ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. DIONISIO LINDAYAG, ET AL., OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.

On November 10, 1959 Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales.
On May 27, 1960 her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin, filed with the Court of First
Instance of said province a verified petition for the Issuance in her favor of
letters of administration over the estate of said deceased, alleging, among
other things, that the latter left real and personal properties situated in the
provinces of Zambales and Bulacan worth approximately P100,000; that the names,
ages and residence of her surviving heirs were: (1) Dionisio Lindayag, 60 years
of age, surviving husband, residing at Olongapo, Zambales, (2) Isabel V.
Saguinsin, 54 years Of age, sister of the deceased, residing at Hagonoy,
Bulacan, (3) Aurora V. Sacdalan, 46 years of age, sister of the deceased, and
(4) Ines V. Calayag 70 years of age, sister of the deceased, both residing at
Paombong, Bulacan; and that, as far as petitioner knew, the decedent left no
debts at the time of her death.

On June 21, 1960 Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf
and in representation of the minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all
surnamed Lindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of
petitioner’s lack of interest in the estate, she being neither heir nor a
creditor thereof. The motion alleged that the late Maria V. Lindayag was
survived by her husband—the movant—and legally adopted minor Children named
Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag, the decendent having
left no legitimate, natural or illegitimate child. A certified true copy of the
decision of the Justice of the Peace of Olongapo, Zambales, dated July 6, 1953
decreeing the adoption of said minors by the decendent and her husband was
attached to the motion.

In opposing the motion to dismiss petitioner argued that only the facts
alleged in the petition should be considered in determining its sufficiency.

On July 28, 1960, after due hearing in the motion aforesaid, the Court issued
the following order of dismissal:

“It appearing that the herein petitioner is only a sister of the deceased
Maria V. Lindayag; that the deceased ia survived by her husband and her three
(3) adopted children named: Jesus, Concepcion and Catherine, all surnamed
Lindayag who were adopted by the deceased on July 6, 1953; that the herein
petitioner is obviously not an heir and has no interest in the estate; and that
the surviving heirs oppose the instant petition on the ground that they want to
settle the estate extra-judicially among them to avoid unnesessary expenses in
prosecuting this case, the Court finds the oppositors’ opposition to be well
taken”.

“WHEREFORE, let this case be dismissed. No pronouncement as to
costs.”

Petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration of the above order having been
denied, she took the present appeal.

The question to be resolved in this appeal is whether petitioner is “an
interested person” in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag.

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters
of administration must be filed by an “interested person”. An interested party
has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited; by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 Off. Gaz. 1171). And it is well
settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special
proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto
must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Trillana
vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil., 710); Espinosa vs. Barrios, 70 Phil. 311).

Petitioner’s interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was
disputed, through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on
the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally adopted
children—thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing held
in connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in support thereof which
according to the lower court, established that said deceased was survived not
only by her husband but three legally adopted children named Jesus, Conception,
and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag.

Upon these facts—which petitioner does not dispute—it is manifest that she is
not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct
interest in her estate.

Petitioner’s view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is
filed, only the facts alleged in the complaint or petition may be taken into
account is not entirely correct. To the contrary, the rule is that at said
hearing said motion may be proved or disproved in accordance with the rules of
evidence, and it has been held that, for that purpose, the hearing should be
conducted as an ordinary hearing; and the parties should be allowed to present
evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure of the complaint or of
the petition to state a cause of action (Asejo vs. Leonoso, 78 Phil. 467; 44
Off. Gaz. No. 10, p. 3807). In the present case, the motion to dismiss the
petition was grounded on petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to institute the
proceedings which, as already stated heretofore, was fully substantiated by the
evidence presented during the hearing.

In view of all the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed, with
costs.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera,
Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.