FAUSTO D. LAQUIAN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. JOSE L. BALTAZAR, MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA; REGIDOR AGLIPAY, PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA; AND MARCELO D. ME…

Direct appeal from an order of dismissal of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga.

On May 16, 1963,
Marcelo D. Mendiola instituted Civil Case No. 2312 of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Fausto D. Laquian, to recover damages
for an alleged defamatory letter written by the latter on May 21, 1962. 
Subsequently, or on May 19,
1964, Mendiola filed with the Municipal
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a criminal
complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4216 of said municipal court, accusing
Laquian of the crime of libel, by reason of the same
alleged defamatory letter.  On April 26, 1965, Laquian moved to dismiss this complaint upon the ground that the
municipal court has no
jurisdiction over the same, in view of the provisions of par. 3 of Art. 360 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 1289, pursuant to which “exclusive” jurisdiction
over said complaint is vested in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga in which the
aforementioned civil case No. 2312 had been filed and is pending.  Acting upon this motion, and the opposition thereto filed by the
prosecution, said municipal court, presided
over by municipal Judge Jose L. Baltazar, denied the motion in an order dated May 27,
1965.  A reconsideration
of this order was, also, denied, on August 4, 1965, in view of which, on August
27, 1965, Laquian commenced, in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, the present special civil
action for certiorari, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2834 of said Court, against said Judge
Baltazar, and Regidor Aglipay, as provincial fiscal of Pampanga,
as well as Marcelo D. Mendiola, for the annulment of
said orders of May 27 and August 4, 1965, and a declaration that said municipal
court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the aforesaid criminal case for
libel.  By an order dated May 18, 1966,
the Court of First Instance, however, denied the petition for certiorari
and dismissed said civil case No. 2834, upon
the ground that the municipal court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
court of first instance over cases of libel, and, hence, over said criminal case No. 4216.  A reconsideration
of this order of May 18, 1966, having been denied, petitioner Laquian interposed the
present ap­peal, which We find
to be well taken.

As amended by Rep. Act No. 1289, approved on June 15, 1955, the third paragraph of Art. 360 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that “(t)he criminal and civil action for
damages in cases of written defamations x x x shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court
of first instance of the province or city where any of the accused or any
of the offended parties resides at the time of the commission of the
offense”; that “the civil action shall be filed in the same court where
the criminal action is filed and vice-versa”; and “(t)hat the court where the
criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
courts.” Pursuant to this Art. 360, the court of first instance of Pampanga, in which civil case No. 2312 was filed on May 16,
1963, had acquired exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain the corresponding criminal action for libel against Laquian.

This notwithstanding, municipal Judge Baltazar
and the court of first instance of Pampanga were of
the opinion that the criminal complaint for said offense, filed on May 19,
1964, was then within the concurrent jurisdiction of said municipal court and
the court of first instance because libel is, pursuant to Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable
with prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to
the civil action which may be brought by the offended party, and Sec. 87(c) of
R.A. No. 296 (the Judiciary Act of 1948), as amended by Rep. Act No. 3828,
approved and effective on June 22, 1963, reads partly:

“x  x  x  x  x  x

“Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces, and
sub-provinces and judges of municipal courts shall have like jurisdiction as
the Court of First Instance to try
parties charged with an offense committed within their respective
jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more
than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or
both, and in the absence of the district judge, shall have like jurisdiction
within the province as the Court of First Instance to hear applications
for bail.”

Thus, the lower courts have virtually held that Rep. Act No. 1289
has been amended by Rep. Act No. 3828. 
This conclusion is, to our mind, untenable, for the following reasons,
namely:

1. Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act allocates jurisdic­tion,
in general.  Upon the other hand,
although using the term “jurisdiction,” Art. 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1289, refers, mainly, to the place
where actions for libel shall be filed, or “venue,” inasmuch as, before the pas­sage of said amendatory act, courts of first instance already
had jurisdiction over criminal
cases for libel.^[1]
Even, however, if Rep. Act No. 1289 did regulate
jurisdiction, it refers exclusively to that relating to civil and criminal
actions for written defama­tion, and it is well settled that a general
law does not repeal or modify a previous special law on a specific subject
included in the general law, unless the intent is manifest.^[2]
No such intent appears in the case at bar. 
Indeed, in the language of People v. Olarte^[3]:

“x x x under
said Article 360, as originally enacted, an offended party residing, let us
say, in the province of Cagayan, could – for the
purpose of causing undue harassment –
commence, in the province of Batanes, a civil action against the publisher of a newspaper
edited in Manila.  At the same time, said
offended party could institute a criminal action in the Court of First Instance
of Sulu.  To
avoid these evils, Article 360 was amended by Republic Act No. 1289.  Pursuant thereto, both actions must
be filed with the same court of first instance, and this must be that of
‘the province or city where any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides
at the time of the commission of the offense,’ unless ‘the libel is published,
circulated, displayed or exhibited in the province or city wherein neither the
offender nor the offended resides,’ in which case ‘the civil and criminal
actions may be brought in the court of first instance thereof.’ That these
were the only objectives of Congress in passing House Bill No. 2695, which
later became Republic Act No. 1289, is manifest, not only from the above quoted
explanatory note to said bill, but, also, from the Congressional Record
pertinent thereto.“^[4]

There is absolutely nothing in Rep. Act 3828 to indicate that
Congress wanted to abrogate or modify the foregoing policy.

2. Even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also,
axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other
courts.^[5]
In the case at bar, upon the filing of civil case No. 2312 of the court of
first instance of Pampanga, on May 16, 1963, that
court acquired, pursuant to said Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, exclusive jurisdiction over the criminal action that may
subsequently be filed in consequence of the same written defamation on which
said civil case No. 2312 was based. 
Here, again, there is no clear expression of the will of Congress, in
Rep. Act No. 3828, to divest said court of first instance of the exclusive
jurisdiction, vested in it prior thereto, over said criminal action.

3. There is every reason to believe that Congress had no such
design.  Indeed, Rep. Act No. 4363,
approved on June 19, 1965, which further amended said Art. 360 of the Revised
Penal Code,^[6]
reproduced the provisions of said Art. 360, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1289, to the effect that “(t)he
criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations x x x shall be filed x x x with the court
of first instance of the province
or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense”; that “the civil action
shall be
filed
in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice versa”
and that “the court where
the criminal action or civil action for
damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion
of other courts.”

It
is, therefore, our considered opinion that the municipal court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide the aforementioned criminal case No. 4216; that respondent Judge Baltazar
has erred in denying Laquian’s motion to dismiss said
case; and that the order of the court of first instance of Pampanga
denying the petition for certiorari in civil case No. 2834 of said court and
dismissing the same should be, as it is hereby reversed, with costs against
private respondent Marcelo D. Mendiola.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
People v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960.

^[2]
Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty,
40 Phil. 224, 229; Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138, 147; Libarnes
v. Exec. Secretary,
L-21505, Oct. 24, 1963; Tumipus Mangayao
v. Quintana Lasud, L-19252, May 29, 1964; Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan, L-21516, Apr. 29, 1966; Gaerlan
v. Catubig, L-23964, June 1, 1966; Kordovez v. Carmona,
L-21473, Oct. 31, 1967; Fal­cotelo v. Gali,
L-24190, Jan. 8, 1968; Romero v. Mun. Mayor of Boljoon, L-22062, Mar. 29, 1968; National Power Corp. v. Judge Arca, L-23309, Oct. 31, 1968.

^[3]
Supra.

^[4]
Underscoring ours.

^[5]
Grafton v. U. S. , 11 Phil. 776,
791; Valdez v. Lucero, 76 Phil.
356; Braca v. Tan, 84 Phil. 582; People v.
Livara, 94 Phil.
771; Lumpay v. Hon. Moscoso,
105 Phil. 968, 972-973; Alimajen v. Valera, 107 Phil. 224, 245.

^[6]
By prescribing the venue when “one of the offended parties is a public
officer.”