PABLO C. SANIDAD, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CRESCENCIANO L. SAQUING, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS SUR, BRANCH II, AND LUCAS V. CAUTON, RESPONDENTS.

As we are asked by petitioner for the implementation of this
Court’s directive, compliance with which is now long overdue, requiring
respondent Judge to proceed with the recount of the votes in the 122 precincts
questioned by petitioner, we pause to ponder. 
Because that petition asks of us that the recount be
conducted at the offices of the Commission on Elections in Manila.  The problem that this petition thrusts upon
us is at once novel and far-reaching.

For, theory had been advanced that a judge of first instance,
even in the exercise of his authority under Section 163 of the Revised Election
Code, is not to perform his task outside of the territorial limits of his
jurisdiction.  Such act, if performed
outside of his district, it has been said, should be stricken down as a
nullity.  Exercise of contemplative
wisdom is thus required.

And now to our task.  We start with the statute.  Section 163 of the Revised Election Code
reads:

“SEC. 163.  When statements of a
precinct are contradictory.  –
In case it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that another copy or
other authentic copies of the statement from an election precinct submitted to
the board give to a candidate a different number of votes and the difference
affects the result of the election, the Court of First Instance of the
province, upon motion of the board or of any candidate affected, may proceed to
recount the votes cast in the precinct for the sole purpose of determining
which is the true statement or which is the true result of the count of the
votes cast in said precinct for the office in question.  No­tice of such proceeding shall be given to
all candidates affected.”

Within the framework of the Revised Election Code and read in
context, said Section 163 of the Revised Election Code confers on a judge of
first instance a special authority to recount. 
That authority is restrictively construed.  It is aimed at delaying as little as possible
proclamation of a winning candidate.  (Ong vs. Etcubañez, L-28415,
January 29, 1968; Lawsin vs. Escalona,
L-22540, July 31, 1964; Parlade vs. Quicho, L-16259, December 20, 1959) The judges
duty is limited to the recount of the votes as the statute prescribes – not the
appreciation of ballots which “is proper in an election contest after
proclamation.” (Ong vs. Etcubañez, supra).

The findings of the judge under the statute in question are not
by any means conclusive in an election contest. 
To be noted is that the power allocated a judge of first instance is
even less than the authority granted a board of election inspectors.  For, that board is given latitude in the
appreciation of ballots.  The judge’s
duty in turn is restricted to the recount of votes as they appear on the face
of the ballots.  Stated otherwise,
recount does not in itself involve a decision in a judicial controversy.  In fact, there is no appeal from the findings
and conclusions reached at a recount.

The controlling legal issue – whether a judge of first instance
may conduct the recount outside of his territorial jurisdiction – we must say,
is apt to be blurred by a strict adherence to the general rule that it is
impermissible for him to go outside his district in the exercise of his powers
essentially judicial.  But even in the
exercise of his regular judicial functions, a judge may be called upon to go
outside of his territory.  Take for
instance the case of replevin of personal property
which at the time of the action was within the jurisdiction of the court but
thereafter was spirited away.  Can it be
successfully maintained that the judge cannot go out of his territorial limits
to ascertain whether that property allegedly taken away is the same property
the subject of the action?  And then
there is the case of the Judge of a Court of First Instance assigned to another
court.  He is authorized under Section
51, par. 2 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 to prepare and sign his decision in any
case submitted to him for decision anywhere within the Philippines.  Conceivably, other instances there are where
a judge may act in the exercise of the judicial power outside of his district.

Since a judge of first instance under Section 163 of the Revised
Election Code is called upon to perform a duty specially conferred by law
separate and apart from the general exercise of jurisdiction set forth in the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and only as a step in the election process
leading to canvass and proclamation, we perceive of situations whereunder a judge may recount the votes outside of his
district.

In the course of our deliberations, grave misgivings were
entertained by some members of the Court that to grant the petition here may
open the floodgates to abuse.  As we mull
over the probability that the resolution herein may be taken as an inflexible
prece­dent, we reached a consensus that, indeed, most any authority could be
subject to abuse.  On one point, however,
the members of the Court are in accord, and it is that if and when some such
problems should arise, courts of justice are not powerless to apply the appro­priate
remedy.  Courts of justice, it has been
said, are temples of right.

That recount should be made at the offices of the Commission on
Elections in Manila is not without
reason.  The 122 boxes are now with the
Commission on Elections.  For purposes of
safekeeping, it is preferable that those ballot boxes remain where they
are.  The problem of transporting them,
the possibility of loss in transit from Manila to Candon,
Ilocos Sur, where the judge
sits, and the problem of adopting security measures once the ballot boxes are
in Candon – all these – weigh heavily against recount
being made in Candon. 
We must not discount the possibility of an election protest following
the recount.  In such eventuality, the
House Electoral Tribunal will take jurisdiction.  That Tribunal sits in Manila.  One more point.  If the recount were to be made in the offices
of the Commission on Elections in Manila,
it will be in an environment relatively under lesser political tension and
passion.

Definite guidelines are necessary to empty all sources of mis­understanding.  Respondent judge shall recount the votes in
the 122 precincts, in the words of this Court in Cawa
vs. Del Rosario, L-16837-40, May 30, 1960, “as they
appear on the ballots.”  He is not
to exercise discretion as to the validity of the ballots cast.  Nor is he to indulge in ballot
appreciation.  For, these are matters
proper in a full-dress election protest, after proclamation of the winning
candidate.  He must promptly perform his
task, given the fact that the second district of llocos
Sur is without representation in the House of
Representatives since the elections of 1965.

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court RESOLVED to grant
petitioner’s motion, and to direct respondent judge to proceed with, and to
continue until termination, the recount of the votes in the 122 precincts in
question “as they appear on the face of the ballots, “with notice to
the parties, said recount to be held at the offices of the Commission on
Elections in Manila, and to start within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Angeles, JJ., concur.