ROQUE ESCAÑO, PETITIONER, VS. RODRIGO C. LIM, RESPONDENT.

The petitioner, Roque Escaño, had applied to the
Public Service Commission, in its Case No. 116808, for authority to operate ten
(10) taxicab units for Cagayan de Oro City and from the said city to any point in the island
Mindanao. Over the opposition of the respondent, C. Lim, a taxicab operator in
the territory applied for, the Commission, on 5 May 1959, granted the
petitioner’s application.

Apart from the
foregoing application, the petitioner, and separately with his wife, Asuncion
II. Escaño,
had been granted other certificates of public convenience to TPU and AC units.
The wife holds the active of the business because her husband, Roque Escaño, is a blind
man.

On motion for reconsideration by
oppositor Lim, however, the Commission, on 20 May
1959, set aside the said decision of 5 May 1959 for the reason that at that time
the oppositor had not completed adducing his evidence
before the municipal judge of Cagayan de Oro. Said judge was commissioned by the Commission to
receive the evidence by deposition.

Meantime, on 8 September 1959,
petitioner Escaño filed another petition to operate
the proposed service, pending final determination of his application. On 28
September 1959, the Commission approved the operation of three
units.

When the evidence of the parties
before the municipal judge was completed (transcribed from tape-recorded
testimonies to which manner no objection was raised), and the parties rested
their respective cases, the Public Service Commission, on 21 December 1959,
revived its earlier decision of 5 May 1959 and authorized the applicant to
operate seven (7) more taxi cabs to complete the ten (10)
units.

But again, oppositor Lim moved, on 21 January to reconsider the order
of 21 December 1959 on the ground that petitioner Escaño is not qualified to operate
the service applied for by him. In his motion for reconsideration, Lim specified
the charges made against Escaño and his wife by Public
Service Inspector Leoncio Paredes. These charges refer to the complaints, Nos. 77920-C
and 77921-C, instituted before the Commission on 16 February 1959 for violation
of certificates in the TPU and & services. In a joint decision on 24 March
1960 of the two cases, the Commission found the Escaños guilty allowing third persons to operate their
vehicles under their certificates for a fee, and forthwith cancelled their &
TPU and AC certificates; but the Escanos filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision and said motion not been
resolved.

Acting on Lim’s
motion for reconsideration of 21 January 1960, the three commissioners then
composing the Commission voted two in favor (Commissioners Galang and Prieto) and one against
(Commissioner Aspillera) the grant of the motion in
separate opinions dated 30 March 1960, 1 April 1960, and 22 March 1960,
respectively.
On 12 April 1960, applicant Escaño moved to reconsider
the majority opinion.

Because, in the meantime,
Republic Act 2077 had increased membership in the Public Service Commission from
three to five, and the two additional Commissioners had not been appointed, no
action could be taken on Escaño’s motion to
reconsider. He then moved to be allowed to provisionally operate the seven (7)
taxicabs that he had acquired prior to the revocation of his permit. By order of
23 December 1960 (Annex N, Appellant’s Brief), the provisional authority was
granted, the Commission taking into account the damages suffered by the
applicant through the suspension of the operation of the taxicabs he had
acquired, the large capital invested, and “that there is no certainty when the
motion for reconsideration can be finally acted upon.” This order was issued by
the three Qualified and then acting Commissioners, Aspillera, Galang and Prieto, the last two being the very ones who had Previously
voted to recall the 1959 decision granting Escaño’s
application to operate his taxis.

The composition of the Commission
was thereafter competed on 30 July 1962, and it issued the following order,
finally resolving adversely Escaño’s motion for
reconsideration (with one commissioner dissenting):

“Considering that the application
filed by Roque Escaño to
operate a taxicab service dated June 16, 1958 was denied by a majority the
Commissioners, as may be noted in the separate opinion rendered by Commissioner
Alejandro A. Galang dated March 30, 1960, and the
opinion of Associate Commissioner Gabriel P. Prieto
dated April 1, 1960, wherein it is clearly stated that the decision Commission
dated May 5, 1959 as well as the order of December 21, 1959 should be cancelled
and set aside; and considering furthermore that said opinions are based on the
fact that in Case No. 77920-C, the applicant Roque
Escaño, was found guilty of a serious violation of his
certificates and was punished accordingly in accordance with law, and
considering furthermore, that no evidence was presented by the applicant to
prove that such a finding of fact is not supported by the evidence of record,
this Commission believes that it has no valid reason to disturb the findings of
fact of Commissioners Galang and Prieto.

“Wherefore, the motion for
reconsideration filed by applicant dated 12 April
1960 is
hereby DENIED, and accordingly, the provisional permit authorized by order of
this Commission dated December 23,
1960, is
Cancelled and Revoked.

“Applicant is therefore required
to surrender the Taxi identification plates issued for his taxicabs authorized
under said provisional permit within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof. If he
fails to do so, the Motor Vehicles Registrar of Cagayan de Oro City is hereby
directed to order the recall or confiscation of the
same.”

A motion by Escaño for the reconsideration of the above order was
unanimously denied on 12 December 1962, Not satisfied
with the foregoing orders of 30 July 1962 and 12 December 1962, petitioner Escaño appealed to this Court.

We find the appeal to be
meritorious, and agree with petitioner-appellant that it was abuse of discretion
for the majority of the Commission to penalize him with revocation of his
taxicab permit upon the basis of a non-final conviction of an alleged violation
of another and distinct certificate of convenience. It is not disputed that the
order of 24 March 1960 finding Escaño guilty of having
willfully violated the conditions of his TPU and AC certificates had not yet
become final, since petitioner’s motion to reconsider the same was still unacted upon, and said could be subject to review by the
Supreme Court, Furthermore, according to the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Aspillera (Petition, Annex P), the said decision of
conviction “was promulgated without sufficient notice to Escaño, who was not given an opportunity to be nor to
present his evidence.” This statement is nowhere contradicted in the record,
and, if true, the conviction could even he void for lack of due process (cf.
Olongapo Jeepney Operators
vs. PSC, L-20699, 26 February 1965).

At any rate, not being final,
said conviction could not constitute a reasonable basis for revoking a totally
distinct certificate of public convenience to operate a taxi service, especially
because the nature of this service is different from the TPU and AC services the
conditions of which are alleged to have been violated. The appealed order of the
Commission thus imposes a second and distinct penalty for which we find no
justification. While a violation of the conditions of a certificate entitles the
Commission to revoke the violated certificate, it was never held that such
violation alone could also result in the forfeiture of a totally different
certificate.

Respondent Lim charges that the
decision of 1 April 1960 revoking Escaño’s taxicab
permit had become final because petitioner’s motion for reconsideration against
the order of 30 July 1962, in reality, was a second motion, since the last order
already denied Escaño’s first motion for
reconsideration of 12 April 1960. We do not agree. It is noteworthy that after
petitioner Escaño’s motion of 12 April 1960, seeking
reconsideration of the revocation of his taxicab permit, Escaño was authorized by the Commission, on 30 December
1960, to operate his second batch of seven taxicabs; this authority, in effect,
suspended the order of revocation of the certificate. Hence, the order of 30
July 1962, while denying Escaño’s first Motion to
reconsider, actually was revoking also the order of 30 December 1960. This added
feature entitled Escaño to ask for reconsideration
anew.

Wherefore, the appealed orders of 30 March
and 1 April
1960, as
well as the order of 30 July
1962
revoking the taxi certificate of Roque Escaño, are reversed and set aside. Costs
against respondent Rodrigo C. Lim.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo,
Barrera, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J. P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.