BENJAMIN DAYAO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ENRIQUE LOPEZ ET AL., DEFENDANTS. ENRIQUE LOPEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On April 10, 1957, Benjamin Dayao filed an action against Enrique Lopez, et
al. for rescission of a deed of sale with damages before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. It was alleged that several persons including Enrique Lopez
executed a deed of sale over a parcel of land for a valuable consideration but
when it was presented to the Register of Deeds of Baguio City it was denied
registration for the reason that a portion of the property sold belonging to
Enrique Lopez and his wife was already sold at public auction in 1953. The
rescission was based on fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the
defendants.

After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but
alleging that he was not duly represented by his former counsel, Enrique Lopez
instituted a writ of certiorari with mandatory injunction before the Court of
Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 24200-R), which eventually remanded the case to the court
a quo with the directive that Lopez be given another opportunity to
present his evidence.

Accordingly, the court a quo set the case for hearing for that purpose
on June 20, 1960, after Lopez had filed an answer to the complaint. The record
shows that the notice of hearing was received by Lopez’ counsel on April 12,
1960, but when the date of hearing came, he orally moved for postponement on the
ground that his client was sick. He did not present any medical certificate, nor
a previous motion for postponement, nor counsel has shown when his client has
been sick. Counsel for plaintiif opposed the motion as it did not conform with
the requirement of the rules. And finding the opposition well-taken, the court
a quo denied the motion, rendering forthwith a decision stating the
following in its dispositive part: “on the basis of the evidence of the
plaintiff already on the record, the decision of this Court, dated January 6,
1958, is hereby revived in toto and is deemed incorporated herein by
reference, as against the defendant Enrique Lopez only.”

The decision was rendered on June 22, 1960. On July 16, 1960, counsel for
Enrique Lopez filed a notice of appeal, as well as the appeal bond, even if he
asked for an extension of time to perfect his appeal. But on August 10, 1960, he
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the alleged ground that on
June 20, 1960, date of hearing, he moved for postponement of the trial for the
reason that his client was sick as evidenced by a telegram the counsel received
from him in which it is recited that he was confined in the Davao General
Hospital on account of certain illness stating that the requisite medical
certificate would soon be forthcoming, which in fact he received on June 22,
1960; but in said motion counset did net state the nature of the sickness, nor
the condition of his client which would show his inability to attend the hearing
on the scheduled date. Counsel for plaintiff filed a vigorous opposition to this
motion. After considering both the motion and the opposition, the trial court
refused to reconsider its decision. Hence the present appeal.

This is the second time that appellant has resorted to the Appellate court
for the alleged failure of the trial court to give him an opportunity to present
his evidence, the first being in Case No. CA-G. R. No. 24200-R of the Court of
Appeals wherein he alleged that his former counsel Augusto Revilla was not duty
authorized to represent him in the lower court.

The notice of hearing in tne instant case set for June 20, 1960 was received
by appellant’s counsel on April 12, 1960, but when said date of hearing came,
appellant’s counsel orally moved for postponement on the ground that his client
was sick without however presenting any medical certificate nor stating when his
client got sick or the nature of his sickness. And notwithstanding the fact that
the decision was rendered on June 22, 1960, and appellant’s counsel filed his
notice of appeal as well as the appeal bond on July 26, 1960, he filed on August
10, 1960 a motion for reconsideration alleging therein the same reasons he had
already advanced in support of his oral motion for postponement. And finding the
reasons given unsatisfactory, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration.

The question to be determined is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration.

Considering the facts as unfolded in the record, we are persuaded to conclude
that the trial court was justified in taking the action it has taken. To begin
with, it should be stated that the hearing of the case was set for June 20, 1960
and notice thereof was received by appellant’s counsel on April 12, 1960. There
is, therefore, an interval of over two months between the date of hearing and
the date appellant’s counsel was notified thereof, and yet said counsel only
thought of moving for postponement in the very last minute. If there was really
no desire to delay the proceeding, appellant’s counsel would have filed a
written motion for postponement much ahead of time to give opposing party enough
time to make proper adjustment and the court to take appropriate action.

In the second place, if it is true that appellant’s counsel has received the
alleged verified medical certificate on June 22, 1960, it is strange that he had
to wait for so long a time before he filed his motion for reconsideration, for
the record shows that he filed said motion on August 10, 1960, or almost two
months thereafter. And as the record shows, said motion was not accompanied by
the alleged verified medical certificate of the supervising resident physician
of the Davao General Hospital. There is, therefore, every reason to believe that
the attempt at postponement is merely a move to delay the hearing which
appellant should have known was intended precisely to give him a further
opportunity to present his evidence. The failure to avail of this hearing can,
therefore, be attributed only to his own fault.

On the other hand, in incidents of this nature, a factor that is important to
consider is whether the party concerned has a good and valid defense which if
presented may have the effect of overcoming or offsetting the adverse decision
rendered against him, which is not the case here, for the record shows that
appellant has sold the parcel of land in question as free from any lien or
encumbrance when in fact he had already sold a portion thereof to other parties.
His claim that, “the plaintiff should be blamed for his negligence and
carelessness in buying a property without first ascertaining in the Register of
Deeds of Baguio” is untenable, considering that the land sold is covered by a
transfer certificate of title issued under the Land Registration Act. Verily,
appellant’s defense, if any, is flimsy and insubstantial.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.