IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF LIM SIONG TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. LIM SIONG, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.

In this appeal in a denaturalization case, the State seeks to set
aside the proceedings for the naturalization of Lim Siong
and to cancel the certificate of naturalization issued in his favor.

Upon petition of Lim Siong filed on June 8, 1960, judgment was rendered on October
14, 1961 declaring him entitled to naturalization.^[1]
On January 9, 1964,
petitioner moved to set his oathtaking for
hearing.  On February 11, the Republic
opposed.  On February 21, the lower court
allowed the petitioner to take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen.  On February 24, three days
after the last mentioned order was issued and before it had become final, the
lower court adminis­tered the oath of allegiance to petitioner.  On March 30, the Clerk of Court issued
Naturalization Certificate No. 3602 in petitioner’s favor.

On August 3, 1965,
the Republic moved to denaturalize petitioner. 
Main ground was lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

For the reasons that follow, judgment should go for the State.

First.  The application for naturalization recites
that peti­tioner’s residence was 755 Soler Street, Manila.  But at the hearing of the petition,
petitioner’s character witness, Nestor Tejada,
declared that in 1949 petitioner resided in Quezon Boulevard.  Then, the record discloses that he also
resided at 214 Escolta.^[2]
Also from the record, we gather that he resided at 1457
Soler Street.^[3]

Failure in good faith or otherwise to state the former places of
residence is fatal; it affects the jurisdiction of the court “to hear
and decide the case.”^[4]
That defect is not cured by supplying data at the hearing of the petition for
naturalization.^[5]
Very recently, in Chua Lian Yan vs. Republic, L-26416, April 26, 1969, we said:  “This non-disclosure is fatal.  Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law
requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner’s ‘present
and former places of residence.’ We have said that ‘residence’ encompasses all
places where petitioner ‘actually and physically resided.’ Tondo,
and T. Earnshaw Street,
Manila, where he resided, and Goa, where he studied, certainly come within
the term ‘residence’.  The legal
requirement of recital in the petition of present and former places of
residence is not without reason:  First,
‘information regarding peti­tioner and objection to his application are apt to
be provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding;’ and second,
failure to allege the former places of residence ‘deprives both public and
government of a fair opportunity to check up petitioner’s activities material
to the proceeding and of registering their objection to his application.'”

Second. 
Petitioner’s failure to file a declaration of intention without being
exempted from that requirement is as fatal. 
By Section 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended by
Commonwealth Act 535, petitioner, to be exempted from the requirement of making
a declaration of intention, must have resided “continuously in the Philippines
for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application.”^[6]

We now go to the facts.

Petitioner arrived in the Philippines
in 1926.  He left for China
in 1931, returned to Manila on January 15, 1933.  He again went to China
in 1937 and came back to Manila on September 16, 1939.  The third trip to China
was in 1940; he was back in Manila
on February 15, 1941.  Another visit to China
was in 1946, which lasted up to April
16, 1949.  Unquestionably,
petitioner’s residence in this country was not actual, substantial and
continuous for a period of thirty years. 
On the contrary, it was punctured with interruptions that cannot be
categorized as short visits to China.  By the standard in Sy
See vs. Republic, supra, at page 192, these absences
bar him from claiming continuous residence.

The filing of a declaration of intention is mandatory.^[7]
Without the required declaration of intention, the court below did not acquire
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for naturalization herein.^[8]
Such failure to file the declaration of intention indeed “rendered the
entire proceeding null and void.”^[9]

Third.  Petitioner is guilty of
misrepresentation.  His appli­cation
states that his only children are Lim Ichi and Lim
Ute, res­pectively born in Chingkang,
China in 1948 and
1949.  The fact, however, is that he had
two other children, Lim Chay Te, female, and Lim I
Tack, male, both residing in China, respectively 23 years and 22 years of age
in 1960.  The fact that these two are
also children of the petitioner Lim Siong is borne
not only by the record of this case but also the record of another case,
L-24946 (Vivo vs. Cloribel, et al.), decided by this
Court on January 18, 1968.  Petitioner
now says that the two children (Lim Chay Te and Lim I
Tack) are merely “adopted” children. 
Such circumstance, however, would not change the situation.  Independent of his intentions for adopting
them, the fact is that he has concealed in his application the truth that he
has two other children.  This, in our
opinion, is sufficient to throw his case out of court.

Fourth.  Petitioner’s two younger children mentioned
in his petition, Lim Ichi and Lim Ute, arrived in the
Philippines
with their mother on December 13,
1960.  At that time, they
were only 12 and 11 years, respectively. 
They were here enrolled in a Chinese school, The Philippine Chinese Educational
School.  Even the principal of this
school is a Chinese.

Section 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended by
Commonwealth Act 535, requires, amongst others, that a person who is exempt
from making a declaration of intention must give “primary and secondary
education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools
recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality.”

It is at this point that we must stress the fact that by the
enrollment of petitioner’s children in the Chinese school, petitioner has
evinced a purpose to instill in his children a Chinese upbringing and has
demonstrated his “lack of earnest intention to identify” himself and his
children “with the Filipino community.”^[10]

The educational requirement just adverted to is one of the avowed
policies of our Government.^[11]
As we have emphasized in Ang Yee Koe Sengkee vs.
Republic, 90 Phil. 594, 596-597, and in Ong
So vs. Republic, L-20145, June 30, 1965:  “It is the policy of the Philippine
Government to have prospective citizens, children of applicants for
naturalization, learn and imbibe the customs, traditions and ideals of the
Filipinos as well as their democratic forms of government.” Indeed, the
learning process should start “as early as pos­sible, and the first
formative years are the most important for the purpose.”^[12]

Nor will the transfer of petitioner’s two children to the Mapua Institute of Technology and the University of the
East after the decision has been rendered below and after the oathtaking improve peti­tioner’s case.  We have said in Chua Lian Yan vs.
Republic, supra, that: 
“Petitioner may not make a point by saying that after the
Philippine Sun Yat Sen
schooling, the child was transferred, as aforesaid, to the Paco
Catholic School, and then to the Far Eastern University.  This change of attitude came too late.  It was subsequent to the filing of the
petition for naturalization.  He is still
short of the requirement in Section 2, paragraph Sixth of the Revised
Naturalization Law.  For, that schooling
was not ‘during the entire period’ of petitioner’s
residence in the Philippines
‘required of him prior to the hearing of his
petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.'” Compliance with the
educa­tional requirement is mandatory,^[13]
and an absolute prerequisite to naturalization.^[14]
Non-compliance with this statutory requirement is fatal to the application for
naturalization.^[15]
It is a valid ground “for the cancellation of a certificate of
naturalization already issued.”^[16]

Fifth.  Apparent is the haste with which the oath was
taken.  The order granting oathtaking was issued on February 21, 1964. 
Three days thereafter, on February 24, the court administered the oath
of allegiance.  This renders the oath
null and void.  Controlling here is our
pronouncement in Ong So vs. Republic,
supra, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes delivering the opinion of the Court,
thus:

“Finally, we must agree with the Government’s stand that the
act of the court of first instance in allowing this applicant to take the oath
of allegiance even before the expiration of the Government’s period to appeal
from the order overruling its objections thereto, and, in fact, three (3) days
before the Soli­citor General received copy of the appealed order, is highly
irregular, to say the least.  Republic
Act No. 530 contemplates that the applicant for naturalization becomes entitled
to all the privileges of citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance, and
the precipitate administration of the oath in the present case appears to be an
attempt to render nugatory the Government’s appeal.  The record is devoid of any justification for
such unseemly haste in conferring the privileges of citizenship before any and
all doubts about applicant’s right thereto are finally settled, and we must
make of record our disapproval of the practice.”^[17]

For the reasons given, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered:

(1)  Declaring all the
proceedings for naturalization in Naturalization Case 43341 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, entitled “In the Matter of the Petition to be
Admitted a Citizen of the Philip­pines, Lim Siong,
Petitioner”, null and void;

(2)  Ordering the
cancellation of petitioner’s naturalization certificate as well as the
identification certificates, if any, issued to him and his children as
Filipinos by the Commissioner of Immigration; and

(3)  For the purposes of
this decision, ordering petitioner forth­with to surrender to the Clerk of the
Court of First Instance of Manila said certificate of naturalization.

Pursuant to Section 18(d) of the Revised Naturalization Law, let
copies of this decision be forwarded to the Department
of Justice and to the Executive Secretary.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Dizon and
Barredo, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
Naturalization Case 43341, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled “In
the Matter of the Petition to be Admitted a Citizen of
the Philippines,
Lim Siong, Petitioner.”

^[2]
Exhibits E, F, H, N, O-4, O-6 and Q.

^[3]
Exhibit G.

^[4]
Go vs. Republic, L-20558, March
31, 1965, citing cases; Yao Long vs.
Republic, L-20910, November 27, 1965.

^[5]
Chi vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 388, 389-390; Yap vs.
Republic, 17 SCRA 956, 960.

^[6] See:  Chua Lian Yan vs. Republic, supra, citing
Sy See vs. Republic, 5 SCRA 189, 191-192.

^[7] Bhrojraj vs. Republic, L-24023, May 8, 1969, citing
Ong Khan vs. Republic, L-14866, October 28,
1960; Yap vs. Republic, 2 SCRA 856, 859; Lim vs. Republic, 16
SCRA 12, 14; Lim Cho Kuan vs.
Republic, 16 SCRA 25, 27; Chua Lian Yan vs. Republic, supra.

^[8] Id.
citing Law Tai vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 852, 855, citing Ong Khan vs. Republic, supra, and Sy Ang Hoc vs. Republic, 1
SCRA 886, 889-890.

^[9] Id., citing Sio Kim vs.
Republic, L-20415, December 29, 1965.

^[10] Dy vs. Republic, 18 SCRA 858, 860.

^[11]
Tan Hoi vs. Republic, L-15266, September
30, 1960.

^[12] Ong So vs. Republic, supra, cited
in Chua Lian Yan vs.
Republic, supra.

^[13]
Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 1 SCRA 1166, 1169, citing Tan vs.
Republic, 49 O.G. p. 1409; Chan Lai vs. Republic, 106 Phil. 210, 215.

^[14] Yap
vs. Republic, 2 SCRA 856, 860.

^[15] Yap
Chun vs. Republic, L-18516, January
30, 1964.

^[16] Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, supra, at p. 1169.

^[17] See
also:  Lim vs. Republic, 18
SCRA 228, 231; Yong Sai vs. Republic, 18 SCRA
264, 271; Lim vs. Republic, 18 SCRA 276, 279.