PATRICIO S. CUNANAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND BASARAN (MORO), RESPONDENTS.

Patricio S. Cunanan seeks the review on
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  As therein set forth, the factual background
is as follows:

“x x
x it appears that on February 14, 1948,
Patricio S. Cunanan lodged a complaint for forcible entry
against the herein defend­ant Basaran Nicolas, a
Philippine Moslem, with the Justice of the Peace Court of Mati, Davao.  The controversy between the two was, however,
amicably settled when on March 20, 1948, the parties, assisted by their respect­ive counsel, entered into a compromise
agreement in this tenor:

” ‘COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

Come now the plaintiff and the defendant in the above-entitled
case, thru their respective counsel, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully submit
the following Compromise Agreement:

“ ‘That the plaintiff cedes and hereby ack­nowledges the right of
ownership and possession of the defendant over a portion of land consisting of
five (5) hectares together with the improvement thereon, which is a portion of
a bigger parcel of land situated in Bobon-Tamisan, Mati, Davao, declared for
purposes of taxation in the name of Basaran Nicolas
(Moro) under Tax No. 2195 for the current year, and which corresponds to the
Southwestern part of the land described in the com­plaint, and declared for
purposes of taxation in the name of
the plaintiff Patricia S. Cunanan, under Tax No. 5742
for the year of 1936;

” ‘That the defendant likewise
renounces and acknowledges the right of ownership and posses­sion of the
plaintiff over the other half of the land above-mentioned, including the
improvements there­on;

” ‘Wherefore, the plaintiff and the
defendant most respectfully pray that judgment be rendered in accordance with
the foregoing agreement without pronouncement as to costs.

“Mati, Davao,
March 20th, 1948.’

” On the basis of this compromise
agreement, the Justice of the Peace Court of Mati, Davao, rendered judgment in accordance with its
stipulations, enjoining the parties to
comply therewith (See Exhibit C).

On August 26, 1953, plaintiff commenced the pre­sent proceedings ^[1],
alleging that the defendant and he (plain­tiff), without any writ of execution, complied with the afore­said
compromise agreement and the decision rendered in con­sonance with its prayer
from March 20, 1948 until about the middle of 1951, when the defendant, taking
advantage of plaintiff’s frequent trips to Manila and Davao
City, maliciously, illegally and forcibly encroached beyond the five (5)
hectares ceded to him (defendant) and en­tered, occupied and harvested
plaintiff’s coconuts, to the great damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.  The complaint prayed for judgment ordering
the execution of the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court of Mati, Davao (Exh. C), commanding the defendant to vacate the
property allegedly usurped by the latter and condemning said defendant to pay
to plaintiff ac­tual damages and attorney’s fees to the tune of P4, 435, plus
the costs of the suit.

“Several motions and supplemental motions to dismiss as well
as answer were filed by the defendant to the foregoing complaint.  Against these, the plain­tiff interposed his
opposition.

“Holding that the compromise agreement, ante, was null and void
because it did not confine itself to simply deciding the question of
possession, which is the legitimate province of a forcible entry case, but also
adjudicated ownership of a parcel of land, a mat­ter obviously beyond the
competence of an inferior court to pass upon; and that the revival of the
action to execute the judgment in the forcible entry case, aforestated,
after the lapse of five years from the ren­dition thereof should have been
brought in the very Court that gave judgment in said forcible entry case, the
trial Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint and de­fendant’s counterclaim, with
costs against the plain­tiff. “

On appeal, taken by Cunanan, the Court
of Appeals declared the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court “null
and void” upon the ground that the latter had no authority to pass upon
the title to a real property and that the compromise agreement, on which said
decision was based, had the same infirmity, for lack of approval by the Provincial Governor of Davao or his representative.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals restored
the parties “to their position before the institution of this action,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

The view taken by the Court of First Instance of Davao and the Court of Appeals is untenable.  It is true that, in the compromise agreement,
Cunanan ceded and, acknowledged “the right of
ownership and possession” of Basaran over the Southwestern half of the land involved in
the forcible entry case, whereas, Basaran renounced and acknowledged Cunanan’s
“right of ownership and possession x x over the other half” of said land.  The approval of this agreement by the Justice
of the Peace Court and its decision “rendered in accordance with the
express terms and conditions stipulated
therein, enjoining the parties to comply with the agreement,” did
not amount, however, to an adjudication on the title to the land aforementioned.  The ownership thereof was mentioned in said
agreement merely as a basis for the right of possession therein acknowledged by
both parties.  Such right of possession
was the only question sought to be settled and actually decided, therefore, by
the Justice of the Peace.

As regards the effect
upon said agreement of the lack of ap­proval thereof by the provincial governor
or his authorized repre­sentative, Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Min­danao and Sulu provide:

“Sec.
145.  Contracts with non-Christians:  requisites. – Save and except
contracts of sale or barter of personal property and contracts of personal
service comprehended in chapter seventeen hereof no contract or agreement shall
be made in the Department by any person with any Moro or other non-Christian
inhabitant of the same for the payment or delivery of money or other thing of
value in present or in prospec­tive, or
in any manner affecting or relating to any real property, unless such
contract or agreement be exe­cuted and approved as follows:

“(a) Such contract or agreement shall be
in writing, and a duplicate thereof delivered to each party.

“(b) It shall be executed before a judge of a court of record,
justice or auxiliary justice of the peace, or notary public, and shall bear the
approval of the provincial governor wherein the same was executed or his
representative duly authorized in writing for such purpose, indorsed upon it.

“(c) It shall contain the names of all parties in interest, their
residence and occupation; x x x.

“(d) It shall state the time when and place where made, the
particular purpose for which made, the special
thing or things to be done under it, and, if for the collection of
money, the basis of the claim, the source from which it is to be collected and
the person or persons to whom payment is to be made, the disposition to be made
thereof when collected, the amount or rate per centum of the fee in all cases;
and if any contingent matter or condition constitutes a part of the contract or
agreement, the same shall be spe­cifically set forth.

(e) x x x

“(f) The judge, justice or auxiliary justice of the peace, or
notary public before whom such contract or agreement is executed shall certify officially
thereon the time when and the place where such contract or agreement was
executed, and that it was in his presence, and who are the interested parties
thereto, as stated to him at the time; the parties making the same; the source
and extent of authority claimed at the time by the contracting parties to make
the contract or agree­ment, and whether made in person or by agent or attorney
of any party or parties thereto.

“Sec. 146. Void contracts. –
Every contract or agreement made in violation of the next preceding sec­tion
shall be null and void; x x x x.”

The foregoing provisions manifestly contemplate ordinary con­tracts,
not agreements for the settlement of judicial proceedings, approved by the
court before which the same are pending. 
The evident purpose of said provisions is to forestall the conflicts –
some of which may affect peace and order – that often ensue in contracts made
by or with non-Christians, when they have not clearly understood the import and
effects thereof.  The evils thus sought
to be avoided can hardly exist in compromise agreements, like the one under
consideration, the parties thereto having had the assistance of their
respective counsel, and the benefit of judicial scrutiny and approval.  In fact, the Justice of the Peace considered,
not only whether the parties fully understood their commitment under the
agreement, but, also, whether the same infringed any existing laws or violated
any “customs or usages observed in the locality.” Besides, both
parties forthwith took possession of the portions respectively allotted to
them, thereby leaving no room for doubt that they were well aware of the nature
of their undertakings and that the same
reflected their true intent.

Needless to say, we
cannot assume that said
sections 145 and 146 intended to attach to the administrative approval given by
a provincial governor or his representative a greater weight than that due to
the approval given by a court of justice. 
This is especially true when we consider that, without a formal contract
between the parties, and in consequence merely of the allegations and/or ad­missions
in their respective pleadings, the Justice of the Peace Court could have
rendered a valid decision sanctioning Basaran’s right
to possess the Southwestern half of the land in dispute, and upholding Cunanan’s identical right as regards the rest of the
land.  The questioned decision of the
Justice of the Peace Court is, thus, clearly valid and binding upon the
parties.

This notwithstanding, plaintiff herein is not entitled, in the
case at bar, to a writ of execution of said decision, because the same had
already been executed, both parties having voluntarily complied with it, and
because, otherwise, plaintiff should have either applied for a writ of
execution in the forcible entry case, before the lapse of five (5) years since
the rendition of the decision therein, or filed with the Justice of the Peace
Court an action for the revival thereof, after the expiration of said period.

Inasmuch, however, as, according to Cunanan’s
complaint in the Court of First Instance, Basaran had
usurped the portion pertain­ing to him (Cunanan) for
over a year, before the institution of the present action publiciana, the same is in order and plaintiff is enti­tled
to a determination of the issues of fact raised in the pleadings therein.

WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Ap­peals and that of the Court of
First Instance are hereby reversed and let this case be remanded to the Court
of First Instance of Davao for further proceedings, with
the cost of this instance against Basaran Nicolas.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, Fernando, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Dizon and
Zaldivar, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
In the Court
of First Instance of Davao.