PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOAQUIN M. SALVADOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, RESPONDENTS. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNION…

In these two petitions
for certiorari, both filed by the
Philip­pine Association of Free Labor Unions, the jurisdiction of the
respondent Judge in both cases, the Honorable Joaquin M. Salvador, in the second petition speaking
for respondent Court of Industrial
Relations en banc, to issue the orders complained
of is assailed.  It is the view of petitioner that
there being no presidential certifi­cation,
an urgent petition of August 29, 1968, filed by the other respondent, the Social Security System, to seek an
authoritative interpretation of a provision of a collective bargaining
agreement adopted as a formal
award of the Court of Industrial Relations of August 5, 1966, is beyond the
competence of respondent Judge to pass
upon.

On such a basic assumption, petitioner could with plausibility
assert that the order of August 29, 1968, enjoining “[petitioner] Union
not to declare any strike and [respondent] Management not to dismiss nor
suspend any of its employees nor to declare any lockout”;^[1]
the order of September 3, 1968, ordering petitioner “to immediately
lift” the pickets in the premises of the Social Security System and its
branches and to show cause why it and its members in the Social Security System
should not be declared in contempt of court;^[2]
and the order of September 5, 1968, directing “all the striking employees
of the Social Security System * * * to return to work on or before 5:00 o’clock
in the afternoon of Friday September 6, 1968” and the management “to
admit them under the same terms and conditions as of the date of the
strike,” and the investigation by
the prosecution division of the Court of Industrial Relations of the contempt
charges filed by respondent Social Security System would be devoid of support
in law and could be stricken down.^[3]
In the second petition,^[4]
where the Court of Industrial Relations itself likewise was made respondent,
the resolution of September 6, 1968 by the court en banc dismissing the motion for the
reconsideration of the order of August 29, 1968 on the ground that such motion
was filed one day beyond the reglementary period,
with Associate Judge Bugayong dissenting, was
likewise impugned as having been issued beyond the jurisdiction of respondent
court.

The respondent Social Security System met the issue squarely with
the allegation that the absence of a new presidential certifi­cation is not
necessarily fatal, there being a
previous one as a result of which the formal award of the respondent
court embodying a collective bargaining agreement reached by the parties was
issued on August 5, 1966.  It would follow that the appropriate
provisions of the Court of Industrial Relations Act^[5]
if utilized render manifest the undeniable power of such court during the effectiveness of such award,
ordinarily covering a period of three years, after due hearing to “alter, modify in whole or in part,
or set aside any such award, order or decision, or reopen any question”^[6] that may be involved.  It likewise possesses authority under the
succeeding section to determine the meaning or interpretation of an award,
order, or decision.^[7]

We find the above contention persuasive and sustain the juris­diction
of respondent Judge Salvador. 
Accordingly, the petitions are dismissed.  We likewise register our emphatic disapproval
of the conduct pursued by petitioner Union in its
failure to obey the above orders complained of, even on the assumption that it
enter­tained no doubt at all that in the issuance thereof, respondent Judge and
thereafter the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, acted without
jurisdiction.

There is no controversy about the facts.  It was shown in both petitions that
petitioner and respondent Social Security System were parties to a collective
bargaining agreement lasting from July 1, 1966 to June 30, 1969, an agreement
adopted as the formal award of respondent Court of Industrial Relations on
August 5, 1966, in a pending case before
it that was certified.^[8]

Lately, a dispute has arisen between the parties regarding an implementation of some of its
provisions.  Petitioner alleged that
respondent Social Security System instead of complying with its obligation filed on August 29, 1968, with the Court of
Industrial Relations, an urgent petition asserting, among other things, that
there was allegedly a controversy with respect
to the interpretation of certain provisions of such agreement.  It considered the matter as forming part of
the previously certified case, a view that found favor with respondent Judge
Salvador of the Court of Industrial Relations.

Accordingly, the first order challenged was issued on August 29,
1968, it being expressly provided therein: 
“During the pendency of the current
dispute as outlined in said petition, the parties, for the sake of industrial peace and pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, are hereby enjoined to
maintain the status quo – the Union not to declare any strike and
the Management not to dismiss nor suspend any of its employees nor to declare
any lockout. * * *”^[9]

 The other orders challenged
in the first petition were issued by respondent Judge Salvador as petitioner Union
did not comply with the Orders of August
29, 1968, presumably due to its firm belief that there being no new
presidential certification, respondent Judge
was absolutely devoid of jurisdiction.

In the other petition,^[10]
reference was made to the additional facts that on September 9, 1968,
respondent Court of Industrial Relations adopted the resolution complained of
denying the motion for reconsideration,^[11]
such resolution being assailed
as having been issued without jurisdiction resulting in its being “a
nullity and in legal contemplation * * * inexistent.^[12]

The first peitition^[13]
was filed on September 6, 1968
and the second^[14]
or September 12, 1968.  Respondents were required to answer on or bet
ore September 16, 1968.  The hearing on both petitions took place on September 17, 1968, and thereafter
the case was submitted for decision.  On September 18, 1968, a resolution was
issued by us dismissing both petitions,
without prejudice to an extended opinion.  This is it.

1. The issue is thus
clear-cut and well-defined.  It is
whether a presidential certification in 1963, resulting in an award in 1966,
embodying a collective bargaining agreement arrived at by disputants sufficed
to vest jurisdiction on respondent Judge to act on a petition filed on August 29, 1968 by the respondent
Social Security System, in effect seeking an interpretation of Article 23 of
such collective bargaining agreement?  As
thus put, the answer cannot be in doubt.

As was made clear
earlier, it must be in the affirmative. 
It cannot be otherwise if deference be paid to the appropriate
provisions of the Court of Industrial Relations Act,^[15] the compulsory arbi­tration aspect of which is unavoidable whenever there is a
presidential certification of a “labor dispute in an industry
indispensable to the national interest.“^[16] As provided
in the Court of Industrial Relations Act: 
“Whenever a doubt shall arise as to the meaning or interpretation
of an award, order or decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, any
interested party may petition the Court to determine such meaning or interpretation and
the Court, upon receiving such petition, shall set a date for the hearing of the case
and shall dispose of the same as soon as practicable.”^[17] As a matter of fact, in the preceding
provision, the power of the Court of Industrial Relations goes farther, for at
any time “during the effectiveness of an award, order or decision, the
Court may, on application of an interested party, and after due hearing, alter,
modify in whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order or decision, or
reopen any question involved therein.”^[18]
Moreover, the competence of the Court of Industrial Relations to act, as set
forth in the very same section, lasts as long as the period specified in such
award, order or decision.  “In the
absence of such specifi­cation, any party or both parties to a controversy may
terminate the effectiveness
of an award, order or decision after three years have elapsed from the date of said award, order or decision by giving
notice to that effect to the Court:  * *
*.”^[19]

In this particular
instance, there is no question that under the collective bargaining agreement
which was embodied in the award of August 5, 1966, the period of effectivity
dated from July 1, 1966 and continues up to June 30,
1969, or for a
period of three years.^[20]

The power of the Court of Industrial Relations which, as thus
phrased, is comprehensive in character, has been given an inter­pretation by us
consistent with the well-nigh sweeping reach of its language.  It has never been construed in a niggardly sense; the recognition of such
authority has been full and sympathetic, never grudging.

So it has been from the earliest case decided in 1939, Goseco v. Court of Industrial Relations.^[21]
Such an approach was mani­fested there. 
Petitioner landowner in that decision contended that there being a
decision of respondent court of December 28, 1937, copy of which was furnished
other respondents on January 20, 1938, it had become final and definite as of
January 25, 1938, from which the conclusion was that respondent court exceeded
his jurisdiction when, acting on a motion for reconsideration dated February
13, 1938, the court granted the same on February 28, 1939.

Why such a contention should be rejected was explained by Justice
Laurel:  “The narrow construction
suggested by the petitioner is perhaps justified if we adopt but a fragmentary
view of the law.”^[22]
Such should not be the case, according to the opinion, as it did not take into
consideration the provision empowering the Court of Industrial Relations”
‘on application of an interested party, and after due hearing, [to] alter,
modify in whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order or decision, or
reopen any question involved therein.’”^[23]
From which, the conclusion follows: 
“If the re­spondent court may, at any time, alter, modify or set
aside an award, order or decision, then the reconsideration of its decision of
December 28, 1937, upon application, in the form of a motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondents Roman Belleza
and others, and after due hearing, was in compliance almost to the letter with
the proviso just quoted.  It would appear
idle, therefore, to contend that in so doing, the respondent court overstepped
its jurisdiction.”^[24]
Moreover, Section 18 of the Act was likewise cited in the opinion from which
the valid inference was drawn “that, since no time is fixed within which
the said court may clarify or unravel the meaning or interpretation of an
award, order or decision, it may do so at any time, thus inducing the further
conclusion that no such award, order or decision is meant to be definitive in
the sense that it is beyond recall.”^[25]

To such a spirit, fealty has been shown in subsequent decisions.^[26]
As was stated by this Court in Church v. La Union Labor Union:^[27]
“The clear object of thee provisions is un­doubtedly to give to the court
a continuing control over the case, in the interest of management and labor, as
long as it remains under its control and jurisdiction, in order to accord
substantial justice to the parties * * *, in line with the liberal policy of
the law which enjoins that ‘the Court shall act according to justice and equity
and the substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicality or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind on such manner as it may deem just and equitable * * *.”

Also, to the same effect, this excerpt from Hacienda Luisita v. National Labor Union:  “As the time for authority to change is
thus expressly fixed by law at three years, it stands to reason that in the
absence of any other agreement to the contrary, and for reasons of justice and
equity, any party to an agreement may change or modify the same upon the
expiration of the period of three years from the date thereof.”^[28]
Then, too, “the industrial court can at any time during the effectiveness of an award alter and
modify in whole or in part said
award or reopen any question involved therein under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, and such is what
said Court has done when it made the award extensive to the new employees, * *
*.”^[29]

We do not go as far as to hold that once there is a
presidential certification under Section
10 of the Industrial Peace Act, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
necessarily apply.  Nor is it necessary.
For the purpose of passing upon these two petitions, it suffices to declare
that there being a previous presidential certification resulting in an award,
the effectivity of which continues up to the present,
respondent Judge could appropriately rely on the two above sections for the
purpose of considering the merit or lack of it of the urgent petition filed by
respondent Social Security System.  As
to the power of respondent Judge, once there is a presidential certification to
require the parties to maintain the status quo, the Union not to
go on strike and the management not to declare a lockout, that is a settled
matter.^[30]

It is in the light of the
above considerations that the juris­diction of respondent Judge to issue the
challenged orders is sustained.

2. One other
matter. The failure to abide by the orders and processes of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies like the Court
of Industrial Relations gives rise to a serious concern.  It engenders at the very least the
well-founded suspicion that such an attitude betrays an absence of good
faith.  It is indicative of a belief at
war with all that adjudication stands for.

No one may be permitted
to take the law into his own hands.  No
one, much less the party immediately concerned, should have the final say on
the validity or lack of it of one’s course of conduct.  Centuries of reliance on the judicial process
repel such a notion.  As was so aptly stated in Gompers
v. Buck’s Stove & Range Company:^[31]
“If the party can make’ himself a judge of the validity of orders which
have been issued, and by his own act of disobedience set them aside, then are
the courts impotent, and what the Constitution now fittingly calls the
‘judicial power of the United States’ would be a mere mockery.”

Nor is this all.  Such refusal to accord due respect and yield
obedience to what a court or administrative tribunal ordains is fraught with
much graver consequences.  Today, it may
be only petitioner Union.  If such a
conduct were not condemned, some other group or groups emboldened by the
absence of any reproof or disapproval may conduct themselves similarly.  The
injury to the rule of law may well-nigh be irreparable.

Law stands for order, for
the peaceful and systematic adjust­ment of frictions and conflicts unavoidable
in a modern society with its
complexities and clashing interests. 
The instrumentality for such balancing or harmonization is the judiciary
and other agencies exercising
quasi-judicial powers.  When judicial or
quasi-judicial tribunals speak, what they decree must be obeyed, what
they ordain must be followed.  A party
dissatisfied may ask for a reconsideration and, if denied, may go on to a higher tribunal.  As long as the orders stand unmodified,
however, they must, even if susceptible to well-founded doubts on
jurisdictional grounds, be faithfully complied with.

Such is the way of the law. 
So it has been in the past.  So it
should continue to be.  If it were
otherwise, the intellect no longer holds sway, the dictates of moderation are
ignored, and passion takes over.  The
words of Dean Pound come to mind: 
“Civilization involves subjection of force to reason, and the
agency of this subjection is law.”^[32]

It is well that petitioner’s counsel during the hearing of this
case affirmed in unequivocal language the absence of any intent to defy the
rule of law.  There should have been,
however, a greater realization on the part of petitioner that law, to borrow
the language of Justice Frankfurter, “alone saves a society from being
rent by internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power however
disguised.”^[33]

He was careful to note of course: 
“Only when a court is so obviously traveling outside its orbit as
to be merely usurping judicial forms and facilities, may an order issued by a
court be disobeyed and treated as though it were a letter to a newspaper.”^[34]
That does not
help the cause of petitioner at all.  It
would be the height of unreason to consider the actuations of respondent Judge
as outside the orbit of a court and a mere usurpation of judicial power.

There is here no “indisputable want of authority.”
There could have been doubts as to its competence, it is true.  It is equally well-settled, however, that a
tribunal, whenever confronted with a particular question, is not devoid of the
authority to pass precisely on the existence or non-existence of its power to
act.  Whether, therefore, the urgent
petition of respondent Social Security System is proper for respondent Judge to
pass upon is not for petitioner itself to decide.  The remedy, if need there be for such, may be
supplied by a higher tribunal.

Even if, therefore, the good faith of petitioner be conceded, the
failure to abide by the commands of the orders herein challenged finds no
justification if the rule of law has any meaning at all.  So it must be even if petitioner in all
sincerity is of the belief that the failure to assert its claim as to the lack
of jurisdiction may imperil the gains of labor. 
Thus:  “It does not mitigate
such defiance of law to urge that hard-won liberties of collective action by workers
were at stake.  The most prized liberties
themselves pre-suppose an in­dependent judiciary through which these liberties
may be, as they often have been, vindicated. 
When in a real controversy, such as is now here, an appeal is made to
law, the issue must be left to the judgment of courts and not the personal
judgment of one of the parties.  This
principle is a postulate of our democracy.”^[35]

It is to be admitted of course that labor has not always found
things easy.  It is understandable that
management to protect its own interest may fail to yield its assent however
justly founded the claims of the former may be. 
Nor is the power that capital commands to be underestimated.  Precisely, for that reason, the framers of
our Constitution saw to it that the rights of labor are expanded and protected.^[36]
The statutory implementation of such constitutional intent has been
impressive.  Judicial decisions have
invariably displayed a similar solicitude for the welfare of labor.  When, however, as unfortunately did happen
here, it engages in conduct at war with the fundamental postulate of the rule
of law, it cannot and should not expect judicial approval or sympathy.  So it is in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition
with a plea for preliminary injunction, L-29471, and the other petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction, L-29487, both filed by the Philippine Association
of Free Labor Unions, are dismissed. 
Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J.,
concurs in the result.

Zaldivar, J., is on official leave.

^[1]
L-29471, Petition, Annex A.

^[2]
Ibid, Annex G.

^[3]
Ibid, Annex J.

^[4]
L-29487.

^[5]
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (1936).

^[6]
Ibid, Section 17.

^[7]
Ibid, Section 18.

^[8]
Case No. 46-IPA.

^[9]
Petition in L-29471, Annex A.

^[10]
L-29487.

^[11]
Ibid, par. 9

^[12]
Ibid, Grounds and Reasons for the Allowance
for the Writs Applied For, par. 5.

^[13]
L-29471.

^[14]
L-29487.

^[15]
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (1936).

^[16]
Section 10, Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875) reads as follows:  “Sec. 10. Labor Disputes in Industries Indispensable
to the National Interest. – When in the opinion of the President of the
Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the
national interest and when such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court
of Industrial Relations, said Court may cause to be issued a restraining order
forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lock­out the employees
pending an investigation by the Court, and if no other solution to the dispute
is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and conditions of
employment. “

^[17]
Section 18, Commonwealth Act No. 103
(1936).

^[18]
Section 17, Ibid.

^[19]
Ibid.

^[20]
L-29487, Annex C-1, Petition, paragraph 10 of Urgent Petition of Respondent
Social Security System.

^[21]
68 Phil. 444 (1939).

^[22]
Ibid, pp. 448-449.

^[23]
Ibid, p. 449.

^[24]
Ibid.

^[25]
Ibid, pp. 449-450.

^[26]
Cf. Luzon Brokerage Co. v. Luzon Labor Union, 83 Phil. 801
(1949) and San Pablo Oil Factory v. CIR, L-18270, Nov. 28, 1962.

^[27]
91 Phil. 163, 168-169 (1952), Cf:  Hotel & Restaurant Free Workers v.
Kim San Cafe & Restaurant, 102 Phil. 470 (1957); National Development
Company v. CIR, 106 Phil. 307 (1959).

^[28]
L-13072, March 30, 1960.

^[29]
NAWASA v. NAWASA Cons.
Unions, L-18938, August 31, 1964.

^[30]
Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 103.

^[31]
221 US 418 (1911).

^[32]
Pound, The Future of Law, 47 Yale L. J., 1, 13 (1937).

^[33]
Frankfurter, J., concurring, United States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 330 US, 258, 308 (1947).

^[34]
Ibid, pp. 309-310.

^[35]
Ibid. p. 311.

^[36]
Article II, Section 5 and Article XIV of the Constitution.