ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. D. O. PLAZA ENTERPRISES, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Direct appeal, on points of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 46762, modifying an earlier decision
for the plaintiff by reducing the rate of interest on the sum adjudged, and
also the attorney’s fees; and by ordering the plaintiff to pay damages to the
defendant on account of a preliminary attachment obtained by the former upon
the latter’s counterclaim.

The complaint in the aforesaid civil case was for collection of
the sum of P43,017.32, representing balance due on purchases of wire ropes,
tractors and diesel parts made by the defendant-appellee,
D. O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc., from the plaintiff-appellant, Elpidio Javellana.  The complaint prayed that the defendant be
ordered to pay the said sum of P43,017.32, with legal
interest, plus attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000.00; it also prayed for a
writ of preliminary attachment.

Upon plaintiff’s putting up a bond, the trial court, on 15 April 1961, issued a writ of
attachment.  On 20 May 1961, the defendant moved to discharge the
attachment on the ground that it was improperly issued.  The motion was denied.

On 7 November 1961,
the defendant filed its answer and counterclaimed for damages arising from the
attachment.  The plaintiff answered and
interposed a counterclaim to the counterclaim.

After some years, or on 27
April 1966, the defendant moved for the dissolution of the
preliminary attachment.  Upon its filing
a counterbond, the court, on 7 May 1966, dissolved the attachment.

On 3 November 1966,
the plaintiff filed a motion to admit his amended complaint, which the court
granted on 12 November 1966.  In this amended complaint, the plaintiff
averred that of the sum of P43,017.32 alleged in the original complaint, the
defendant has paid P3,900.00, thereby leaving a balance of P39,117.32 unpaid,
but that, as indicated by invoices, defendant’s purchases were payable within
thirty (30) days and were to bear interest of 12% per annum plus 25% attorney’s
fees.  The amended complaint accordingly
prayed for the increased amounts. 
Defendant did not answer this amended complaint.

After trial, the court, on 15 June 1967, rendered judgment. It found the following
facts:

“ – – – – – – – – – .  During
the period from 23 July 1959 to 30 July 1960, defendant, in a series of
transactions, purchased from plaintiff wire ropes, tractors and diesel spare
parts, (in) payment for which he issued several checks amounting to P43,017.32,
which, when presented to the bank, were dishonored for lack of funds.  Defendant substituted these checks with
another set of checks for the same amount, but again, the same were dishonored
for lack of funds, as evidenced by Exhibits A to M., except for one check in
the amount of P3,900.00, as evidenced by Exhibit
C.  Thus, the principal obligation was
reduced to P39,117.32. 
At the time of the issuance of the said checks, the de­fendant never
informed plaintiff that it had funds to back them up.  Plaintiff made demands to defendant for
payment, but defendant pleaded for time and liberalization of payment, which
was rejected by the plaintiff.  The
transactions in question were covered by invoices listed in Exhibit P, a sample
or which is evidenced by Exhibit C, wherein said transactions were for 30-days
term, 12% interest per annum to be charged from date of invoice, and 25%
attorney’s fees in case of litigation.

“The defendant claims that there were other transactions
between plaintiff and defendant involving the amount of P196,828.58;
that it had no intention not to pay the checks it issued upon presentment; and
that it suffered damages in the amount of P14,800.00 by reason of the
attachment.

“  – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – .

“  – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – .

“The counterclaim for damages arising from the attachment is
without merit.  The defendant was mani­festly
in bad faith when it issued two sets of bouncing checks.  Hence, the attachment was not improper, contrary
to defendant’s claim.”

The dispositive
portion of the decision decreed:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and
against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P39,117.32 with interest at 12% per annum from 14 April 1961, the date of the filing
of the original complaint, until final payment, plus 25% of the principal
indebtedness as attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

“The counterclaim as well as the counterclaim to
the counterclaim are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.”

On 28 June 1967,
the defendant moved to reconsider. Over the objection of the plaintiff, the
court issued an order dated 10 August
1967, now the subject of the present appeal, modifying the previous
decision, in the manner following:

“WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of
the de­cision rendered in this case is hereby modified as follows:

“(a)  By ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the
sum of P39,117.20 plus the legal interest therein from
the filing of the complaint until the amount is fully paid.

“(b)  Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant the
sum of P16,190.00, the amount of damages suffered by the defendant on account
of the preliminary attach­ment of the defendant; and

“(c)  By ordering the defendant to pay P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

“Without pronouncement as to costs.”

Plaintiff-appellant assigns the following errors:  the reduction of the attorney’s fees, the
reduction of the interest, and the grant to the defendant of damages arising
from the attachment.

The first two assigned errors are well-taken.  The court a quo reduced the interest stated
in its previous decision from 12% to mere legal interest and the attorney’s
fees from 25% to P5,000.00 on the basis of estoppel,
the ground therefor being that the reduced amounts
were those alleged, hence admitted, by the plaintiff in his original
complaint.  This was error.  The original complaint was not formally offered
in evidence.  Having been amended, the
original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have
required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the
admissibility of which, as evidence, requires its formal offer.

“Pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record as
judicial admissions. However, any statement contained therein may be considered
as an extrajudicial admission, and as such, in order that the court may take it
into consideration, it should be offered formally in evidence.” (5 Moran
58, citing Lucido v. Calupitan,
27 Phil. 148; Bastida v. Menzi,
58 Phil. 188)

“Where amended pleadings have been filed, al­legations in the
original pleadings can have no effect, unless formally offered in
evidence.”  (Jones on Evidence, Sec.
273)

Since the record does not show that the complaint (marked as
Exhibit 115) was admitted in evidence, there is no proof of estoppel
on the part of the plaintiff on his allegations in the complaint. Not only
this, but since the stipulation for 12% interest on balance due and the 25%
counsel fees appear on the invoices themselves, appellee
Plaza Enterprises can not fairly claim that it was deceived or misled by the
pleadings of appel­lant.  Even more, the
original plea for P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees is only
contained in the prayer of the original complaint, and it is a well established
rule that the prayer for relief, although part of the complaint, is no part of
the cause of action and does not give it character, the plaintiff being
entitled to as much relief as the facts warrant (Rosales vs. Reyes, 25 Phil.
495; Aguilar vs. Rubiato, 40 Phil. 470).

But the appellant’s last assigned error is without merit.  Although the defendant was found to be in bad
faith in issuing two (2) sets of bouncing checks in payment for its
indebtedness, such bad faith was not related to his having incurred the
obligation in favor of the plaintiff but to defendant’s failure to perform said
Obligation.  There was, therefore, no
ground for the plaintiff to attach the defendant’ s
properties on the ground of fraud.  That
the plaintiff acted in good faith in securing attachment does not relieve him
from the damages that the defendant sustained by reason of the attachment because
he, the plaintiff, was, in the first place, not entitled to attachment; the
element of malice was unnecessary (3 Moran, Rules of Court, 19).

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby
reversed insofar as it reduced the amount of attorney’ s
fees and the interest on the principal sum adjudged in the original decision
dated, 15 June 1967; but
the order is affirmed in all other respects. 
No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor, JJ., concur.