Adm. Case No. 767. December 20, 1971
AVELINA A. MAGNO AND FOSTER C. HOWELL, PETITIONERS, VS. LEON P. GELLADA, RESPONDENT.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The present administrative case is for the disbarment of respondent,
Leon P. Gellada, a member of the Philippine Bar, upon
a verified petition filed with this Court by petitioners Avelina
A. Magno and Foster C. Howell on May 3, 1967.
The charges are as follows:
“1. Representation of respondent in one and the same
case despite conflicting and antagonistic claims, without the consent of any
and all of the parties affected in said case, thus creating dissension and
conflicts between the two estates, namely:
the Estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges in Special Proceedings No.
1672 and the. Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges in Special Proceedings No. 1307, both
pending before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
2. Unauthorized
representation in a case despite his relief as counsel and unethically persisting
on appearing in said case by himself and through his newly appointed
assistants who replaced his former assistants and who were previously relieved
together with him.
3. The
unethical solicitation of cases from the heirs of the late Charles Newton Hodges
after his relief as counsel for the administrator of said estate, writing
several maudlin letters, some bordering in libel, slandering his brother
counsel, especially those who are already in the case and who replaced him in
the case.”
Respondent filed his answer to the petition, denying the
averments therein and putting up a number of affirmative defenses. In a resolution dated August 16, 1967 this Court referred the case to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Under date of October 27, 1971 the Solicitor General submitted his
report wherein, after discussing the evidence presented by the parties, both
oral and documentary, and making an extensive statement of facts found by him
to have been established by such evidence, he presents a resume thereof
together with his own conclusions.
“In a nutshell, the grounds for respondent’s disbarment as
prayed for can be classified into three main categories:
(1) Representation of conflicting interests, (2)
unauthorized representation in a case, and (3) unethical solicitation of cases.
Anent the first ground the following facts appear to be
incontrovertible:
The spouses Charles N. Hodges and Linnie
Jane Hodges, American citizens, died on December 25, 1962 and May 25, 1957, respectively. Inasmuch as respondent had been their
retained counsel before the last war and until their death, respondent filed a
petition before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Special Proceedings No.
1307) for the probate of the will of Linnie Jane
Hodges. The will was admitted to probate
and Charles N. Hodges was appointed administrator and later executor of the
estate of his deceased spouse.
Similarly, upon the death of Charles N. Hodges, respondent instituted
Special Proceedings 1672 before the same Court for the probate of his
will. Petitioner Avelina
Magno was appointed special administratrix
of the estate of Charles N. Hodges with Harold Davies as co-administrator. Upon the relief of petitioner Magno as administratrix of the
estate of C. Hodges, Atty. Mirasol was appointed
co-administrator, and subsequently the latter was replaced by Joe Hodges, who
in turn was replaced by the PCI Bank.
Both wills were prepared, acknowledged and notarized by Respondent.
With respect to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, petitioner Magno was appointed administratrix upon the death of Charles N. Hodges.
Respondent was counsel for petitioner Magno
in her capacity as Administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges and was also counsel for Charles N.
Hodges as administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, and later of Atty. Mirasol as co-administrator of Harold Davies. On June
10, 1964, Attys. Rizal R. Quimpo and Raul Manglapus entered
their appearance (Exhibit 42) as counsel for petitioner Avelina
Magno in her capacity as Administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. At that time, respondent was no longer
counsel for Atty. Mirasol, co-administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges, as he filed a notice of withdrawal of his appearance on
July 24, 1963 (Exh. 3).
On January 24, 1964,
a Motion (Exh. D & 4) was filed in both Special
Proceedings for the purpose of effecting a settlement of part of the
controversies existing in the administration of both estates, which provided
among others:
“3. x x x x x x x x x x
“(c) Leon P. Gellada
shall receive the sum of P29,200.00 for his services heretofore rendered to
both the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges and as attorney and notary public for C. N. Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges and said sum shall be charged to both
estates. In addition he shall receive a
retainer of P700.00 per month from February
1, 1964 and 10% of all collections effected on account of court
cases which he may handle and may be assigned to him by the administrators,
which monthly retainer and collection fees shall be charged to both the
estates of C. N. Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges.
“(e) The ten (10%) per cent collection fees
hereinabove stipulated payable to Attys. Gellada, Mirasol and Mediodia shall be
paid only after receipt of the sums collected by the administrators it being
understood that Gellada and Associates, by majority
vote, if need be, will agree on the distribution of the collection fees if, as
is contemplated, they all appear in and work on the different cases which are
understood to be their joint responsibilities regardless of assignment by the
Administrator.
“(f) Gellada &
Associates shall handle all pending collection cases for both the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges and they shall defend
all pending suits for money claims filed against said estates. No new cases are to be filed by them in court
in the future unless assigned to them by both administrators of the estates of
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges without prejudice
to their continuing to represent the administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Avelina A. Magno, and the Higdon
family. The firm of Ozaeta,
Gibbs and Ozaeta acting as counsel for and on behalf
of the PCIB acting as administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate in Special Proceedings
No. 1672 shall have the right to exercise general supervision over said
attorneys Gellada, Mirasol
and Mediodia but said firm shall have no right to
exercise supervision over said attorneys insofar as the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges is concerned. In the event collection cases are appealed to
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court the firm of Ozaeta,
Gibbs and Ozaeta may handle if it so decides such
appeals and any fees collected on such appeals shall be shared by said firm and
the Gellada & Associate in a fair and equitable
manner.
“(g) The retainers and collection fees of the Gellada and Associates hereinabove stipulated are subject
to amendment or termination at the end of one year. If terminated no further retainers or
collection fees shall be due or payable to them.”
Petitioners contend that in acting as counsel for C. N. Hodges,
Atty. Mirasol and Petitioner Avelina
Magno, he represented conflicting interests in the
estates of both spouses. This contention
is premised on the argument that respondent entertained the theory that upon
the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, her husband,
Charles, succeeded to her entire estate to the exclusion of the brothers and
sisters of Linnie Jane Hodges, so much so that the
latter were prejudiced in their rights.
Respondent on the other hand, has vehemently denied such allegation
and alleges that the said theory only came about when Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta entered
their appearance for some of the heirs of Charles Hodges, who claimed the
entire estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on account of
which respondent withdrew as counsel for Atty. Mirasol.
The records show that as early as July 24, 1963, respondent filed a notice of withdrawal as
counsel for Atty. Mirasol (Exh.
3) whereas Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta first appeared as counsel for PCIB, administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges in 1964.
Consequently, it could not be possible that the withdrawal of respondent
as counsel for Atty. Mirasol was allegedly due to the
theory of Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta that the heirs of C. N. Hodges succeeded to the
whole estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. It is to be noted that both wills provided
that upon the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse shall succeed to the
entirety of the estate of the deceased.* Obviously this provision gave rise
to various interpretations on the part of petitioners, the heirs to both
estates, their respective counsel, and respondent herein. However, such interpretation is a matter of
opinion, the validity of which is presently under litigation in the special
proceedings adverted to. Moreover, the
evidence is bereft of any finding that the heirs of Linnie
Jane Hodges and Charles Hodges were unduly prejudiced by the appearance of
respondent as counsel for petitioner Magno, and Atty.
Mirasol. On
the contrary, Joe Hodges, an heir of Charles N. Hodges and his counsel, J. A.
Hodges, Louise Hodges, and the Higdon family, all of whom are heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges, through their respective counsel,
signed the Motion dated January 24,
1964 (Exh. D & 4), showing their
conformity to the fees for services rendered by respondent and the cases in
which respondent shall continue as counsel.
Furthermore, in a pleading dated December 17, 1964 (Exh.
28) petitioner Magno agreed to respondent’s claim for
additional compensation considering the value of the estate and
“considering further, the amount of compensation already paid to Atty.
Allison J. Gibbs, who is comparatively new in this case.” In this
connection it is well-settled that the duties of an administrator of an estate
is to assemble the properties of the estate, pay the debts, and distribute the
residue among the heirs entitled thereto in accordance with the orders of a
competent court. These, precisely were
the duties of petitioner Magno as administratrix
of Linnie Jane Hodges’ estate and Atty. Mirasol as administrator of C. N. Hodges’ estate. As such they did not assume any interest
adverse to that of the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges
and Charles N. Hodges. The same can be
said of respondent, as counsel for both administratrix
and co-administrator.
If ever respondent filed suits against Joe Hodges and Howard
Hodges, heirs of Charles Hodges, and Era Bowman and Emma Howell, heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges, they were in pursuance of his claim for
attorneys fees for services rendered and damages suffered by him. These suits have no relation whatsoever to
the estates in question. Furthermore
when these cases were filed, respondent was no longer representing any of the administrators
or heirs of both estates.
It has been established by the evidence appearing on record that
upon the filing by petitioner Magno of the
“Manifestation” dated June
15, 1964 (Exh. G) relieving respondent
and his associates (Mirasol and Mediodia)
as counsel for Administratrix Magno
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo, who are
also counsels for the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges,
the respondent and said associates never appeared as counsel for Administratrix Magno or the heirs
of Linnie Jane Hodges. Consequently, neither he nor his associates
could be held liable for unauthorized representation. The acts of respondent pertinent to this
charge had only to do with the filing of a Motion to hold in abeyance the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion of Attys. Manglapus
and Quimpo (Exhibit 5) until the court resolves the
motion he filed to fix and approve the attorney’s fees of Gellada
and Associates in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Exh. H). Moreover,
because respondent continued to receive Notices for hearing, pleadings and
orders from the Court, he appeared before the Court not as counsel for any of
the parties in both estates, although he believed that he was still responsible
for the proper conduct of the case, but to apprise the Court of his improper
relief and the substitution of new lawyers who have taken over the case. The appearance of Attys. Norberto de la Cruz
and Reynaldo Gellada who took over from Attys.
Fernando Mirasol and Romeo Mediodia
were in connection with paragraph (f) of the Motion dated January 24, 1964
(Exhibits D and 4) previously mentioned, which were agreed upon by the
petitioners, the heirs and counsels of both estates.
Respondent was counsel for Fernando Mirasol,
co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges until July 24, 1963, when he filed his notice of
withdrawal as counsel (Exh. 3). The alleged letters of respondent to Jose
Hodges of Lubbock, Texas
(Exh. T) dated March 31, 1963 and to J. A. Hodges, dated March 15, 1963 (Exh.
U) are immaterial insofar as the charge for unethical solicitation of cases
from the heirs of the late Charles Hodges are concerned, because said letters
were written while respondent was still
counsel for Mirasol.
As to the letter purportedly sent by respondent to Mr. and Mrs. J. A.
Hodges, the latter replied that they did not wish respondent to resign as
estate lawyer. And as regards the letter
by respondent to Atty. Clinton of Texas, counsel of J. A. Hodges, it was
established that it was not to solicit cases from some of the heirs, but was in
answer to Clinton’s letter asking how much fees respondent would charge in
representing them, to which respondent answered that he was not particular
about his fees. At any rate, there is no
showing that respondent’s services as counsel for any of the parties were
engaged after he wrote the alleged “solicitation letters” and neither
did respondent appear as counsel for any of the parties of both estates after
he was relieved.
It is to be noted that because of this disbarment proceeding the
special proceedings in both estates have been suspended. The same is true with Civil Case No. 6886
(Exhibit 44) entitled Leon P. Gellada vs. Era Bowman,
et al. We would like to mention in
passing that parts of the testimonial evidence and some pleadings have been
marked with unsavory remarks and offensive language engendered by personal
ill-feelings of counsel of both parties toward each other, which ought to have
been carefully avoided as these have unnecessarily delayed proceedings of the cases
filed by their respective clients.
It is a well-settled rule that in disbarment proceedings, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing
proof (Go vs. Candoy, Adm. Case No. 736, October 23,
1967). Thus, as held in one case, the
power to disbar attorneys ought always to be exercised with great caution, and
should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. For the presumption is – an
attorney is innocent of the charges prepared and has performed his duty as an
officer of the court in accordance with his oath (Re Reily,
7 ALR 89 cited in In Re Tionko,
43 Phil. 191).
We submit that the evidence adduced is insufficient to justify the
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law of respondent.”
We have gone over the record and are of the opinion that the
foregoing findings and conclusions insofar as the actuations of respondent are
concerned, have been fully established.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Solicitor General’s
recommendation the instant petition is hereby dismissed and respondent Atty.
Leon P. Gellada is exonerated of the charges against
him. Let a copy of this decision be
filed with respondent’s record in the Roll of Attorneys.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
*
This particular statement of the Solicitor General does not give the pertinent
provisions of both wills in full, the litigation concerning which is now
pending in this Court in two appealed cases.