G.R. No. L-4371. August 27, 1953
MARIA GUERRERO, APPLICANT AND APPELLANT, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
PARAS, C.J.:
The oppositor contends that the lot applied for by Maria Guerrero was declared a part of the public domain in the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in cadastral case No. 283, wherein it was held that “Las carreteras caminos, calles, callejones, cauces de agua, canales de regadio y otras partidas de terreno no enumerados como lotes, situadas dentro del perimetro de la masa total de terreno objeto de este expediente, se declaran terrenos de dominio publico, y por tanto, propiedad del Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas.”
This contention is untenable, since, as pointed out by the trial judge, the decision was promulgated on December 26, 1923, long before the Pampanga River changed its course in or after 1937. Obviously, the questioned lot was then still a part of the river bed and therefore public, regardless of said decision. On the other hand, after the rived had changed its course, the former bed has to belong to the riparian owners by virtue of article 370 of the Civil Code which provides as follows: “Beds of rivers abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the water belong to the owners of the lands bordering thereon throughout their respective extents. If the abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall be equidistant from the former boundaries.”
The decision in the case of Panlilio vs. Mercado (44 Phil., 695), cited by the oppositor in support of the argument that there has been no indication on the part of the Government to abandon the lot in question as part of the former bed of the Pampanga River, is not controlling, because in said case there was a showing that the Government, as soon as practicable, took steps to bring back the old course of the river. In the case at bar there is no pretense that the Government ever intended to pursue a similar step.
It is also urged for the oppositor that article 370 is not applicable to the present case, as lot No. 1725 was acquired by Maria Guerrero by virtue of a homestead patent, and said grant cannot be increased except in the manner provided for in the Public Land Act. This is clearly without merit, because after Guerrero’s title to lot No. 1725 had become absolute, the land ceased to be public and became one of private ownership entitled to all the benefits granted by law.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, and it is so ordered without costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.