PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (PALEA) AND FORTUNATO F. BIANGCO, FOR HIMSELF AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF PALEA, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO DE LA ROSA …

This special proceeding for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
was given due course notwithstanding the questions raised being primarily
procedural in view of the allegations that the grant of a preliminary mandatory
injunction by then respondent Judge Francisco de la Rosa, now deceased,
amounted to a judicial interference with a labor dispute, the petitioners being
the Philippine Air Lines Employees’ Association and Fortunato
F. Biangco, then the incumbent President of such
labor organization.  The answer submitted
denied that the grant of such preliminary mandatory injunction could be
characterized as a grave abuse of discretion and denied further that it was a
result of a bias or prejudice against petitioner Biangco,
who, in the elections of officers in such labor organization, won over a reelectionist candidate. Thereafter, memoranda of both
sides were filed.  In the reply
memorandum for private respondent Philippine Air Lines, Inc., after a recital
of the facts by its then counsel, the late Crispin D. Baizas,
there was a summary of the relevant facts justifying the issuance of the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction and the absence of any taint of inflicting
damage or prejudice to any labor organization.  Thus: “1. Petitioner Fortunato
Biangco was elected PALEA president somewhere in
April, 1967.  2.  He succeeded as president of the petitioner
PALEA, Vicente Balajadia who in turn succeeded Emilio
F. Saño. 
3.  Petitioner PALEA under the
presidency of Vicente Balajadia, did not hold office at the premises in question.  Vicente Balajadia
removed their offices when this respondent advised them to vacate the
premises.  When petitioner Fortunato Biangco then assumed
the presidency, the offices of petitioner PALEA were not in the premises in
question.  4.  When the petitioners’ offices were
transferred by Vicente Balajadia from the premises in
question, Saño remained, for which reason ejectment proceedings were taken against him.  5. 
Petitioners filed an urgent motion for a
reconsideration of the order of the court dated September 1, 1967 and to stay the execution of the
alias writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which was heard by the
respondent Judge.  6.  After the said urgent motion was heard and
submitted for resolution, petitioners by way of a second thought filed the
instant petition on grounds not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.  7. 
That petitioners have a remedy in the lower court but to use their own
words – ‘it was improper for peti­tioners to intervene in the case at that
stage, for it was already on appeal from the inferior court and to do the same
would be to raise issues not raised on or in the inferior court – this matter
not allowed by the Rules of Court.’ The petitioners, however, forgot that the
appeal to the Court of First Instance would involve a trial de novo of the
case.”^[1]

It is clear from the
petition itself that this action is intertwined with Civil Case No. 2742^[2] for ejectment
against the aforesaid Emilio F. Saño.  It was as an incident of such action that the assailed preliminary
mandatory injunction was issued.  What
the petition failed to state was that such a case was then on appeal before
respondent Judge.  Thereafter,
defendant-appellant Saño filed a motion to dismiss
appeal which was granted not by the late respondent Judge but by the Judge then
presiding, Judge Enrique A. Agana, Sr.  There is, therefore, ample
support for the view advanced by private respondent that no right of a labor
organization or of petitioner Biangco as the then
President was violated by the issuance of the preliminary mandatory
injunction.  It is equally far-fetched,
although a semblance of plausibility was sought to be imparted to the petition,
to impute to the late respondent Judge failure to manifest fidelity to the
protection that the Constitution accords to labor,^[3] as interpreted by a host of decisions of
this Tribunal notable for their unfailing sympathy with its objective.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.  No costs.

Concepcion, Jr., Abad
Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., in the result.

Barredo, J., is on leave.

^[1]
Reply Memorandum for Respondent Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 6-7.

^[2]
Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Emilio F. Saño.

^[3]
According to Article II, Section 9 of the Constitution:  “The State shall afford protection to
labor, promote full employment and equality in employ­ment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations
between workers and employers.  The State
shall assure the rights of workers to self-organi­zation, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.  The State may provide for compulsory
arbitration.” Under the 1935 Constitution, Article XIV, Section 6, the
provision reads: “The State shall afford protection to labor, espe­cially
to working women and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner
and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture.  The State may provide for compulsory
arbitration.”