BARTOLOME A. PASTOR, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. FRISCO T. LILAGAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TACLOBAN CITY, BRANCH 34, AND SUSAN CHAPMAN-L…
LAGURA-YAP, J.:
The facts of this case are not complicated:
On November 4, 2002, a Complaint[4] for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Partition, Reconveyance, Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Damages and Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order was filed by the heirs of the late Louies Chapman and Hipolita Chapman, all represented by Susan Chapman-Lee (private respondent), against Bartolome Pastor Jr. (petitioner) and Foundational Center Inc., before the RTC of Tacloban City. The disputed property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-81. In the main, private respondent alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale[5] dated November 12, 1977, which was the basis of TCT No. T-81, is void because Hipolita Chapman’s signature thereon was forged.[6] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2002-11-232, raffled to the RTC of Tacloban City.
It appears, however, that private respondent’s co-heirs refused to be included in the case. Accordingly, private respondent filed an Amended Complaint[7] dated September 3, 2004, impleading them as party-defendants.
On July 19, 2012, or about eleven years after the case was initially instituted, private respondent (plaintiff therein) rested her case and filed a formal offer of exhibits. Thereafter, petitioner’s presentation of evidence was set on December 4, 2012. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to appear in court on that date and the lower court issued an Order[8] resetting the hearing of the case on March 8, 2013, with a warning that failure on the part of defendant (petitioner herein) to adduce evidence on the next setting would amount to a waiver on his part to present evidence and that the case will be deemed submitted for decision upon filing of the parties’ memoranda.
On March 7, 2013, petitioner’s counsel appeared in court and verbally moved for another resetting on the ground that their witnesses are not available and that their respective judicial affidavits are not yet ready. In its Order[9] dated March 8, 2013, the lower court denied petitioner’s motion for postponement, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the oral motion to postpone is denied, and consequently, the defendants have lost their opportunity/right to adduce evidence.
The above-entitled case is hereby ordered submitted for DECISION after the plaintiffs and defendants shall have filed their respective MEMORANDA. Parties are hereby given twenty (20) days to submit said memorandum from receipt of this Order. After the expiration of the period, with or without the memorandum, the case shall be deemed submitted for DECISION.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration[10] of the above Order but it was denied on April 22, 2013.[11]
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before Us raising the lone assignment of error:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT STRICTLY ADHERED TO ITS IMPRESSION THAT THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO PRESENT AND ADDUCE EVIDENCE WAS A WAIVER OF SUCH RIGHT.
Petitioner argues that while procedural rules are prescribed to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant the courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.[12] Considering, too, that the Judicial Affidavit Rule (Administrative Memorandum No. 12-8-8-SC) took effect only recently, the trial court should have acted with leniency. Thus, public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Order which considered him to have waived his right to present evidence.
In her Comment,[13] private respondent refutes all the material allegations in the petition. Private respondent maintains that petitioner was given numerous opportunities to present himself and his witnesses but he simply refused to avail of those opportunities. Petitioner did not file any written motion for postponement in gross disregard of the Rules. Further, private respondent maintains that the non-inclusion of the Foundational Center Inc., which is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 2002-11-232, is fatal to the case as it is an indispensable party. Lastly, petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration with respect to the non-admission of the judicial affidavits in the April 22, 2013 Order, which is a condition sine qua non before the present petition for certiorari can be filed.
In his Reply to Private Respondent’s Comment,[14] petitioner counters that he did not drag the case for eleven years and that contrary to private respondent’s assertion, he had only one missed opportunity to present his evidence under the Judicial Affidavit Rule. The public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to apply the requirements of Section 10 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule. Public respondent failed to discuss and rule whether petitioner had a valid reason to delay the submission of his witnesses’ judicial affidavits based on the first violation of the rule. Corollarily, public respondent violated petitioner’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws when he unfairly granted private respondent all her chances, a total of six times, but denied petitioner his first chance under the Judicial Affidavit Rule.
On November 13, 2013, this Court issued a Resolution[15] denying petitioner’s Very Urgent Motion for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,[16] and directing the parties to file their respective memoranda. Both parties promptly complied with the aforesaid resolution and submitted their memoranda[17] and thereafter, the instant petition was deemed submitted for decision.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to grant the petition.
At first blush, it would seem that the Order declaring petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and the Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereto were regular and that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Orders. However, a closer look into the facts and a deeper understanding of pertinent laws and relevant jurisprudence would show that there are peculiar circumstances which sway Us into reversing, pro hac vice, the March 8, 2013 and April 22, 2013 Orders.
First, the subject properties serve an important public function, having been devoted to religious (Catholic Charismatic Center) and educational (St. Therese Christian Charismatic Center) purposes, housing 1,000 general members and 800 students. At present, the subject properties, including the improvements constructed thereon, are valued at around sixty million pesos (P60,000,000.00).[18] To decide the case based on mere technicalities would subvert, rather than promote, justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as in the instant case, should no longer be subject to cavil.[19]
Second, a perusal of petitioner’s judicial affidavits, which public respondent conveniently refused to admit, reveals that petitioner has a meritorious case. It must be stressed that private respondent instituted the complaint on the ground that the deed of sale is void since Hipolita’s signature thereon was forged. Petitioner has procured witnesses to controvert this claim, one of whom served as a witness to the said deed of sale. Petitioner’s judicial affidavit, too, discussed in detail how Hipolita offered to sell, and in fact sold, the properties to the petitioner because the former was about to leave the country for good. These allegations are better ventilated in a full-blown trial. To decide the case based solely on the evidence of private respondent (plaintiff therein) would effectively be a default judgment in her favor. In Tan v. Dumarpa,[20] the Supreme Court ruled that “Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. In this regard, We have often admonished courts to be liberal as default judgments are frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to petitioner and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which petitioner asks that it be set aside.”
Third, public respondent should have exercised leniency in its application of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, considering that it took effect only on January 1, 2013, or just 3 months prior to the March 8, 2013 Order. Section 10 of the said Rule provides for the effect of non-compliance with the Judicial Affidavit Rule, viz:
Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial Affidavit Rule. – (a) A party who fails to submit the required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have waived their submission. The court may, however, allow only once the late submission of the same provided, the delay is for a valid reason, would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00 at the discretion of the court.
The first part of the provision states the general rule that failure to submit the required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed a waiver on their submission. The second part provides for its exception, as the courts may allow the late submission thereof provided the delay is for a valid reason, would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00, at the discretion of the court. All of the aforementioned requisites are present in this case. The hearing on March 7, 2013 was canceled due to the unexpected visit of the Chief Justice in Tacloban.[21] Petitioner, however, failed to submit his judicial affidavit and that of his witnesses on the hearing set the following day. Such failure is not entirely unjustified considering that petitioner’s counsel had to prepare numerous judicial affidavits in other cases he handles, which is understandably not an easy task to accomplish. As this was petitioner’s first delay in the advent of the Judicial Affidavit Rule, public respondent should have been lenient and allowed petitioner to submit his judicial affidavits belatedly. Furthermore, private respondent would not be prejudiced by such belated submission as she has already rested her case after presenting her evidence, which, notably, took more than ten (10) years.
Lastly, and this is important, public respondent should have been fair and circumspect in his treatment to both parties. He cannot apply the rule on substantial justice on private respondent on one hand, and the rule of strict interpretation on the petitioner on the other hand. We cannot close Our eyes to the fact that, as already mentioned, it took private respondent more than 10 years to present her evidence and in that span of time, public respondent had been extremely lenient to private respondent, at least insofar as postponements and late submission of motions and pleadings are concerned. To recall, when private respondent failed to file an amended complaint on time, in violation of its March 16, 2004 Order,[22] public respondent still admitted the same in its November 16, 2004 Order[23] on the ground of substantial justice. Public respondent stated in the said Order that the strict implementation of the Rules must sometimes yield to the interest of substantial justice and due process. In the same Order, petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss[24] was denied to give private respondent the chance to ventilate her claims in a full-blown trial. Considering the length of time upon which private respondent presented her case, it is highly likely that numerous motions for resetting were filed and granted by the trial court. As to why public respondent allowed private respondent an entire decade to present her claim but chose to strictly apply the Rules against petitioner with great haste remains a mystery to this Court. Public respondent should have acted fairly and prudently because he sits in a court of law, justice and equity.
From the foregoing discussions, it is crystal clear that the ends of justice will be better served if the case is decided based on its merits, and not on technicalities. Again, in Tan v. Dumarpa,[25] the Supreme Court had this to say:
“Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, We will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.
In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held that “cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better.”
In fact, “procedural rules are created not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It is far better to dispose of the case on the merits which is a primordial end rather than on a technicality, if it be the case that may result in injustice.” (Emphasis Ours, citations omitted)
On the Propriety of the Instant Petition
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy thereto such as when an error of judgment as well as of procedure are involved. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special civil action of certiorari. However, in certain exceptional cases, where the rigid application of such rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed. Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of.[26] In this case, a rigid application of the Rules would undeniably result in a miscarriage of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Orders dated March 8, 2013 and April 22, 2013 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Public respondent is directed to allow petitioner to present evidence in Civil Case No. 2002-11-232 and thereafter, to decide the case based on its merits.
SO ORDERED.
Delos Santos, J., Chairperson, and Lopez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-14.
[2] Issued by Judge Frisco Lilagan; Annex A of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 15-16.
[3] Annex B of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 17-21.
[4] Rollo, pp. 22-29.
[5] dated November 12,1997; Rollo, p. 31
[6] Rollo, p. 24.
[7] Id. at 35-42.
[8] as referenced in page 1 of the March 8, 2013 Order.
[9] See footnote 2.
[10] Rollo, pp. 59-63.
[11] See footnote 3.
[12] Rollo, p. 11.
[13] Id. at 109-127.
[14] Id. at 139-155.
[15] Id. at 262-265.
[16] Id. at 225-230.
[17] Petitioner’s Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 266-272; Respondent’s Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 273-289.
[18] Rollo, p. 151-153.
[19] Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 32, 42-43 (2002).
[20] G.R. No. 138777, September 22, 2004.
[21] Annex C of the Reply; Rollo, p. 160.
[22] Annex F of the Petition; Rollo, p. 176.
[23] Annex P of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 216-217.
[24] Rollo, pp. 231-240.
[25] Supra.
[26] Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone, 402 Phil. 271 (2001).