, invoking Aguador v. Enerio,^[3] and Sison
v. Pajo.^[4] Further, petitioner alleges that the fact
that he is no longer municipal mayor of Norzagaray,
constitutes a substantial change in the sit­uation of the parties which makes
the issuance of the writ of execution inequitable.

Petitioner prays, among others, that judgment be rendered
declaring that the payment of back salaries of private respondents should be
made by the incumbent mayor and by the municipality of Norzagaray,
Bulacan, and that petitioner is no longer liable for
the payment thereof; and annulling the Order dated April 22, 1977 of respondent
court denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.

On May 24, 1977,
this Court required petitioner to implead the Municipality
of Norzagaray,
Bulacan as party respondent and on June 25, 1977, petitioner filed an
amended petition impleading the Municipality
of Norzagaray
and Amando Enriquez, the incumbent municipal mayor.

In his amended petition, petitioner alleges that the writ of
execution is already being enforced against the personal properties of
petitioner; that such enforcement during the pendency
of the instant petition would probably work injustice to petitioner; and that
petitioner stands to suffer great and irreparable injury if enforcement of the
writ is not temporarily restrained. 
Petitioner, therefore, prays that the execution be stayed or a temporary
restraining order be issued pending resolution of the instant proceedings.

On August 1, 1977, private respondents filed their Comment
maintaining that respondent court acted correctly and committed no abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to quash the writ of execution,
(1) it being the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ for the
enforcement of a final and executory judgment; and
(2) since the personal liability of the petitioner and his co-defendant to pay
the back salaries of the private respondents as mandated in the decision sought
to be executed cannot be shifted or transferred to the municipality of Norzagaray, Bulacan, for to do so
would be to vary the terms of a final judgment. 
On August 12, 1977,
this Court resolved to consider the Comment of respondents as answer to
the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda, and
thereafter the case was submitted for decision.

The issue is whether or not respondent Court in denying the
Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution acted with grave abuse of discretion or
with lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It cannot be denied that both the judgments of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan and of the Court of Appeals categorically
state that the liability of herein petitioner is personal.  Thus, according to the trial court, “Eufemio T. Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento, municipal mayor and municipal
treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan,
respectively, should be ordered personally to pay the salaries which the
plaintiffs failed to receive by reason of their illegal removal from office
until they are actually reinstated.” (Italics supplied).

In affirming the decision
of the trial court, the Court of Appeals^[5] ruled that “The defendants are personally
liable jointly and severally because
they acted without justifiable cause (Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, Sept. 7, 1968, 25 SCRA 1).”^[6]

The jurisprudence relied
upon by the petitioner in his
effort to shift the responsibility to the Municipality of Norzagaray appears inapplicable.  In Aguador
v. Enerio, supra, cited by petitioner, the municipal mayor and the members of the
Municipal Council of Oroquieta were specifically
ordered “to appropriate necessary amounts to pay the salary differentials for the petitioners
and also for the payment of their entire salaries from month to month, subject
naturally to the availability of funds after all statutory and subsisting
contractual obligations shall have been properly covered by adequate appropriations.”
The issue raised was whether or not, after the municipal mayor, members of the
municipal council and the
municipal treasurer were
expressly made parties in the mandamus case and in the contempt
proceedings, it was necessary to include the municipality as a party, to make
the latter liable.  This issue was
resolved in the negative by this Court. 
In the case of Sison v. Pajo, supra, the trial court directed the Acting
Municipal Mayor and Acting Chief of Police of Bamban,
Tarlac to reinstate Bonifacio
Lacanlale as Acting Chief of Police, effective June 30,
1957 “with the
incident of payment of back salaries by the Municipality of Bamban.” The issue was whether or not the municipality of Bamban could be ordered to pay the back salaries of
the Chief of Police, it appearing that said municipality was not impleaded in the case. 
This Court ruled that the fact that the Municipality of Bamban, Tarlac was not by name impleaded in the case for reinstatement and back salaries
does not affect the employee’s right to the payment of back salaries,
considering that the officers required by law to represent the municipality in
all suits were made parties in their official capacity, hence the case was
heard and decided as if the municipality had been made a party.  In both cases the judgment of the Court
specifically directed the municipality to pay the back salaries.

Here, the judgment of the
trial court, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found petitioners Eufemio T. Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento Batacan personally
liable for the payment of the salaries which the dismissed policemen failed to
receive because of their illegal removal from office, and ordered them “to
pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff Juanito Sarmiento his salary for the period beginning January 15,
1968; plaintiff Melanio Esteban his salary for the
period beginning February 1, 1968; and plaintiffs Candido
Cruz, Isabelo Saplala,
Tomas Palad, Antonio Ancheta,
Antonio Silverio, Eligio Punzal and Celedonio Principe
their salaries for the period beginning January 23, 1968, until they are
actually reinstated to their former positions.”

In Nemenzo v. Sabillano,^[7] the Court ruled that appellant Municipal
Mayor Bernabe Sabillano was
“correctly adjudged liable” for the payment of the back salaries of appellee Police Corporal Joaquin P. Nemenzo
because his act of dismissing appellee “without
previous administrative investigation and without justifiable cause * * * is
clearly an injury to appellee’s rights.  Appellant cannot hide under the mantle of his
official capacity and pass the liability to the municipality of which he was
mayor.  There are altogether too many
cases of this nature, wherein local elective officials, upon assumption of
office, wield their new-found power indiscriminately by replacing employees
with their own proteges, regardless of the laws and
regulations governing the civil service. 
Victory at the polls should not be taken as authority for the commission
of such illegal acts.”

In the discharge of
governmental functions, “municipal corporations are responsible for the
acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the extent that, they
have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements
there­of.”^[8]

A public officer who
commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his
duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable therefor like any private individual.^[9] This principle of personal liability has
been applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or
discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of
non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office,
the officials were acting outside their official authority.^[10]

Respondent Court,
therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion
to quash writ of execution.  The writ was
strictly in accordance with the terms of the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.  Costs against petitioner.

Barredo, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, Jr., JJ., concur.

Santos and Abad Santos,
JJ., on official leave.

^[1]
Annex “E”, Petition, Rollo, p. 36.

^[2]
Record on Appeal, p. 191, Rollo, p. 44.

^[3]
L-20388, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 140.

^[4]
L-18443, May 31, 1965, 14
SCRA 160, 169-170.

^[5]
Fifth Division, composed of Justice Ramon
C. Fernandez, now Associate Justice of this Court, as ponente, and
concurred in by Justices Ricardo C. Puno and Delfin Fl. Batacan.

^[6]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 15, Rollo,
p. 30.  Italics supplied.

^[7]
L-20977, Sept. 7, 1968, 25
SCRA 1.

^[8]
Palma v. Graciano, L-7240, May 16, 1956, 99 Phil. 72, 74, citing Cooley, Municipal
Corporations, 376; 38 Am. Jur. 299-300.

^[9]
Palma v. Graciano,
Ibid.; Carreon v. Province
of Pampanga,
et al., L-8136, Aug. 30,
1956, 99 Phil. 808.

^[10]
Stiles v. Lowell, 233 Mass. 174, 123 NE 615, 4 ALR 1365, cited in 63 Am.
Jur. 2d 770.