ELIZALDE & CO., INC., DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME “HACIENDA VALENCIA,” PETITIONER, VS. ALLIED WORKERS’ ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, BAIS CHAPTER, AGRICULTURAL SECTION (AWA)…

Certiorari to review a resolution
of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 198-MC-Cebu (Allied
Workers’ Association vs. “Hacienda Valencia” Business Enterprises and
Elizalde & Co., Inc.), asserting its jurisdiction
over the case.

The Allied Workers’ Association
of the Philippines, Bais
Chapter, Agricultural Section, a labor organization with Permit No. 3296-IP from
the Department of Labor, had petitioned the Court of Industrial Relations for a
certification as sole and exclusive representative of all the employees of the
“Hacienda Valencia,” owned and operated by
petitioner Elizalde & Co., Inc. The latter filed a
motion to dismiss, claiming that the petitioning workers were all agricultural
workers of the “Hacienda Valencia,” an enterprise dedicated solely to the
planting and cultivation of sugar cane; and that, as decided in the case of
Santos vs. C.I.R., L-17196, December 28, 1961, controversies between
capital and labor in agricultural lands under any system of cultivation are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations and not
within that of the Court of Industrial Relations. The motion to dismiss was
granted by the hearing judge; but upon appeal to the court en banc, the
latter, by majority vote, reversed the resolution, holding that it has
“exclusive jurisdiction over all cases that pertain to the union rights of the
employees, agriculture workers being included therein by virtue of section 27 of
Republic Act 2263.”

Hence this
petition for certiorari.

The question of jurisdiction over
conflicts between landowners and laborers engaged in agricultural work is not
new, and has been repeatedly passed upon by this Supreme Court. The case of Victorias Milling Co.
vs. C.I.R. and Free Visayan Workers, G. R.
No. L-17281, decided on March 30, 1963, is particularly relevant, being
almost on all fours with the present case. There a union of laborers working in
the sugar cane haciendas of the Victorias
Milling Co. had charged the company with unfair labor practice in the Court of
Industrial Relations. The latter’s jurisdiction was impugned before this Court, and it was held
that:

“The members of respondent Union
are merely agricultural laborers in petitioner’s haciendas, the principal work
of which is planting and harvesting sugar cane and other chores incidental to
ordinary farming operations. They are agricultural workers, and in the
supposition that the milling: company had committed unfair labor practice upon
them, the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over the
case.”

It was also ruled in Hacienda
Esperanza, et al. vs. C.I.R., et al., G. R. No. L-18708, Nov. 28,
1962:

“An unfair
labor practice case involving agricultural laborers engaged in agricultural
pursuits are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations.”

a ruling reiterated in Camus vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-18225, June 30,
1964.

The rationale of these
rulings was set in the preceding case of Santos vs. C.I.R., et al., G.R.
No. L-17196, December 28, 1961, in that—

“not only because an agricultural
laborer does not come with'” the purview of the word “employee” defined in
Section 2(d) of R.A. 875 but also because any matter that may pertain to the
relation of tenant and landlord cornea under the Agricultural Tenancy Act (R.A.
No. 1199 as amended by Republic Act No. 2263) and any controversy that may arise
between them as an incident their relationship comes under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations created by Republic Act No.
1267.”

The Court of Agrarian Relations,
expressly created for the “enforcement of all laws and regulations
governing the relation of capital and labor on all agricultural
under any system of cultivation” (See 1, R.A. 1267), was given
exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines consider, investigate,
decide and settle all questions, matters, controversies, or disputes
involving all those relationships established by law which determine the
varying lights of poisons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where
one of the parties works the land” (Sec. 7, R.A. 1267), and that jurisdiction is
certainly enough to include disputes over union representation of agricultural
laborers and other workers that were given, by Section 27 of Republic Act No.
2263, the right to form, maintain and expand their unions and organizations,
prohibiting landholders from discouraging, initiating, dominating, assisting or
interfering with such unions or organizations.

The appealed resolution of the
respondent court argues that there would be no penalty imposable for violation
of the laborer’s rights conferred by section 27, Republic Act No. 2263, except
by applying the Industrial Peace Act, R. A. 875. This is a mistake. That section
was an amendment to Republic Act 1199 (Tenancy Act), and, therefore, Us
violation would be punishable under section 57 of the latter Act, penalizing
with a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one
year or both any violation of its provisions; as well as under the contempt
power conferred by section 8 of Republic Act No. 3267 on the Agrarian
Court.

Nor are we impressed by the
consideration that the Court of Industrial Relations already has the machinery
to deal with questions of union representation. There is no reason why the Court
of Agrarian Relations may not set up its own organization to deal with cases
within its jurisdiction as circumstances may require, making use of its
rule-making power or by calling upon the opposite government offices, as its
organic law empowers it to do.

Respondent AWA calls attention to
the fact that Republic Act No. 809 and its provisions refer to the persons
engaged in the “sugar industry.” Nothing in said Act, however, indicates any
legislative intent to convert the agricultural laborers into industrial
employees; the term “sugar industry” in said Act refers to sugar millers,
planters and laborers as a whole, and has no bearing on the issue now before the
Court.

Wherefore, the resolution under review is
reversed, and the petition for certification is ordered dismissed, without
prejudice to petitioner’s seeking relief in the proper courts. No
costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo,
Barrera, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J. P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.