MARIA GUERRERO, APPLICANT AND APPELLANT, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

Guerrero versus Director of Lands

The Case

This is a registration case in which Maria Guerrero sought to have a parcel of land in Rizal, Nueva Ecija registered in her name, and the Director of Lands opposed on the ground that the land belongs to the public domain. The case matters because it fixes the rule on what happens to a riverbed when a river naturally changes its course: the abandoned bed passes to the owners of the lands bordering it, and a homestead patent already issued to a riparian owner is no obstacle to that right. It is a clean illustration of the interplay between the old Civil Code's rule on abandoned riverbeds and the Public Land Act.

Procedural History

Maria Guerrero filed her application for registration in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, and the Director of Lands opposed it. The trial judge ruled that Guerrero, as a riparian owner, had acquired ownership of the portion of the lot bordering her adjacent lot under Article 370 of the old Civil Code, but because that portion was not delimited in the plan and technical description, the application was dismissed without prejudice to an amended application covering only the portion pertaining to her. Both the applicant and the oppositor appealed. The applicant failed to file her brief, and her appeal was dismissed, leaving only the oppositor's appeal, which brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Facts

On March 10, 1941, Maria Guerrero filed an application in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for the registration of a parcel of land in barrio Macapsing, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, identified as lot No. 2765. The Director of Lands opposed, claiming the lot is part of the public domain.

The parties stipulated that the lot was formerly part of the bed of the Pampanga River, which changed its course after the year 1937, and that Maria Guerrero owns the adjacent lot No. 1725. The trial judge, in a decision dated October 15, 1948, held that Guerrero, as a riparian owner, had acquired ownership of the portion of lot No. 2765 bordering her lot No. 1725 under Article 370 of the old Civil Code, but dismissed the application without prejudice because that portion was not delimited in the plan and technical description.

On appeal, the Director of Lands contended that the lot had been declared part of the public domain in a cadastral case decided on December 26, 1923, and that Article 370 did not apply because lot No. 1725 was acquired by Guerrero through a homestead patent, which cannot be increased except as the Public Land Act provides.

Issues

• Whether or not the cadastral decision of December 26, 1923, declaring the lot part of the public domain, bars Guerrero's claim to the land.
• Whether or not Article 370 of the old Civil Code applies so that the abandoned riverbed belongs to Guerrero as riparian owner.
• Whether or not the fact that lot No. 1725 was acquired by homestead patent prevents Guerrero from acquiring the abandoned bed.

Applicable Provisions

Article 370 of the old Civil Code provides:

Beds of rivers abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the water belong to the owners of the lands bordering thereon throughout their respective extents. If the abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall be equidistant from the former boundaries.

This is the provision on which Guerrero's claim to the abandoned riverbed rests, and the Court applies it to confer ownership on the riparian owner.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the cadastral decision does not bar the claim. That decision was promulgated on December 26, 1923, long before the Pampanga River changed its course in or after 1937. At that time the lot was still part of the riverbed and therefore public regardless of the decision; it was only after the river changed its course that the former bed passed to the riparian owners under Article 370.

On the second issue, the Court held that Article 370 applies. After the river changed its course, the former bed belonged to the riparian owners by virtue of that article. The Court distinguished the case of Panlilio versus Mercado, cited by the oppositor, because there the Government had shown it took steps as soon as practicable to bring back the old course of the river, whereas here there is no pretense that the Government ever intended to do so.

On the third issue, the Court held that the homestead patent is no obstacle. Once Guerrero's title to lot No. 1725 had become absolute, the land ceased to be public and became private property entitled to all the benefits granted by law. The argument that the grant cannot be increased except as the Public Land Act provides is clearly without merit.

Doctrine

When a river naturally changes its course, the abandoned bed belongs to the owners of the lands bordering it throughout their respective extents, and if the abandoned bed divides estates of different owners, the new dividing line is equidistant from the former boundaries. A prior cadastral declaration that the land is public domain does not defeat the riparian owner's right where the change of course occurred after that declaration. And a homestead patent, once the title becomes absolute, converts the land into private ownership, so the riparian owner may acquire the abandoned bed without violating the Public Land Act.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, without costs, sustaining Guerrero's right as riparian owner to the portion of the abandoned riverbed bordering her land.

Remember This

Memorize the rule: the abandoned riverbed of a river that naturally changes course belongs to the riparian owners, and a homestead patent does not bar that right. Examiners use this case to test Article 370 of the old Civil Code and the effect of a cadastral declaration made before the river shifted.