G.R. No. L-46371. December 14, 1981
AMPARO SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FELISA DE LA FUENTE SAMSON, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND ANGELES CITY, FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH IV, AND ANGEL…
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, to annul and set aside the order denying the petitioner’s motion
to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 2315 of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, entitled: “Angel A. Reyes, Inc.,
plaintiff, versus Miss Amparo Santos,
defendant,” as well as the order declaring her in default, and all
proceedings made subsequent thereto; and to restrain the respondent Judge of
First Instance from further conducting the trial of the said case.
The record shows that on
January 17, 1976, the herein private respondent, Angel A. Reyes, Inc., a
domestic corporation with principal offices at 1363 Quezon
Boulevard Extension, Quezon City, filed a complaint
for “Unlawful Detainer” against the herein
petitioner, Amparo Santos, with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 2315.[1]
Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon Amparo
Santos on August 16, 1976,
but she failed to file the required answer within the reglementary
period. Upon motion of the plaintiff
therein, Amparo Santos was declared in default on January 12, 1977 and the plaintiff
was directed to present its evidence on January
20, 1977.[2]
Upon receipt of the order declaring her in default, the petitioner,
Amparo Santos, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction
over the action for “unlawful detainer”
which is within the competence of the municipal court.[3]
The plaintiff therein opposed the motion, claiming that the movant
had no personality to ask for the dismissal of the complaint because she lost
her status in court when she was declared in default, and that, assuming that
the herein petitioner had not lost her standing in court, her motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction would not prosper as the complaint,
although entitled one for “Unlawful Detainer“,
is for the cancellation and annulment of the contract of sale of real property
which is within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance.[4]
After the controversion of the issues, the respondent
Judge issued an order on April 26,
1977, denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit since the
case was principally an annulment or cancellation of a contract of sale of real
property.[5]
On May 3, 1977, the herein petitioner filed a motion to lift the
order of default, alleging that she failed to file an answer by reason of
fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence in that after receiving the summons
and a copy of the complaint, she went to see Angel A. Reyes at his office in
1363 Quezon Boulevard Extension, Quezon
City, to confer with him regarding the case; that Angel A. Reyes, during their
meeting, assured her that if she would update her accounts on the lots, he
would not pursue the case anymore; that with that understanding, she continued
to make payments on the lots, which the plaintiff received; and that the
assurance of Angel A. Reyes made her believe that it was no longer necessary
for her to answer the complaint and realized her error quite too late when she
received a copy of the order declaring her in default. She further claimed that she has a good and
meritorious defense in that she had been faithfully and religiously paying her
monthly installments for the lots in question for more than 12 years and she
already paid the sum of P96,000.00 to the plaintiff although the contract price
is only P57,500.00, and she is still paying for the said lots; that the acts of
the plaintiff in cancelling unilaterally the
contracts of purchase and sale, the forfeiture of the installment payments
made, and the filing of the instant complaint are repugnant to public policy
and do violence to existing laws; and that to allow all the parties herein to
fully ventilate their respective sides of the question and to present their
evidence will best serve the interests of substantial justice.[6]
The plaintiff therein opposed the motion for the reason that the herein petitioner’s
failure to file an answer within the reglementary
period is not excusable and the petitioner herein had really intended not to
file an answer to the complaint.[7]
The respondent Judge denied the Motion on May 24, 1977, stating that the
negligence of the petitioner in failing to file an answer is not excusable
since the motion to lift the order of default was filed after the lapse of four
(4) months from the time she received a copy of the order declaring her in
default; and that the herein petitioner wantonly disregarded established
procedure.[8]
Hence, the instant recourse.
As prayed for, a temporary restraining order was issued, restraining the
respondent Judge from further proceeding with the trial of the case.[9]
Upon a review of the record of the case, We are convinced that
the respondent Judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss the complaint. The
record shows that the petitioner filed the said motion to dismiss immediately
after her receipt of the order declaring her in default without first filing a
motion to set aside the order of default.
It is the rule that a party declared in default loses his standing in
court and is not entitled to any notice of subsequent proceeding nor to take
part in the trial until he files a motion to set aside the default order.[10]
Petitioner, therefore, had no right to file the said motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the issue of whether or not the
action is purely a possessory action and as such
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Angeles City Court, and, therefore,
beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge of first instance, not having
been properly raised in the lower court, is academic.
However, We find that the respondent Judge erred in denying the
petitioner’s motion to lift the order of default. The record shows that upon receipt of the
summons and copy of the complaint, the petitioner immediately went to see Mr.
Angel A. Reyes, president and executive officer of the respondent corporation
bearing his name, about the case. Mr.
Reyes assured her that if she would update her accounts, he would not pursue
the case anymore. Accordingly, the
petitioner paid her accrued obligations to the plaintiff and did not file any
answer to the complaint anymore, and was surprised when she received a copy of
the order declaring her in default.
Immediately thereafter, she took steps to vacate the order of
default. Under the circumstances, the
failure of the herein petitioner to answer the complaint within the reglementary period is excusable.
Besides, the petitioner appears to have a good and meritorious
defense. She averred that the records of
the respondent corporation are not in order and that she had been religiously
and faithfully paying her account with the respondent corporation for twelve
(12) years already and had paid to the corporation the amount of P96,000.00
although the total contract price for the two lots in question is only
P57,500.00. If proven, such
circumstances may defeat the plaintiff’s claim.
While the motion to lift the order of default was filed four (4)
months after the petitioner was declared in default, no judgment has been
rendered in the case as yet so that the filing of the said motion was within
the period prescribed by the Rules.
Under Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, a party declared in default
may at any time after discovery thereof
and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
default upon proper showing that his failure answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect and that he has a meritorious defense.
Considering that the failure of the petitioner to file her answer
to the complaint within the reglementary period is
excusable; and that the granting of the petitioner’s motion to set aside the
order of default would in no way prejudice the respondent corporation and
deprive it of any substantial right, nor is there evidence of intent to unduly
delay the case, the respondent Judge should have applied the Rules liberally
and set aside her order of default.
Courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for a
default judgment is frowned upon, and unless it clearly appears that the
re-opening of the case is intended for delay, it is best that trial courts give
both parties every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without
resort to technicality.[11]
WHEREFORE, the writ is granted and the order of the
respondent Judge, dated January 12, 1977, declaring the petitioner Amparo Santos in default, and all proceedings made
subsequent thereto are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner, Amparo
Santos, is hereby directed to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen
(15) days from notice hereof. Costs
against the private respondent Angel A.
Reyes, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Chairman), Abad Santos, De Castro, Ericta, and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., no part.
[1] Rollo, p. 18.
[2] Id.,
p. 52.
[3] Id.,
p. 22.
[4] Id.,
p. 24.
[5] Id.,
p. 35.
[6] Id.,
pp. 36-39.
[7] Id.,
p. 40.
[8] Id.,
p. 43.
[9] Id.,
p. 46.
[10]
Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
[11]
Pineda vs. Court of Appeals, L-35583, Sept. 30, 1975, 65 SCR 228, citing Tecson
vs. Tecson, 93 Phil. 903.