FILIPINO METALS CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE BLAS OPLE, SECRETARY OF LABOR, CARMELO NORIEL, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS, MR. GEORGE EDUVALA, MR. ZARAGOZA, NEW FILIPINO…

Two questions, as yet unresolved at the time of the filing of
this petition as well as at the time of its submission, called for its being
given due course.  They are (1) whether
the then Acting Secretary of Labor acted according to law in referring back an
appeal from an order of the Director of Labor Relations, requiring the holding
of a certification election to such official for him to decide and (2) whether
an employer has an interest cognizable in law to appeal from such order.  The second question had since then been
resolved, but the first has not as yet been given a definitive answer.

Petitioner as the employer filed this certiorari
proceeding assailing the actuation of the then Acting Secretary of Labor Amado G. Inciong.  He referred back to the then Director of
Labor Relations, Carmelo C. Noriel,^[1]
the appeal interposed by petitioner against an order declaring an existing
collective bargaining agreement as suspended subject to the outcome of the
certification election, required to be held within twenty days.  The basis for such appeal was the existence
of a certified collective bargaining agreement which, in the opinion of petitioner,
should be given full force and effect rather than being suspended.  After a motion for reconsideration was denied, an appeal was taken to the then
Acting Secretary of Labor.  It is the
contention of petitioner that there should be a decision by the Secretary or
Acting Secretary, instead of the appeal being sent to the very same official
who issued the order sought to be nullified. 
In the answer filed on behalf of public respondents, such a procedure
was sought to be justified on the basis of one of the implementing rules
providing that the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations in certification
matters should be final and unappealable.^[2]
The then Acting Secretary Inciong, so it is argued,
“was completely justified in referring the case back to the Director of
Labor Relations for the latter to treat the same as a motion for reconsideration.”^[3]

The petition must be dismissed not in accordance with the above
view which raises a procedural due process question, but in accordance with
previous authoritative rulings (1) on the lack of interest of
petitioner-employer cognizable by law and (2) the necessity for the holding of
a certification election.

1.       The pertinent
question of the assailed order of the then Secretary of Labor Amado G. Inciong reads as
follows:  “Without waiving any of
our powers and duties under the Administrative Code [to] review any decision by
subordinate officials of this Depart­ment, it is our policy that this Office
will intervene in Med-Arbitration cases only where there is an imminent threat
to public order and stability or when, impelled by urgent public
considerations, the Secretary of Labor at his own initiative decides to review
decisions of the Bureau of Labor Relations.”^[4]
The introductory phrase is correct insofar as it states categorically that the
Secretary of Labor then, the Minister of Labor now, is vested with the power of
reviewing “any decision by subordinate officials” and is free from
any objection when it was made clear that there was no waiver of such power,
with this qualification that a duty cannot be waived.  Then came the statement of the policy of
non-intervention except in cases of “imminent threat to public order and
stability or when, impelled by urgent public considerations,” such power
to review decisions of the Bureau of Labor Relations would be exercised.  Such a limitation as a matter of policy may
be acceptable.  There is this flaw,
however, from which it suffers.  An
appeal having been taken from an order of the Bureau of Labor Relations, there
was a duty cast upon the then Acting Secretary to pass on it.  He could have affirmed what was done by his
subordinate, modified it, or reversed it. 
The tenor of his order being obviously the lack of an “imminent threat
to public order and stability” as well as of “urgent public
considerations,” an affirmance of the appealed
decision was indicated.  When, instead,
the matter was referred anew to the very same official, even if in the guise of
treating it as a motion for reconsideration, there was an affront to the concept
of procedural due process.  Considering
that the then Acting Secretary of Labor called on the Director of Bureau of
Labor Relations to review his own determination, the objection based on due process ground cannot be brushed
aside.  It is impressed with merit.^[5] As is so well put in an oft-quoted legal
maxim:  Nemo
debet esse judex in propria
causa.

2.       As pointed out in the
opening paragraph of this opinion, this Court has authoritatively laid down the
controlling doctrine as to when an employer may have an interest sufficient in
law enabling him to contest a certification election.  There is relevance to this excerpt from
Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel:^[6] “The record of this proceeding
leaves no doubt that all the while the party that offered the most obdurate
resistance to the holding of a certification election is manage­ment,
petitioner Consolidated Farms, Inc., II. 
That circumstance of itself militated against the success of this
petition.  On a matter that should be the
exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining
representative, the employer is definitely an intruder.  His participation, to say the least, deserves
no encouragement.  This Court should be
the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with a
purely internal affair of labor.”^[7]
Reference was likewise made in the above decision to the earlier case of Monark International, Inc. v. Noriel.^[8]
Thus:  “It is true that there may be
circumstances where the interest of the employer calls for its being heard on
the matter.  An obvious instance is where
it invokes the obstacle interposed by the contract-bar rule.”^[9]
There is nothing in its thirteen-page appeal^[10]
to the Acting Secretary of Labor clearly indicative that the main reliance was
on the contract-bar rule.  All it alleged
was that there was an existing collective bargaining agreement and therefore it
would be “untimely” to hold a certification election.^[11]
That clearly does not suffice to take this case out of the operation of the authoritative doctrine.  At any rate, the time that had elapsed since
1976 would make it manifest that
a certification election is long overdue.

3.       It is equally
indubitable that the doubt sought to be cast on the authenticity of the signa­tures
appearing in the petition for certification election cannot be a bar to its
being granted.  Even on the assumption
that the evidence is clearly insufficient and the number of signatories less
than 30% that cannot militate against the favorable response to such petition
for certification election.  As far back
as Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations,^[12]
a 1976 decision, this Court categorically held: “Petitioner’s contention
to the effect that the 30% requirement should be satisfied suffers from an even
graver flaw.  It fails to distinguish
between the right of a labor organization to be able to persuade 30% of the
labor force to petition for a certification election, in which case respondent
Bureau is left with no choice but to order it, and the power of such
governmental agency precisely entrusted with the implementation of the
collective bargaining process to determine, consi­dering the likelihood that
there may be several unions within a bargaining unit to order such an election
precisely for the purpose of ascertaining, which of them shall be the exclusive
collective bargaining representative. 
The decision of respondent Bureau of April 14, 1975 was intended for that purpose.  That was why not only petitioner but also the
Philippine Federation of Labor, the National Labor Union, the National
Federation of Labor Unions and the Samahan ng mga Manggagawa
at Kawani sa AG&P were
included in the list of labor unions that could be voted on.  To reiterate a thought already expressed,
what could be more appropriate than such a procedure if the goal desired is to
enable labor to determine which of the competing organizations should represent
it for the purpose of a collective bargaining contract?”^[13]

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the restraining
order lifted.  Costs against Filipino Metals
Corporation.

Aquino, Concepcion,
Jr., Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Barredo and Abad
Santos, JJ., are on official leave.

^[1]
The other respondents are Mr. George Eduvala, Mr. Zaragoza, New Filipino Metal Workers Union-TUPAS, and
Industrial Workers Union.

^[2]
Paragraph 10, Answer, quoting Section 10, Book V, of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code which reads: 
“The Bureau shall have twenty (20) work­ing days from receipt of
the records of the case within which to decide the appeal.  Its decision shall be final and unappealable.”

^[3]
Ibid.

^[4]
Petition, Annex Q.

^[5]
There is this exception.  An appeal could
be referred back by the Minister of Labor to the Director of Labor Relations in
the absence of evidence for the reception thereof, on the basis of which a
decision can be rendered by the latter. 
Cf. Metro Drug Corpo­ration v. Sagmit,
L-51154, October 18, 1979,
93 SCRA 560 (per Melencio-Herrera, J.)

^[6]
L-47752, July 31, 1978, 84
SCRA 469.

^[7]
Ibid, 473.

^[8]
L-47570-71, May 11, 1978,
83 SCRA 114.

^[9]
Ibid, 118.

^[10]
Petition, Annex S.

^[11]
Ibid, 13.

^[12]
L-42115, January 27, 1976,
69 SCRA 132.

^[13]
Ibid, 141.  The above doctrine was
reiterated in Today’s Knitting Free Workers Union v. Noriel,
L-45057, February 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 450; Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa
v. Noriel, L-45475, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA
414; Monark International Inc. v. Noriel, L-47570-71, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA 114; National
Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna, L-46722, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA
607; Scout Ramon v. Albano Memorial College v.
Noriel, L-48347, October 3, 1978, 85 SCRA 494.