IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN IN L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO VS. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen’s
“Petition to Sur­render Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is “a great
injustice com­mitted against his client by this Supreme Court.” He indicts
this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal “peopled by men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violation of the Cons­titution with
impunity.” His client, he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this
Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become “one of the sacrificial
Victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” In the same breath that he alludes
to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court,
saying “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not
only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” He then vows to argue the
cause of his client “in the people’s forum,” so that “the people
may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court,” and that
“whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never
be repeated.” He ends his petition with a prayer that

“x x x a
resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
under­signed attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession.”

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the
aforementioned petition.  Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:

“Vicente Raul AImacen, in an
unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal’s unconstitutional and obnoxious’
practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals is without any reason.

“Because of the tribunal’s ‘short-cut justice,’ Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to Pay 120,000, without
knowing why he lost the case.

*        *          *

“There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, ‘where our Supreme Court
is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity.’

*        *           *

“He expressed the hope that by divesting him­self of his title
by which he earns his living,
the pre­sent members of the Supreme Court ‘will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention with­out
discrimination, and
will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious “lack of
merit” or “denied resolutions.”’ (emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen‘s statement that

“… our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity,”

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle
of September 28, 1967.  In connection therewith, Pacis
commented that Atty. Almacen had “accused the
high tribunal of offenses so
serious that the Court must clear itself,” and that “his charge is
one of the constitutional bases for impeachment.”

The genesis of this
unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,^[1] in which Atty. Almacen
was counsel for the defendant.  The trial
court, af­ter due hearing, rendered judgment against his client.  On June 15, 1966 Atty. AImacen
received a copy of the decision.  Twenty
days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration.  He served on the adverse counsel a copy of
the motion, but did not no­tify the latter of the time and place of hearing on
said motion.  Meanwhile, on July 18,
1966, the plaintiff
moved for execution of the judgment.  For
“lack of proof of service,” the trial court denied both motions.  To prove that he did serve on the adverse
party a co­py of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which
he at­tached the required registry return card. 
This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn
by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August
22, 1966, had
already perfected the appeal.  Because
the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond,
the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court’s
decision in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the
following words:

“Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed
by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be
dismissed, and of the oppo­sition thereto
filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dis­misses, the appeal, for the reason
that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed
record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing
thereof and is, therefore, a
useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G. R. No. L-16636; June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to ap­peal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.”

Atty. Almacen
moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co. is not decisive.  At the
same time he filed a pleading entitled “Latest decision of the Supreme
Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration,” citing Republic of the
Philippines
vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza,
L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case.  Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration, thus:

“Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same
date filed by defendant-appellant, praying for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 8, 1967,
dismissing the appeal.

“Appellant contends that there are some im­portant
distinctions between this case and that of Ma­nila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. vs. Batu Construc­tion & Co., G.R. No.
L-16636, June 24, 1965,
relied upon by this Court in its
resolution of May 8, 1967.  Appellant further states that in the latest
case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the
question raised by appellant’s motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety &
Fi­delity Co., Inc. case.

“There is no substantial distinction between this case and
that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.

“In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza,
the resolution denying the motion
to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was
issued on November 26, 1962,
which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the
Manila Surety Case, which was June 24,
1965.  Fur­ther, the
resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court
issued it ‘without prejudice to appellee’s restoring
the point in the brief.’ In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza), the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub
silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila
Surety and Fidelity case.  Therefore
Republic vs. Ventu­ranza is no authority on the
matter in issue.”

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this
Court by certiorari.  We refused
to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly
thereafter was his motion for reconside­ration as well as his petition for
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time.
Entry of judgment was made on September
8, 1967.  Hence, the second
motion for recon­sideration filed by him after the said date was ordered
expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen
gave vent to his disappointment by filing his “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Cer­tificate of
Title,” already adverted to – a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its
individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate.  Patiently, we waited for him to make good his
proffer.  No word came from him.  So he was reminded to turn over his
certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offer­ed to surrender, so that
this Court could act on his petition.  To
said reminder he manifested “that he has no pending petition in con­nection
with Case G. R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay,
said case is now final and executory;” that this
Court’s September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a
positive or nega­tive act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
“chose to pursue the negative act.”

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a mem­ber of
the bar for contumely and gross misconduct,
this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen
to show cause “why no disciplinary action should be taken against
him.” Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he
asked for permission “to give reasons and cause why no discipli­nary
action should be taken against him x x x in an open and public hearing.  “This Court resolved (on December 7)
“to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five
days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument
shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision.” To this
resolution he mani­fested that since this Court is “the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge,” he preferred to be heard and to answer
questions “in person and in an open and public hearing” so that this
Court could ob­serve his sincerity and candor.  He also asked for leave to file a written
explanation “in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person.” To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a
written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened
offers no apology.  Far from being
contrite, Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his
jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and
innuendo.  Thus:

“At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible,
Chapter 7, St. Matthew:-

“‘Do not judge, that you may not be judged.  For with what
judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it
shall be measured to you.  But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother’s eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye?
Or how canst, thou say to thy brother, “Let me cast out the speck from thy eye”; and
behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother’s eye.

“Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even so do you also to
them; for this is the Law and the Prophets.’

“Your respondent has no intention of disavow­ing the
statements mentioned in his petition.  On
the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated,
compatible with his lawyer’s oath that ‘he will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court.  But he vigorously DENY under oath that the under­scored
statements contained in the CHARGE are in­solent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that
they tend to bring the entire
Court, without jus­tification, into disrepute; and
constitute conduct unbecoming of
a member of the noble profession
of law.

“Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH
and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly
motivated with the highest interest of jus­tice that in the particular case
of our client, the members have shown callousness to
our various
pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings
will bear us on this matter, x x x

“To all these beggings,
supplications, words of humility, appeals
for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy
and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, – what did we get from this COURT?
One word, DENIED, with all its hardi­ness and insensibility.  That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain
callousness towards our particular case.

“Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of
the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained
unpunished, this Court in the reverse
order of natural things, is now
in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in
good faith.

“Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and
supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GE­NEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors
attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason,
NEVER.  Now that your respondent is gi­ven
the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis,
DID YOU? Sir.  Is this the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said: – ‘the story is cur­rent,
though nebulous as to its truth, it is still be­ing circulated that justice in
the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war.  There are those who have told me frankly and
brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commo­dity in the Philippines.’

“We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER.  We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR.  We attack the de­cision of this Court, not
the members. x x
x We were provoked.  We were compelled by force of ne­cessity.  We were angry but we waited for the finality
of the decision.  We waited until this
Court has performed its duties.  We never
interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties.  But in the
end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment
against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with ‘circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wis­dom’, your Respondent rise to claim his
God-given right to speak the truth and his
Constitutional rights of free speech.

“The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the
further violations we sought to be
prevented is impliedly shared by our
Presi­dent. . . .

“What has been abhored and
condemned, are the very things that were applied to us.  Recalling Madam Roland’s famous apostrophe
during the French revolution, O’
Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name’, we may dare say, O’ JUSTICE,
what technicalities are committed in thy
name’ or more appropriately, ‘O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy
name.’

“We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of
any abuses, but who would cor­rect such abuses considering that yours is a
court of last resort.  A strong public
opinion must be ge­nerated so as to curtail these abuses.

“The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings
that can be found in all courts and go­vernment offices.  We have added only two more symbols, that it
is also deaf and dumb.  Deaf in the sense
that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, under­standing,
sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite
of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give
us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or gi­ven.
… We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement.  We only describe the impersonal state of things and nothing more.

“As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in
the members of this Court and for which reason we offered to-surrender our
lawyer’s certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. 
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow.  As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice.  If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by
the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.”

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he
claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine
the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for
review.  We are quite aware of the
criticisms^[2]
expressed against this Court’s practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions.  We have been asked to do away with it, to
state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial.  We have given this suggestion very careful
thought.  For we know the abject
frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary
hours meticulously marshalls
his arguments, only to have his efforts
rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. 
Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are
utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.^[3] The rest do exhibit a first-impression
cogency, but fail to withstand critical scrutiny.  By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may,
were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we
reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us
by the Constitution.  The proper role of
the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vin­son of the U.S. Supreme Court has
defined it, is to decide “only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
parties in­volved.” Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in
Maryland vs. Baltimore
Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

“A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and
as to the same petition different reasons may lead different justices to the
same result x x x.

“Since there are these conflicting, and to the uninformed,
even confusing reasons for deny­ing petitions for certiorari, it has been
suggested from time to time that the
Court indicate its reasons for denial. 
Practical considerations preclude. 
In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable
duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court’s business, in effect,
within the Court’s discretion.  During
the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively,
on their merits.  For the same three
terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260 1,105, 1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review.  If the Court is to
do its work it would not be feasible to give rea­sons, however brief, for
refusing to take these cases.  The time
that would be required is prohibitive. 
Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a
particular case at a parti­cular time makes review undesirable.“

Six years ago, in Novino, et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its
considered view on this
matter.  There, the petitioner’s counsel
urged that a “lack of merit” resolution violates Section 12 of
Article VIII of the Constitution.  Said
Chief Justice Bengzon:

“In connection with identical short resolu­tions, the same
question has been raised before; and we held that these ‘resolutions’ are not
‘decisions’ within the above constitutional requirement.  They merely hold that the petition for review
should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it.  It should be re­membered that a petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so
there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial.  For one thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

“By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped
the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice
of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely
ordered ‘dismissed’.”

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on
petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit
of appellate review.  Hence, the need for
compelling rea­sons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved
into accepting them.  For it is axiomatic
that the supervisory jurisdic­tion vested upon this Court over the Court of
Appeals is not in­tended to give every losing party another hearing.  This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:

“Review of Court of Appeals’ decision, dis­cretionary.
– A review is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor.  The following, while neither controlling nor
fully measuring the court’s discretion, indicate the character of reasons which
will be considered:

“(a) When the Court
of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by
the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law
or with the applica­ble decisions of the Supreme Court;

“(b) When the Court
of Appeals has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of ju­dicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such de­parture by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of
the power of supervision.”

Recalling Atty. Almacen’s petition for
review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings and
records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the
light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court.  Far from straying away from the
“accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,” it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions.  There was, there­fore, no need for this Court
to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew – or ought to have known – that for a motion
for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the
adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which
admittedly he did not).  This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:

,”The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for
motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which
provides that such notice shall state the time and place of hearing and shall
be served upon all the parties concerned at least three days in advance.  And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted
upon by the court without proof of such notice. 
Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, L-18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81;
Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). 
The rea­son is obvious: Unless the movant sets
the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether
that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him
on his ob­jection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within
which he may file his reply or opposi­tion.”

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the
lower court’s judgment, he has only himself to blame.  His own negligence caused the forfeiture of
the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right.  To shift away from himself the consequences
of his carelessness, he looked for a “whipping boy.” But he made sure
that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his
professional certificate, he took the liber­ty of vilifying this Court and
inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the
members thereof.  It would thus appear
that there is no justification
for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration.  We know that it is natural for a lawyer to
express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to
be a meritorious case.  That is why
lawyers are given wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of,
not only the courts’ rulings but also the manner in which they are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and
criticize the actuations of public officers. 
This right is not diminish­ed
by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,^[4]
or that it is articulated by a lawyer.^[5]
Such right is especially recog­nized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,^[6]
because then the court’s actuations are thrown open to public consumption.^[7]
“Our decisions and all our official actions,” said the Supreme Court
of Nebraska,^[8]
“are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted
right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit.  Judicial officers, like other public
servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public
opinion.”

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an
attack on one’s integrity, competence and honesty, with “immi­nent danger
to the administration of justice,” is the reason why courts have been
loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.^[9]
This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who sit as
members of an entire Court are them­selves collectively the aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who
vigorously assails their actuations.^[10]
For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability
into the tapes­try of justice.  Hence, as
citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges.^[11]

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct.^[12]
They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance.^[13]
For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to
serve.

Well-recognized therefore
is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly res­pectful terms and through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges.  The reason is
that

“An attorney does not surrender, in assum­ing the important
place accorded to him in the admi­nistration of justice, his right as a citizen
to criti­cize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar,
as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by­ the courts.”  (In re Ades,
6 F. Supp. 487)

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been
an important part of the traditional work of the lawyer.  In the prosecution of appeals, he points out
the errors of lower courts.  In articles
written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for all to see the flaws and
inconsistencies of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d. 286).  As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in
the expression or publication of opi­nions as to the capacity, impartiality or
integrity of judges than members of the bar. 
They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct
judgment.  They are in constant
attendance on the courts. x x x To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject
under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession
and livelihood, by the judge or judges
whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. …”

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such
right.  No law may abridge this
right.  Nor is he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into
the official
conduct of the judges, which
would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen.” (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657, 665).

“Above all others, the members of the bar have the best
opportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our
judges.  No class is less likely to abuse the
privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an
able and upright bench.” (State Board of Exa­miners in Law v. Hart, 116
N.W. 212, 216)

To curtail the right of a
lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the
lips of those in the best positions to
give advice and who might
consider it their duty to speak, dispar­agingly.  “Under such a rule,” so far as the bar is concerned, “the merits of a sitting judge may be
rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must
be profound silence.” (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W.196)

But it is the
cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety.  A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges there­of, on the other.  Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross viol­ation of the duty of respect to courts.  It is such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obliga­tions and
duties which are not mere flux and ferment. 
His investi­ture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no
burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of res­pectful
behavior toward the courts.  He vows
solemnly to conduct himself “with all good fidelity x x
x to the courts;”^[14]
and the Rules of Court constantly remind him “to observe and maintain the
res­pect due to courts of justice and judicial officers.”^[15]
The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him “to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.”

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

“. . . the
obligation which attorneys impliedly
assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not
merely to be obedient to the Constitution
and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and
judicial officers.  This obligation is not discharged by merely observing
the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts.” (Bradley v. Fisher, 20 Law.4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer’s duty to render respectful subordination to the
courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.  Hence, in the assertion of their clients’
rights, lawyers – even those gifted with
superior intellect – are enjoined to rein up their tempers. 

“The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax
his patience and temper to submit to rul­ings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and
self-respect are as necessary to the
orderly administration of justice as they are to the effec­tiveness of an army.  The decisions of the judge must be obeyed,
because he is the tribunal appoint­ed to decide, and the bar should at all
times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission.” (In Re Scouten, 40
Atl. 481)

“We concede that a lawyer may think high­ly of his
intellectual endowment.  That is his pri­vilege.  And he may suffer frustration at what he
feels is others’ lack of it.  That is his
misfortune.  Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he
may at tack a court’s decision in words calculated to jet­tison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right.” (Per Justice
Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979, June 26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be
an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another.  Thus,
statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications^[16]
or in the course of a political
campaign,^[17]
if couched in insulting language as to
bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may sub­ject the attorney to
disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence
at this juncture is an examination of relevant
parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a “judge as a public official is neither
sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office,” the Supreme Court of Florida in State
v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless
declared that “any conduct of a
lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice de­mands condemnation and
the application of appropriate penalties,” adding that:

“It would be contrary to every democratic theory to hold that
a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not
exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at the
destruction of public confidence in the
judicial system as such.  However, when
the likely impairment of the administration of justice is the direct product of false and scandalous
accusations   then the rule is otherwise.
“

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N. W. 2d 672, an attorney was sus­pended for putting out and
circulating a leaflet entitled “JUSTICE ??? IN OTUMWA,” which accused a municipal judge of having
committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject
to the control of a group of city officials. 
As a prefatory statement he wrote: “They say that Justice is BLIND,
but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and
DUMB!” The court did not hesitate to
find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.

“The entire publication evidences a desire on the part of the accused to belittle
and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the ge­neral
public.”

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163
Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an
attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a can­didate for re-election to a judicial office.  The circular which re­ferred to two decisions
of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge “used his
judicial office to enable said bank to
keep that money.” Said the court:

“We are aware that there is a line of autho­rities which place no limit to the criticism
mem­bers of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and
integrity of the highest courts.  See
State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N. W. 212, 17 LRA (N. S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex Parte
Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. 
In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:

“It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous
publication by an at­torney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so
vile and of such a nature as to
justify the disbarment of its author.’

“Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were
of graver character than those made by the respondent here.  But, in our view, the better rule is that
which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing
law the strictest observance at all times of the princi­ples of truth, honesty
and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the
public confidence in the due administration
of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained.  In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.”

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso.
v. Metzen,123 N. E. 734,
an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the
judge who set aside the decree on bill
of re­view.  He wrote the judge a
threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit
against the judge and others.  The letter
began:

“Unless the record in In re Petersen
v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is pro­tected from the libel, lies, and perjury commit­ted in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case
warrants.”

Further, he said: “However let me
assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged,” and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not
irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men.  Ordering the attorney’s disbarment, the Supreme
Court of Illinois declared:

“x x x Judges are not exempt from
just criti­cism, and whenever there is proper ground for se­rious complaint
against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances
to the pro­per authorities, but the public interest and the admi­nistration of
the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the
people.  Unjust criticism, insulting
language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who
are officers of the court, which tend
to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence
in their integrity, cannot be permitted. 
The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge of judi­cial functions,
and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the
Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute
with the public.”

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts
of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed, say­ing that the
seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. 
It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions
or deci­sions of the Court.  The lawyer
was charged
with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two
years.  The Court said:

“A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to
weaken the authority of the court ag­ainst whose members it was made, bring its
judg­ments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the
people’s right, and interfere with the administration of justice. x x x

“Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not,
under the guise of disciplinary pro­ceedings, deprive him of any part of that
freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen.  The acts and decisions of the courts of this
state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair
and honest comment and criticism.  It is
only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he
will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech.  We well understand that an independent bar,
as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil
rights.” In Re Troy, 111
Atl. 723, 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the
court from which the appeal was
taken.  Such action, the Court said,
constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice,
notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and
asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he
considered grave injustice.  The Court
said:

“We cannot shut our eyes
to the fact that there is
a growing habit in the profession of criti­cising the
motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is
influenced by corrupt or improper motives. 
Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit
charges to the authori­ties in whom is vested the power to remove judicial
officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a
violation of his duties, or would justify an inference
that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties
devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable
inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them protected. x x x While we recog­nize the inherent right of an
attorney in a case deci­ded against him, or the right of the public generally,
to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the
reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising
the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties,
when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the
community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and
when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their
duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges
is guilty of professional misconduct. “

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

“I accepted the
decision in this case, how­ever, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative, and finally concluded, that, as my
clients were foreigners, it might have been
expecting too much to look for a
decision in their favor against a widow
residing here.”

The
Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

“x x x the
-expressions above set out, not only
transcend the bounds of propriety and privi­leged criticism, but are
an unwarranted attack, direct,
or by insinuation and innuendo, upon
the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a
license from this court and who
is under oath to demean himself with
all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.”

The charges, however, were dismissed
after the attorney apolo­gized to the
Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Ereckenridge, 258
Pac. 747, an attorney
published in a newspaper an article in
which he im­pugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of
having arbitrarily and for a sinister
purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.  The
Court sus­pended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

“The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of
such members does not mea­sure
up to the requirements of the law itself,
as well as to the ethics of the profession. x x x

“The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under our system and ideals
of government.  No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private
citizens, as well as to public officials,
whether he labors in a judicial capacity
or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual.  But such
right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act
honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if
administered at all, could ever properly
serve their client or the public
good by de­signedly misstating
facts or carelessly asserting the law. 
Truth and honesty of purpose by members
of the bar in such discussion is necessary.  The health of a municipality is none the less
impaired by a pol­luted water supply than is the health of the thought of a
community toward the judiciary by the filthy, wanton, and malignant misuse of
members of the bar of the confidence
the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal
with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose
rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judi­ciary.  For
such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands
retribution – not the court.”

9. In Bar Ass’n of San Francisco v. Philbrook
170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges
the terms “criminal, corrupt, and
wicked conspiracies,” “criminal confederates,” “colossal
and con­fident insolence,” “criminal prosecution,” “calculated
brutality,” “a corrupt deadfall,” and similar phrases, was
considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the
erring law­yer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N. W. 215,
the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of
criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending.  This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said
Chief Justice and his associates in
the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the
defeated litigants.  The letters were
published in a newspaper.  One of the letters contained this paragraph:

“You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it
than the burglar to his plunder.  It seems
like robbing a widow to re­ward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that
the widow got no undue
advantage. … The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions
discoverable, short of as­signing to the
court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness
to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or
the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its
hundreds of bright, active students,
or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a state­ment
of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is
stated, and quarantine after it is made,
it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.”

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspen­sion of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows:

“The question remains whether the accused was guilty of
professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to
him.  This was done, as we have found,
for the very purpose of insulting him
and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the
Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his asso­ciates in their official
capacity.  Such a communica­tion, so
made, could never subserve any good pur­pose.  Its only effect in any case would be to
gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the offi­cers so
assailed.  It would not and could not ever
en­lighten the public in regard to their judicial capaci­ty or integrity.  Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert.  No judi­cial officer, with due regard to his
position, can re­sent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanc­tioned by
law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent,
addressed se­cretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. 
‘The sending of a libel­ous communication or libelous matter to the
person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication.’ 18 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017.  In these
respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was
wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have
said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.

“The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but
so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution
and sanc­tioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be
enforced.  To that extent his rights as a
citizen were paramount to the obligation
which he had assumed as an officer of this court.  When, however, he proceeded and thus assailed
the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can
recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to
maintain the respect due to courts and
judicial officers.  ‘This obligation is not discharged by merely ob­serving the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally for their official acts.’ Brad­ley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U. S. ) 355,
20 L. Ed. 646.  And there appears to be
no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an
assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken
words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere.  Either act constitutes misconduct wholly
different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others.  The distinction made is, we think, entirely
logical and well sustained by authority. 
It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod, supra. 
While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained
the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the
court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished
for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court,
for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded.  ‘Is it in the power of any person,’ said the
court, ‘by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only
the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to
compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the
people by tame submission to the in­dignity, or else
set in his own person the evil exam­ple of punishing the insult by taking the
law in his own hands? * * No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions.’

“That a communication such as this, addressed to the judge
personally, constitutes professional de­linquency for which a professional
punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided.  ‘An attorney who, after being defeated in a
case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his
conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guil­ty of
misconduct and will be disciplined by the court.’ Matter of Manheim, 133 App.
Div. 136, 99 N. Y. Supp. 87.  The same is
held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N. Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.
Y.  In the latter case it appeared that
the accused attorney had ad­dressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was
stated, in re­ference to his decision: It is not law; neither is it common
sense.  The result is I have been robbed
of 80.’ And it was decided that, while such misconduct was not a contempt under
the state, the matter should be ‘called to the attention of the Supreme Court,
which has power to discipline the attorney.’ ‘If, ‘says the court, ‘counsel learned in
the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge
them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as
principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may
feel that they may redress their fan­cied grievances in like manner, and thus
the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute.’

“The recent case of
Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as
the case at bar.  The accused, an
attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the
latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court,
and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause
wherein the accused had been one of the at­torneys.  For this it was held that the attorney was
rightly disbarred in having ‘willfully failed to main­tain respect due to him
[the judge] as a judicial of­ficer, and thereby breached his oath as an
attorney.’ As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application
to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte
Bradley, 7 Wall (U. S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v.
State, 22 Ark. 149; Com­monwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas.
408; People v. Green, 7 Colo. 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351;
Smith’s Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten’s Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, 40 Atl.
481.

“Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have
been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be
sufficient lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others. …”

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court
affirmed a lawyer’s suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a news­paper
in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister in­fluence of a gang
that had paralyzed him for two years.

12. In In Re Graves, 221
Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney’s unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes “moral turpitude.”
There, the attorney was disbarred
for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions
in ge­neral, claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his
general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N. E. 2d 659, an attorney published
newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising
the court in intemperate language.  The
invariable effect of this sort of propaganda,
said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal
profession into disrepute with the public, for which rea­son the lawyer was
disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dis­satisfied
with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on
jurists.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit
as a member of the bar.  His disbarment
was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and im­pressive
affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances
or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a
crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair com­ment and
legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring the into disrepute or to subvert
public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice,
constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment
or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the
exer­cise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guar­dian
of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the
face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those cata­logued in the
above-cited jurisprudence.  Cases of
comparable na­ture have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to
punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated
to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence
of such condemnable practices.

A perusal of the more
representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez,
61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as “absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to
the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls,” this Court, although
conceding that

“It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the
cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of
which he is cap­able, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise
said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and
respect which the dignity of the courts requires.  The reason for this is that respect for the
courts guarantees the sta­bility of their institution.  Without such guaranty, said institution would
be resting on a very shaky foundation.”

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch
as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

“x x x an inexcusable disrespect of
the autho­rity of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because
the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its pow­er and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vi­cente J. Francisco’s
client x x x.”

2. In In re Sotto, 82
Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reacting
to the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo,
who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in
his paper, caused to be published in a local newspaper a statement expressing
his re­gret “that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted
said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency
or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members,” and his belief that
“In the wake of so many blunders and injustices delibe­rately committed
during these last years, x x x
the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court,” which tribunal he denounced as “a constant peril to
liberty and democracy” and “a far cry from the impregnable bul­wark
of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary.” He there also announced that one of the first measures he
would introduce in then forthcoming
session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of
the Supreme Court.  Finding him in
contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee
of free speech, this Court declared:

“But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to
be published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment
on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then
and still is pending consideration by this
Court upon petition of Angel Parazo.  He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presen­tation of a
bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from ele­ven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided
the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are
incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice.  But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and
degrading the administra­tion of justice x x x.

“To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the
last years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices,’ that is to
say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and
justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor
the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence
of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this
Court.  The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, un­der the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the
Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection
of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their con­fidence
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect jus­tice therefrom, they might be
driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
might be the result.  As a member of the
bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and autho­rity of this Court,
to which he owes fidelity accord­ing
to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice.  Respect to
the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.”

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

“x x x an attorney as an officer of
the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his con­duct and communication to the courts; he may be re­moved
from office or stricken from the roll
of attor­neys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N. S. ], 586, 594).”

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer:
In re Proceed­ings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court
with having “repeatedly fallen” into
the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous “erroneous” pronouncements, “in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction” of the Court of
Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel’s misconduct was unequivocal.  Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr.
Justice Sanchez stressed:

“As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed
in the motion for reconsideration, implications
there are which inescapably arrest at­tention. 
It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations
comes into question.  That
pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction.  It makes a sweeping charge that the de­cisions
of this Court, blindly
adhere to earlier rul­ings without as much as making
‘any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction
of the industrial court.  The plain import of all these is that this Court
is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed
error and continuously re­peated that error to the point of perpetuation.  It pic­tures this Court as one which refuses
to hew to the line drawn by the
law on jurisdictional boundaries. 
Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pro­nouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not
entitled to respect.  Those statements
detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court: They bring into
question the capability of the members – and some former members – of this
Court to render justice.  The second
paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled
as ‘so-called’ the ‘rule against splitting of jurisdiction.”

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other
cases^[18]
which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited
cases – all of them involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed
pending litigation.  So that, in line with the doc­trinal rule that
the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuen­does
while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof,^[19] Atty. Almacen
would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied
emphasis that the re­marks for
which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had
written finis to his appeal.  This is
of no moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has
terminated has lost much of its vitality. 
For sometime, this was the
prevailing view in this jurisdiction. 
The first stir for a modification
thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon,^[20]
the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the
majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which up­held the rule
above-adverted to.  A complete
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In
re Brillantes,^[21]
a con­tempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was ad­judged
in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar examinations were conducted in a farcical manner af­ter the question of the validity of
the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed.  Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by
Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alar­con
to the effect that there may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated.  Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:

“A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding,
constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by courts.  A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring
them in any way into disrepute, consti­tutes likewise criminal contempt, and is
equally punishable by courts.  What is sought, in the first kind of
contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the
all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a
pend­ing case.  In the second kind of
contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from
any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them.  In the first there
is no contempt where there is no ac­tion
pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the
newspaper publication.  In the second,
the contempt exists, with or
without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself
and its dignity.  Courts would lose their
utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.”

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen
by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under consideration
were made only after the judgment in his client’s appeal had attained
finality.  He could much be liable for
contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for
contempt for such post-litigation utter­ances and actuations, is here
immaterial.  By the tenor of our Re­solution of November 17, 1967,
we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns
Atty. Almacen’s professional identity, his sworn duty
as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the
disciplinary pow­er inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard the morals
and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of
callings.  In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a
case in court is altogether of no consequence. 
The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the
legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has
proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well
within our authority to do.  By
constitutional mandate,^[22] ours is the solemn duty, amongst others, to
determine the rules for admission to the practice of law.  Inhe­rent in this prerogative is the
corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law
those who have proved them­selves unworthy of continued membership in the
Bar.  Thus –

“The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the
court, is an inherent and incidental power
in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge
of judicial functions.  To deny its
existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not
subject to restraint.  Such a view is
without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. 
Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice – and
in this state that power is vested in this
court – has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion,
to exclude them from practice.”^[23]

This, because the admission of a lawyer
to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their
confidence and respect.  So much so that
–

“x x x whenever it is made to appear
to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence
of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty,
of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege.  Therefore it is almost uni­versally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that
one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a
matter of right, but as a pri­vilege conditioned on his own behavior and the
exer­cise of a just and sound judicial discretion.”^[24]

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power
to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental
power.  It has been elevated to an
express mandate by the Rules of Court.^[25]

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now
proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the utter­ances and actuations
of Atty. Almacen here in question are pro­perly the
object of disciplinary sanctions.

The proferred surrender of his lawyer’s
certificate is, of course, purely potestative on
Atty. Almacen’s part. 
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its
way.  Beyond making the mere offer,
however, he went farther.  In haughty and
coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his
vicious tirade against this Court.  The
integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated
to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its
members.  Picturing his client as “a
sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy,” he categorically denounces
the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind “but also deaf
and dumb.” With unmiti­gated acerbity, he virtually rakes this Court and
its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of
“silent in­justices” and “short-cut justice” while at the
same time branding its members
as “calloused to pleas of justice.” And, true to his announced threat
to argue the cause of his client “in the people’s forum,” he caused
the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated
effort to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward the Court. 
Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no
apo­logy.  Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, be rehashed and reiterated
his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and
feathered the Court and its members as in­veterate hypocrites incapable of
administering justice and unwor­thy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen’s
peti­tion, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself.  The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far trans­cend the permissible bounds of legitimate
criticism.  They could never serve any
purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attor­ney, attract public attention to himself and, more important
of all, bring this Court and its
members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment
of the orderly administration of justice. 
Odium of this character and texture presents no re­deeming feature, and
completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth.  It is not a whit less than a classic example
of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer’s oath and gross transgression
of the Canons of Legal Ethics.  As such,
it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked.  The way for the exertion of our disciplinary
powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from
criticism.  Like any other Government
entity in a viable democracy,
the Court is not, and should not be, above cri­ticism.  But a critique of the Court must be
intelligent and discri­minating, fitting to its high function as the court of
last resort.  And more than this, valid
and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires
detachment and disinterestedness, real
qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them.  Any criticism of the Court must possess the
qua­lity of judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and in­fused by
philosophy.^[26]

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exer­cise
of our authority in the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen
would have it appear, the members of the Court are the “com­plainants,
prosecutors and judges” all rolled up into one in this instance.  This is an utter misapprehension, if not a
total distor­tion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of
our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceed­ings
like the present are sui generis.  Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
this proceeding is not – and does not involve
–a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct
of its officers.^[27]
Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.  Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.  It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.^[28] Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.  Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to ac­count for his actuations
as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the pro­per and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.^[29]
In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree,
aggrieved parties.  Any tirade against
the Court as a bo­dy is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the indivi­dual
members thereof.  But in the exercise of
its disciplinary pow­ers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct
from the individual personalities of its members.  Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a
collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but only
as a duly constituted court.  Their
distinct individualities are lost in the
majesty of their office.^[30]
So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar,
it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof – as well
as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard
should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar
of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal
fraternity.

Finally, the power to
exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of
the power to admit persons to
said practice.  By constitutional
precept, this power is vested exclusively
in this Court.  This duty it cannot abdicate
just as much as it cannot
unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it.^[31]
So that even if it be conceded
that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot
disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands
that they, acting as a Court, exercise
the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action.  The present is such a case.  In the end, the imagined anomaly of the
merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge
is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the
sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for
his transgressions.  As marked out by the
Rules of Court, these may range from
mere suspension to total removal or disbarment.^[32]
The discretion to assess under
the circumstances the imposable
sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which,
being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect
due to the Court be zealously maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen
is of considerable gravity
cannot be overemphasized.  However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end
desired, and believing that it
may not perhaps be futile to hope that in
the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen
will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate
and that in every effervescence
of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under
the circumstances.  His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by
neither manifesting repentance
nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of
determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are
impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite.  This, we are empowered to do not alone
because jurisprudence grants us discretion
on the matter^[33]
but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is
obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the
practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded
as falling outside of the compass of that authority.  The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to
Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or
how short that suspension shall last. 
For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to
resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS
THE SENSE of the Court
that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of
law until further orders, the suspension
to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of
Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information
and guidance.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., no part.

---

^[1]
Docketed as Civil Case 8909 on September 17, 1965
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

^[2]
See e.g. “Mounting
Discontent against the Supreme Court’s Minute Resolution,” 32 Lawyers J.
p. 325; “Lack of Merit Resolutions are Obnoxious,” 31 Lawyers J. p.
329.

^[3]
In the years 1966, 1967 and 1968, this Court rejected by minute resolutions
803, 682 and 848 petitions, respectively, and resolved by extended decisions or
resolutions 584, 611 and 760 cases, respectively. For the period covering the
first six months of the year 1969, this Court rejected by minute resolutions 445 petitions, and resolved by
extended deci­sions or resolutions 279
cases.

^[4]
U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); In re Gomez, 43
Phil. 376; Salcedo vs. Hernandez,
61 Phil. 736 (Malcolm, J., dissenting);
Austria vs. Masaquel,
G. R. L-22536, Aug. 31, 1967;
Cabansag vs. Fernandez, et al.,
G.R. L-8974, Oct. 18, 1957.

^[5]
In re Gomez, supra.

^[6]
In re Gomez, supra; In reLozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930); In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668 (1932); People vs. Alarcon; In re Contempt Proceedings,
Mangahas, 69 Phil. 265 (1939). See Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.
S. 331, 90 L. ed. 1295; In re Bozorth, 118 A.
2d 432; In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d 432 (1959); In re Pryor, 26 A.m. Rep. 474; Hill v. Lyman,
126 NYS 2d 286; Craig v.
Hecht, 68 L. ed. 293 (Concurring opinion of Justice Taft).

^[7]
Strebel v. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321 (1954).

^[8]
State v. Bee Pub. Co. 83 N. W. 204, Sullivan, J. See also State
ex rel
Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct. 72
N.W. 193.

^[9]
In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d
432 (1959).

^[10]
U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil.
731 (1918); In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; Cabansag v. Fernandez, L-18974,
Oct. 18, 1957; Austria vs. Masaquel,
L-22536, Aug. 31, 1967; Re Troy (1920), 111 Atl. 723;
State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct.
(1897), 65 Am. St. Rep. 90; Coons v. State, 134 N.E. 194; State vs. Sweetland, 54 N.W.
415; Hill vs. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286; Case of Austin,
28 Am. Dec. 657.

^[11]
State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116  N.W. 212, 17 LRA (NS) 585; Re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep. 747; Ex Parte
Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 637; Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657; Brannon v.
State, 29 So. 2d 918; Medgar Evers v.
State; 131 So. 2d 653; Re Ades, 6 F 2d 467.

^[12]
“A judge as a public official,” said Justice Thornal
in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604,
“is neither sacrosanct, nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in
office.”

^[13]
In re Bozorth, 118 Atl. 432: “The harsh and sometimes un
founded criticism of the members of any of the three branches of our Government
may be the unfortunate lot of public officials x x x, but it has always been deemed a basic principle that
such comment may be made by the public x x x. Nor should the judicial branch x x
x enjoy any more enviable condition than the other
two branches.”

In Bridges v. California, 86 L. ed 192, Mr. Justice
Black, speaking for the majority, said: “x x x an enforced silence, however, limited, solely in the name
of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment,
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.” Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the mi­nority opinion, said: “Judges as
persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from
criticism than other persons or institutions. Just because the holders of
judicial office are identified with the interest of justice they may forget
their common human frailties and fallibilities. There have sometimes been
martinets upon the bench as there have sometimes been wielders of authority who
have used the paraphernalia of power in support of what they called their dignity. Therefore judges must be
kept mindful of their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by
a vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt. ‘A man
cannot be summarily laid by the heels because his words may make public feeling
more unfavorable in case the judge should be asked to act at some later date,
any more than he can for exciting public feeling against a judge for what he
already has done.’ x x x
Courts and judges must take their share of the gains and pains of discussion Which
is unfettered except by laws of libel, by self-restraint, and by good
taste. Winds of doctrine should freely blow for the promotion of good and
the correction of evil. Nor should restrictions be permitted that cramp the
feeling of freedom in the use of tongue or pen regardless of the temper of the truth of what may be
uttered.”

^[14]
Sec. 3, Rule 138.

^[15]
Sec. 20(b), Rule 138.

^[16]
See e.g. Re Chopac, 66 F. Supp., where an attorney was suspended for three
years for writing a judge a letter in which
he said that the judge in signing an order took “ad­vantage of your office
to rule with passion and vehemence.” Also People v. Green, 3 P. 65,
where an attorney was disbarred
for stopping a judge upon the street and address­ed abusive, insulting language
to See also Johnson v. State, 44
So. 671; In re McCowan, 170 P. 1101; State v. Calhoon, 102, 2d 604; Re Huppe, 11 Pac. 2d 793; State v. Rhodes, 131 NW
2d 118; Re Rogers, 212 Pac. 1034; In re
Griffin, 1 NYS 7; In re Wilkes, 3 NYS 753; Re Manheim, 99 NYS 87; Re Greenfield, 262 NYS 2d 349; In re Klein, 262 NYS 2d 416; In re Smith,
36 A 134.

^[17]
In re Humphrey, 163 P. 60; In re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39; In Snyder’s Case, 76 ALR 666; Re
Troy, 111 A. 723; State v.
Sprigs, 155 P. 2d 285.

^[18]
Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; In the matter of the
Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba, Contempt
proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312, 315; People vs.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 579; People vs. Venturanza, et al., 85 Phil. 211, 214; De Joya, et al. vs. CFI of Rizal,
99 Phil. 907, 914; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29, 1959; Paragas vs. Cruz, L-24438, July 30,
1965; Cornejo vs. Tan,
85 Phil. 772, 775.

^[19]
In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801; In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 1965; Cornejo
vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772, 775.  State
vs. Dist. Court,
151 Pac. 2d 1002; In re Shannon,
27 Pac. 352; State ex rel.
Grice vs. Dist. Court,
97 Pac. 1032;
Weston vs. Commonwealth, 77 S. E. 2d 405; State vs.
Kaiser, 13 P. 964; State vs. Fee Pub. Co. 83 N.W. 204; Patterson vs. Colorado, 51 L. ed. 879; Re Hart, 116 N.W.
212.

^[20]
69 Phil. 265.

^[21]
42 O.G. 59.

^[22]
Article VIII, Section 12, Constitution.

^[23]
Re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541.

^[24]
Re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 84.

^[25]
Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

^[26]
See Norman Dorsen, Frontiers of Civil Liberties,
pp. 60-61; Griswold, “Of Time and Attitudes,” 74 Harvard Law
Review, 81, 94; Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States
(1961) pp. 176-177; see also Freund,
On Law and Justice (1968) ch. 4.

^[27]
In re Montagne
and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; De
Durant, 10 Ann. Cas. 1913, 1220.

^[28]
State vs. Peck, 91 Atl. 274; 286; Fairfield
County Bar vs. Tay­lor,
22 Atl. 441.

^[29]
Ex Parte Tyler, 40 Pac. 33, 34; Treadwell’s
case, 7 Pac. 724; Deles vs. Aragona,
March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 634, 644, and the cases therein cited.

^[30]
Sarcos vs. Castillo, et al., L-29755, January 21, 1969.

^[31]
Cf. Radiowealth Inc. vs. Agregado, 47 O.G., No. 12 (Supp.) pp.87, 89, citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
Vol. 2, p. 870; Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil. 552, 553; Ex parte Alabama
State Bar Ass’n., 8 So. 768.

^[32]
Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

^[33]
Melville vs. Wettengel, 57 Pa. 2d 699;
People vs. Winogard, 287 Pac. 864; People vs. Kelley,
285 Pac. 767; People vs. Harris, 112 N.E. 978; People vs.
Anderson, 112 N.E. 273; In
re Gullickson, 181 Atl.
716; Haitmanek vs. Turano, 158 A. 878; Grimsell
vs. Wilcox, 98 A. 799; States vs. Kern,
233 N. W. 629; In re Borchardt, 192 N.E.
383; State vs. Trapley, 259 Pac. 783; State vs. Jennings, 159 S.E. 627; In re Jacobson, 126
S.E. 2d 346; Mulvey
vs. O’Niell, 44 Atl. 2d 880;
State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Ass’n
vs. Hatcher, 209 Pac. 2d
873; Cleveland Bar Ass’n vs. Wilkerson,
156 N.E. 2d 136; In re Eddy, 292 N.Y.S. 619.