DIONISIA PARAMI VDA. DE CABASAG, PETITIONER, VS. AMADOR P. SU, RICARDO BORBON, ROQUE L. SU, SR., TIMOTEO LOZADA, MARIA (NIEVES) LOZADA VDA. DE SU AND HONORABLE ALFREDO CATOLICO,…

Petition for certiorari
to reverse a decision of the Court of First Instance (Branch I) of Misamis Occidental in its Civil Case No. 2418, then
presided by the Honorable Alfredo Catolico.

Petitioner Dionisia Parami Vda. de Cabasag had filed a complaint
in said case entitled “Recovery of Actual Damages of Real Property”
wherein she pleaded three causes of action against the private respondents
herein.  Basic facts alleged were that
she and her late husband were holders and possessors of a parcel of coconut
land in Salimpono, Sapang Dalaga, Misamis Occidental,
covered by Tax Declarations No. 3976 and 3977, and by Homestead Application No.
V-73776 (E-V-65535) duly approved by the Bureau of Lands; that being illiterate
and ignorant, the plaintiff and her late husband were induced to live in the
house of defendant Su, where the husband subsequently died; that while there,
the defendants conspiring together, induced the couple to execute and thumbmark a document deceitfully represented to be a deed
acknowledging an indebtedness of P4,000.00 which plaintiff and her husband had
borrowed to repay a previous obligation to a chinaman
in Dipolog, Zamboanga, but
which deed turned out to be one of absolute sale of the land previously
mentioned and its improvements, for an alleged price of P11,000.00 that was
never received by the purported vendors.

In the first cause of action, it is averred that defendants took
physical possession of the land on the strength of the alleged sale and reaped
the fruits thereof, to the damage of the real owners in the sum of P57,000.00.

For a second cause of action, it is pleaded that the defendants
(respondents here) “confabulating, cooperating and helping one
another” demolished the plaintiff’s house in said land, valued at P10,000.00.

And for a third cause of action, it is alleged that plaintiff
suffered “financial anguish, mental torture and social humiliation”
resulting in moral damages amounting to P50,000.00 and
attorney’s fees.

The complaint therefore prayed for a declaration of nullity of
the deed of sale and recovery of damages and attorneys’ fees totalling P122,000.00.

After answers traversing the averments of the complaint, pleading
misjoinder of defendants and counterclaiming for P105,000.00 damages and attorney’s fees, the Court below
remanded the case to the Justice of the Peace Court of Sapang
Dalaga, in an order reading as follows (Petition,
Annex 4):

“When this case was called for hearing today, for the purpose
of finding out which court has original jurisdiction to try the same, it appearing
on the record that this court has already ordered or authorized a witness for
the plaintiff in this case to take the corresponding deposition but by reason
of the expressed provisions of Republic Act No. 3828 regarding the original
jurisdiction of Municipal Courts with respect of cases of this nature, the same
falling squarely in the provisions of said Republic Act 3828, this case is
hereby ordered remanded to the Justice of the Peace Court of Sapang Dalaga for trial on the
merit and for proper disposition.

“SO ORDERED.”

Reconsideration having been asked and denied, the petition for certiorari was filed in this Court.  Defendants answered that the order complained
of was rendered “in the honest belief that the case was really within the
competent jurisdiction of the said Municipal Court” of Sapang
Dalaga.

Plainly, the lower Court’s order, Annex “4” of the
complaint is not only erroneous but indefensible.  Republic Act 3828 merely increased the Civil
jurisdiction of Municipal Courts to cases involving not more than P10,000.00,^[1]
which is but a tenth of the damages claimed both in the complaint and the
answer.  Moreover, the complaint also
prayed for the nullification of the deed of sale, and consequent recovery of a
piece of land, which placed the case within the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance and not that of the inferior courts (Cf. Pajarillo
vs. Manahan, 99 Phil. 1000, 1003) that can only pass upon title to land as
incident to forcible entry and detainer suits (Judiciary
Act, sec. 88).

By what process the Court of First Instance arrived at its
extraordinary conclusion, we are at a loss to understand, because the order
sets forth no reasons.  That His Honor,
the trial judge, honestly believed that he had no jurisdiction is not relevant,
since the question is one of law. 
Plainly, the matter was not given proper attention.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted, and the order
complained of is annulled and set aside. 
The case is remanded to the Court of origin, for further proceedings
conformably to law.  Costs
against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1] “SEC.
7 – The first and second paragraphs of Section eighty-eight of the same Act, as
amended, are hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 88.  Original jurisdiction in
civil cases.  – In all civil
actions, including those mentioned in Rules fifty-nine and sixty-two of the
Rules of Court, arising in his municipality or city, and not exclusively
cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the justice
of the peace and the judge of a municipal court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the value of the subject-matter or amount of the demand does
not exceed ten thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs.  Where there are several claims or causes of
action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single
complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate
claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. 
In forcible entry and detainer proceedings,
the justice of the peace or judge of the municipal court shall have original
jurisdiction, but the said justice or judge may receive evidence upon the
question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the property, solely
for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and
damages for detention.  In forcible entry
proceedings, he may grant preliminary injunctions, in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, to prevent the defendant from committing
further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.