GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONER, VS. DOROTEA O. CONANAN AND MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, RESPONDENTS.

Review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated June
21, 1973, dismissing petitioner’s petition for settlement and
partition of estate.

On November 13, 1972,
petitioner filed with the court below the above-said petition, subject of which
is the estate left by her late son, Felix L. del
Rosario, who died in a plane crash on September
12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal
(Partial Joint Stipulation of Facts, p. 2, petition, p. 6, rec.).

On March 17, 1973,
respondents filed their opposition.

On April 26, 1973,
the court a quo, pursuant
to a verbal agreement forged between the parties, issued an order requiring
them to come up with a joint stipulation of facts (p. 9, rec.).

On May 19,
1973, the parties
submitted the following stipulation of facts:

“OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of
the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.

“PETITIONER admits that oppositor
DOROTEA OTERA DEL ROSARIO is the legitimate surviving wife of the deceased
FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.

“PETITIONER admits that MARILOU DEL ROSARIO,
is the legally adopted child of the late FELIX L. DEL
ROSARIO and DOROTEA DEL ROSARIO CONANAN.

“THAT THE PARTIES admit that the late FELIX L. DEL
ROSARIO died last September 12,
1969 at Antipolo, Rizal in
a plane crash and within the juris­diction of the Honorable Court.

“That the only surviving nearest relatives of deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO are
the petitioner and oppositors DOROTEA O. CONANAN and
MARILOU DEL ROSARIO.

“Parties admit to pay their respective counsel in the amount
to be determined by the court.

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that on
the basis of the facts stipulated, the Court declare the heirs of the deceased” (pp. 9-10,
rec.).

On June 21, 1973,
the lower court issued the challenged order, pertinent portions of which read:

“A perusal of the petition shows that the instant case was
filed under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which reads as follows:

‘Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether
he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Court of
First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an
interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1)
month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once
a week for three (3) con­secutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court
may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an
executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of
the will, if any there is, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to
participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them after the
payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and
such persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity,
or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if
otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession
of the portions of the estate so awarded to
them respectively.  The court
shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings,
and all orders and judgment made or rendered in the course thereof shall be
recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it
involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper registrar’s office.

“While it may be true that a petition for summary settlement
is allowed under the aforequoted provision of the
rules, the same rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross value
of which does not exceed P10,000.00.  The instant petition, however, clearly
alleges that the value of the real properties alone left by the deceased Felix
del Rosario amounts to P33,000.00 which is obviously over and above the value
of the estate allowed under the rules. 
The action taken by the petitioner (cannot be) construed as one filed
under an intestate proceeding as the requirements provided by law for the same
has not been complied with.  Based on the
foregoing observation alone, the petition must perforce be dismissed.

“But granting arguendo that
this Court may consider the petition as an exercise (of) the powers of a probate Court in determining and declaring
the heirs of the deceased as prayed for in the aforequoted
partial joint stipulation of facts, the law on intestate succession is clear
that an adopted child concurring with the surviving spouse of the adopter
excludes the legitimate ascendants from succession.  x x
x x x.

“The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is
applicable in the instant case finds
no basis for the said article is applicable in cases where there are no other
concurring intestate heirs of the adopted child.  x x
x x x.

“Based on the foregoing, therefore, the petitioner not being
included as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner of or have any right over
the properties sought to be partitioned and under the provisions of Section 1, Rule 69 in relation to
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, such action must be commenced or instituted by the party in interest.

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
findings, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition without pronounce­ment as to
costs” (pp. 10-12, rec.).

On July 10, 1973,
petitioner filed a notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond (see
respondents’ comments, p. 18, rec.).

I

WE rule that on purely jurisdictional consideration, the instant
petition should be dismissed.

Indeed, in a litany of precedents dating as far back as the 1938
case of Utulo vs. Pasiono Vda. de Garcia (66 Phil. 302) and
reaffirmed in Asuncion and Castro
vs. De la Cruz (No. L-7855, November 23, 1955, 97 Phil. 910) and Gutierrez vs. Cruz (G.R. No. L-21027,
July 20, 1968, 24 SCRA 69), WE uniformly held that for the court to acquire
jurisdiction in a petition for summary settlement of estate under the rules,
the requirement that the amount of the estate involved should not exceed
P10,000.00 (P6,000.00 under the old rules) is jurisdictional.

In the instant case, both parties jointly affirmed that the value
of the realty left by the deceased Felix del Rosario is in the aggregate amount
of P33,000.00 which, as the court a quo
correctly found, is obviously “over and above the value allowed under the
rules.”

II

However, by virtue of the transcendental implications of the
holding of the court a quo, in the sense that once wholly
sustained, said holding would preclude petitioner from re-filing the proper
action – a consequence which, on
the grounds of equity and fair play, WE cannot allow to befall on petitioner –
WE deem it essential, for the guidance of the parties, especially herein
petitioner, to point out the demerits of the appealed verdict.

A couple of important issues are posed for our consideration, to wit:

1. Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will
apply, Article 343 on the one hand, or Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the other;
and

2. Whether the material data rule enunciated by Rule 41, Section 6
of the New Rules of Court should be followed, ex cathedra, in the
present case.

A

The lower court found the following provisions of the New Civil
Code germane to the instant case:

“Art. 341.  The adoption
shall:

“(1) Give to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of
the adopter;

“(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the
parents by nature;

“(3) Make the adopted person a legal heir
of the adopter;

“(4) Entitle the adopted person to use the
adopter’s surname.”

“Art. 978. 
Succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct
line.”

“Art. 979. 
Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and
other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages.”

WE opine that the governing provision is the hereinafter quoted
Article 343 of the New Civil Code, in relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of said
law, which directs that:

“Art. 343. 
If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants
and by an adopted person, the latter shall not have more successional
rights than an acknowledged natural child.”

Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualifi­cation to Article
341 which gives an adopted child the same rights and duties as though he were a
legitimate child.  The reason for this is
that:

“(I)t is
unjust to exclude the adopter’s parents from the inheritance in favor of an adopted
person” (Report of the Code Commissioner, p. 92).

It is most unfair to accord more successional
rights to the adopted, who is only related artificially by fiction of law to
the deceased, than those who are naturally related to him by blood in the
direct ascending line.

The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving
parent of the deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat
the intent of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession,
where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter does not necessarily exclude the former from
the inheritance.  This is affirmed by
Article 893 of the New Civil Code which states:

“If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves
legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse shall have a right to one-fourth
(only) of the hereditary estate.

“This fourth shall be
taken from the free portion.”

Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be
the adopted child and the legitimate parents or ascendants only.  The language of the law is clear, and a contrary view cannot
be presumed.

It is, thus, OUR view that Article 343 should be made to apply,
consonant with the cardinal rule in
statutory construction that all the
provisions of the New Civil
Code must be reconciled and
given effect.

Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate
parents of the deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural child, which
is comprehended in the term “illegitimate children”.  Consequently, the respective shares of the
surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should be determined by Article
1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads:

“Art. 1000. 
If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and illegitimate
children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving spouse
and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall have
one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children the other fourth.”

B

Anent the other issue, respondents, in their comment of June 29,
1973, emphasize that the petitioner’s record on appeal violates the material
data rule in that

“It does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond
were filed with the lower court in disregard of the requirement of Section 6,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that the record on appeal must contain such data
as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.”

Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally the material data
rule, whenever circumstances and substantial justice warrant.

The cases of Berkenkotter
vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-36629, September 28, 1973
(53 SCRA 228) and Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals (No. L-29719, November
28, 1975, 68 SCRA 216, 220) are particularly in point.

In Villanueva, WE held:

“The deviation from the rigid rule adopted in the case of Government of the Philippines vs. Antonio, et al., G.R. No. L-23736, October 19, 1965, is due to our realization
that after all what is of vital importance in the requirement of Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is that the Record on
Appeal shall show that the appeal was really perfected within the reglementary period. 
If it could be ascertained from the record of the case that the appeal
was perfected within the reglementary period,
although such fact did not evidently appear on the face of the record on
appeal, the defect or deficiency is not fatal.

“If the appellate court is con­vinced that the appeal was perfected on time, it should not
throw out but assume
jurisdiction over it.  After all, that
procedural requirement is only
intended to enable the appellate court to determine if the appeal is still within its jurisdiction and
nothing more” (Villanueva vs.
Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 220, underscoring supplied).

From the docket and process slip of this case, it is shown that
the date of notice of the Court of First Instance decision is July 3, 1973 and
that the expiry date to file petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court is December 14, 1973.  Petitioner filed her notice of appeal,
appeal bond and record on appeal on
July 10, 1973 – or still very much within the reglementary period to perfect an appeal.  And although
this is not mentioned in the
record on appeal, it is, nevertheless, a fact of record, the
veracity of which this COURT does not doubt.

Perforce, there being substantial compliance with the requirement of the Rules of
Court, WE resolve this issue in favor of
petitioner.

The liberal
interpretation of the material
data rule aimed at serving the ends of
substantial justice has found amplification in the recent cases of Pimentel, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., L-39423 and L-39684, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 475; Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, Tomas Carag, et
al., L-40495, October 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 322, 328-332; and Manuel R. Luna vs.
Court of Appeals, Capati, et al., L-37123, October
30, 1975, 67 SCRA 503, 506.

WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS HEREBY DIS­MISSED,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO PETITIONER’S FILING THE APPROPRIATE ACTION IN A COMPETENT
COURT.  NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Muñoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.