CAMILO AGCANAS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. TEODORO NAGUM, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

In this appeal on questions of law from the summary judgment rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering
defendant-appellant to surrender possession of the disputed land to plaintiff-appellee, with damages and costs, the Court reiterates the
established precept that trial courts have but limited authority to render
summary judgments and may do so only in cases where there is clearly no genuine
issue as to any material fact.

In substance the complaint for reivindicacion
which was filed on July 10, 1956,^[1]
alleged that plaintiff-appellee “is the owner in
fee simple and since 1945 or prior thereto, up to May 18, 1956, the one in
actual possession” of the 6.1277 hectare-parcel of land described in the
complaint, which he acquired under the free patent provisions of the Public
Land Law, whereby the corresponding original certificate of title was issued in
his name on December 16, 1955 by the Register of Deeds of Isabela;
that defendant-appellant asserting his own ownership of the same land,
“entered upon and took possession thereof without the consent of the
plaintiff” and ignored plaintiff’s demand to vacate the premises; and
prayed for recovery of the land with damages, P500.00 – attorney’s fees and
costs.

In his answer of September 19, 1960 (sic),^[2]
defendant-appellant not only denied the material allegations of the complaint,
but also averred special defenses supported by documents attached to his answer
alleging that he has been in actual, peaceful and continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the land in question since 1936, which he had fully cultivated
with the help of his tenants and dedicated to the planting of upland corn and
rice besides other fruit trees; that he applied for a homestead patent to the
land on June 12, 1947, and his application was duly approved by the
Director of Lands on April 14, 1948, and he had filed final proof of his
said homestead on June 5, 1955 in compliance with the requirements for the
issuance in his favor of the corresponding free patent and certificate of
title; that plaintiff had been one of his tenants who worked for two agri­cultural
years (1954-1955 and 1955-1956) on a portion of about one hectare of the land;
that defendant only learned upon receiving a copy of the complaint in the lower
court that plaintiff in bad faith and taking undue advantage of his (plaintiff’s)
stay on the land as a tenant, had surreptitiously and in collusion with some
employees of the Bureau of Lands filed directly with the Bureau’s central
office in Manila, a homestead application for the same land on May 5, 1955,
with the Bureau’s central office’s unscrupulous employees making it appear that
the land in question was not claimed or occupied by any other person except
plaintiff who allegedly made his entry therein since 1939, (which application,
the record shows, was speedily approved on September 9, 1955); that
consequently, he filed on November 26, 1956 with the Bureau of Lands “a
petition for the cancellation of plaintiff’s patent;” (the record shows that
the Director of Lands in an order dated September 26, 1961, overruling
plaintiff’s opposition thereto, ordered an investigation, so that if the facts
so warrant “appropriate legal remedies” [might be instituted] to
correct any mistake, error or fraud which might have been committed in
connection with the administration and disposition” of public land); and
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the issuance of an order cancelling plaintiff’s free patent and title, with
P1,000.00 attorney’s fees and other equitable relief.

On September 25, 1956,
plaintiff filed his “Answer to Counterclaim” in the form of special
defenses in defendant’s answer and traversed the
allegations thereof.  Thereafter on
December 31, 1961, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment to which he
attached his sworn statement and affidavits of a barrio-mate and his brother,
Leon Agcanas, all executed on July 27, 1960, and
supporting the averments in plaintiff’s affidavit to the effect that plaintiff
was never the tenant of defendant, for the latter is land­less while
plaintiff’s parents owned enough lands which were trans­mitted by inheritance
to their children. Plaintiff in his affidavit claimed for the first time as
against his allegations in his complaint that defendant entered upon the land
without his consent, that def­endant “armed with bolos together with his
companions came to the land while I was working thereon with my brother and
drove us away under pain of death if we attempted to come back and work
there”, an allegation that his brother Leon Agcanas
is completely silent about in the latter’s (Leon’s) supporting affidavit.  The doc­uments supporting plaintiff’s claim of
title to the land and his declaration of the same in his name for tax purposes
on May 3, 1956, and payment of the 1954-1955 tax thereon on the same date, were
likewise attached to the motion.

Defendant filed on April 18, 1962 his opposition to the motion
for summary judgment to which he attached the pertinent documents with regards
to the fact of the Director of Lands’ having ordered an investigation, over
plaintiff’s opposition, as to the issuance of the free patent in favor of
plaintiff notwithstanding the previous approval of defendant’s earlier
application to the same land, and prayed that the case be held in abeyance
until after the results of the Bureau’s investigation.

The lower court nevertheless granted summary judgment on September 25, 1962, having previously
conducted a hearing on the question of damages on July 21, 1962, and ordered defendant to vacate the land
and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff, with damages at P220.00 per
agricultural year plus costs.

Defendant was granted leave to prosecute his appeal as a
pauper.  An examination of the pleadings
and the record readily shows that the lower court erred in rendering summary
judgment, because the sharply conflicting claims of the parties tendered
genuine issue as to the material facts for the determination of which a trial
is indispensable.

1.     
Rule 34, section 3 (formerly Rule 36, sec. 3 of
the Rules of Court) categorically provides that summary judgments may be rendered
upon motion and after hearing only “if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file together with the affida­vits, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

It is evident under this rule that a summary judgment can be
rendered only where there are no questions of fact in issue or where the
material allegations of the pleadings are not disputed.^[3]

2.     
In Gatchalian
vs. Pabilin,^[4]
this Court, struck down a summary judgment erroneously rendered by the same
lower court, notwithstanding the existence of material questions of fact
requiring trial.  We cited with approval
the late Chief Justice Moran’s expo­sition on the rule of summary judgments
that “A summary judgment should not be granted unless the facts are clear and
undisputed, and if there is a controversy upon any question of fact, there
should be a trial of the action upon its merits” and that the rule
“does not vest in the court jurisdiction summarily to try the issues on
deposi­tions and affidavits, but gives the court limited authority to enter
summary judgment only if it clearly appears that there is no genuine issue of
material fact.  Upon a motion for
summary judgment, the Court’s sole function is to determine whether there is an
issue of fact to be tried.  In other
words, the rule [Rule 36, (now Rule 34) sec. 3] does not invest the court
with jurisdiction summarily to try the factual issues on affidavits, but
authorizes summary judgment only if it clearly appears that there is no genuine
issue as to only material fact.”

In the present case, aside from the conflicting issues of fact
above recited, appellant’s counsel properly pointed out in his opposi­tion to
the motion for summary judgment that “various questions of fact are raised
by the pleadings of both sides, such as (a) as to who is in actual possession
of the land in controversy; (b) since when and how its occupants obtained possession
thereof; (c) what improvements are found on the land; (d) of what do they
consist; (e) in about what year they were planted or made, and by whom, etc.
(Land Administrative Order No. 6). “ 
These material issues of fact may not be resolved in a motion for
summary judgment based on mere affidavits.

3.     
The lower court obviously was misled into
rendering its summary judgment as a matter of law on the basis of its reasoning
that “In gratia argumenti,
and conceding hypothetically that the herein defendant can successfully prove
their allegation of substan­tial material facts pre-existent and subsisting
which should have legally demonstrated that the homestead patent should not
have been granted to the herein plaintiff, due to the supposed lack on the part
of the legal requirements of residence and cultivation and due to his
subsequent abandonment of the homestead, the herein defendant has no legal
personality to personally seek the nullification of the title of the
plaintiff.”

This Court has had previous occasion in Balmonte
vs. Mercado^[5]
to annul another summary judgment erroneously rendered by the same lower court
in a similar case, wherein it likewise ordered the therein defendant to
surrender possession of the disputed land to therein plaintiff on the strength
of the order of the Director of Lands upholding therein plaintiff’s better
right to the free patent notwithstanding that such order was pending review on
appeal before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.  This Court held therein that “Inasmuch as
both parties in this case claim to derive title from the Government, the final
decision of the latter on their conflicting claim is essential to plaintiff’s
cause of action.  Indeed, if the order of the Director of Lands of September 15, 1955, were reversed and the patent issued to the plaintiff
cancelled by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, plaintiff
would have no cause of action against defendant herein.  Hence, judicial action on the relief prayed
for by Balmonte should be sus­pended until the
appeal, taken by the Marcelos, from said order shall
have been finally determined, for which reason evidence should be introduced in
the lower court on the result of said appeal.”^[6]  Our ruling in the Balmonte
case quoted above applies with equal force to the present case, where appellant
has shown a strong prima facie case of prior occupancy and prior
approval of his earlier home­stead application for the disputed land, and the
matter was pending investigation by the Director of Lands at the time of the
rendition of the summary judgment, as against the facts in Balmonte
where the Director of Lands’ investigation had upheld therein plaintiff Balmonte’s better right to the land, which was however
pending review and decision on appeal by the department head.  For, indeed, prescinding
from the eventuality that should defendant-appellant’s prior right to the land
be upheld administratively, plaintiff-appellee would
have no cause of action against defendant-appellant, the legal question of
whether appellee could obtain recovery of possession
of land from defendant-appellant hinges on his establishing the disputed claim
that he was in prior possession thereof and had been forceably
ousted therefrom by appellant.

4.     
Plaintiff’s right to recovery of the land may be
determined only after the due process of trial and cross-examination of the
witnesses.  The record as it stands puts
in grave doubt whether plaintiff would be able to do this: in his homestead
application of May 21, 1955, he alleged that he was 24 years old; that would
make him only 14 years old in 1945 when according to his complaint he was then
“the owner in fee simple” and “the one in actual
possession” of the land; and if we were to go by his homestead application,
Exhibit D, where he makes no claim through occupancy of his ancestors (not
having filled out as required in such cases Pars. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of his
application), he asserts therein that he “entered upon and began
cultivation of the (land)” and “continuously cultivated the same”
since 1939, at which time he would have been only 8 years old.  In contrast, per defendant’s prior
application of June 12, 1947,
executed by defendant at the age of 46 years, defendant claimed to have first
cultivated the land since 1936 when he was 35 years of age.

5.     
It would therefore be well for the trial court
to whom this case is herein remanded to note this
Court’s injunction in the Gatchalian case, supra,
through Mr. Justice Reyes, that “the questions of law should be
resolved after, and not before, the questions of fact are
properly litigated, since the facts proved may well affect the legal
provisions applicable.”

For should defendant-appellant succeed in substantiating the
special defenses in his answer and establish that his prior homestead
application had been duly approved by the Director of Lands and he had filed
the final proof of his homestead on June 5, 1955, as alleged by him, the subject
land would have thereby become segregated from the mass of public lands as of
then, equivalent to a patent actually issued, since the issuance of a patent
would be a mere ministerial act and duty of the Director of Lands  and defendant’s right to the land could no
longer be affected by the subsequent void grant of the same land to plaintiff.^[7]

Furthermore, should defendant-appellant succeed at the trial in
establishing the fraud and breach of trust on the part of plaintiff as his
alleged former tenant who allegedly maliciously and in bad faith took undue
advantage as defendant’s tenant on the land to grab the same from defendant,
the recent decision of this Court in Miguel vs. Court of Appeals et al^[8]
would entitle def­endant, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive
trust, to obtain in the case below a judgment for the reconveyance
of the land notwithstanding that the Director of Lands and the Register of
Deeds have not been made parties to the case. 
In the said case of Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that
where the respondent in breach of fiduciary duty and through fraud succeeded in
obtaining a sales patent and ultimately an original certificate of title over a
parcel of land which was openly and continuously possessed by petitioner in the
concept of owner, the respondent could be judicially compelled to reconvey or assign to petitioner the land thus unlawfully
and in breach of trust titled by the respondent.

6.     
The Court deems it just and equitable in the
light of the facts and circumstances of the case that reasonable attorney’s
fees should be recovered by defendant as prayed for.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby set
aside and the record remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits after
final termination of the administrative proceedings for cancellation of
plaintiff’s patent and title, and for a new judgment conformably with the views
hereinabove set forth and as the facts, law and justice may warrant.  Plaintiff-appellee
is sentenced to pay defendant-appellant the sum of P1,000.00
as attorney’s fees and the costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Director of Lands
so that the administrative investigation of defendant-appellant’s complaint and
petition for cancellation of the free patent and title issued in the name of
plaintiff-appellee, if it is still pending, may be
expedited and resolved without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, and
Villamor, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., on official leave.

^[1] Civil Case No. Br. II-92 of the Court of
First Instance of Isabela.

^[2] Per
Rec. on App. p. 3; but the year should most probably be 1956, since plaintiff
filed an answer to counterclaim on September
25, 1956.

^[3]
See Ibañez et al. vs. North Negros Sugar Co., Inc., et al., L-6790, 96 Phil. 980.

^[4] L-17619,
October 31, 1962, 6 SCRA
508; emphasis supplied.

^[5] L-12918, April 25, 1961, 1 SCRA 1028.

^[6]
Emphasis supplied; citing Miguel, et al. vs. Vda.
de Reyes, et al., L-4851, July 31, 1953; Lubugan,
et. al. vs. Castrillo, et
al., L-10521, May 19, 1957; Geukeko vs. Araneta,
L-10182, December
24, 1957; Vda.
de Villanueva, et al. vs. Ortiz, et al.,
L-11412, May 28, 1958; Municipality
of Hinabañgan,
et al. vs. Municipality of Wright et al., L-12603, March 25, 1960.

^[7] Corpus vs. Beltran, 97 Phil. 772; Balboa vs. Farrales, 41 Phil. 498.

^[8] L-20724, October 30, 1969; a sequel of
Miguel vs. Reyes, 93 Phil. 542 (1953), where the complaint was dismissed
for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.