THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, CLEMENTE DOMINGO, JR., EDUARDO ROXAS, JUA…

This is a petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 19) seeking to set aside the Orders of
the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal in Criminal Case
No. CCC-VII-1406:  (a) dated June 4, 1974 amending its Resolution
dated May 15, 1974 (Rollo, p. 28); (b) dated
January 26, 1978 directing petitioner to comply with the
Order of June 4, 1974 (Rollo, p.
44); and (c) dated April 21, 1978 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Rollo, p. 50); and praying
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, ex-parte and
without bond, pending final resolution of the merits of the petition,
restraining respondent Judge from enforcing said Orders insofar as they
direct petitioner to reinstate the accused (herein private respondents) to their
former positions and to authorize the payment of their back
salaries.

The dispositive portion of the
Resolution dated May 15,
1974 as amended by the Order dated June 4, 1974 (Rollo, p. 31), reads as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the herein accused, this case is hereby
DISMISSED.  Consequently, accused Clemente Domingo, Jr., Eduardo Roxas, Juanito Leopando, Miguel Palamos, Vergel Ponciano and Deogracias Lizardo are hereby
ACQUITTED of the charge of Murder, and forthwith, accused Domingo, Jr.,
Leopando and Ponciano are
liberated from imprisonment and discharged from the custody of the law, unless
they are being detained for some other legal
cause.

The bailbonds posted by accused Palamos, Roxas and Lizardo for their provisional liberty are hereby
cancelled.

The Acting Director of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered to
reinstate Prison guards Clemente Domingo, Jr., Eduardo
Roxas, Juanito Leopando, Vergel Ponciano, and Deogracias Lizardo to their former positions and to authorize the
payment of their salaries which they failed to receive during the period of
their suspension.

Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Department of Justice and
the Acting Director of Prisons for their valuable information and
guidance.”

The Order dated January 26, 1978
states:

“Considering that based on the manifestation of the Solicitor
General, there is available funds and General Vicente Raval, Acting Director of the National Penitentiary, is
willing to pay, the Court resolves, as it is hereby resolved, to direct the
Acting Director of Prisons to comply with the Order of the Court dated June 4,
1974, within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof, reinstating all the
above-named accused to their former positions and to authorize the payment of
their salaries each accused failed to receive during the period of their
suspension.”

The Order dated April 21,
1978, on the other hand states that:

“Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated March 22, 1978, filed by the Assistant Solicitor
General Eulogio Raquel-Santos and considering the
opposition thereto, dated April 12,
1978 filed by Atty. Leonides Ecarma, counsel for the accused in the above-entitled case,
the Court resolves as it is hereby resolved, to DENY the instant Motion for
Reconsideration.

The Order of the Court dated January 26, 1978 directing movant Acting Director of Prisons to comply with the Order
dated June 4, 1974,
stands.”

The facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondents were prison guards at the New Bilibid Prison when they were charged with Murder in
Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1406-Rizal of the Circuit Criminal
Court, Pasig, Metro
Manila.  Pending trial of said murder case they were
suspended and subsequently dismissed from the service on orders of then
Secretary of Justice, pursuant to Letter of Instructions No. 14-A of the
President (Rollo, p. 20).  On
May 20, 1974 respondent
Court promulgated its Resolution dated May 15, 1974 acquitting the accused of the crime charged
for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, beyond
reasonable doubt (Rollo, p. 28).

On motion of private respondents, dated May 27, 1974, respondent Court amended its
Resolution of May 15, 1974,
to include the reinstatement of private respondents to their respective
positions before indictment and to authorize the payment of their back salaries
during the period of their suspension.  Thus the questioned Order of June 4,
1974.

On June 14, 1974 respondents, save Miguel
Palamos who died during the pendency of the case, were reinstated to their
positions.  Instead of authorizing the payment of the back salaries
of respondents, however, petitioner forwarded the Order to the Secretary of
Justice who denied the same in a 2^nd Indorsement dated August 7, 1974. 
Subsequently, on motion of respondents for the
execution of the Order, respondent Court issued another Order dated October 3,
1977, stating that the Acting Director of Prisons is fully bound by its Order
directing the payment of the back salaries claimed by respondents during the
period of their suspension, April 6, 1971 to June 13, 1974, for the reason that
it has become final and executory. 
Again, petitioner, instead of complying, forwarded the Order of
October 3,
1977 to the Secretary of
Justice who reinstated his denial in a communication to the respondents dated
December 29,
1977 (Rollo, pp.
33-34).

On January 3, 1978 respondents filed their motion to declare
petitioner in contempt of court (Rollo, p.
33), which was opposed by petitioner on the ground that an order or mandate
which is void, because it was issued by a court without jurisdiction over the
subject or the parties litigant, as in this case, cannot be considered a
contempt and that respondent Court acted without jurisdiction in including in
the order the reinstatement and payment of the back salaries of respondents
(Rollo, p. 40).  Without
granting or denying the motion to declare petitioner in contempt of court,
respondent Court issued the Order of January 26,
1978.

On March 16,
1978 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 45) of the Orders of respondent Court
dated June 4, 1974 and
January 26, 1978; which was
however denied in the Order of Respondent Court dated April 21, 1978, above-quoted.

Hence, this petition, filed on August 23, 1978 (Rollo, p. 19).  Respondents filed
their Comment on October 2,
1978 (Rollo, p. 62)
in compliance with the resolution of the First Division of this Court (Rollo, p. 52).  On October 9, 1978,
the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to require both
parties to submit simultaneous Memoranda.  (Rollo, p. 70).

Respondents filed their Memoradum on
November 20, 1978 (Rollo, p. 79); petitioner filed his Memoradum on January 25, 1979 (Rollo, p. 101).

The only issue raised by Petitioner in this case is whether or not
respondent Court acted within its jurisdiction when in an Order absolving the
accused from criminal liability, it at the same time directed the Acting
Director of Prisons to reinstate said accused to their former positions and to
authorize the payment of their supposed back salaries during the period of their
alleged suspension (actually dismissal).

Considering, however, that private respondents have already been
reinstated to their former positions as prison guards, the
issue with respect to the reinstatement of respondents to their previous
positions before they were indicted has become moot and academic. 
All that remains to be decided is whether or not it is within the
jurisdiction of respondent Court to order petitioner to authorize the payment of
the salaries of respondents during the pendency of the
criminal case filed against them.

Respondents alleged that they are entitled to payment of the
salaries they failed to receive during their suspension (Rollo, p. 82), citing Section 4 of R.A.
557 repealing Sec. 2272 of the Revised Administrative Code, Sec. 4 of R.A.
557 reads:

“When a member of the provincial guards, city police or municipal
police is accused in court of any felony or violation of law by the provincial
fiscal or city fiscal, as the case may be, the provincial governor, the city
mayor or the municipal mayor shall immediately suspend the accused from office
pending the final decision of the case by the court and, in case of acquittal,
the accused shall be entitled to payment of the entire salary he failed to
receive during his suspension.”

Also cited was the case of Noremor v.
Municipality of
Oras,
7 SCRA 405 (1963) which considered the above-quoted provision as
mandatory.

Petitioner, on the other hand, holds a contrary view (Rollo, p. 104), citing People v. Daleon, 1
SCRA 759 (1961), wherein the Court held that:

“The question is not new.  In at least three cases
previously decided by this Court (People v. Mañago, 69 Phil. 496; Publo v. Lagutan, 70 Phil. 481; Manila
Railroad Co. v. Baltazar, et al., L-5451, Sept. 14, 1953), We have ruled
that the trial court, in a criminal action for malversation of public funds wherein the accused is
acquitted, is without power to order the payment of his salary during the period
of his suspension.  The reason is that the only issue joined by the
plea of not guilty is whether or not the accused committed the crime charged in
the information, and in such case, the only judgment that the court is legally
authorized to render is either one of acquittal or of conviction with the
indemnity to the injured party and the accessory penalties provided for by
law.

Appellee Daleon
cites several cases wherein we upheld the right of an accused of the crime of
malversation, in case of acquittal, to back salaries
and reinstatement, but these cases are not in point because they involved
appeals either from civil actions or from administrative proceedings seeking
such remedies.  In other words, while an accused acquitted of malversation may claim payment of back salaries during the
period of his suspension and reinstatement, his relief lies not in the same
criminal case wherein he is acquitted but in the proper administrative or civil
action prescribed by law.

“WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified by eliminating
therefrom the portion which orders the payment of
appellee Antonio E. Daleon’s
salary during the period of his suspension from office.  Costs against appellee Antonio E. Daleon.” (People vs. Daleon, 1 SCRA 760).

Republic Act No. 557 is a special law which applies only to
provincial guards, city and municipal policemen with civil service eligibility
(Kordovez v. Carmona, 21 SCRA 678
[1967]).  It is evident that it does not apply to respondents who
are neither provincial guards, city policemen or
municipal policemen but prison guards.  The Noremor case cannot be cited in favor of
Respondents.

Another point that militates against the payment of back
salaries of respondents which respondent Court failed to consider is the fact
that respondents were removed from the service during their suspension
pursuant to Letter of Instructions No. 14-A, dated September 29, 1972.  It is a settled rule
that in the absence of proof that the dismissal of respondents was tainted with
bad faith and in grave abuse of discretion, they are not entitled to back
salaries (Octot v. Ibañez, 111 SCRA
79 [1982]; Clemente v. Commission on
Audit, 128 SCRA 297 [1984]).

The records show that when respondents were acquitted by the trial
court in the Order of May 15, 1974, which was subsequently amended by the Order
of June 4, 1974 including their reinstatement and payment of back salaries,
petitioner readily reinstated respondents to their previous positions on June
14, 1974 (Rollo, p. 80) but could not
authorize payment of back salaries against the advice of the then Secretary of
Justice.  This shows that the dismissal of respondents was not
motivated by ill will or personal malice but only by a desire on the part of
petitioner to comply with the mandate of Letter of Instructions No. 14-A. 
Moreover, as pointed out, LOI No. 647 does not authorize payment of backwages of reinstated employees. 
(Octot v.
Ibañez, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby GRANTED, and
the Orders of Respondent Court dated June 4, 1974, January 26, 1978 and April 21, 1978 are hereby SET ASIDE.

SO
ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Alampay,
Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, and Bidin, JJ., concur.