THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLANTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MONICA ANINO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental in Criminal Case No. 6290, denying
the motion to quash the information filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the
court a quo, charging appellant Monica Anino
of the crime of dereliction of official duty punished under Article 208 of the
Revised Penal Code.

The information substantially alleged as follows:  that during the months of June, July and
August, 1965, and for sometime thereafter, the said accused, being the duly
elected Barrio Captain (Lieutenant) of
Barrio Villaflor, municipality of Oroquieta,
Misamis Occidental, and holding office as such with
the legal duty of enforcing the laws and ordinances in said barrio, did then
and there allow, encourage and tolerate illegal cockfights and a game of chance
known as “hantak”
from which she collected 20% of the proceeds for the barrio treasury, thus,
violating the law or tolerating and encouraging the commission of crimes or
maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution of violators of the law in
dereliction of her duties as such barrio official.

The legal question posed
revolves around the le­gality of the act of the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Occidental in filing the case with the Court of
First Instance of the said province.

Thus, herein appellant
reiterates in this appeal the grounds relied upon by her in her motion to quash
in the court below, namely:

(1)  
That the filing of the case
directly with the Court of First Instance is contrary to section 12 of Republic
Act No. 3590, otherwise known as the Barrio Charter, which took effect on June
22, 1963; and

(2)   That the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental does not have original jurisdiction of the case under Republic Act No. 3828.

Citing and relying on the
first paragraph of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3590 which reads, thus:

“Section 12.  SUPERVISORY POWER OF THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR –
The municipal mayor shall exercise the power of supervision over barrio officials. 
He shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
barrio officials for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
misconduct in office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude.  For minor delinquency,
he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be
desirable he shall submit written Charges touching the matter to the municipal
council, furnishing a copy of such charges to the respondent and law enforcement agencies either personally or by
registered mail.  Upon recommendation of the
Barrio Council the municipal mayor may
in such case suspend the officer pending action by the council, if in
his opinion, the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer
in question, but in no case shall the period of suspension exceed thirty days,
x x x.”

it is the contention of the appellant
that under the foregoing provision of the law, the exclusive and original
jurisdiction to investigate barrio officials for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
misconduct in office is vested solely unto
the Municipal Mayor who shall conduct a
hearing of the charges, and should his finding be that they certain
merely to minor delinquency, he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall submit
written charges touching the matter to the Municipal Council furnishing a copy
of such charges to the respondent and law enforcement
agencies either personally or by registered mail.”

To the extent and within the literal meaning of the language of
that portion of the section of the
law cited by the appellant, it
would seem that the contention is correct.  However,
taking into account the succeeding paragraph of the same section of the law, which reads thus:

“Where suspension is thus effected,
the written charges against the officer shall be filed within five days with
the municipal council, which shall adopt the procedure specified in section
twenty-one hundred eighty-nine and twenty-one
hundred ninety of the Administrative Code.”

and considering
that, as required, the Administrative investigation should be proceeded and
conducted in accordance with the provision of Section 2190 of the
Administrative Code, which reads thus:

“If, upon due consideration, the provincial board shall adjudge
that the charges are not sustained, the proceedings shall be dismissed; if it
shall be adjudged that the accused has been guilty of misconduct which would be
sufficiently punished by reprimand or further reprimand, it shall direct the
provincial governor to deliver such reprimand in pursuance of its judgment; and
in either case the official, if suspended, shall be reinstated.

“If in the opinion of the board the case is one requiring more
severe discipline, and in case of appeal, it shall without unnecessary delay
forward to the Secretary of Interior, within eight days after the date of the
decision of the provincial board, certified copies of the record in the case,
including the charges, the evidence, and the find­ings of the board, to which
shall be added the recommendation of the board as to whether the official ought
to be suspended, fur­ther suspended, or finally dismissed from office; and in
such case the board may exercise its discretion to reinstate the official if suspended.

“The trial of the suspended municipal official and the
proceedings incident thereto shall be given preference over the current and
routine business of the board.”

it is evident that the nature, scope and
extent of the investigation conceived thereunder, is
purely administrative in nature, and this is clearly deducible from the fact
that the penalty that case imposed upon the erring official is only either
reprimand, suspension or dismissal from office. 
And it is clearly inferrable from the same
provisions of the law that when the act constituting the neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of misconduct in office amounts to a transgression of the penal laws,
then it becomes the duty of the prosecuting officer of the Government to take a
hand in the case by instituting the corresponding investigation and prosecution
of the guilty person to the full limit of the law.

Where certain conduct of a public official subjects himself to a
criminal prosecution under the common law, the fact that a statute makes such
conduct a ground for his removal from office, does not
relieve him of his criminal responsibility. 
(Ingco vs. Provincial Fiscal
of Batangas, et al., G. R. No. L-23220, Dec. 18,
1967.)

Proceedings for removal from office is an administrative action,
which is entirely distinct and separate from a criminal action, because a crime
is a public wrong, more atrocious in character than misfeasance or malfeasance
committed by a public official in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious
not only to a person or a group of persons but to the State as a whole.  The circumstance that the offence alleged to
have been committed, was perpetrated in connection with the performance of
official duties, is no reason to stop the prosecution of the case for the
alleged acts constitute a crime distinct in itself, and detachable from its character
as an administrative defense committed by a public officer.

The power of supervision of the Municipal Mayor over barrio
officials under the Barrio Charter Law is
similar and analogous to the supervision exercised by the Provincial Governor
over municipal officials and thus, when the Provincial Governor is informed
that a municipal official is guilty of official misconduct amounting to a criminal liability, it is the duty
of the Provincial Governor to refer the matter to the Provincial Fiscal who is
duty bound, under the law, to institute the necessary proceedings in
court.  This is so, because the
prosecution and enforcement of penal laws are functions of the State.  Thus, it has been held that a barrio Lieutenant who fails to
cause the prosecution for the crime of arson
of which he is aware is guilty of “prevarication” (U.
S. vs. Mendoza,
23 Phil. 194).  We really see no cogent
reason why the Provincial Fiscal may not prosecute herein appel­lant
independently of whatever administrative inves­tigation the Municipal Mayor
himself might conduct relative to the same charges.  To hold otherwise would be tantamount to
tying the hands of the prosecuting arms of the State and prevent them from prosecuting
an offending barrio official unless and until the Municipal Mayor concerned
shall have acted and forwarded the charges to the fiscal.  Such a situation, to our mind could not have been
the intent and purpose of the law relied upon by herein appellant.  Consequently, we have to declare that the
provincial Fiscal was legally right in taking this case directly with the Court
of First Instance, and the trial court acted correctly in denying the motion to
quash the information on this ground.

But appellant would insist further that the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental does not have original
jurisdiction to hear the case.  It is
argued that since the crime of
dereliction of duty charged in the information carries with it a penalty of six
months and one day to two years and four months which is below the maximum
penalty of three (3) years imprisonment which municipal courts may impose under
the law, the information should have been filed with the municipal court
concerned.  Reliance is made upon Sec. 87(c) of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, which took effect on June
22, 1963, and among other things provides:

“Sec. 87.  Original jurisdiction to try criminal case.- Justices of the peace and judges of the municipal court
of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:

x          x          x          x          x

“(c) Except
violations of election laws all other offenses in which the penalty provided by
law is imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of not more than three thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment.”

There is no merit in this claim. 
It should be noted that notwithstanding the aforequoted
amendment to Sec. 87 of Republic Act
No. 296 by Republic Act No. 3828, the original jurisdiction of courts of
first instance to try cases wherein the
penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for more than 6 months, or a fine of
more than P200.00 has remained unchanged, leaving a zone where the jurisdiction
of these courts is now concurrent with that of justice of the peace and
municipal courts.  To this effect was the
holding in the case of Esperat vs. Hon. David Avila,
.et al.,^[1] where this court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
J. B. L. Reyes, explained that:

“Actually, there is nothing irreconcilable between 44(f) and
87(c) of the Judiciary Act.

“As therein provided, the court of first instance was given
original jurisdiction over cases where the penalty prescribed by law is
imprisonment for more than six months
or fine of more than P200.00;
the justices of the peace and municipal or city courts of chartered cities,
over cases where the penalty is imprisonment for not more than 3 years, and fine of no more than P3,000.00.  In other words, where the prescribed penalty
is imprisonment for more than six months, but not exceeding 3 years, or fine of more than P200.00 but not
exceeding P3,000.00 (not exceeding 6 years or fine not
exceeding P6,000.00, in justice of the peace or municipal court in the capital of the province),
the justice of the peace or municipal court only has concurrent (and not
exclusive) original jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance.  And, it may
be stated that this concurrent
jurisdiction between the inferior courts and the court of first instance was
not provided for the first time in Republic Act No. 3928.  Under Republic Act 2613, crimes the penalties
for which do not exceed 6 years, or fine for not more than P3,000.00,
were spe­cifically placed within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
and municipal courts, concurrent with the court of first instance.

“It follows, therefore, that
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and muni­cipal
courts is confined only in cases where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment
for 6 months or less or fine of P200.00 or less, whereas, the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the court of
first instance covers cases where the penalty, is incarceration for more than 3
years (or 6 years in the case of city courts and municipal courts in provincial
capitals), or fine for more than P3,000.00 (P6,000.00 in proper cases), or both
such imprisonment and fine.  Between
these exclusive jurisdiction lies a zone where the
jurisdiction is concurrent.  This is the
proper construction to he placed on the provision involved therein, regardless
of what may have been the prior rulings on this matter. x x x.”

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, and in the
light of the authority above-quoted, the instant appeal should
be, as hereby it is dismissed, with costs against
appellant.  Let the record of this case
be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
L-25922, June 30, 1967.