G.R. No. L-26397. June 30, 1969
TOMASA BULOS VDA. DE TECSON, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF PABLO TECSON OCAMPO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. VICENTE TECSON, BENJAMIN, RAUL AND MIGUEL, ALL SURNAMED TEC…
FERNANDO, J.:
The present litigation primarily involves claims to property of
the original plaintiff, the deceased Pablo Tecson Ocampo, who, five days after filing the original complaint,
died to be substituted by the present plaintiff-appellant,
his administratrix, Tomasa Bulos Vda. de
Tecson, his second wife. The conflict over property is between the
present plaintiff-appellant on the one hand and the sole child of the first
marriage, Vicente Tecson, as well as of his three
children, Benjamin, Raul and Miguel, on the other. While the original complaint,[1]
filed as far back as April 26, 1940, sought to set aside an alleged
extrajudicial partition dated September 1, 1932 as well as a deed of donation
of September 27, 1932, both in favor of defendant-appellee
Vicente Tecson, the legitimate son and sole heir of
the first marriage, the complaint, as above noted, was thereafter amended
several times with the present plaintiff-appellant Tomasa
Bulos Vda. de Tecson being substituted for
the deceased, as a result of which the issues, insofar as relevant for the
disposition of this appeal, have, in the opinion of the lower court,
proliferated.
They may be summarized, in the language of the appealed decision
thus: “Whether or not the deed of cesion, * * *, and the deed of renunciation of the
inheritance, * * *, executed respectively by Pablo Tecson
and Vicente Tecson were fictitious and executed
solely for the purpose of evading the attachment of the other properties of
Pablo Tecson Ocampo by his
creditors, as contended by Vicente Tecson, or whether
they were freely and voluntarily executed by Vicente Tecson,
as contended by the administratrix of the estate of
Pablo Tecson, – its invalidity or illegality being
recognized by both parties, it being a renunciation of future inheritance; and
whether or not Vicente Tecson had received the
properties mentioned in the deed of cesion, * * *,
and the deed of renunciation * * *, and if he had his obligation to collate the
same in the estate of the deceased Pablo Tecson; * *
* The validity of the extrajudicial partition, * * *, and whether, as contended
by the plaintiff, it had been obtained thru fraud and misrepresentation by
Vicente Tecson, or, as contended by Vicente Tecson, it was a free and voluntary act of Pablo Tecson Ocampo; * * * The validity
of the deed of donation, * * *, and whether or not it had been obtained thru
fraud and misrepresentation on the part of Vicente Tecson,
or, as contended by the defendant, it was a free and voluntary act of Pablo Tecson Ocampo; and, assuming its
validity, whether Vicente Tecson is required to
collate the same in the inheritance of Pablo Tecson Ocampo, and whether the donation is subject to revocation
due to the subsequent appearance of the children of Pablo Tecson
Ocampo; and * * * Whether or not the action to annul
the extrajudicial partition and donation has already prescribed.”[2]
A recital of the family history found in the exhaustive decision
of Judge Jose N. Leuterio, then of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija,
goes far to clarify matters and put things in their proper perspective. Thus:
“To determine the real intention and purpose of Pablo Tecson Ocampo in executing the
deed of extrajudicial partition of the San Mariano property, * * *, and
donating it to his son and to his grandchildren Benjamin, Raul and Miguel Tecson, * * *, we must have to go into the family
history. The San Mariano property is
part of the conjugal partnership properties of the spouses Pablo Tecson Ocampo and Juana
Mendoza. Vicente Tecson
was the only son of the spouse. He was
what the defense says, ‘hijo de familia‘
and has not been trusted with the management and custody of the family
property. Vicente Tecson,
even during his marriage with the mother of now defendants Benjamin, Raul and
Miguel, lived in the house of his parents in San Miguel, Bulacan,
until the death of his mother Juana Mendoza in April, 1928. Benjamin, Raul and Miguel also lived with
their grandfather. The mother of these
three children wife of Vicente Tecson, died when the oldest son Benjamin was only four years
old. The father and his children, now
grandchildren of Pablo Tecson, lived with Pablo Tecson Ocampo and Juana
Mendoza. Juana Mendoza took care of
these three children until her death in 1928.
Pablo Tecson Ocampo
and his wife Juana Mendoza took care of the education of these three children
sending them to exclusive schools, including the Ateneo,
De la Salle College and Jose Rizal College.”[3]
Likewise, according to the appealed
decision: “Even, however, during
the lifetime of the wife of Pablo Tecson Ocampo, he had illicit relations with Tomasa
Bulos, whom he married later. They had three spurious children Lorenzo,
Josefina and Isabel whom they later adopted in 1936. After the death of Juana Mendoza, the amorous
relations between Pablo Tecson and Tomasa Bulos continued, only with
more intensity. Pablo Tecson Ocampo transferred his
residence to San Mariano, San Antonio,
to be near Tomasa Bulos who
was living in Tikiw of the same municipality. No partition, however, or liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of Pablo Tecson Ocampo and Juana Mendoza had been made. So, in December 1929, for this reason and
partly perhaps because the business of the Tecson Ricemill was going down, they liquidated the conjugal
partnership, with the execution of the deed of cesion,
* * *, and the deed of renunciation, * * *, by Pablo Tecson
Ocampo and Vicente Tecson,
respectively.”[4]
It was then noted in the appealed decision: “With the execution of these two
documents, Pablo Tecson Ocampo
killed, as it were two birds with one shot, he liquidated the conjugal
partnership and he freed himself from being pursued by the creditors of the Tecson Ricemill. It must be observed that in the deed of cesion, * * * and in the deed of renunciation, * * * Vicente
Tecson did not receive any real property acquired
during the marriage of Pablo Tecson Ocampo and Juana Mendoza.
All that he had acquired under the two documents were the interest and
participation of Vicente Tecson Ocampo
in the Tecson Ricemill but
subject to its obligation, then of unknown quantity. And in the deed of renunciation, Vicente Tecson acknowledged having received only palay, money and credits.
It may be asked why Vicente Tecson had acceded
to this arrangement? The answer lies in
the fact that he had always been under the support of his father and had lived
with him from the time of his marriage up to the year 1928. And when we consider that Pablo Tecson Ocampo had a domineering
character, and had absolute control over his son and grandchildren, such that
these descendants could not approach him and had to resort to their uncle
Mariano, it is easy to understand why Vicente Tecson
had acted and agreed to the deed of cesion and the
deed of renunciation. In 1932 Pablo Tecson Ocampo, whether of his
free will or whether at the instigation of or thru the insistence or
supplication of Tomasa Bulos,
finally decided to crown his amorous relations with Tomasa
Bulos with marriage.
However, it would appear that his ties with his late wife Juana Mendoza
and with his son and grandchildren were still strong, and he did not want to
enter into the marriage relation without at least giving his son and
grandchildren the protection they were entitled to in view of his affection. And so he thought of dividing the San Mariano
property between himself and Vicente Tecson, and he
and Vicente donated the whole property to his grandchildren Benjamin, Raul and
Miguel.”[5]
What did transpire next, according to the decision now on appeal:
“Effectively, on September 1, 1932,
Pablo Tecson Ocampo and
Vicente Tecson executed the deed of extrajudicial
partition, * * * and on September 27,
1932 the deed of donation * * *.
But he did not entirely relinquish all the benefits in the San Mariano
property in donating the same to Raul, Benjamin and Miguel. Together with Vicente Tecson,
Pablo Tecson borrowed the amount of P12,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank, giving as
security the San Mariano property. This
money, except for what was used for the payment of the obligation of the Tecson Ricemill, went to Pablo Tecson Ocampo. And this debt was finally paid by the
donors. Having done what he could for
the protection of his son and grandchildren, and perhaps with a feeling of
relief, a little over one month after the execution of the deed of donation, *
* *, or on November 3, 1932, Pablo Tecson Ocampo married his paramour, Tomasa
Bulos.[6]
Further clarification was supplied by the lower court decision
thus: “Things passed quietly for a
sometime until the donees made mention of this
donation to Atty. Juan T. David who found that the title to the property
donated still remained in the name of the donors. And so the arrangement as outlined by Atty.
Juan T. David was made. Over three years
had passed since the donation had been executed. In those three years, a slight change in the
heart and affection of Pablo Tecson Ocampo had taken place. Whether this change of heart was
voluntary or thru the supplication and importunities of the second wife, Tomasa Bulos, need not here be
discussed. Suffice it to say that Pablo Tecson Ocampo made it hard for
the donees to effect the transfer of the donated
property; and not until the donees consented to the
leasing of this property to Tomasa Bulos for a period of five years, at a nominal rental of
over P2,400.00, did Pablo Tecson
Ocampo agree to the registration of the donation and
the transfer of the title to the donees. The court says the rental nominal as it was
only for the amount of P2,400.00, when, according to the plaintiff herself, the
annual share of the owner in the San Mariano property was about 5,000 cavanes of palay. The contract of lease was executed and Tomasa Bulos entered into the
possession of the property as lessee in the year 1936. Like the proverbial Camel, who, once having
placed his head inside the tent wanted to occupy the whole tent for himself,
Pablo Tecson Ocampo and his
wife Tomasa Bulos wanted to
have one half of the San Mariano property for themselves; they were no longer
content with the possession and enjoyment of the property as lessee for five
years on a rental sufficient only to pay the annual amortization of the
indebtedness of the donees. And so efforts were made by
the donor Pablo Tecson Ocampo
to secure one half of the San Mariano property for his children with Tomasa Bulos.”[7]
Things were placed even more in their true perspective by this
portion of the decision: “The donees, however, refused to give any further concession to
their grandfather Pablo Tecson Ocampo,
perhaps because they believe that if they returned one half of the property
their grandfather would not benefit therefrom, but
only his children, by the second marriage with Tomasa
Bulos. The donees Benjamin, Raul and Miguel refused to meet their
grandfather Pablo Tecson Ocampo
as requested by him in the letters Exhibits M, N and O. And four days after the appointed time for
their meeting on November 25, at San Miguel in the house of Mariano Tecson, Pablo Tecson Ocampo filed civil case 8304 for the annulment of the
donation. [Thus] it can be clearly seen
that Pablo Tecson Ocampo
wanted to make some arrangements with the donees
Benjamin, Raul and Miguel with respect to the San Mariano property, not because
his consent thereto had been obtained thru fraud and misrepresentation but
because of his small children whom he believed he had deprived of their
inheritance and to whom he wanted to leave a part of his property. Nothing in his letter, which had expressed
the true sentiment and feeling of Pablo Tecson Ocampo, was said of any misrepresentation or any deceit
either on the part of his son Vicente or on the part of the other
defendants. Unfortunately, a donation
inter vivos is irrevocable except for the causes
which are provided by law, none of which presently appears. Pablo Tecson Ocampo would want to modify the donation, an intention
manifest in his letter to Benjamin, Raul and Miguel, * * *, in which he
expressed his desire to meet them on Nov. 25, 1939 in the house of his brother
Mariano so that he could make known his last final decision, as if a donation
which had been perfected was still subject to his change of heart and
mind.”[8]
For an accurate appraisal of Judge Leuterio’s
decision, the discussion of the legal questions raised must be taken into
account. Thus: “But even it be conceded that the
donation * * * and the extrajudicial partition, * * * had been fraudulently
obtained by Vicente Tecson, still plaintiff’s claim
must fail. According to the plaintiff, Pablo Tecson Ocampo discovered for the first time that Exhibits C and E
were not in fact mere documents to enable Vicente Tecson
to borrow money from the Bank, but were in fact an extrajudicial partition and
donation, in the latter part of February, 1936.
In fact, Tomasa Bulos
got a copy, * * * of the deed of donation on March 3, 1936.
The fraud was discovered, at the latest, therefore, on that date, March 3, 1936. An action to annul a donation on the ground
of fraud must be brought within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud, in
this case, not later than March 3, 1940. The present action was brought only on April 26, 1940, or over 4 years after the discovery of the fraud. It might be argued that the first action
civil case 8304 was brought within the statutory period. But that action was
dismissed, and therefore, it did not interrupt the running of the statutory
period within which to bring the action (Art. 1946, par. 2, Spanish Civil Code,
the law then in force. Lacuesta vs. Guerrero, 8 Phil. 719)”[9]
Nor was another legal question of consequence, the effect of
children being subsequently born to the second marriage of Pablo Tecson Ocampo, left
untouched. Thus: “It is quite obvious of course, and it
needs no extended discussion, that the donation may not be revoked by the
subsequent appearance of children of Pablo Tecson Ocampo with Tomasa Bulos, for at the time of the donation, Pablo Tecson Ocampo had already one
legitimate child, – the defendant Vicente Tecson
(Art. 644, Spanish Civil Code).”[10]
On the above issues, the dispositive
portion of the appealed decision reads:
“In conclusion the court finds: * * * the deed of cesion * * and the deed of renunciation, * * * must be
understood and construed as a liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership of Pablo Tecson Ocampo
and Juana Mendoza, and void as a renunciation of the right of Vicente Tecson to inherit from Pablo Tecson
Ocampo; and as Exhibits A and B are a liquidation of
the conjugal partnership of Pablo Tecson Ocampo and Juana Mendoza, Vicente Tecson
is not and should not be required to collate what he has received by virtue
thereof in the succession to the estate of Pablo Tecson
Ocampo; the deed of extrajudicial partition. Exhibit C, is hereby declared to be valid as
the free and voluntary act of Pablo Tecson Ocampo; the deed of donation, * * * is likewise declared to
be valid as the free and voluntary act of Pablo Tecson
Ocampo.”[11]
From such a decision an appeal was taken to the Court of
Appeals. Subsequently, in a resolution
of its third division dated July 26, 1966, the records of the case were
certified to us for final adjudication, in accordance with the then controlling
statutory provision, the amount involved being more than P200,000.00. The appeal is thus properly before us.
In her
brief, plaintiff-appellant Tomasa Bulos
Vda. de Tecson
alleged that two errors were committed by the lower court, namely, its failure
to appreciate certain evidence of relevant and material importance,
disregarding their true import, weight and stark effect, with the result that
it failed to conclude that the preponderance of evidence was clearly in her
favor and its finding as valid and as the free and voluntary act of the
deceased, Pablo Tecson Ocampo,
the deed of extrajudicial partition as well as the deed of donation.
Neither assignment of error carries enough weight to call for a
reversal of the decision. An objective
analysis of the evidence, free from the compulsion of partisan bias, yields no
other conclusion except the correctness of the lower court’s appraisal of the
facts. Necessarily then, it is not to
accord deference to reason to allege, as plaintiff-appellant does in this
appeal, that the preponderance of evidence was clearly in her favor and that
the deed of extrajudicial partition as well as the deed of donation could not
be considered as the free and voluntary act of the deceased, Pablo Tecson Ocampo. There is nothing in the brief of
plaintiff-appellant, even if minutely considered, that would sustain the above
assignments of error. To repeat, the
line of argument pursued by her is far from persuasive.
For one thing, what is objected to is
not any alleged failure to apply the law that is controlling but the lower
court’s appraisal of the decisive facts.
Such an appreciation is primarily for the trial judge, who heard the
witnesses testify and who was thus in a much better position to gauge their
credibility. Not that the conclusion
thus arrived at is to be considered binding.
We would be recreant to our appellate task if
such be our attitude. We are called
upon, however, in the absence of any taint of arbitrariness or bias, to yield
to its findings the presumption that they were arrived at with due care and
deliberation. A heavy burden is thus
placed on the party who would have us disregard them. It must do so in a clear and convincing
fashion. Such is not the case here.
What is said in the recent case of Corliss
v. Manila Railroad Company[12]
finds relevance. Thus: “In the more traditional terminology,
the lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great respect. After all, the lower court had the
opportunity of weighing carefully what was testified to and apparently did not
neglect it. There is no affront to
justice then if its finding be accorded acceptance, subject of course to the
contingency of ultimate reversal if error or errors, substantial in character,
be shown in the conclusion thus arrived at.
It is a fair statement of the governing principle to say that the
appellate function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for
the result reached by the trial court.”
In this particular case, the rational basis for the almost
fifty-page decision, as reproduced in the record of appeal, of Judge Leuterio cannot escape attention. The presence of a careful and painstaking
effort to appraise the true worth of what was testified to cannot be
denied. After setting forth the issues,
reproduced in this opinion, fully ten pages were devoted to a recital of the
evidence for plaintiff-appellant.
Equally so, the evidence for defendants-appellees
received the same careful treatment. The
rest of the decision was taken up with a thorough and exhaustive analysis of
the facts which have been duly proven and the principles of law that should
govern. It would thus appear that no
effort was spared by Judge Leuterio to arrive at a
correct and dispassionate conclusion.
If after such meticulous study, distinguished likewise by a more
than adequate grasp of the intricate legal questions presented, the lower court
decision is to be subjected to the stigma sought to be fastened upon it by
plaintiff appellant, then the commendable efforts of lower court judges to
maintain a high standard of the administration of justice would go for
naught. Far be it from us to contribute
to such a deplorable result. The appeal must
fail.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Honorable Jose N. Leuterio of June
25, 1959 is affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Dizon and
Barredo, JJ., did not take part.
[1]
Thereafter, an amended complaint dated May 14, 1941; a supplemental complaint
dated May 31, 1941; a consolidated amended complaint dated June 11, 1941 and a
new amended complaint dated May 15, 1947 were filed. Record on Appeal, pp. 58-71; 114-127;
154-175.
[2]
Record on Appeal, pp. 439-440.
[3] Ibid, p. 476.
[4] Ibid,
pp. 476-477.
[5] Ibid,
pp. 477-478.
[6] Ibid, p. 479.
[7] Ibid,
pp. 479-480.
[8] Ibid,
pp. 482-484.
[9] Ibid,
pp. 484-485.
[10] Ibid, p. 485.
[11]
Ibid, pp. 485-486.
[12]
L-21291, March 28, 1969. Cf. Medina v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, L-15113, January 28, 1961; Gutierrez v.
Villegas, L-17117, July 31, 1963; Arrieta v.
National Rice & Corn Corp., L-15645, January 31, 1964.