G.R. Nos. L-23786-87. August 29, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CORNELIO MANUEL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
On November 15, 1956 two informations,
one for murder (Criminal Case No. 2511) and the other for illegal possesÂsion of firearm (Criminal Case No.
2512), were filed against appellant Cornelio Manuel before the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte. Simultaneously filed before the same court
were two other separate but closely related charges, against Indelecia Saguid-Irorita for
parricide (Criminal Case No. 2510) and for illegal possession of firearm
(Criminal Case No. 2513).
As these four (4) cases had to do with the death of Dominador Irorita, accused Indelecia’s husband, a joint trial was allowed for the
reception of the evidence for the prosecution. However, appellant’s motion for a separate trial was granted insofar as the
presentation of his own evidence was
concerned.
Upon conclusion of the
trial the court a quo
rendered a single decision in
all four (4) cases on October 30, 1963, acquitting Indelecia
but finding appellant Cornelio Manuel guilty of both charges against him. In Criminal Case No. 2511 (for murder) he was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the amount of P6, 000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings[1]; and in Criminal Case No. 2512 (for illegal
possession of firearm) he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of TEN (10) YEARS
imprisonÂment and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Hence this appeal.[2]
From the testimony of the
nine (9) witnesses for the prosecution, the following facts have been
substantially established: that Dominador Irorita and Indelecia SaguidÂIrorita were husband and wife; that Indelecia had been susÂtaining illicit relations with
appellant; that Dominador died in the early afternoon
of September 6, 1965 in barrio Ester, Municipality of Vintar,
Ilocos Norte, and when Indelecia,
the deceased’s widow, and Segundina, the latter’s
mother, were questioned about the cause of Dominador’s
death, both replied that the deceased had died of tuberculosis; that beÂcause
of a persistent rumor, which spread in the barrio after the deceased’s
internment, that he died not of tuberculosis but from gunshot wounds he had
received, then barrio lieuÂtenant Miguel Leaño
conducted further inquiries, which eventually led to Indelecia’s
admission that the rumor was true; that she even directed him (barrio
lieutenant Miguel Leaño) to a big pile of cogon grass
about 150 meters east of her house, where the fatal gun was recovered; that
Victor Flores substantially corroborated the testimony of Miguel Leaño on this point, the former being the latter’s
companion at the time; that in order to determine positively the cause of Dominador’s death, his body was exhumed on September 13,
1956 and a post mortem examination was made by Dr. Caridad Cid, municipal health officer of Vintar, who confirmed that Dominador
had died indeed from gunshot wounds; and that a sergeant Gamayo
of the local P.C. command then personally conducted the investigation of the case, which culminated in the
execution of separate written sworn statements by InÂdelecia,
Segundina and herein appellant. In her statement (Exh. “C”), Indelecia
fingered appellant as the gun-wielder, and admitted at the same time that she
was really appellant’s mistress. Segundina, in a separate statement (Exh. “E”), merely stated that she saw
appellant leaving the vicinity of the victim’s house after the fatal
shooting. When confronted with the two
statements later, appellant executed a statement of his own (Exh. “A”), wherein he admitted that he was the
one who fired the fatal shots, using an unlicensed .45 caliber sub-machinegun
for the purpose. Juan Jacinto, Justice
of the peace of Vintar before whom the aforesaid
statements were sworn to duly apprised the affiants of their constitutional
rights before he affixed his signatures to the respective jurats. A portion
of the bamboo flooring in the victim’s house, which had been shattered by the
bullets fired at the victim, was found to have been subÂsequently repaired.
The foregoing, in synthesis, is the evidence given by the
prosecution witnesses against appellant.
In adÂjudging him guilty of the offenses charged, the trial court did
not confine itself to the facts and circumstances established by the said
evidence but considered also the testimony of Indelecia
given in the course of her own trial and in her own defense, to the effect that
it was appellant who shot and killed her husband. This is now assigned as error, and we find
the assignment well taken. Indelecia was not a witness for the prosecution, and her testimony in her own defense
cannot be considered against appellant.
Not only was the trial separate insofar as their resÂpective defenses
were concerned, but appellant was not present when Indelecia’s
testimony was given. One of the rights
of every person charged in a criminal case is to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witness against him.[3] This right is violated if the evidence taken
in another case, or in the separate trial of another accused, is considered to
his detriment.[4]
The case for the
prosecution must find its basis somewhere else.
The most relevant piece of evidence is appellant’s confession (Exh. “A”), wherein he admitted that in the
afternoon of September 6, 1956 he entered Dominador Irorita’s house and posted himself directly below the place
on the bamboo floor where Dominador was sleeping side
by side with his wife Indelecia; that with a .45
caliber sub-machine-gun, which he likewise admitted belonged to him, he pumped
three bullets into the victim; that after the shooting, appellant gave the gun
to Indelecia, with whom appellant had been
maintaining illicit relations for a long time and who was herself aware of the
plan to kill her husband.
Appellant, however,
declared on the witness stand that his thumbmark on
the said confession was procured through force, violence and intimidation. Specifically, he said that the PC soldiers
under Sergeant Gamayo maltreated him by boxing him
and hitting him in various parts of his body with the steel butts of their
guns; and that he was repeatedly placed, face downward, inside a drumfull of water until he became unconscious. This brutal treatment, he declared, continued
throughout the night and until the morning of September 14, 1956. As
proof of his maltreatment appelÂlant presented a medical certificate (Exh. “4”) signed by Dr. Roman de la Cuesta, chief of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Hospital, which certificate lists the following
injuries found in his person:
“1.
Abrasion, multiple scaring, costal arch, right chondro-sternal articulation, level of third rib, left;
2. Two abrasions at supra-scapular region left; and one abrasion, shoulder,
ter or aspect, right;
3. Healed, deep abrasion, between 3rd and 4th fingers, doesum hand, left.”
That the said injuries
were due to maltreatment by the PC soldiers who obtained appellant’s confession
is rather doubtful. According to Dr. de
la Cuesta, injury No. 3 in the certificate was probably the earliest to be inflicted. Upon cross-examination he gave the opinion
that the same could not have been sustained earlier than seven (7) days prior
to the physical examination of appellant.
Since the physical examination was made on September 24, 1956, the said injury dated back no
earlier than September 17, that is,
four days after the alleged
maltreatment on the night of September 13.
Besides, if it was true that appellant had been repeatedly pummelled with steel gun butts in different parts of his
body the injuries would have been much more serious than just abrasions. It was not at all improbable that those
abrasions were self-inflicted after the conÂfession had been given.
Another significant
circumstance is that when appellant was brought before Judge Juan Jacinto on September
15, 1956 to ratify
the statement he had given earlier to the investigaÂtors, he voluntarily
reaffirmed the truth of its contents.
Judge Jacinto, commendably enough, did not confine himself to the simple
formality of having the declarant swear to the
written statement, but examined him closely and had the proÂceedings before him
separately recorded in writing, thus:
“x x x x
x x x x x
Q Showing to you this
statement (Court shows) in which appears a thumbmark
on the name ‘Cornelio Manuel’, is this
the declaration which you thumbmarked before the PC?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, listen. Remember that this declaration incriminates
you. And you have a right not to
incriminate yourself. This will be used
against you in Court. Did you willingly declare before the PC and
did you willingly thumbmark this statement?
A I declared them because they are the
truth and nothing but the truth.
Q And you will not deny them?
A I have some reluctance because I declared
them after I was maltreated by the PC.
Q But all these declarations came from your
own mouth, is that it?
A Yes,
because they forced me.
Q Did anyone teach you
to declare what I read to you?
A No one, sir, but I declared them after I was forced.
Q But you admit the truth of everything
contained in this thumbmarked dèclaration
of yours? Remember I am not forcing you in any way, that is
why there are two witnesses.
A Yes, I admit
the truth of my declaration read to me.
Q Therefore, what you only want to tell to
the Court is that, although your declaration before the PC is true, you
declared the truth only after you were maltreated?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure now of that? I am
not forcing you. Be free to tell
the truth.
A What I want to say is that the firearm is
not mine and that I was not the one who shot Dominador
Irorita.” (Exh.
“B”)
Q Who owns the firearm
then?
A The deceased, Dominador
Irorita.
Q Why do you say that
it is his?
A It is the truth.
Q Why?
A I have seen it before in his possession.
Q Where did you see
it?
A In his house.
Q He showed it to you?
A No, sir, but I saw that he cleaned it.
Q How many times did
you see him clean it?
A Only once.
Q When did you see
him clean it?
A Long time ago. Four months ago.
Q Now listen, so
everything I read to you, now deny?
A No, sir, I do not deny all, but….. (witness pauses). . . . the truth is that I do not own the firearm, and
even if that is only what will mitigate me.
Q You must remember
that you are in Court. Tell the truth
only; you are making many contradictory
statements. What do you mean when you
say that even if that is only
what will mitigate me (paca-alusaysayac).
A Yes, sir, because it is not licensed. I do not admit that, because it is not mine.
Q Now, except that
part which says that you own the
firearm, you admit the truth of all the other parts of the declaration I read
to you?
A Yes, sir, the other parts are true.
Q You will not change
your mind again?
A No,
more sir.” (Exh.
“B”)
Clearly
then, except that part in which he admitted ownership of the fatal gun,
appellant voluntarily affirmed the veracity of his extrajudicial confession. This
affirmÂation is in effect a second confession, the voluntary characÂter of
which is beyond dispute, considering the circumstances under which it was
made. Indeed appellant felt free enough
from restraint to deny that the gun used in the killing was his and to say that
it belonged to the deceased himself. In
the face of his categorical and repeated admission of the truth of his previous
statements, with the only exception just referred to, his half-hearted attempt
to deny that he shot Irorita deserves no
consideration at all.
Appellant’s principal
defense is alibi. According to him he spent
the whole day of September 6, 1956 working in a place locally known as Alilog, a good 2 kilometers away from the house of the
victim; and left his house early that morning and only learned of the victim’s
death late that night when he returned home. As proof of his presence in Alilog, appellant presented an old notebook (Exh. “5”) which contains, among
other matters a list of the persons who supposedly worked there on September 6, 1956[5].
The said notebook and its
contents, however, fail to furnish convincing support to appellant’s
testimony. There is no showing that the
entries in the notebook are authentic.
And, in spite of appellant’s assertion that there were about twelve (12)
other workers in his group who were with him at the time, not one came forward
to corroborate him. Even his own father,
who he claimed was his companion in going to and coming from Alilog, was not presented by the defense.
Then again, the
2-kilometer distance between Alilog and barrio Ester,
where the crime was committed, does not rule out the possibility of appellant’s
being at the latter place at the time of the killing.
“For that defense (alibi) to succeed, it should be shown to
the satisfaction of a prudent mind that the distances between the places were
the accused claimed to be and where the crime was committed are such that it
would have been clearly imÂpossible for him to be at the latter at the time of the crime.” (People v. Secapuri, G.R. No. L-17518,
February 28, 1966)
“x x x For
it (alibi) to prosper, it is not enough to prove that defendant was somewhere
else when the crime was comÂmitted, but must likewise demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time.” (People v. Jamero, G.R.
No. L-19852, July 29, 1968;
24 SCRA 206)
The crime was
characterized by treachery and hence properly qualified as murder. The victim was shot while asleep, without any
risk to appellant. And since appellant
surreptitiously entered the house of the victim to commit the crime, the trial
court correctly considered dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.
On the other hand, we
find no reason to disturb the trial court’s appreciation of lack of instruction
as a mitigating circumstance. The
said court was in a position to gauge appellant’s level of intelligence from
his appearÂance, demeanor and manner of answering questions.
The penalty for murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death (Art. 248, RPC). Because the
generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling is offset by the mitigating circumstance
of lack of instruction, the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period,
that is, reclusion perpetua, was correctly imposed by the trial court in the
murder case.
With respect to the
charge of illegal possession of firearm, there is no alternative but to find
appellant guilty thereof. Considering
that it was he who fired the fatal shots, his possession of the unlicensed
death weapon cannot be denied.
Considering further that he actually made use thereof for an illegal purpose, the imposition of the penalty
prescribed by law in its maximum period, namely, imprisonment to 10 years, is
likewise justified. (See 2692, Ad. Code,
as amended).
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed
with respect to the penalty imposed upon appellant Cornelio Manuel in each of
the two cases, but is modified by
increasing the indemnity adjudged by the lower court in the murder case to P12,
000.00, to be paid to the heirs of Dominador Irorita other than his wife. Costs against appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., took no part.
[1] In the charge of murder against Cornelio
Manuel, Segundina Agbayani,
Indelecia’s mother, was likewise charged as an accessory.
Eventually she was acquitted by the trial court on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
[2] Actually, Cornelio Manuel has appealed to
this Court only his conviction for murder; his conviction for illegal
possession of firearm was initially appealed to the Court of Appeals. But, as explained by the deputy clerk of the
trial court in his transmittal letter dated October 10, 1964, the records of
both cases were forwarded here because “the evidence in both cases, both
oral and documentary are inextricably the same, and it would be
impossible to forward the murder case to the Honorable Supreme Court and the
illegal possession of firearm to the Honorable Court of Appeals.” This
decision therefore deals also with Criminal Case No. 2512 (for illegal possession of firearm).
[3]
Sec. 1(f), Rule 115, Rules of Court. The Constitution also provides that “(I)n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right x x x to meet the
witness (against him) face to face x x x“(Art. III, Sec.
1, (17).
[4] See U.S.
v. Bello,
11 Phil. 526; see also People v. Lavarias
G.R. No. L-24399, June 29, 1968.
[5] The persons listed in the notebook were
members of a local association known as “zanjeria“,
the purpose of which was to help transform otherwise barren land into
productive ricefields for a share in the expected
harvests. Appellant was admittedly a
member of the “zanjeria“.