THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CORNELIO MANUEL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

People versus Manuel

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Cornelio Manuel, a criminal appeal from a conviction for murder and for illegal possession of firearm, both arising from the shooting of Dominador Irorita in Vintar, Ilocos Norte. The case matters to a reviewee for three reasons: it fixes the rule that the testimony given by a co-accused in her own separate defense cannot be used against another accused, it shows how a confession ratified before a judge becomes a second and voluntary confession, and it restates the strict test for alibi.

Procedural History

Two informations were filed against Cornelio Manuel before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, one for murder and one for illegal possession of firearm. Two related charges were filed against Indelecia Saguid-Irorita, one for parricide and one for illegal possession of firearm. Because all four cases concerned the death of Dominador Irorita, the trial court allowed a joint trial for the reception of the prosecution's evidence, but granted the appellant's motion for a separate trial as far as the presentation of his own evidence was concerned.

On October 30, 1963, the trial court rendered a single decision in all four cases. It acquitted Indelecia but convicted Cornelio Manuel on both charges against him. For murder it sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs in the amount of 6,000 pesos, and to pay the costs. For illegal possession of firearm it sentenced him to ten years of imprisonment and to pay the costs. He appealed. The murder conviction went to the Supreme Court, while the illegal possession conviction was initially appealed to the Court of Appeals; the records of both cases were forwarded to the Supreme Court because the evidence in both was inextricably the same, and so the Supreme Court decided both.

Facts

Dominador Irorita and Indelecia Saguid-Irorita were husband and wife. Indelecia had long been sustaining illicit relations with the appellant, Cornelio Manuel. Dominador died in the early afternoon of September 6, 1956 in barrio Ester, Vintar, Ilocos Norte. When Indelecia and Segundina, the deceased's mother, were asked about the cause of death, both said he had died of tuberculosis.

A persistent rumor spread in the barrio that he had died not of tuberculosis but of gunshot wounds. The barrio lieutenant, Miguel Leaño, conducted further inquiries, which led to Indelecia's admission that the rumor was true. She even pointed him to a pile of cogon grass about 150 meters east of her house, where the fatal gun was recovered. The body was exhumed on September 13, 1956, and the municipal health officer confirmed that Dominador had died from gunshot wounds. A sergeant of the local constabulary then investigated, and separate sworn statements were executed by Indelecia, by Segundina, and by the appellant. In her statement Indelecia pointed to the appellant as the gun-wielder and admitted that she was his mistress. In his own statement the appellant admitted that he fired the fatal shots with an unlicensed .45 caliber sub-machinegun.

The appellant later claimed on the witness stand that his thumbmark on the confession was procured through force, violence, and intimidation, and he presented a medical certificate listing abrasions on his body. His principal defense, however, was alibi: that he spent the whole day of September 6, 1956 working at a place called Alilog, about two kilometers from the victim's house, and learned of the death only late that night. He presented an old notebook listing the persons who supposedly worked there that day, but no coworker and not even his own father was presented to corroborate him.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in considering, against the appellant, the testimony given by Indelecia in the course of her own separate trial and in her own defense.
• Whether or not the appellant's extrajudicial confession, and his subsequent ratification of it before the justice of the peace, may be taken as a voluntary confession of the killing.
• Whether or not the defense of alibi must be accepted.
• Whether or not the killing was qualified as murder and the penalties for both offenses were correctly imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, paragraph f of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, on the rights of the accused at trial, provides:

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination, to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and to have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of other evidence in his behalf.

This is the right the trial court violated when it used Indelecia's testimony, given in her own defense and without the appellant being present or able to cross-examine her, as evidence against him.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, on the penalty for murder, provides:

The crime of murder is punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.

This is the provision the Court applies in fixing the penalty, which, with one aggravating circumstance offset by one mitigating circumstance, is imposed in its medium period.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court sustained the assignment of error. Indelecia was not a witness for the prosecution, and her testimony in her own defense cannot be considered against the appellant. The trial was separate as to their respective defenses, and the appellant was not present when she testified. One of the rights of every person charged in a criminal case is to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witness against him, and that right is violated if evidence taken in another case, or in the separate trial of another accused, is considered to his detriment.

On the second issue, the Court held that the case for the prosecution must rest on the appellant's confession. He claimed it was extracted by force, but the medical certificate did not support him: the earliest injury dated back no earlier than September 17, four days after the alleged maltreatment, and repeated blows with steel gun butts would have produced injuries far more serious than abrasions. More significantly, when he was brought before Judge Juan Jacinto on September 15, 1956 to ratify the statement, he voluntarily reaffirmed its truth. The judge examined him closely, and the appellant felt free enough to deny ownership of the gun while admitting everything else. That affirmation is in effect a second confession, the voluntary character of which is beyond dispute.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the alibi. The notebook entries were not shown to be authentic, no coworker was presented, and the two-kilometer distance did not rule out his presence at the scene. The Court stated the test:

For that defense to succeed, it should be shown to the satisfaction of a prudent mind that the distances between the places where the accused claimed to be and where the crime was committed are such that it would have been clearly impossible for him to be at the latter at the time of the crime.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the crime was characterized by treachery, because the victim was shot while asleep without any risk to the appellant, and that dwelling was correctly considered as an aggravating circumstance, since he surreptitiously entered the victim's house to commit the crime. Lack of instruction was properly appreciated as mitigating. With the aggravating circumstance of dwelling offset by the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, the penalty in its medium period, reclusion perpetua, was correctly imposed. On the illegal possession of firearm, his possession of the unlicensed weapon cannot be denied, and because he used it for an illegal purpose, the penalty in its maximum period, ten years, was justified.

Doctrine

First, the testimony given by one accused in his or her own separate defense cannot be used against a co-accused who was not present and had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, for that would violate the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him under Section 1, paragraph f of Rule 115.

Second, a confession ratified before a judge who closely examines the declarant, and which the declarant voluntarily reaffirms, amounts to a second confession whose voluntary character is beyond dispute.

Third, alibi must be rejected unless it shows that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

Fourth, for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, where one generic aggravating circumstance is offset by one mitigating circumstance, the penalty is imposed in its medium period.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and the penalties imposed on Cornelio Manuel in both cases, but modified the award by increasing the indemnity in the murder case to 12,000 pesos, payable to the heirs of Dominador Irorita other than his wife, with costs against the appellant.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that evidence taken in another case, or in the separate trial of another accused, cannot be considered against an accused without violating his right to confrontation and cross-examination. Examiners like to use this case on the right of confrontation, on the voluntariness of a confession ratified before a judge, and on the strict test for alibi.