LUIS DE VERA, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Luis de Vera was employed as a driver of International
Container Corporation in November of 1970 at a daily wage of eight pesos
(P8.00) and worked for six days a week until he stopped working, on June 3, 1972.

On October 4, 1972,
de Vera filed before Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor a claim
for disability compensation against his employer, International Container
Corporation, on the ground that in the course of his employment he became sick
of peptic ulcer which compelled him to leave his work.^[1]

Having received notice of the claim on October 30, 1972, the International Container
Corporation filed its employer’s report controverting
the claim on the ground that the alleged ailment was not work connected.^[2]

After a hearing, acting referee Daisy Dumol
Lopez rendered an award to the claimant, the dispositive
portion of which We quote:

xx         xx         xx         xx

“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondent International Container Corporation:

“1.     To pay claimant,
Luis de Vera, the sum of Four Hundred Sixty Pesos and 80/100 (P460.80) as
disability compensation under Section 14 of the Act;

“2.     To pay claimant’s
counsel Atty. Igmidio Lumibao,
Jr., the sum of Twenty-Three Pesos and 04/100 (P23.04) as attorney’s fees under
Section 31 of the Act;

“3.     To pay this Office,
the sum of Five Pesos (P5.00) as administrative fees pursuant to Section 55 of
the Act, as amended.”

On a motion for reconsideration filed by the employer on the
ground that the illness of petitioner did not arise out of nor was it
aggravated by his employment and that the claim of petitioner was filed out of
time, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in a decision dated September 30, 1975, set aside the
award and dismissed the claim for lack of merit.  Said decision is now before Us for review.

Respondent Commission reasoned out its reversal of the referee’s
award thus:

“The claimant claims to have stopped working on June 3, 1972, on account of his peptic
ulcer and hyper­acidity (page 2 of the record). 
In support of this allegation, the claimant submitted Exhibit ‘A’, a
physician’s report, dated September
24, 1972, issued by Dr. Eulogio Banigued (page 1 of the record).  In the said physician’s report, and this has
attracted our attention, it is stated that claimant’s illness was only for ‘epigastric discomfort and burning sensation.’ This fact
argues against a finding of compensability in favor of the herein claimant, in
that his alleged peptic ulcer and hyperacidity were not disabling
ailments.  If claimant stopped working on
June 3, 1972, as alleged, it
was definitely not on account of his epigastric
discomfort and burning sensation (in the abdomen).

xx         xx         xx         xx

“In workmen’s compensation cases, it is not enough that the
workingman comes to this Commission and tells us that he is sick.  He has to prove that his illness is causally
related to his work and that the same has incapacitated him to earn his usual
wages.  He has to prove these facts by substantial
evidence.  In this case under
consideration, the claimant has miserably failed to do just that.  We shall conclude, without fear of
contradiction, that this instant case does not come within the coverage of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.” (pp. 15-16, rollo)

The aforequoted pronouncements cannot
stand in the face of overwhelming decisions of this Court on the legal
presumption of compensability of an illness which supervenes in the course of
and is aggravated by one’s employment and results in the employee’s disability
to perform his customary work permanently or for some period of time.^[3]

As found by the acting referee, Daisy Dumol
Lopez, there is evidence in the record that the claimant suffered abdominal
pains in the process of employment and had to stop working by reason
thereof.  In fact, petitioner had to leave
the city and stay in the province presumably to seek rest from the heavy burden
of driving the company’s vehicles, as proof of which he was physically examined
and treated for his “epigastric discomfort”
by a physician, Dr. Eulogio Banigued
in the town of Bautista, province of Pangasinan.

The employer asserts however that peptic ulcer could not have
been caused by petitioner’s work as a driver; that the greater part of the
driver’s day is spent in a sitting position and he does not operate his vehicle
eight continuous hours and as a rule he takes snacks, etc. at pleasure; and
that peptic ulcer may result from irregular eating habits or from excessive
alcohol intake.^[4]

The record is bereft however of evidence to substantiate the
above assertions of respondent employer; moreover, such assertions are
insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption of compensability of a claim as
was filed in the instant case.

In Belmonte vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, et al. the Court through Justice Claudio Teehankee reiterated and stressed its ruling in Abana vs. Quisumbing
(1968, 22 SCRA 1278, 1282) to the effect that granting that claimant’s evidence
is insufficient to show a causal link between the nature of the employment and
the ailment, under the provisions of section 44 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act as amended it is to be presumed that the claimant’s illness which
supervened at the time of his employment either arose out of or was at least
aggravated by said employment, and that with this legal pre­sumption the burden
of proof shifts to the employer and the employee is relieved of the burden to
show connection.^[5]

The employer’s submission that peptic ulcer could have been
caused by excessive alcoholic intake and/or irregular eating habits is of no
consequence for as also held in Abana vs. Quisumbing, supra,

“While there is that possibility that factors other than the
employment of the claimant may also have contributed to the aggravation of his
illness, this is not a drawback to its compensability.  For, under the law, it is not required that
the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of
claimant’s illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for.  It is enough that his employment had
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease.”
xx     xx (at
1282; see also Aranzanso vs. Hon. Sagnit,
et al., 1976, 71 SCRA 608, 612)

Finally, in line with the liberal course of action the Court
takes in connection with claims of workers for disability compensation under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the instant claim of petitioner may justifiably
be made to fall within a judicial pronouncement that for compensation to be
available the “harm to the physical structure of the body need not be
external or visible nor must it be established by direct evidence.”^[6]

WHEREFORE, We set aside the decision under review and
affirm the award rendered by the acting referee quoted in page two hereof, and
in addition the respondent employer is ordered to:

(a)      
refund petitioner for medical
expenses supported by receipts incurred during the period of disability, if
any;

(b)      
provide petitioner with such
services and supplies as may be necessary for the cure of the particular
ailment which caused the disability object of this claim; and

(c)      
pay Sixty-one (P61.00) Pesos as
administrative fee.  No costs.

So Ordered.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Martin, Fernandez, and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
p. 12, rollo

^[2]
p. 44, ibid.

^[3]
Victoria M. Roma vs. WCC and Bureau of Public Schools, L-43675, October
28, 1977, citing A.D. Santos vs. De Sapon, et
al., 16 SCRA 792 and numerous other cases.

^[4]
p. 4 of respondent company’s Memorandum at p. 81, rollo

^[5]
58 SCRA 138, 143 (1974)

^[6]
Brodtmann et al. vs. Zurich General Accident
& Liability Ins. Co. Ltd. 1937, 90 F. 2d 1; Maryland Casualty Co. vs.
Broadway et al., 1940, 110 F. 2d 357, 359; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York vs. Neas et al., 1937, 93 F. 2d 137