RAFAEL FALCOTELO, FERNANDO JOSE, REYNALDO ROXAS, SANTOS COMENDADOR AND ULPIANO TAOPO, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. RESTITUTO GALI, CIPRIANO ILAGAN, SEGUNDO GONZALES, SALVADOR DE …

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the appeal taken by petitioners herein
from an order of dismissal of the City Court of Caloocan.

The present action, which petitioners characterize as one of quo
warranto, was commenced on March 17, 1964.  It is alleged in the petition that petitioner
Rafael Falcotelo and his co-petitioner Fernando Jose
Reynaldo Roxas, Santos Comendador
and Ulpiano Taopo, were
duly registered candidates, the first, for barrio captain, and the others, for
membership of the Barrio Council for Bagong Barrio,
City of Caloocan, at the elections held in said
barrio, on January 12, 1964; that, in due course, the Board of Election Tellers
for the Bagong Barrio certified that Falcotelo and his aforementioned co-petitioners had then
been elected barrio captain and barrio councilmen, respectively, of said
barrio; that Falcotelo assumed his duties as
barrio  captain, on January 13, 1964,
whereas, his co-petitioners began to discharge their duties, as barrio
councilmen, on January 16, 1964; that petitioners continued to discharge their
respective duties up to January 27, 1964; that respondent Res­tituto
Gali was a candidate for barrio captain in the
elections held on January 12, 1964, although petitioner Falcotelo
defeated him in said elections; that respondents Salvador de Guzman and
Alejandro Pangyarihan were, likewise, registered candidates
for the barrio council, in the same elections, and were among those proclaimed
elected by the Board of Election Tellers, although they (Guzman and Pangyarihan) refused to assume the duties of barrio councilmen
by virtue of said proclamation; that, on January 26, 1964, another election was
held for the same barrio council of Bagong Barrio;
that Restituto Gali and the
other respondents herein, namely, Cipriano Ilagan, Segundo Gonzales, Paulino
Pascual, Alfredo Moreno, Salvador de Guzman and Alejandro
Pangyarihan, were proclaimed elected in said
elections, respondent Gali, as barrio captain, and the
other respondents, as members of the barrio council of Bagong
Barrio; that petitioners herein did not enter their respective candidacies for
the elections held on January 26, 1964, but opposed the same “through proper re­presentations
made with the Commission on Elections, and the Rizal
Province and Caloocan City PC Command;” and
“that respondents are now unlawfully holding and exercising the powers and
prerogatives of the Bagong Barrio Council,
particularly, that of Barrio Captain and Councilmen, and performing the
functions connected therewith.”

Respondents denied the main averments of the petition, and
affirmed, inter alia, that the
elections scheduled to be held on January 12, 1964, had been postponed to January
26, 1964, by resolution of the old Barrio Council of Bagong
Barrio, dated January 10, 1964; that such postponement was due to lack of funds
for said elections and to the uncertainty the existing as regards the precise territorial
boundaries of Bagong Barrio, in view of which the
corresponding query had been submitted to the office of the Mayor of Caloocan City; that despite said postponement, herein
petitioners had proceeded with the elections on January 12, 1964, without
authority therefor; that the alleged election of
petitioners herein, on January 12, 1964, is accordingly, null and void; that
respondents are the duly elected and qualified members of the barrio council
for Bagong Barrio; that petitioners had never performed
and exercised the duties of members of said council; that the city Court of Caloocan has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a quo warranto case, like the one at bar, which is within the
jurisdiction of courts of first instance and the Supreme Court; and that the
proper action, under Republic Act No. 3590, should be an election contest.

After appropriate proceedings, the City Court of Caloocan issued an order holding that, although it had
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, pursuant to the eighth paragraph of
Section 8 of the Revised Barrio Charter (Republic Act No. 3590), petitioners
are barred by the statute of limitations of actions (Sections 173 and 174 of
the Revised Election Code).  It,
accordingly, dismissed the case, in view of which peti­tioners appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, in turn,
dismissed the appeal upon the ground that, pursuant to Sections 87, 88 and 90
of Republic Act No. 296, and Section 8 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, the
original jurisdiction over quo warranto
proceedings is in the Supreme Court and in Courts of First Instance, and that
consequently, the City Court of Caloocan had no
jurisdiction over the present case.  A
reconsideration of the order to this effect having been denied, petitioners interposed
the present appeal.

Obviously, the court of first instance erred in dismissing the appeal
on account of lack of jurisdiction of the city court to take cognizance of this
case.  If this premise were true, the proper
step would have been to dismiss the case, unless the parties were
agreeable to the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the court of first
instance, to which respondents seem to have objected.  Said premise was, however, erroneous, for the
pertinent part of Section 8 of the Revised Barrio Charter (Republic Act No.
3590) reads:

“x x x All
disputes over barrio elections shall be brought before the justice of the
peace court of the municipality concerned; And in the determination and
decision thereof, the court shall follow as closely as possible the procedure
prescribed for inferior courts in Rule 4, Rules of Court.  The decision of the justice of the peace
court shall be appealable pursuant to the Rules of
Court to the Court of First Instance whose decision shall be final on questions
of fact.”

Referring to the counterpart of this paragraph, in Section 7 of
the original Barrio Charter (Republic Act No. 2370) – which is identical
thereto – this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reyes, held, in Palma
vs. Mandocdoc:^[1]

“x x x The
very amplitude and imperativeness of the terms employed in paragraph 6 of Section
7 of the Barrio Autonomy Act (Republic Act No. 2370) – ‘all disputes
over barrio election’ — rebuts the argument of the jurisdiction therein
conferred upon justice of the peace courts should be limited to disputes arising
from elections the validity of which is not contested.  The statute is too absolute to admit
distinctions, and evidences legislative intent to confer extraordinary
jurisdiction upon justice of the peace courts for the sake of prompt and
inexpensive solutions to the controversies arising from barrio elections.  Even conceding appellants claim, that the
original wording of the section meant to confer to the justice of the peace
courts jurisdiction only over election contests — and disregarding the
significance of the disappearance of such limitative expressions in the final
text — still, irregularities in the conduct of elections such as were
alleged in the petition are proper grounds of protest under the election laws
and not of quo warranto, the latter being limited
to cases of disloyal­ty or ineligibility of the proclaimed candidates x x x“

The applicability of the foregoing to the case at bar becomes
obvious when we consider that, in the petition herein, one of the
irregularities pointed out by petitioners is the alleged existence of flying
voters, which, even if true — on which we express no opinion – would not affect
the ability of respondents herein and would, at best, be a ground for an
election protest.  In fact, the
qualifications for candidates to the barrio council are set forth in Section 10
of the Revised Barrio Charter, and petitioners herein do not allege that
respondents lack any of said qualifications.

Regardless, however, of whether the present case is an election
contest or protest, or quo warranto
proceedings, or whether the original jurisdiction to hear the same is in the
municipal or city court or the court of first instance, we find that this case
should be dismissed upon the ground that it had been filed out of time.  Indeed, the eligibility of a local elective
of­ficial may be contested only within one (1) week after the pro­clamation of
his election,^[2]
whereas his election may be con­tested, upon grounds other than ineligibility,
within two (2) weeks after said proclamation.^[3]
In the present case, respondents were proclaimed elected on January 26, 1964, whereas the case at
bar was commenced on March 17, 1964,
or over seven (7) weeks thereafter.  In
other words, whether this action is regarded as one for quo warranto, or as an election contest, the petition
herein is barred by the statute of limitations of actions.

The provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No.
296), and Section 8 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, upon which the court of
first in instance relied, refer to quo warranto
proceedings in general, whereas Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180, as
amended, governs quo warranto cases against elective
provincial or municipal officials, in particular, which should not be deemed
amended, therefore, by Republic Act No. 296, and controls the case at bar,
insofar as the period within which the case may be commenced is concerned.

Indeed, the Revised Election Code^[4]
governs “all elections of public officers” in the Philippines,^[5] and
the very same public interest and public policy which demand that the
qualifications and election of provincial and municipal officials be contested,
if defective, within the peremptory periods of one (1) week and two (2) weeks,
respectively, after proclamation, render it imperative that the corresponding
actions, as regards barrio officials — who are, likewise, municipal officials —
be filed within the same periods of time.

We are aware of the fact that, our decision in Bautista vs. De la
Cruz^[6]
contains a passage to the effect that Sections 173 and 174 of the Revised
Election Code “do not apply to the election of barrio officials.” It
should be noted, however, that said statement was made in connection with the
question whether the original jurisdiction to hear the case was vested
in the justice of the peace court, as provided in Republic Act No. 2370 (now
Republic Act No. 3590), or in the court of first instance, as provided in said
sections of the Revised Election Code, and, that we then held that Republic Act
No. 2370 was the law applicable to said case. 
This, of course, is correct, but, only insofar as it refers to the
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, there being a conflict, in
connection therewith, between the Barrio Charter and Republic Act. No. 180;
but, no such conflict exist between the latter, on the one hand, and
either said charter or the Revised Barrio Charter, on the other, as regards
the procedure to be followed and the periods within which the corresponding actions
should be filed.  At any rate, to the
extent that it may be in conflict with the present decision, that of Bautista
vs. De la Cruz should be deemed modified accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case should be, as it
hereby dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
G. R. No. L-17393, promulgated November
28, 1962.

^[2] “x
x x When a person who is
not eligible is elected to provincial or municipal office, his right to the
office may be contested by any registered candidate for the same office before
the Court of First Instance of the province within one week after the proclamation
of his election, by filing a petition for quo warranto.  The case shall be conducted in accordance
with the usual procedure and shall be decided within thirty days from the
filing of the complaint.  A copy of the
decision shall be furnished the Commission on Elections.” (Sec. 173,
Republic Act No. 180, as amended.)

^[3] “x
x x A petition contesting
the election of a provincial or municipal officer-elect shall be filed with the
Court of First Instance of the province by any candidate voted for in said
election and who has presented a certificate of candidacy, within two weeks
after the proclamation of the result of the election.  Each contest shall refer exclusively to one
office, but contests for the offices of the vice-mayor and councilor may be
consolidated in a single case.” (Section 174, Republic Act No. 180, as
amended.)

^[4] Republic
Act No. 180, as amended.

^[5] Section
2 of said Act.

^[6] L-21107,
December 24, 1963.