BERNARDO C. CARBONEL, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCA VDA. DE CARREON AND HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO CARREON, REPRESENTED BY FRANCISCA VDA. DE CARREON AND SOCORRO C. V…

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals^[1] dated January 7,
1975, in CA-G.R. Nos. 51274-75-R entitled “FRANCISCA A. VDA. DE CARREON, et
al. vs. BERNARDO C. CARBONELL“, and “BERNARDO C. CARBONEL vs. FRANCISCA
A. VDA. DE CARREON, et al.”, affirming in both cases the judgment of the
trial court which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

In Civil Case No. Br. II-795:

(1) Ordering the defendant Bernardo Carbonel to vacate the premises and to
respect the possession of the plaintiffs;

(2) Ordering further the defendant to remove his improvements within thirty
(30) days after this judgment becomes final;

With costs against the defendant.

In Land Registration Case No. Br. II-N-85:

(1) Declaring Francisca Alingog widow, and the children of the late
Salustiano Carreon, namely: Geronimo, Isabel, Virgilio, Jose and Liliosa all
surnamed Carreon, Filipino citizens, of legal ages, and residents of Santiago,
Isabela, the owners in fee simple of the eastern half of Lot No. 207 of the
Santiago Cadastre;

(2) Declaring Socorro C. Vda. de Agatep, widow of the late Martin
Agatep, of legal age, Filipino, resident of Manila, the owner in fee simple of
the western half of Lot No. 207 of the Santiago Cadastre;

(3) Ordering the oppositors to file a subdivision plan of Lot 207 of the
Santiago Cadastre, within thirty (30) days after this judgment becomes final.

SO ORDERED.

Cauayan, Isabela, January 15, 1972.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 130-131; Rollo, p. 90)

with the modification in the ejectment case, that Carbonel should pay monthly
rentals of P20.00 from September, 1964 until he finally vacates, and the removal
of his improvement shall be executed at his expense.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On September 29, 1965, herein petitioner Carbonel commenced a Land
Registration proceeding before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela,
docketed as Land Registration Case No. Branch II-N-85, claiming ownership over
Lot No. 207 of the Santiago Cadastre which he sought to register under Act. No.
496 or the Land Registration Act.

This was opposed by Spouses Salustiano Carreon and Francisca Alingog, who
also claimed ownership over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 207 (Brief for
Defendant and Applicant Appellant, Court of Appeals, pp. 4-5, Rollo, p.
91).

On June 22, 1966, the trial court issued its Order of default, except with
respect to the Bureau of Lands which was granted a period to expire on July 18,
1966 within which to file its opposition, and the spouses Salustiano Carreon and
Francisca Alingog who had already filed a formal opposition. Subsequently,
however, the Provincial Fiscal in behalf of the Bureau of Lands filed a
manifestation alleging that the Bureau of Lands would interpose no opposition to
said registration.

On January 18, 1967, appellee Socorro C. Vda. de Agatep filed a
motion to vacate the Order of Default and to admit her opposition, claiming to
be the owner of the one-half western portion of Lot 207, which motion was
granted by the trial court in its Order of April 21, 1967 lifting the order of
Default insofar as Socorro C. Vda. de Agatep is concerned.
(Rollo, p. 91; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, C.A., p. 6).

On December 7, 1966, oppositors spouses Salustiano Carreon and Francisca
Alingog had instituted a civil suit before the trial court against the appellant
Bernardo C. Carbonel for ejectment and damages with injunction, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-795, alleging in substance that the
defendant Bernardo Carbonel verbally leased the eastern portion “B” of Lot No.
207 of the lot in question from the plaintiffs spouses Salustiano Carreon and
Francisca Alingog sometime after April, 1954 in consideration of P20.00 per
month which was allegedly religiously paid by appellant Bernardo Carbonel from
1954 to August, 1965. Sometime in August 1964, both of them allegedly agreed to
increase the monthly rental to P30.00 as already stated but Carbonel refused to
sign the written lease contract and further refused to vacate the premises
despite demand to do so. (Ibid., pp.6-7)

Answering the complaint, appellant Bernardo Carbonel denied its material
averments, more particularly, the existence of a landlord-tenant or
lessor-lessee relationship between him and appellee Carreons, alleging that at
the outset he leased the same from Amado Caunian, his predecessor-in-interest
and from whom he bought later the lot in question, and that whatever right
plaintiffs-appellees have in the property in question the same has already
prescribed. (Ibid., pp. 4-7; CA Decision, Rollo, pp.
32-33)

The two cases were tried jointly, after which the trial court rendered the
above-cited decision.

It appears that no motion for reconsideration of aforesaid decision was filed
but Bernardo C. Carbonel, applicant in Land Registration Case No. Br. II-N-85,
and defendant in Civil Case No. Br. II-N-795, appealed to the Court of
Appeals.

Francisca Vda. de Carreon, as plaintiff in the
ejectment case, also appealed but on motion of defendant’s counsel the same was
dismissed for failure to file an appeal bond (Rollo, p. 40).

As above stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court in both cases with modification.

The dispositive portion of the aforementioned decision reads:

“IN VIEW WHEREOF, in the land registration case, judgment will
have to be as it is hereby affirmed: in the ejectment case, judgment is also
affirmed, with the modification that Carbonel should also pay P20.00 a month
from September, 1964 until he finally vacates, and the decree of removal of his
improvement shall be executed at his expense; costs against Carbonel.

SO ORDERED.

Bernardo C. Carbonel moved for the reconsideration of said
decision (ANNEX D, Rollo, pp. 42-85) but for lack of sufficient merit
the same was denied on May 8, 1975 (Rollo, p. 88).

Hence, this petition.

Without giving due course to the petition, respondents were
required to comment (Rollo, p. 94) which Comment was filed on August
12, 1975 (Rollo, pp. 99-110).

Thereafter, on September 22, 1975, the First Division of this
Court resolved:

“L-40729-30 (Bernardo C. Carbonel v. Francisca A. Vda. de
Carreon, et al.) — Upon consideration of the allegations of the petition
and respondent’s comment thereon, the Court Resolved to give LIMITED DUE COURSE
to the petition only insofar as the petition alleges that respondent Court of
Appeals committed an error of law in modifying the judgment of the trial court
in favor of respondents (as plaintiffs-appellees) by granting damages at P20.00
a month from September, 1964 until vacation of the property in the ejectment
case notwithstanding that respondents’ proposed appeal from the said judgment
had been dismissed by the very Court of Appeals itself as per its resolution of
October 8, 1973 which dismissal was duly entered per entry of final judgment
dated November 5, 1973. x x x.

“The petition is denied in all other respects. Accordingly, the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment in the land registration
case in favor of respondents (as oppositors-appellees) and likewise affirming
the judgment in the ejectment case ordering petitioner to vacate the property
and the removal of his improvement at his expense, with costs, stands. Execution
for the enforcement of the judgment in favor of respondents including the
ejectment of petitioner from the property and the removal of his improvement
shall issue upon entry of this resolution by way of entry of judgment and only
the sole question of whether petitioner shall pay respondents P20.00 a month
from September 1964 until he finally vacates as per the modification of judgment
in the ejectment case made by respondent Court of Appeals shall await the
decision of this Court in accordance with the limited due course given the
petition by this Court.” (Rollo, p. 112)

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of this Resolution
(Rollo, pp. 127-137) was denied, and the denial is Final
(Rollo, p. 139).

Consequently, partial judgment was duly entered per entry of
final judgment dated November 16, 1975 (Rollo, p. 164).

The Brief for Petitioner was filed on December 15, 1975
(Rollo, p. 147) while that of respondent’s was submitted on January 19,
1976 (Rollo, p. 154).

After failure of petitioner to file reply brief, the case was
declared submitted for decision without the said reply brief (Rollo, p.
161).

The issue of whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals
committed an error of law in modifying the judgment of the trial court in favor
of respondents notwithstanding the dismissal of respondents’ proposed appeal
from said judgment should be answered in the affirmative.

To perfect an appeal, under Rule 41, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court, the notice of appeal (the appeal bond and the record on appeal having
been filed) must be served (together with copy of the record on appeal) upon the
adverse party and filed with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice
of the order or judgment appealed from. As held in Garcia v. Echiverri,
these requirements, are not only mandatory but also jurisdictional in nature and
must be complied with within the 30-day reglementary period (132 SCRA 631 [1984]
.

In the case at bar the proposed appeal of private respondents
to the Court of Appeals was dismissed for failure to file an appeal bond
(Rollo, p. 40).

Thus the appeal not having been perfected, the order of
dismissal was valid. (Medran v. CA, 83 Phil. 164; Vda. de
Crisologo v. CA, 137 SCRA 231 [1985]). The questioned decision is final
and executory and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the
final judgment of the trial court (Garcia v. Echiverri; Vda.
de Crisologo v. CA, supra). Exceptions to the general rule of
allowing the perfection of an appeal outside the reglementary period cannot
likewise be availed of in the case at bar, as such liberality was held not
warranted, where the decision of the lower court is satisfactorily supported by
the records. (Vda. de Crisologo v. CA, supra)

However, respondents insist, that notwithstanding the dismissal
of the appeal of private respondents as plaintiffs in the ejectment case, they
still retain their standing in court not as appellants but as
plaintiffs-appellees and as such they are not precluded from making assignment
of errors which they did and which was taken cognizance of by the respondent
Court of Appeals (Respondent’s Brief, pp. 7-8).

The contention has no merit.

In the case of Bunge Corp. and Universal Comm. Agencies v.
Elena Camenforte & Company, 91 Phil. 861, it was held that appellee,
who is not also an appellant, may also assign errors in his brief where his
purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he may not do so if
his purpose is to have the judgment modified or reversed, for, in such case, he
must appeal. On failure of herein respondents to perfect their appeal, the
judgment of the trial court in the ejectment case became final and executory and
a modification of such judgment by the appellate court cannot be allowed
(Phil. Engineering Corp. v. Ceniza, 6 SCRA 194).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby modified by the deletion of the amendment interposed
therein and the decision of the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla,
and Bidin, JJ., concur.