G.R. No. L-53406. December 14, 1981
NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR, THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR, THE HONORABLE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATION…
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioner Union
to compel public respondents to conduct a certification election among the rank
and file employees of the respondent employer in Case No. LRD-M-8-360-79 or in the
alternative, to require the respondent Minister of Labor or his Deputy to act
on private respondent’s “Appeal” and on petitioner’s “Motion to
Dismiss with Motion to Execute.”
It appears that on August
17, 1979, petitioner Union filed a petition
to be directly certified as collective bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of private respondent corporation (Annex
“A”; p. 26, rec.).
On September 7, 1979,
the date of the hearing, private respondent was required to submit on October 5, 1979 a payroll of
employees as of July 31, 1979. On the same date, in a handwritten
manifestation, respondent employer through counsel, agreed that as soon as the
registration certificate of the local union was issued by the Ministry of Labor
and that it was shown that the local union represents the majority of the rank
and file, the Bank would recognize the said union and would negotiate
accordingly (Annex “B”; p. 27, rec.).
On October 5, 1979,
the abovesaid registration certificate of the local
union /Certificate No. 9352-LC, issued by the Ministry of Labor/ was
secured. On October 15, 1979, petitioner
filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Decide and submitted a copy of the
Registration Certificate of the local union and union membership application of
183 members out of more or less 259 rank and file employees of employer Bank,
authorizing the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE) /herein petitioner/ to
represent them “as their sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent in
all matters relating to salary rates, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment in the Producers Bank of the Philippines” (p.
38, rec.). Nonetheless, respondent corporation failed to submit the required payroll
and the list of rank and file workers based on said payroll.
On October 18, 1979,
Med-Arbiter Climaco G. Plagata
issued an order directing the holding of a certification election, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election is
hereby ordered held, conducted, and supervised by representation officers of
this office within 20 days from receipt hereof.
The same representation officers shall conduct pre-election conferences
in order to thresh out the mechanics and other minor details of this election
including the inclusion and exclusion proceedings to determine the qualified
electors in this election. The choice
shall be either YES, for Petitioner, or NO, for NO UNION DESIRED.
“SO ORDERED” (Annex “C”, pp.
28-29, rec.).
On October 19, 1979,
respondent corporation filed a motion to suspend
further proceedings in view of an allegedly prejudicial issue consisting of a
pending proceeding for cancellation of the registration of petitioning union
for allegedly engaging in prohibited and unlawful activities in violation of
the laws (Annex “D”; pp. 30-32, rec.).
On October 23, 1979, by agreement of the parties, respondent then
Deputy Minister of Labor Amado Inciong,
acting for the Minister of Labor, assumed jurisdiction over the certification
election case and the application for clearance to terminate the services of
thirteen (13) union officers by private respondent corporation. Thus, an order was issued on the same date
which reads:
“On October 23, 1979 the parties entered into an agreement
that the Office of the Ministry of Labor shall assume jurisdiction over the
following disputes under P.D. No. 823 in the interest of speedy labor justice
and industrial peace:
“1. certification election case; and
“2. application for clearance to terminate
thirteen (13) employees with preventive suspension.
(Agreement,
October 23, 1979).
“Accordingly, the Deputy Minister deputized Atty. Luna C. Piezas, Chief of the Med-Arbiter Section, National Capital
Region, to conduct summary investigations for the purpose of determining the definition
of the appropriate bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioning
union as well as compliance with the 30% mandatory written consent in support
of the petition under the bargaining unit as shall have been defined.
“On the application for clearance to terminate with preventive
suspension, this Office deems it necessary, for the mutual protection of each
party’s interest and to assure continuance of the exercise of their respective
rights within legal limits, to lift the imposition of preventive suspension on
the subject employees. The lifting of
the preventive suspension shall include Messrs. Castro and Sumibcay,
who are presently on leave of absence with pay in pursuance of the agreement
reached at the level of the Regional Director, Further, should the two (2)
employees’ leave credits be exhausted, they are to go on leave without pay,
but this shall not be construed as done in pursuance of the preventive
suspension.
“Finally, the lifting of the preventive suspension shall be without
prejudice to the continuance of the hearing on the application for clearance
involving the thirteen (13) employees the determination of the merits of
which shall be disposed of at the Regional level” (Annex “E”,
pp. 33-34, rec.).
Hence, Med-Arbiter Luna Piezas
conducted hearings but withdrew, in view of the alleged utter disrespect for
authority, gross bad faith, malicious refusal to appreciate effective, prompt
and honest service and resorting in malicious and deliberate lying in dealing
with Ministry of Labor officials by a certain Mr. Jun Umali,
spokesman of the Producers Bank Employees Association. The case was then transferred to Med-Arbiter
Alberto Abis on November 7, 1979 (Annex “F”, p. 35, rec.).
During the hearing on November
9, 1979, respondent Bank failed to submit a list of rank and file
employees proposed to be excluded from the bargaining unit. Respondent Bank’s counsel however, in a
verbal manifestation pressed for the exclusion of the following personnel from
the bargaining unit:
1.
Secretaries;
2.
Staff of Personnel Department;
3.
Drivers;
4.
Telephone Operators;
5.
Accounting Department;
6.
Credit Investigators;
7.
Collectors;
8.
Messengers;
9.
Auditing Department Personnel;
10.
Signature Verifiers;
11.
Legal Department Personnel;
12.
Loan Security Custodians; and
13.
Trust Department Personnel.
On November 19, 1979,
Med-Arbiter Alberto Abis Jr. ordered the holding of
certification election among the rank and file employees but sustained the
stand of respondent company as to the exclusion of certain employees. Thus, the pertinent portion of said order
reads:
“After a careful perusal of the records, evaluation of the
evidence on hand and consideration of the positions taken by the parties, we
find and so hold that Petitioner-Union has substantially complied with the mandatory
and jurisdictional requirement of 30% subscription of all the employees in the
bargaining unit as prescribed by Section 2, Rule 5, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
Submission by the Petitioner during the hearing of copies of the
application and membership forms of its members wherein they have duly
authorized Petitioner ‘as their sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent’
constitutes substantial compliance of the mandatory and jurisdictional 30%
subscription requirement, it appearing from the records that out of the 264
total rank and file employees, 188 are union members who have so authorized
Petitioner to represent.
“With respect to respondent bank’s motion to suspend the
proceedings in the instant case pending resolution of the cancellation
proceedings now pending in the Bureau of Labor Relations, we find that the
same is not tenable in the absence of a restraining order.
“In consideration of the agreement of the parties, it is
hereby ordered that the scope or coverage of the appropriate bargaining unit
should include the Head Office of the Producers Bank of the Philippines
and all its branch offices and shall comprise of all the regular rank and file
employees of the bank. Excluded are all
managerial and supervisory employees, probationary, contractual and casual
employees and security guards.
It is further ordered that by virtue
and in consonance with industry practice as revealed by the CBAs
of 18 banks submitted by Petitioner-Union, the following positions should
likewise be excluded from the bargaining unit; Secretaries of bank officials;
employees of the Personnel Department, EXCEPT Manuel Sumibcay,
Primi Zamora and Carmelita Sy;
employees of the Accounting Department; employees of the Legal Department;
employees of the Trust Department, credit investigators, telephone
operators, and loan security custodians.
Signature verifiers, drivers, messengers and other non-confidential
employees included in the bank’s list of proposed exclusions should be allowed
to vote, but the votes should be segregated as challenged. In case a doubt arises as to whether or
not the position held by an employee is confidential in nature, the employee
should be allowed to vote, but his vote should be segregated as challenged.
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, it
is hereby ordered that a certification election be conducted among the regular
rank and file employees of the Producers Bank of the Philippines (the
appropriate bargaining unit of which is defined above) after the usual
pre-election conference called to formulate the list of qualified voters and
discuss the mechanics of the election.
“It is further ordered that the election in the bank’s
branches outside the Metro Manila area be conducted by the appropriate Regional
Offices of the Ministry of Labor having jurisdiction over them.
“SO ORDERED (pp. 5-7, Annex “G”; pp. 41-43, rec.;
underscoring supplied).
On November 29, 1979, petitioner filed a partial appeal to the
Director of Bureau of Labor Relations questioning the exclusions made by
Med-Arbiter Abis of those employees who are not among
those expressly enumerated under the law to be excluded. It vigorously urged the inclusion of the rest
of the employees which is allegedly the usual practice in the banking
industry. It likewise urged the holding
of a certification election allowing all those excluded by Med-Arbiter Abis to vote but segregating their votes as challenged in
the meantime. Hence, it averred:
“It is in the position of the petitioner that notwithstanding
the statements above that the petition for certification should be held
immediately by allowing all those not excluded from Arbiter Abis‘
order to vote without prejudice to a final decision on the matters subject of
these appeal/. Which we also submit that
in order to expedite the proceedings these exclusions should also be allowed
to vote even pending resolution of the appeal but segregating them for further
consideration” (pp. 3-4, Annex “H”; pp. 46-47, rec.).
On December 4, 1979, respondent bank likewise appealed from the
aforesaid November 19, 1979 order of Med-Arbiter Alberto Abis,
Jr. to the Minister of Labor on the following grounds:
(1) that the act of Med-Arbiter Abis in issuing the abovesaid
Order is ultra vires, full and complete
jurisdiction over the questioned petition being vested in the office of the
Minister of Labor and hence the only adjudicative body empowered to resolve the
petition;
(2) that the fact that
petitioner’s Union registration was subject of cancellation proceedings with
the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered the issuance of the abovequestioned
Order directing the holding of a certification, election premature; and
(3) that the bargaining
unit was not appropriately defined [Annex “I”; pp. 49-57, rec.].
On December 7, 1979, the entire records of the
case were allegedly elevated as an appealed case by Regional Director Francisco
L. Estrella to the Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations and was docketed thereat as appealed case No. A-1599-79.
On January 21, 1980, the Union of Producers Bank Employees
Chapter-NATU filed a motion to intervene in the said petition for certification
election alleging among other things that it has also some signed up members in
the respondent Bank and consequently has an interest in the petition for
certification election filed by petitioner as it will directly affect their
rights as to who will represent the employees in the collective bargaining
negotiations (Annex “P”; pp. 100-101, rec.).
On January 24, 1980, the Bureau of Labor Relations Director Carmelo C. Noriel rendered a
decision affirming the Med-Arbiter’s order with certain modifications, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
“Preliminarily, the issue of jurisdiction is being raised by
respondent bank but we need not be drawn into nor tarry in this issue but
instead proceed to consider the merits of the case. Suffice it rather to say that the appealed
order was signed by the med-arbiter a quo and the records of the
case were elevated on appeal to this Bureau by the Regional Director of the
National Capital Region. Besides respondent should not unduly press the jurisdictional
issue. Such question does not
lead nor contribute to the resolution of the real pressing issue — the
certification election issue. What is at
stake here is the right of the employees to organize and be represented for
collective bargaining purposes by a union at the respondent bank where none
existed up to the present time. On this
consideration alone, respondent’s vigorous objection alleging want of
jurisdiction cracks from tangency of the issue.
xx xx xx
“The matter of defining the bargaining unit, that is to say
the appropriateness thereof, usually presents for determination three
questions, to wit, the general type of the bargaining unit or whether it should
be an industrial unit embracing all the employees in a broad class or a craft
unit that is confined to a small specialized group within a broad class, the
scope of the bargaining unit or whether it would embrace all employees in a
given class at only one plant or at several plants of an employer, and the
specific composition of the bargaining unit, that is, whether or not the unit
should include employees of different occupational groups, like clerks,
inspectors, technical employees, etc..
On these questions, we are not without legal guidelines. The law and the Rules are clear. The petition for certification election,
whether filed by a legitimate labor organization or by an employer in appropriate
case, shall contain, inter alia, the
description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless
circumstances otherwise require. Thus,
the policy under the Labor Code on the matter of fixing the bargaining unit is
to favor larger units and this is sought to be implemented on a two-tiered
basis. On the lower tier, the law
mandates the employer unit as the normal unit of organization at the company
level, thus discouraging if not stopping fragmentation into small craft or
occupational units as what prevailed prior to the Labor Code. But the Code envisions further consolidation
into larger bargaining units. Thus, on
the higher tier, the law mandates the eventual restructuring of the labor
movement along the ‘one union, one industry’ basis. There should therefore be no doubt as to the
law and policy on the fixing of the appropriate bargaining unit which is
generally the employer unit. Applying
this rule to the instant case, the appropriate bargaining unit should embrace
all the regular rank and file employees at the head as well as branch offices
of respondent bank. Of course, the
exception to this employer unit rule is when circumstances otherwise
require. But such is not at issue here,
respondent not having adduced circumstances that would justify a contrary
composition of the bargaining unit.
“Respondent however insists on the definition of the
appropriate bargaining unit upon the question of whether or not to exclude admittedly
regular rank and file employees which it considers confidential, managerial
and technical. This question, it should
be pointed out, does not enter the matter of defining the bargaining unit. The definition of the appropriate unit refers
to the grouping or more precisely, the legal collectivity of eligible
employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The presumption is that these employees are
entitled to the rights to self-organization and collective bargaining,
otherwise they would not be, in the first place be considered at all in the
determination of the appropriate bargaining unit.
“The question therefore of excluding certain
rank and file employees for being allegedly confidential, managerial or technical
does not simply involve a definition of the bargaining unit but rather
raises the fundamental issue of coverage under or eligibility for the exercise
of the workers’ rights to self-organization and collective bargaining. On this score, the law on coverage and
exclusion on the matter should by now be very clear. Article 244 of the Labor Code states that all
persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including
religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions operating for
profit shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist
labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. Articles 245 and 246 (ibid) provide that
security guards and managerial employees are not eligible to form, assist or
join any labor organization. As defined
by the Code, a managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management
policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign
or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial
actions. All employees not falling
within this definition are considered rank and file employees for purposes of
self-organization and collective bargaining.
“It is in the light of the foregoing provisions of law that
the challenged order, in so far as it excludes all managerial and supervisory
employees, secretaries of bank officials, credit investigators, telephone
operators, loan security custodians, employees in the accounting, auditing,
legal, trust and personal departments respectively, should be modified for being
either superfluous, discriminatory or simply contrary to law. The express exclusion of managerial employees
in the Order is superfluous for the same is already provided for by law and is
presumed when the bargaining unit was defined as comprising all the regular
rank and file employees of the bank. It
is also anomalous and discriminatory when it excluded employees of the
personnel department but included specific individuals like Manuel Sumibcay, Primi Zamora and
Carmelita Sy.
Exclusion as managerial employee is not based on the personality of the
occupant but rather on the nature and function of the position. The exclusion of the other positions is
likewise contrary to law, there being no clear showing that they are
managerial, employees. The mere fact of
being a supervisor or a confidential employee does not exclude him from
coverage. He must strictly come within
the category of a managerial employee as defined by the Code. The Constitution assures to all workers such
rights to self-organization and collective bargaining. Exclusions, being the exception and being in
derogation of such constitutional mandate, should be construed in strictissimi juris.
“Furthermore, to uphold the order of exclusion would be to
allow the emasculation of the workers’ right to self-organization and to
collective bargaining; statutory rights which have received constitutional
recognition when they were enshrined in the 1973 Constitution. Indeed, the further rulings that ‘other non-confidential
employees included in the bank’s list of proposed exclusion be allowed to vote
but the votes should be segregated as challenged’ and ‘that in case of doubt as
to whether or not the position held by an employee is confidential in nature,
the employee should be allowed to vote but his vote should be segregated as
challenged’ both complete the said order’s self-nullifying effects.
“At the most and indeed as a policy, exclusion of confidential
employees from the bargaining unit is a matter for negotiation and agreement of
the parties. Thus, the parties may agree
in the CBA, to exclude certain highly confidential positions from the bargaining
unit. Absent such agreement, coverage
must be observed. In any event, any
negotiation and agreement can come after the representation issue is resolved
and this is just the situation in the instant case.
“In fine, the appropriate bargaining unit shall include all
the regular rank and file employees of the respondent including the positions
excluded in the challenged order dated 19 November 1979, with the exception of
the secretaries to the Bank President, Executive Vice-President, Senior Vice
President and other Vice Presidents as agreed upon by the parties during the
hearings.
“Respondent vehemently interposes also the pendency of cancellation proceedings against petitioner
as a prejudicial issue which should suspend the petition for certification
election.
“We cannot fully concur with this contention. Unless there is an order of
cancellation which is final, the union’s certificate of registration remains
and its legal personality intact.
It is entitled to the rights and privileges accorded by law,
including the right to represent its members and employees in a bargaining unit
for collective bargaining purposes including participation in a representation
proceeding. This is especially
true where the grounds for the cancellation of its union certificate do not
appear indubitable.
“The rights of workers to
self-organization finds general and specific constitutional guarantees.
Section 7, Article IV of the Philippine Constitution provides that the
right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged. This right is more
pronounced in the case of labor. Section
9, Article II (ibid) specifically declares that the State shall assure the
rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure and just and humane conditions of work.
Such constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken much less
easily nullified. A healthy
respect for the freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers
or members be not easily visited with capital punishments against the
association itself.
“On the 30% consent requirement, respondent contends that the
bargaining unit is not appropriately defined hence, the med-arbiter’s finding
that there was compliance with the 30% ‘jurisdictional requirement is patently
erroneous.’ To this we must disagree. As
earlier stated, the definition of the appropriate bargaining unit does not call
for an actual head count or identification of the particular employees
belonging thereto. That is done in the
pre-election conference. It is
sufficient that the bargaining unit is defined such that the employees who are
part thereof may be readily ascertained for purposes of exclusions and
inclusions during the pre-election conference when the list
of eligible voters are determined.
“In this regard, respondent does not really seriously question
the 264 total number of employees except for the
alleged exclusion which should reduce the number thus allegedly affecting the
sufficiency of the supporting signatures submitted. We have already ruled against the exclusions
as violative of the constitutional guarantee of
workers’ right to self-organization.
Consequently, since 188 of the 264 employees subscribed to the petition,
which constitutes 70% of the total employees in bargaining unit, the 30%
consent requirement has been more than sufficiently complied with. In any case, even if we grant the alleged
exclusions totalling about 45, the same will not give
any refuge to respondent’s position. For
assuming momentarily that the exclusions are valid, the same will not fatally
affect the 30% consent compliance.
“Finally, lest it be so easily forgotten, a certification
election is but an administration device for determining the true choice of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit as to their bargaining
representative. Unnecessary obstacles
should not therefore be thrown on its way.
Rather, the parties should take their case, if they have, directly to
the real and ultimate arbiter on the matter, the employees sought to be represented
in the bargaining unit.
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the
Order dated 19 November 1979 calling for a certification election is hereby
affirmed with the modification that the same shall be conducted among all the
regular rank and file employees of the respondent bank at its head and branch
offices, including those excluded in said Order, except only the positions of
secretary to the Bank President, Executive Vice-President and other
Vice-Presidents which agreed to be excluded from the bargaining unit by the
parties during the hearings. The choice
shall be between the petitioner and no union.
“Let the certification election be conducted within twenty
(20) days from receipt hereof. The
pre-election conference shall be immediately called to thresh out the
mechanics of the election. The list of
qualified voters shall be based on the July 1979 payroll of the company.
“SO ORDERED” (pp. 5-9, Annex
“J”; pp. 63-67, rec.; underlining supplied).
On February 11, 1980, petitioner received an undated and
unverified appeal of the respondent bank to the Minister of Labor questioning
the decision of Bureau of Labor Relations Director Carmelo
C. Noriel which appeal alleged that:
“I. THE QUESTIONED ORDER IS NULL AND VOID FOR
HAVING BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION SINCE –
“(i) It is this
Honorable Office, not the BLR, that has jurisdiction over the parties’
appeals from the Order of Med-Arbiter Alberto A. Abis
Jr.
“II. ASSUMING, AD ARGUENDO, THAT THE
BLR HAS JURISDICTION, THE APPEALED ORDER IS NONETHELESS NULL AND VOID, THE BLR
HAVING GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ORDER, DATED
NOVEMBER 19, 1979, OF MED-ARBITER ABIS IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED
WITHOUT AUTHORITY/JURISDICTION CONSIDERING THAT –
“(i) Full
and complete jurisdiction over this petition is vested in this Office, which,
under P.D. 823, as amended, and by agreement of the parties, is the
adjudicative body solely and exclusively empowered to resolve this petition.
“(ii) The fact that petitioner’s Union registration
is now the subject of cancellation proceedings before the BLR renders the issuance
of an Order directing the holding of a certification election premature; and
“(iii) The bargaining unit is not appropriately
defined; hence, the BLR’s, and before it, the MedArbiter’s finding that there was compliance with the
30% jurisdictional requirement is completely without basis and, therefore,
grossly erroneous.
“III. THE MOTION FOR INTERVENTION FILED BY
INTERVENOR UNION OF PRODUCERS BANK EMPLOYEE’S CHAPTER-NATU WHICH THE BLR, FOR
UNKNOWN REASON(S), FAILED TO RESOLVE, RENDERS IMPERATIVE THE REDETERMINATION OF
WHETHER OR NOT THE MANDATORY 30% JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN MET.”
(Pp. 2-3, Annex ‘K’; pp. 69?70, rec.).
On February 21, 1980, petitioner union filed a manifestation on
respondent’s undated and unverified appeal (Annex “L”; pp. 91-94,
rec.).
On the same date, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss with
motion to execute (Annex “M”; pp. 95-96, rec.).
On March 3, 1980, petitioner filed an urgent motion to resolve
respondent’s appeal together with petitioner’s motion to dismiss and motion for
execution (Annex “N”; pp. 97-98, rec.).
On March 14, 1980, petitioner received a copy of a letter
endorsement dated March 7, 1980 which reads;
“Respectfully referred to the Honorable
Minister of Labor, the herein attached Motion to Execute and Manifestation to
Dismiss with Motion to Execute and Manifestation on Respondent’s undated and
unverified Appeal dated February 21, 1980 and February 20, 1980 respectively,
for appropriate action.
“In a memorandum dated 9 November 1979, the Deputy Minister
of Labor completely inhibited himself in this case” (p. 169, rec.).
Public respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel did not proceed to hold the certification election, neither did the Minister of Labor act on the
appeal of private respondent and on petitioner’s motion to dismiss with motion
to execute.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition on March 19, 1980.
On May 2, 1980, private respondent Bank filed its comments (pp.
111-122, rec.).
On June 25, 1980, public respondents filed their comment (pp.
131-142, rec.).
On August 16, 1980, petitioner filed its memorandum (pp.
155-169; rec.).
On September 2, 1980, private respondent Bank filed its
memorandum (pp. 179-197, rec.).
On October 1, 1980, public respondents filed a manifestation in
lieu of memorandum alleging inter alia
that:
“1. The instant petition for mandamus seeks
to compel the respondent Minister of Labor to act on respondent Producers
Bank’s Appeal and on petitioner’s motion to execute the decision of respondent
Director of Labor Relations dated January 24, 1980, directing the holding of a
certification election in said bank;
“2. The
said petition, however, is now moot and academic because:
“(a) Respondent Minister of Labor had already
acted on the said appeal in his decision
dated April 11, 1980 the dispositive portion of
which is as follows:
‘Wherefore, respondent Bank’s Appeal is hereby dismissed and the
validity of the Decision of January 24, 1980, herein adopted is hereby
recognized. No motion for reconsideration
of this Order shall be entertained.’
“(b) Petitioner may now file, if it so desires,
with respondent Director of Labor Relations, a motion for the execution of his
decision so that the certification election can be held at respondent bank;
“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that
the instant petition be dismissed for being moot and academic” (pp.
201-202, rec.; underlining supplied).
On October 10, 1980, petitioner filed a “Manifestation Re:
Decision of the Minister of Labor” alleging among other things that:
xx xx xx
“2. Petitioner had not received any copy of such
April 11, 1980 decision of the Minister of Labor mentioned by the Honorable
Solicitor General. In fact, the Comment
of the public respondents dated June 11, 1980 signed by Assistant Solicitor
General Octavio R. Ramirez and Trial Attorney Elihu A. Ybañez made no mention
of the same in the private respondent’s memorandum of September 2, 1980″
(p. 204, rec.).
On October 28, 1980, petitioner filed a comment on manifestation
of the Honorable Solicitor General dated 30 September 1980 and motion alleging
therein that despite inquiries made, no official copy of the alleged April
11, 1980 decision of the Minister of Labor mentioned in the manifestation
of the Solicitor General has been furnished the petitioner. Hence, it prayed that the Minister of Labor
be requested to submit to this Court a certified copy of the aforesaid. April 11, 1980 decision of the Minister of
Labor.
On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a manifestation and comment
stating that:
“1. On October 29, 1980, it received a copy of the
decision of the Honorable Minister of Labor in Case No. NCR-LRD-8- 360-79 as
may be seen from Annex ‘A’.
“2. The decision is dated October 23, 1980 and not
April 11, 1980 as stated in the Manifestation in Lieu of Memorandum of the
Office of the Honorable Solicitor General, dated 30 September 1980.
“3. Petitioner respectfully request
an explanation from the public respondents on this apparent discrepancy which
has in fact misled even this Honorable Court” (p. 211, rec.).
On November 11, 1980, private respondent Bank filed a
manifestation/motion stating that the aforementioned April 11, 1980
decision of the Minister of Labor is non-existent, as in fact the Minister
of Labor issued an order affirming the decision of BLR Director Noriel only on October 23, 1980.
xx xx xx
“3. Notwithstanding the issuance of the October
23, 1980 Order by the Minister of Labor, the Bank respectfully submits that
this petition for mandamus, initiated by petitioner on March 19, 1980
and given due course by this Honorable Court should not be dismissed. The petitioner herein prays from this
Honorable Court that ‘public respondents be ordered to conduct the certification
election as ordered by Med-Arbiter Plagata, Abis and BLR Director Noriel
among the rank-and-file employees xxx’ of the Bank. Alternatively, the petitioner prays that
the Minister of Labor or his Deputy be required ‘to act forthwith’, on the
appeal filed by petitioner herein. As
could be gleaned clearly from the allegations and prayer in this petition for mandamus,
the petitioner primarily seeks the holding of a certification election. Only secondarily is it asking this Court
to command the Minister of Labor or his Deputy to resolve the appeal filed by
the Bank.
“4. The affirmance by
the Minister of the disputed order of BLR Director Noriel
thus renders moot and academic only the secondary or alternative prayer of the
Union in this mandamus case. What
still remains for resolution by this Honorable Court is the issue squarely put
before it on the propriety or impropriety of holding a certification election. This issue has been traversed by the
petitioner and the Bank in their respective memoranda filed with this Court,
with the Bank stressing that a certification election would be improper
because, among others, the petitioning Union violated the strike ban, there is
a pending case for cancellation of its registration certificate, and
applications for clearance to dismiss the Union’s striking members are pending
approval by the BLR Director.
“5. A dismissal of this petition for mandamus
would unduly delay the resolution of the issue of whether a certification
election should be held or not.
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully moved that
this Honorable Court rule on the issue of whether or not a certification
election should be held under circumstances obtaining in the present case”
(pp. 214-216, rec.; underscoring supplied).
On November 24, 1980, public respondents filed a reply to the
manifestation and comment of petitioner explaining the discrepancy of the two
dates –October 23, 1980, the actual date of the order of the Minister of
Labor affirming the decision of the BIR Director and April 11, 1980, the date
mentioned by the Solicitor General as the alleged date of the aforesaid order
of the Minister of Labor. Thus the
pertinent portion of the letter of Director Noriel to
the Solicitor General likewise explaining the apparent discrepancy of the
aforesaid dates reads:
“I should likewise invite your attention to the date of the
Order which is October 23, 1980 and not April 11, 1980 as indicated in the
‘Manifestation in Lieu of Memorandum’ dated September 30, 1980 of the Solicitor
General filed with the Supreme Court. The
April 11, 1980 date must have been based on a draft order which was
inadvertently included in the records of the case that was forwarded to your
office. We wish to point out,
however, that the dispositive portion as quoted in
the Manifestation is exactly the same as that in the Order eventually signed
and released by the Labor Minister on October 23, 1980″ (p. 220, rec.).
Public respondents further averred that “(I)n any event,
whether the order is dated April 11, 1980 or October 23, 1980 will not matter
since both ‘orders’ dismissed the appeal of the respondent Bank, upon which
dismissal the Manifestation in Lieu of Memorandum dated September 30, 1980, of
public respondents, was based.” Public respondents thus reiterated their
prayer that the instant petition be dismissed for being allegedly moot and
academic (pp. 219-222, rec.).
On December 5, 1980, petitioner filed a comment to
manifestation/motion of counsel for private respondent alleging inter alia that “x x x should the Honorable Court be minded to resolve the issue
raised in the Manifestation/Motion of private respondent – i.e. – whether the
alleged strike ban violation is a bar to a certification election, it will be
noted that the matter of whether there has been a ‘violation’ of the strike ban
or not is still to be heard by the Regional Director through Labor Arbiter Crescencio Trajano after this
Honorable Court dismissed G.R. No. L-52026 on the matter of jurisdictional
competence of the Regional Director to hear the question raised therein. To the present, although, the Regional
Director has commenced to act on the case, there is no decision on whether
the strike ban has been violated by the petitioner union.” Petitioner
union vigorously asserted that while private respondent Bank has a pending
petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of herein petitioner
union, it is still premature for private respondent. Bank to claim that the petitioner union has
violated the strike ban. Petitioner then
alleged that “(T)here is also no proof or decision that acts
indulged in by the petitioner and its members amounted to a strike and
even assuming arguendo that such act (which
was the holding of a meeting for 30 minutes before office time in the morning)
constitutes a ‘strike’ and further that such act violates the strike ban. It has been held through Honorable Justice
Antonio P. Barredo in Petrophil
vs. Malayang Manggawa sa ESSO (75 SCRA 73) that only the leaders and members who
participated in the illegal activity are held responsible. If this were so, then the rest of the
members who are innocent are still entitled to the benefits of collective bargaining. There is thus no need to delay the holding of
a certification election on the alleged ground that there is a pending
action of the respondent company against the petitioner union for ‘violation of
the strike ban'” (pp. 226-227, rec.).
It is likewise pointed out by petitioner union that even if it
would be ultimately confirmed that indeed petitioner union has violated the
strike ban, cancellation f the registration certificate of petitioner union is
not the only disciplinary action or sanction provided for under the law but
other penalties may be imposed and not necessarily cancellation f its
registration certificate.
On January 12, 1981, pursuant to the resolution of this Court
dated December 4, 1980, petitioner union filed its rejoinder which reiterated
the stand of the Solicitor General that the present case has become moot and
academic by virtue of the decision of the Minister of Labor affirming the
decision of the BLR Director which ordered a certification election (p. 230,
rec.).
It is quite obvious from the facts set forth above that the
question of jurisdiction vigorously asserted by herein private respondent Bank
has become moot and academic.
What therefore remains for this Court to resolve is the issue as
to whether or not a certification election should be held under the
circumstances obtaining in the present case.
Is it proper to order a certification election despite the pendency of the petition to cancel herein petitioner
union’s certificate of registration?
The Court rules in the affirmative. The pendency of the
petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of herein petitioner
union is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. The pendency of
the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner
union founded on the alleged illegal strikes staged by the leaders and members
of the intervenor union and petitioner union should
not suspend the holding of a certification election, because there is no order
directing such cancellation (cf. Dairy Queen Products Company of the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., No. L-35009, Aug.
31, 1977). In said Dairy Queen case, one
of the issues raised was whether the lower court erred and concomitantly
committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the fact that therein respondent
union’s permit and license have been cancelled by the then Department of Labor
and therefore could not be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file employees of therein petitioner company.
While the rationale of the decision was principally rested on
the subsequent rescission of the decision ordering the cancellation of the
registration certificate of the respondent union, thereby restoring its legal
personality and all the rights and privileges accorded by law to a legitimate
organization, this Court likewise declared: “There is no showing,
however, that when the respondent court issued the order dated December 8,
1971, certifying the Dairy Queen Employees Association-CCLU as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all regular rank and file employees of
the Dairy Queen Products Company of the Philippines, Inc., for purposes of
collective bargaining with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of work and
other terms and conditions for appointment, the order of cancellation of
the registration certificate of the Dairy Queen Employees Association-CCLU had
become final” (78 SCRA 444-445, supra, underscoring supplied).
It may be worthy to note also that the petition for cancellation
of petitioner union’s registration certificate based on the alleged illegal
strikes staged on October 12, 1979 and later November 5-7, 1979 was
evidently intended to delay the early disposition of the case for certification
election considering that the same was apparently filed only after the October
18, 1979 Order of Med-Arbiter Plagata which
directed the holding of a certification election.
Aside from the fact that the petition for cancellation of the
registration certificate of petitioner union has not yet been finally resolved,
there is another fact that militates against the stand of private respondent
Bank, the liberal approach observed by this Court as to matters of
certification election. In a recent
case, Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local vs. Hon. Carmelo
C. Noriel, et al.
(No. 51005, May 26, 1981), “/T/he Court resolves to grant the petition
(for mandamus) in line with the liberal approach consistently adhered to
by this Court in matters of certification election. The whole democratic process is geared
towards the determination f representation, not only in government but in other
sectors as well, by election. Thus, the
Court has declared its commitment to the view that a certification election is
crucial to the institution of collective bargaining, for it gives substance to
the principle of majority rule as one of the basic concepts of a democratic
policy” (National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs. Luna, 83 SCRA 610).
Likewise, Scout Ramon V. Albano
Memorial College vs. Noriel, et al. (L-48347, Oct. 3,
1978, 85 SCRA 494, 497, 498), this Court citing a long catena of cases ruled:
“xx x ‘The institution of collective bargaining is, to recall
Cox, a prime manifestation of industrial democracy at work. The two parties to the relationship, labor
and management, make their own rules by coming to terms. That is to govern themselves in matters that
really count. As labor, however, is
composed of a number of individuals, it is indispensable that they be
represented by a labor organization of their choice. This may be discerned how crucial is a certification
election. So our decisions from the
earliest case of PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co, Free Telephone Workers Union
to the latest, Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity
Workers’ Federation (PCWF) v. Court of Industrial Relations, had made clear.’
The same principle was again given expression in language equally emphatic in
the subsequent case of Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of
Labor Relations: ‘Petitioner thus appears to be woefully lacking in awareness of
the significance of a certification election for the collective bargaining
process. It is the fairest and most
effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the
working force. It is a fundamental
postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in an honest
election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is
controlling. No better device can assure
the institution of industrial democracy with the two parties to a business
enterprise, management and labor, establishing a regime of self-rule.’ That is to accord respect to the policy of
the Labor Code, indisputably partial to the holding of a certification
election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the
choice of the labor organization to represent the workers in a collective
bargaining unit” (underlining supplied).
It is true that under Section 8, Rule II, Book V of the Labor
Code, cancellation of registration certificate may be imposed on
the following instances:
(a) Violation
of Articles 234, 238, 239 and 240 of the Code;
(b) Failure
to comply with Article 237 of the Code;
(c) Violation
of any of the provisions of Article 242 of the Code; and
(d) Any
violation of the provisions of this Book.
The aforementioned provisions should be read in relation to
Article 273, Chapter IV, Title VIII which explicitly provides:
“Art. 273. Penalties.
–(a) Violation of any provision of this Title shall be punished by a fine of
One Thousand Pesos /P1,000.00/ to Ten Thousand Pesos /P10,000.00/ and/or
imprisonment of one (1) year to five (5) years.
“(b) Any person violating any provision of this
Title shall be dealt with in accordance with General Order No. 2-A and General
Order No. 49.
“(c) Violation
of this Title by any legitimate labor organization shall be grounds for
disciplinary action including, but not limited to, the cancellation of its
registration permit.
xx xx xx x”
(underscoring supplied).
From the aforequoted provisions, We are
likewise convinced that as it can be gleaned from said provisions,
cancellation of the registration certificate is not the only resultant penalty
in case of any violation of the Labor Code.
Certainly, the penalty imposable should be commensurate to the
nature or gravity of the illegal activities conducted and to the number of
members and leaders of the union staging the illegal strike.
As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director Noriel: “The rights of workers to self-organization
finds general and specific constitutional guarantees. Section 7, Article IV of the Philippine
Constitution provides that the right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. This right is more pronounced in the case of labor. Section 9, Article II (ibid) specifically
declares that the State shall assure the rights of workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and
humane conditions of work. Such
constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken much less easily
nullified. A healthy respect for the
freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be
not easily visited with capital punishments against the association
itself” (p. 8, Annex “J”; p. 66, rec.).
WHEREFORE, THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS PRAYED FOR IS
GRANTED AND RESPONDENT BLR DIRECTOR NORIEL HEREBY ORDERED TO CALL AND DIRECT
THE IMMEDIATE HOLDING OF A CERTIFICATION ELECTION. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., no part.
Abad Santos, J., in the result.