THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JESUS D. NAZARENO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

It is to be, expected that a brief for appellant would carry the
impress of partisan zeal, at times even carried to excess.  Necessarily then, it must be scrutinized with
care.  Moreover, allowance must be made
for its biased character.  It may not
suffice therefore to discredit the appealed decision.  When the plea for reversal is however reinforced by a careful and conscientious appraisal
of the evidence of record coming from the then Acting Solicitor General Vicente
V. Mendoza,^[1] who, instead of filing appellee’s
brief, submitted a thirty-four page Manifestation recommend­ing acquittal, it
assumes a different posture — one much more favorable to the accused.  So it is in this appeal by Jesus D. Nazareno who was prosecuted for rape, thereafter convicted,
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua
with indemnification to the offended party in the amount of P5,000.00.  The principal reliance of the Manifestation
coming from the Office of the Solicitor General is on the three recent
decisions of People v. Maisug,^[2] People v. Reyes^[3] and People v. Lopez.^[4] Its concluding portion reads thus:  “In fine, undersigned counsel for the
People respectfully submit that the trial court’s assessment of the evidence on
record upon which it found appellant guilty of the crime of rape is
incorrect.  Instead, the testimony and
written statement of the complainant, it is respectfully submitted, are wanting
of that proof to demonstrate that the crime of rape as charged was committed by
the appellant through force and intimidation. 
Even if there is reasonable doubt as to his innocence, as obtaining in
this case, he is entitled to acquittal.”^[5] Accordingly, the constitutional presumption
of innocence^[6] not having been overcome, it should
prevail.  As prayed for by the counsel of
the accused and the then Acting Solicitor General, the appealed decision should
be reversed and appellant acquitted of the crime of rape with costs de oficio.

The undisputed facts, the inherent lack of credibility on crucial
points in the complainant’s version, certain damaging admissions made by her on
the witness stand, the uncontradicted testimony of
appellant and other attendant circumstances, ought to have cautioned the trial
judge against a finding of guilt.  A
dispassionate consideration of the matter should have led to the conclusion
that the constitutional presumption of innocence had not been overcome by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

The complainant Rayda Aumada was a maid in the house of the accused Jesus D. Nazareno in Pagongan, Baganga, Davao Oriental,^[7]
her services dating from November 16,
1969.^[8]
She continued as such up to January, 1971.^[9]
She gave birth to a child on April 14,
1971.^[10]
That child was thrown away by her after its birth,^[11]
its dead body having been discovered in Pagongan
creek on the evening of the same day by the children of a witness, Lucrencio Layupan.^[12]
There was an investigation by the barrio captain, complainant admitting that it
was she who gave birth to the child, the father, according to her, being
appellant Jesus D. Nazareno.^[13]
She likewise gave the information that she was under instruction from him to
throw the baby, but no mention
was made of force being employed when the sexual act took place.^[14]
The complaint charging the accused with rape was not filed until May 5, 1971.  It was alleged in the complaint that the
alleged rape took place in the middle part of January, 1970.^[15]
On the witness stand, it was her testimony that she was compelled against her
will to submit to his desire twice, the
first time on the first week of January and then on the last week of that
month.^[16] Her sister, who was another maid in the same
house, was not told about the matter.^[17] She was free to visit her parents but she
likewise made no complaint to them about her being abused by appellant.^[18]
She stayed in the same house­hold for one more year, but the wife of the
accused was kept equally ignorant of the alleged rape and did not even notice
her pregnant condition all the while, although the delivery occurred barely
three months after she left.^[19]

The lack of credibility
of certain assertions made by her on the witness stand that cast grave doubts
on her accusation was noted in the manifestation of the Acting Solicitor
General.  The most notable instance of
the improbable character of her version of what transpired was the long delayed
birth of the child arising from the alleged act of rape long after the
nine-month usual period of pregnancy.  As
set forth therein:  “From the
month of February, 1970, the starting period of her conception of a child,
after her alleged sexual intercourse with the appellant during the last week of
January, 1970, there is a supervening
period of fifteen (15) months, more or less: 
This Honorable Court made the correct observation that ‘the average
duration of human pregnancy, counting from the first day of menstrual period,
is about two hundred eighty days or forty weeks’ (People v. Castro, 58 SCRA
473, quoting William’s Obstretrics, 14th Ed., p.
236), which is about nine complete months. 
Even the complainant herself, already 22 years old when she testified in
the court below * * * declared that she knows that it takes nine (9) months for
a fetus to stay in the womb of a mother * * *. 
There may be pre­mature births of seven-month old or eight-month old
babies, but it is biologically improbable for a baby to overstay in the womb of
its mother, even if already dead, for more than six (6) months.  In her effort to explain thin biological
improbability, complainant made additional declarations which only produced
further improbable situations.  [Here
reference was made to her admission that she gave birth in October, 1970 and then on April
14, 1971.] Granting
that she gave birth to a baby in October, 1970, which is well within the
nine-month period of pregnancy, counting
from her last menstrual period
in February, 1970, it is biologically improbable for her to give another birth
on the fifth month, or on April 14, 1971, counting from her alleged last birth
of a baby in October, 1970.  If her
declaration that she gave birth to a baby in October, 1970, allegedly fathered
by the appellant, at a time when she was still staying in the house of the
appellant as the family’s housemaid, were true, there would have been a big
family scandal.”^[20]

In addition to certain
admissions already noted, there were others, equally damaging to the
prosecution, elicited during a rather searching cross-examination.  When asked whether or not her failure to
reveal the alleged rape to her parents was “because Jesus Nazareno never forced you to have intercourse with
him,”^[21] her answer was categorical:  “Yes, sir.”^[22] On the occasion of the alleged first time
she was subjected to sexual abuse and upon receiving the answer from her that
there was penetration, the matter was sought to be clarified further with the
query of whether it was due to the fact that she “did not put up any
resistance.”^[23] Again, the reply was:  “Yes, sir.”^[24]
A subsequent question was whether she
“readily submitted to him.”^[25] Again, she replied:  “Yes, sir.”^[26] It was a rather severe cross-examination to
which she was subjected and unfortunately for her cause she was quite
candid.  Thus she did admit likewise that
she did not move at all in order to avoid penetration.^[27] She even went to the extent of replying
affirmatively to the question of “whether she enjoyed the whole sexual
act.”^[28] As regard her testimony that there was
another rape on the last week of January, 1970, again, the searching
cross-examination under which she was subjected elicited such answers as her
having really wanted it.

The lower court failed to take into consideration the uncontradicted testimony of the appellant favorable to
him.  It believed that it was his threat
as “a possessor of a .22 caliber revolver Magnum with six live bullets”^[29]
that enabled him to perpetrate the act without resistance on her part, when
according to evidence not refuted under questioning by the trial judge himself,
the license for such a firearm was acquired for the first time in 1971.^[30]
Moreover, it was the trial judge who, likewise, in the course of his questioning
the appellant, ascertained the fact that his wife was a classroom teacher, her
school located one kilometer away from the house but returning every noontime
to take her lunch, her afternoon class being only from the hours two to three.^[31]
It was at noontime on both occasions, the first week and the last week of
January, 1970, that allegedly complainant was subjected to sexual abuse by
appellant.^[32]

Lastly, the lower court failed to take into account other
attendant circumstances which, if properly appraised, could have reinforced the
conclusion that the judgment should be one of acquittal.  It suffices to mention one.  There are intimations in the record that
complainant was far from desirous of having appellant charged with this
offense.  Her reluctance was duly noted
by his counsel, who made the observation that “in the first two hearings
conducted by the trial court [complainant]
did not appear to testify on her own behalf. 
In view of her absence during the trial, she was ordered arrested and
lodged in the municipal jail; it was only then, after this apparent
compulsion, that she hesitantly testified against the accused.”^[33]
Such an assertion finds confirmation in the records of the criminal case sent
to us by the lower court.  It included an
order of arrest worded thus:  “[To
any officer of the law]:  You are hereby
commanded to arrest [Rayda Aumada]
who is said to be found at [Calinaban, Baganga, Davao Oriental] and who
has been charged before me with the offense (her failure to appear during the
trial on the aforesaid case) and bring her forthwith before me to be dealt with
according to law.”^[34]

It does clearly appear
therefore that the Office of the Solicitor General was left with no choice
except to recommend reversal of the appealed decision.  It is to the credit of the then Acting
Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza and his associates that they took pains to
set forth in detail the weakness of the case for the prosecution which
unfortunately the lower court glossed over, thus ignoring the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

1. It is quite apropos therefore that the Manifestation
submitted by the then Acting Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza to quote this
relevant excerpt from the opinion of Justice Barredo
in People v. Maisug:^[35]
“By and large, the evidence on record does not engender enough faith that
appellant is guilty of the charge.  If
somehow it is discernible that it is more the inadequacy of details in the
state’s evidence that makes it difficult for Us to arrive at definite
conclusions rather than, perhaps, the actual facts themselves, still We cannot
pin responsibility on appellant.  That
moral conviction that may serve as basis of a finding of guilt in criminal
cases is only that which is the logical and inevitable result of the evidence on
record, exclusive of any other consideration. 
Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it
is, even more, our constitutional duty to acquit him.”^[36]
Only thus may there be fealty to the constitutional presumption of
innocence.  A recent restatement–of its
mandatory character may be found in People v. Dramayo:^[37]
“Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction.  It is thus required that every circum­stance
favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.  The proof against him must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.  The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but
that it amounted to a crime.  What is
required then is moral certainty.”^[38]

2. Two recent cases, as previously noted, where precisely the
acquittal in a prosecution for rape was based by this Court on the
constitutional presumption of innocence not having been overcome, was referred
to in the Manifestation:  People v. Reyes
and People v. Lopez.  The opening
paragraph of the opinion in the former was as follows:  “The state policy on the heinous offense
of rape is clear and unmistakable.  Life
is made forfeit under certain circumstances. 
At first blush, the harshness of the penalty may give cause for concern,
considering that by the very nature of its commission, it is both sordid and
joyless, the pleasure derived, if any, being minimal.  To be thereafter sentenced to a long period
of confinement, perhaps for the rest of one’s life, even to suffer death may
appear excessive.  Nonetheless, there is
sound reason for such severity.  It is an intrusion into the right of privacy,
an assault on human dignity.  No legal
system worthy of the name can afford to ignore the traumatic consequences for
unfortunate victim and grievous injury to the peace and good order of the
community.  * * * Nonetheless, the seriousness with which the
state rightfully views the matter with the corresponding imposition of the
punish­ment that fits the crime calls for extreme care on the part of the
judiciary to avoid an injustice done to an accused.  For it is equally true that this is an
offense to which, as is often the case, only two people can testify,
thus requiring the most conscientious effort on the part of the arbiter to weigh
and appraise the conflicting testimony. 
If a reasonable doubt exists, the verdict must be one of
acquittal.”^[39]
In People v. Lopez, the opinion stressed: 
“In the light of the credible and competent facts of record, this
Court cannot view the matter in the same way the lower court did.  The state of moral certainty as to the guilt
of the accused was not reached.  * * * It bears repeating likewise that in
reversing the appealed decision and acquitting the accused, this Court is not
insensible to the misfortune that befell the hapless complainant.  As it was in the lower court, so here, there
is all the sympathy for her.  She is more
to be pitied than censured.”^[40]
The last sentence is particularly appropriate. 
The reality, the cold hard fact, was that she was the mother of an
unwanted child, in all probability conceived under circumstances where
undoubtedly her freedom of will could not have full play.  All that the reversal of the judgment signifies then, to stress
the matter anew, is that, as far as this particular complaint for rape was
concerned, there was failure of proof to satisfy the rigorous standard the law
exacts, compelled by the Constitution no less, to justify conviction.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court
dated October 22, 1976 is
reversed and appellant acquitted of the offense of rape charged, with costs de
oficio.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion,
Jr., and Santos,
JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., did not take part.

^[1]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo
and Solicitor Deusdedit V. Quijano.

^[2]
L-22187, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 742.

^[3]
L-36874-76, September 30, 1974,
60 SCRA 126.

^[4]
L-41974, November 29, 1976,
74 SCRA 205.

^[5]
Manifestation, 33.

^[6]
According to Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, * * *.”

^[7]
T.s.n., Session of January 12, 1973, 9, 11.

^[8]
Ibid, 104.

^[9]
Ibid, 113.

^[10]
Ibid, 114.

^[11]
Ibid, 131.

^[12]
Session of February 22, 1973,
237-239.

^[13]
Ibid, 245-246.

^[14]
Ibid, 247-248.

^[15]
Appellant’s Brief, Appendix A, Decision, 102.

^[16]
T.s.n., Session of January 12,
1973, 11-12; 33.

^[17]
Ibid, 79.

^[18]
Ibid, 80-81.

^[19]
Ibid, 117-120.

^[20]
Manifestation, 15-16.

^[21]
T.s.n., Session of January 12, 1973, 137.

^[22]
Ibid.

^[23]
Ibid, 88.

^[24]
Ibid.

^[25]
Ibid, 90.

^[26]
Ibid.

^[27]
Ibid, 90.

^[28]
Ibid, 90-91.

^[29]
Appellant’s Brief, Appendix A, Decision, 107.

^[30]
T.s.n., Session of October 5, 1976, 68-69.

^[31]
Ibid, 70-73.

^[32]
Ibid, Session of January 12,
1973, 63; 98.

^[33]
Appellee’s Brief, 45.

^[34]
Criminal Case Record Wrapper, Order of Arrest, 68.

^[35]
27 SCRA 742.

^[36]
Ibid, 753.

^[37]
42 SCRA 59.

^[38]
Ibid, 64.

^[39]
60 SCRA 126, 127-128.

^[40]
74 SCRA 205, 211.  Cf. People v.
Alvarez, L-34644, Jan. 17, 1974, 55 SCRA 81; People v. Barbo, L-30988, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 459; People v.
Castro, L-33175, Aug. 19, 1974, 58 SCRA 473; People v. Reyes, L-36874,
Sept. 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 126; People v. Ilagan,
L-36560, May 28, 1975, 64 SCRA 170; People v. Ramirez, L-30635, Jan. 29,
1976, 69 SCRA 144; People v. Godoy, L-31177,
July 15, 1976, 72 SCRA 69; People v. Poblador,
L-44129, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon,
L-44299, Aug. 31, 1977.