THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SEGUNDO M. ZOSA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SA­MAR, JUSTINA SALAZAR LA­PIDARIO, TOMAS MACASIL, SR., AND…

Certiorari to annul the Order of respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Samar, re­versing the
judgment of conviction rendered by the Municipal Court of Daram,
Samar in Criminal Case No.
3093.  The petition is premised upon the
follow­ing facts:

On September 22, 1974,
Justina Salazar Lapidario,
Tomas Macasil, Sr. and Santos Macasil,
Sr., private respondents, were convicted of the crime of grave coercion by the
Municipal Court of Daram, Samar. 
The judgment of conviction was appealed to the Court of First Instance
of Samar, Branch I, presided over by the Honorable
Segundo M. Zosa, and the appeal was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 878.  Upon a finding
that the proceedings before the Mun­icipal Court were not duly recorded,
respondent Judge ordered the prosecution to present anew its evidence in a
trial de novo.  On December 2, 1974, private respondents
were arraigned before respond­ent Court. 
The prosecution commenced the presenta­tion of its evidence on January 10, 1975, and rested its case on April 17, 1975.  On April
25, 1975, the defense filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the prosecution had failed to prove the element of violence, which is an
indispensable element of the crime of grave coercion.  The prosecution filed an opposition to the
motion to dismiss on May 5, 1975.  On June
5, 1975, respondent Court issued the Order subject matter of this
petition, dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence.  A motion for recon­sideration of the afore-mentioned
Order was filed by the prosecution on the ground that respondent Court had no
jurisdiction to review or try the
appealed case, but the same was denied on August 20, 1975.

Petitioner contends that; (1) the appeal from the judgment of the
Municipal Court of Daram, Samar,
lies directly with the Court of Appeals, the crime of grave coercion being
within the concurrent juris­diction of said Municipal Court and the Court of
First Instance; hence, the latter had no jurisdic­tion over the appeal; and (2)
respondent Court should not have tried the case de novo because,
contrary to its finding that the proceedings in the Municipal Court were not recorded, said proceedings were in fact
recorded in typewritten form, the same having been transmitted to respondent
Court together with the records of the case.

On the other hand, respondents aver that the proceedings in the
Municipal Court of Daram, Samar
were not duly recorded because the typewritten notes transmitted by it to
respondent Court were neither certified nor signed by the stenographer who
purportedly took notes of the proceedings, and that the prosecution did not
object to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction, but instead presented its
evidence and submitted it to the judgment of said court.  It was only after the case was dismissed that
it raised for the first time the question of jurisdiction.

It will be noted that petitioner, thru the pro­secution, failed
to seasonably object to the find­ings of the respondent Judge that the
proceedings in the inferior court had not been duly recorded and, therefore, a trial de novo had to he
conducted.  Instead of interposing an
objection to this course of action, the prosecution went through the process of trial, thereby indicating their conformity with such findings of the
respondent Court.  It was only after the
Order dismissing the case against private respondents had been issued that, in
a motion for reconsideration, the prosecution came up with the assertion that
the proceedings in the inferior court had been duly recorded.  This being the case, peti­tioner can no
longer ventilate before this Court the issue of whether or not there was proper
record­ing in the inferior court, particularly as the same is a question of
fact which We are not in a position to resolve. 
Parties must take the consequences of the position they assume.^[1] A party who has taken one position, by which
he has benefited at the expense of the other is estopped
from repudiating that and taking another inconsistent position to the pre­judice
of the other.^[2] Besides, the finding of respondent Court, in
its Order of December 2, 1974, that the proceedings were not recorded in
accord­ance with law appears to be supported by the record.

There is no question
that the crime of grave coercion, which is punishable by arresto mayor or a fine of not exceeding P500.00, falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the municipal and city
courts with the Courts of First
Instance.^[3] It must be noted that while under the original Section 45 of the Judiciary Act of June 17, 1948, the Court of First Instance has
“appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in municipal and justice of the peace
courts in their respective provinces”, this conferment of general
appellate jurisdiction was subsequently modified by latter amendments.  Thus, Section 87 of the Judiciary Act, as
amended by Rep­ublic Act No. 2613 on August 1, 1959, specifically provided that
all cases falling within the concur­rent jurisdiction of “justices of the
peace of pro­vincial capitals” and “judges of municipal courts”
with the Courts of First Instance shall be “tried and decided on the
merits by the respective justices of the peace and municipal judges.  Proceedings had shall be recorded and
decisions therein shall be appealable
directly to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, as the case may be.” On June 22, 1963, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 3828, justices of the peace and justice of the peace courts were
converted into municipal judges and municipal courts and were granted authority
to appoint their
clerk-stenographers.  On August 4, 1969, Republic Act No. 6031
took effect. This law converted municipal and city courts into courts of record
and made final the decisions of Courts of First Instance in appeal­ed cases
falling under the exclusive original juris­diction of municipal and city
courts, except on questions of law. 
Under the last paragraph
of Sec­tion 45 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Repub­lic Act No. 6031, it
was specifically provided that in “cases falling under the concurrent
jurisdictions of the municipal and city courts with the Courts of First
Instance, the appeal shall be
made directly to the Court of
Appeals whose decision shall be final.” This subsequent enactment
must, therefore, be deemed as another exception to the original rule contained in Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296 that
the Courts of First Instance
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in city and municipal
courts.  This construction is in harmony
with the statutory purpose of expediting the termination of cases by limiting
the number of appeals from the decisions of munici­pal courts.  Thus, cases falling under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the municipal and city courts are appealed to the
Courts of First Instance, and the decision of the latter shall be final, pro­vided
that the findings of fact contained in said, decision are supported by
substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the conclusions are not clearly
against the law and jurisprudence.  Upon
the other hand, in cases falling under the concurrent juris­dictions of
municipal and city courts with the Courts of First Instance, the appeal shall
be made directly to the Court of Appeals whose decision, except on questions of
law, shall be final.  This is evident
from the discussion of Senate Bill No. 659, which is now Republic Act No. 6631.^[4]

In order that it could be appealed directly to the Court of
Appeals, the proceedings should be re­corded. 
In the absence of a full
and complete records of the proceedings, the trial of the case by the Municipal
Court of Daram was not conducted in accordance with
law.

In the light of Our ruling in Aquino v. Estenzo,^[5] the proceedings taken before the
Municipal Court of Daram, Samar under the circumstances should, therefore, be considered null and void.  In Aquino, We said:

“We hold that the proceedings in the City
Court of Ormoc City
in Criminal Case No. 5640 was a nullity, not because the City Court had no
jurisdiction to try the case but because the require­ment of the law that the
proceedings be recorded was not complied with. 
When it was provided in Sec. 87 (c) of Rep. Act 296, as amended by Rep.
Act 2613, that the city courts of chartered cities have like jurisdiction as
the Court of First ins­tance to try parties charged with an offense in which
the penalty provided by law does not exceed of prison correcional
or imprisonment for not more than six
years or fine not exceeding P3,000.00 or both, the city court thereby acts as a
Court of First Instance and its decisions are appealable
directly to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, as the case may
be. 
When the city court tries cases of this nature and it acts as a Court of
First Instance, it must perforce act as a court of record.  The very law itself provides that in the
exercise of this jurisdiction by the munici­pal courts of provincial capitals
and by city courts the proceedings must be recorded.  Certain­ly, the decisions of the city courts
or of the municipal courts of provincial capitals in the exercise of this
jurisdiction are similar to de­cisions
of the Court of First Instance, and their decisions cannot be appealed to the
Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be, if there are no
records of their proceedings.  ‘When a
city court, or the municipal court of pro­vincial capitals, does not record its proceedings in the trial of a case in the exercise of its
jurisdiction under Sec. 87(c) of Republic Act 296, as amended then it
does not exercise its juris­diction in accordance with law and, therefore, the
proceedings had before it are null and void.” (At pp. 23-24).

Notwithstanding that the court involved in the Aquino case is a city court and not a municipal court, We
find no cogent reason why the principles enunciated in said case could not be
applicable to the case at bar.

Rather than return the case to the Daram
Court for a new hearing which would unduly delay the matter, it was within the
competence of the Court of First Instance of Samar to
take cognizance of the case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction and decide the case on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is here­by DISMISSED, without pronounce as
to costs.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, and Concepcion, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result in a separate opinion.

^[1]
Casey v. Galle, 94 U.S.
673, 24 L, ed. 168.

^[2]
Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U.S.
415, 26.L. ed. 187.

^[3]
Article 286, Revised Penal Code.  See
Section 87(c) in relation to Section 44 of the Judiciary Act.

^[4]
Discussion on Senate Bill. No. 659, as reported in the Senate Congressional
Record, Vol. IV, No. 69, pp. 4270-­4273, May 19, 1969:

“Senator LAUREL.  Mr. President, appeals on mat­ters within the
concurrent jurisdiction of both courts of First instance and municipal courts are made direct to the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court under the present situation as contemplated by this bill.

“Senator PADILLA.  Even they started in the
municipal court?

“Senator LAUREL.  Yes, Your Honor.  If they are within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the court, the appeal is
direct to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

* * *      * * *      *
* *

“Senator PADILLA.  Are those amendments approved in this bill or
in another bill?

“Senator LAUREL.  In this bill, Your Honor.

“Senator PADILLA.  Do I understand, Your Honor, that my proposal
now has been partially considered and approved?

“Senator LAUREL.  Yes, by the Comittee
– and it was present.

“Senator PADILLA.  But it does not appear in this amendment by
substitution.

“Senator LAUREL.  For instance, on the first page, from line
15, Mr. President, it reads: ‘IN CASES FALLING UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF MUNICIPAL AND CITY COURTS WHICH ARE APPEALED TO THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE, THE DECISION OF THE LATTER SHALL BE FINAL.’ By automatic
operation of cases not within exclusive original jurisdiction, that will mean
concurrent.  These are not covered by the
rule requiring finality of the decision of courts of first instance under the principle of “Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.” (Italics
supplied.)

^[5]
SCRA 18.

Clean
Clean

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