PEDRO J. VELASCO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Both appellant Velasco and appellee
Manila Electric Co. have filed their respective motions to reconsider the
decision of this Court dated 6 August
1971.  For the sake of
clarity, the two motions will be here dealt with separately.

A   – APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

The thrust of this motion is that the decision has incorrectly
assessed appellant’s damages and unreasonably reduced their amount.  It is first argued that the decision erred in
not taking into account, in computing appellant’s loss of income, the
appellant’s undeclared income of P8,338.20, assessed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for
the year 1954, in addition to his declared income for that year (P10,975), it
being argued that appellant never claimed any other source of income besides
his professional earnings.  Several
circumstances of record disprove this claim. 
(1) That the amount of P8,338.20 was kept apart
from the ordinary earnings of appellant for the year 1954 (P10,975), and not
declared with it, is in itself circumstantial evidence that it was not of
comparable character.  (2) If it was part
of his ordinary professional income, appellant was guilty of fraud in not
declaring it and he should not be allowed to derive advantage from his own
wrongdoing.  (3) The decision pointed but
that by including the undeclared amount in appellant’s disclosed professional
earnings for 1954, to a grand totals of P19,313.20, the income for said year
becomes abnormally high (in fact, more than double), as compared to appellant’s
earnings for the three preceding years, 1951-1953, that averaged not more than
P7,000 per annum.  Such abnormality
justifies the Court’s refusal to consider the undisclosed P8,338.20
as part of appellant’s regular income for the purpose of computing the
reduction in his earnings as a result of the complained acts of appellee.  (4)
Finally, the true source of the un­declared amount lay in appellant’s own
knowledge, but he chose not to disclose it; neither did he call upon the
assessing revenue officer to reveal its character.

Appellant Velasco urges that the damages awarded him are
inadequate considering the present high cost of living, and calls attention to
Article 1250 of the present Civil Code, and to the doctrines laid down in
People vs. Pantoja, G.R No. L-18793, 11 October 1968, 25 SCRA 468.  We do not deem the rules invoked to be
applicable.  Article 1250 of the Civil
Code is to the effect that:

“ART. 1250. 
In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency
stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the
establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is
an agreement to the contrary.”

It can be seen from the employment
of the words “extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated”
that the legal rule envisages contractual obligations where a specific
currency is selected by the parties as
the medium of payment; hence it is inapplicable to obligations arising from tort and not from
contract, as in the case at bar, besides
there being no showing that the factual assumption of the article has
come into existence.  As to the Pantoja ruling, the regard paid to the decreasing purchase of the peso was
considered a factor in estimating the indemnity due for loss of life, which in itself is not susceptible of
accurate estimation.  It should not be
forgotten that the damages awarded to herein appellant were by no means full
compensatory damages, since the decision
makes clear that appellant, by his failure to minimize his damages by means easily within his reach, was declared entitled only to a reduced award for the nuisance sued upon
(Steel vs. Rail & River Coal Co., 42 Ohio App. 228, 182 N. E. 552); and the
amount granted him had already taken into account the changed economic
circumstances.

Nor is the fact that appellant lost a chance to sell his house
for P95,000 to Jose Valencia constitute a ground for
an award of damages in that amount.  As
remarked in the main decision, there is no adequate proof of loss, since there
is no evidence of the depreciation in the market value of the house in question
caused by the acts of defendant Meralco.  The house, after
all, has remained with appellant, and he admits in his motion for
reconsideration (page 48) that properties have increased in value by 2006 since
then.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration is
denied.

B  – APPELLEE’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Appellee Manila Electric Company argues
that in case the noise emitted by its substation can not be brought down to the
50 decibel level imposed by our decision in chief, the remedy of the appellant
would be to compel the appellee Company to acquire
and pay for the value of the house, under the so-called doctrine of
“inverse condemnation”, and cites in support our doctrines in Bengzon vs. Province of Pangasinan,
62 Phil. 816, and Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., L-18841,
27 January 1969, 26 SCRA 620-634.  But as pointed out by appellant in his
opposition, this issue was not raised, nor was the inverse condemnation
doctrine invoked in the trial court, so that it would be improper to consider
it on appeal, and worse still, on a motion for reconsideration of the decision
on the merits.  Furthermore, there is no
showing that it is impossible to reduce the substation noise to the level
decreed by this Court in the main decision. 
On the contrary, appellee’s own evidence is
that the noise can be reduced by erecting a wall barrier on the line separating
the substation lot and the property of appellant.

The version that appellee did not erect
the wall because of the objections of appellant’s wife was denied by her, and
there is no preponderance of evidence in favor of appellee
on this point.  Moreover, since it was
appellant Dr. Velasco who complained, his wife’s objection would not suffice to
constitute a waiver of his claim.

As to the petition to increase the sound level prescribed by this
Court from 50 to 55 decibels, on the ground that present “ambient sound
already ranges from 44 to 55 decibels in the mornings”, the same can not
be granted.  As shown by the evidence at
the trial, the intensity of the noise emitted by appellee’s
transformers are most objectionable at night, when people are endeavoring to
rest and sleep in compensation for the fatigue and tensions accumulated during
daytime.

WHEREFORE, appellee’s motion to
reconsider is likewise denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.