G.R. No. L-28332. June 30, 1970
PACIENCIA LIM VDA. DE SERRANO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HERMILA CARTAGENA, SALVACION MAGUINSAWAN, MIRALUNA MAGUINSAWAN AND HERMILINA MAGUINSAWAN, RESPON…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by Paciencia Lim Vda. de Serrano from a decision of
the Court of Appeals, the dispositive part of which
reads:
“WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and
set aside and another is rendered declaring the plaintiffs Salvacion
Maguinsawan, Miraluna Maguinsawan and Hermilina Maguinsawan as co-owners of the properties described in
paragraph 7 of the complaint, subject to the usufructuary
right of plaintiff Hermila Cartagena
in accordance with Article 834 of the old Civil Code; ordering the defendant
spouses, Paciencia Lim Serrano and Antonio Serrano,
to deliver possession of said properties to the plaintiffs and to render an
accounting of the fruits and income thereof from 1947 until they shall have
surrendered possession thereof to the plaintiffs; and ordering all the
defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Costs in both instances shall be against the
defendants.”
The main facts are set forth in said decision, from which We quote:
“This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Hermila
Cartagena and her children, Salvacion,
Miraluna and Hermilina all
surnamed Maguinsawan, from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Davao dismissing their complaint
against Anuncio Delaman, Gorgonio Delaman, and the spouses
Antonio Serrano and Paciencia Lim. Serrano, for recovery of ownership and
possession of four (4) parcels of land described in paragraph 7 of the
complaint as follows:
‘1. A
parcel of agricultural land located at Banahawan Bro.
of Taragona, Municipality of Mati,
Davao, bounded on the North by Banahawan
River; on the East by Francisco Bonga; on the South
by A. Masosquid; and on the West by P. Calicot, containing an area of about 24,000 hectares, with
the following improvements, 1,000 ponos of cocos, 1-A prod; 1,000 ponos of cocos, 2-A productive (sic).
‘2. A parcel of agricultural
land located at Jovellar, Taragona,
Mati, Davao, bounded on the
North by N. Lomante; on the East by Provincial Road;
on the South by Manoanon Creek and on the West by Langon Creek, containing an area of about three (3)
hectares or more, with no less than 300 ponos of cocos productive.
‘3. A parcel of land located
at Silingan, Taragona, Mati, Davao, bounded on the North
by Purakawa Plant Co., on the East by Policiano Carreon; on the South
by Public lands, containing an area of about 21,000 hectares, more or less,
planted to coconuts, all productive and to palay and
corn from season (sic).
‘4. A residential lot
situated at Taragona, Mati,
Davao, bounded on the North by Barrio Plaza, on the
East by San Pedro Street, on the South by Alegaris
Street, and on the West by Eulogio Lomanto, containing an area of 306 square meters, more or
less.’
“The plaintiffs are the wife and children of Francisco Maguinsawan, who died in Taragona,
Mati, Davao,
on February 22, 1942. The properties in dispute form part of his
estate.
“In Special Case No. 265 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, entitled ‘In the matter of the Intestate Estate of
Francisco Maguinsawan,’ commenced on August 6, 1945[1]
by Paciencia Lim Serrano, an alleged creditor of the
deceased, Francisco’s mother, Ceferina Dilag, who died sometime in 1943, was declared the sole
heir to his entire estate.
“In Special Case No. 730 of the same court, entitled
‘Intestate Estate of Ceferina Dilag,’
Ceferina’s surviving sister, Bruna
Dilag, was declared her legal heir and was adjudged
entitled to the above properties’.
“Bruna Dilag
died single and without any issue on January
5, 1958. In Special Case No.
947, also of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
entitled ‘Intestate Estate of Bruna Dilag,’ her nephews, herein defendants Anuncio
Delaman and Gorgonio Delaman,
were declared her legal heirs and the properties in litigation were adjudicated
in their favor. Thereafter, or on
November 22, 1960[2]
defendants Anuncio Delaman
and Gorgonio Delaman sold
said properties to defendant Paciencia Lim Serrano
who, together with her husband Antonio Serrano, is presently in possession
thereof.
“The complaint in this case was originally filed on October 30, 1958 against Anuncio Delaman and Gorgonio Delaman as defendants.
It was amended on June 26, 1961,
to include the spouses Antonio Serrano and Paciencia
Lim Serrano as defendants.
“As cause of action, plaintiffs allege that Francisco Maguinsawan, husband of Hermila Cartagena, died on or about February 22, 1942, in Taragona, Mati, Davao; that the two lived together as husband and wife from
1935 until the death of Francisco Maguinsawan in 1942
and begot three children, namely, the remaining plaintiffs Salvacion,
Miraluna and Hermilina all
surnamed Maguinsawan; that during said period,
Francisco Maguinsawan acquired the properties in
question, which he and Cartagena improved and
cultivated thru their joint efforts; that the defendants, by subtle scheme,
stealth, strategy and fraud, caused the filing of the three intestate
proceedings mentioned above, resulting in the adjudication of the properties in
litigation in favor of defendants Anuncio Delaman and Gorgonio Delaman, and that on October 29, 1959,[3]
defendants Paciencia Lim Serrano and Antonio Serrano
who, with malice aforethought and bad faith, instigated the filing of said
proceedings, bought the properties from defendants Anuncio
Delaman and Gorgonio Delaman.
“The defendants denied the material averments of the complaint
and, as special defense, alleged that the present action is now barred by
Special Cases Nos. 265, 730 and 947. The defendant spouses further averred that
they are purchasers for value and in good faith of the properties in
litigation.
“Against the decision of the court a quo dismissing
their complaint, the plaintiffs have, in their appeal brief, assigned the
following errors:
‘1. Trial
Court erred in not finding that the plaintiffs were the victims of Scheme,
Stealth, Strategy and Fraud in connection with Special Cases Nos. 265, 730 and
947.
‘2. The
Trial Court erred in holding that the plaintiff Hermila
Cartagena voluntarily appeared and intervened in
Special Case No. 265.
‘3. The
Trial Court erred in holding that the action should be dismissed on the ground
of prior judgment.
‘4. The
Trial Court erred in not finding that the plaintiff Hermila
Cartagena
and the deceased Francisco Maguinsawan were presumed
to be legally married.
‘5. The Trial Court erred in
not finding that the plaintiffs Salvacion Maguinsawan, Miraluna Maguinsawan and Hermilina Maguinsawan, at the very least, enjoyed the status of
acknowledged natural children and therefore entitled to inherit.
‘6. The
Trial Court erred in finding that the plaintiff Hermila
Cartagena is not entitled to one-half of the properties
left by Francisco Maguinsawan.'”
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals found that
the last assignment of error is untenable – Hermila Cartagena having admitted, during the trial, that the
properties in question had been acquired by Francisco Maguinsawan
before their alleged marriage in 1935, and, hence, were his “exclusive
properties” but upheld the first, second, third and fourth assignments of
error, in view of which, without passing upon the fifth assignment of error
which was evidently unnecessary – it rendered the appealed decision in favor of
Salvacion, Miraluna and Hermilina Maguinsawan, and their
mother, Hermila Cartagena. Although Anuncio Delaman and Gorgonio Delaman were defendants in the trial court and appellees in the Court of Appeals, together with the
spouses Paciencia Lim Serrano and Antonio Serrano, said Anuncio and Gorgonio Delaman did not appeal
from the unfavorable decision of said appellate court.
The case has been brought to Us on
appeal by certiorari taken by Paciencia Lim Vda. de Serrano, whose husband had
died in the meanwhile. She maintains
that the Court of Appeals erred: 1)
“in holding that the final order of the probate court in Special Case No.
265, declaring that the late Francisco Maguinsawan
died unmarried, leaving his mother, Ceferina Dilag, as his only heir, and the final orders of said
probate court in Special Cases Nos. 730 and 947 are res
judicata“; 2) “in not holding that
said final orders x x x
cannot be collaterally attacked” in the present case; 3) “in holding
that respondent Hermila Cartagena
was legally presumed” to be married to Francisco Maguinsawan,
and in granting her the corresponding usufructuary
right; 4) in declaring that Salvacion, Miraluna and Hermilina Maguinsawan are “legitimate children and legal heirs
of the deceased Francisco Maguinsawan, and in
adjudicating the properties in question to them”; 5) “in declaring
the deceased Antonio Serrano and his widow, herein petitioner, as purchasers in
bad faith”; and 6) “in not affirming the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Davao” dismissing the present
case.
The issues thus raised by Mrs. Serrano may be summed up as
follows: 1) whether the deceased Francisco Maguinsawan
was legally married to Hermila Cartagena;
and 2) whether she and her aforementioned children may recover the properties
in dispute, despite the final orders issued in Special Cases Nos. 265, 730 and
947.
With respect to the first question, the Court of Appeals said:
“On the question of whether or not Hermila
Cartagena was legally married to Francisco Maguinsawan, the preponderance of evidence leans in favor
of the claim of said plaintiff that she and the decedent (Francisco Maguinsawan) were married on January 7, 1935. Hermila Cartagena’s claim was
corroborated by Francisco Sanga, an assigner of Francisco
Maguinsawan since the year 1925, who testified to the
effect that he was present during their wedding ceremony. Such claim also finds strong support from the
documentary evidence Exhibits B, C and F. Exhibit B is a public instrument
executed by Francisco Maguinsawan on August 11, 1941, in which he
represented himself as “casado” (married).
Although the name of the spouse is not mentioned in said instrument, it is
reasonable to conclude that he was referring to herein plaintiff Hermila Cartagena since he was
then living with her and there is no claim that Francisco Maguinsawan
was married to someone else other than Hermila Cartagena.
“Exhibit C is an instrument executed by plaintiff Hermila Cartagena sometime in
1947 designating defendant Paciencia Lim Serrano, to
whom Francisco Maguinsawan left an indebtedness in
the sum of P1,734.64, as administratrix
of the properties in litigation until full payment of said obligation. Said instrument, which was executed before
the institution of the present action, refers to plaintiff Hermila
Cartagena as ‘Hermila C. Vda. de Maguinsawan.’
“Exhibit F is a public record, being a report dated November 4, 1951, submitted by Primitivo Papa, Chief of Cadastral Survey Party No. 20-D,
to the Director of Lands in connection with Homestead Application No. 175018 of
Francisco Maguinsawan. Said report states, among others, that ‘the
applicant is married and the name of his wife is Carmila
Cartagena‘ and that he has three children. On the witness stand, Primitivo
Papa confirmed the veracity of the contents of his report Exhibit F, declaring
that this was prepared on the basis of information given to him personally by
Francisco Maguinsawan, then a homestead applicant.
“Moreover, there is hardly any dispute that Francisco Maguinsawan and plaintiff Hermila
Cartagena had deported themselves as husband and wife
from 1935 until the former’s death in 1942. This circumstance gives rise to the
presumption that they had entered into a lawful contract of marriage (Rule 131,
Sec. 5 (bb), Rules of Court).
“We do not believe that the allegations in Exhibit 2 to the
effect that ‘the deceased Francisco Maguinsawan had
been living as husband and wife with Hermila Cartagena with whom he had three children who are minors’
and that ‘the said children are at present living with their natural mother Hermila Cartagena‘ are sufficient
either to rebut the above presumption of lawful marriage or to outweigh the
plaintiffs’ evidence establishing the marriage to plaintiff Hermila Cartagena and the late
Francisco Maguinsawan. Exhibit 2 is an opposition
filed in Special Case No. 265 by Anatolio Maguinsawan and Alberto Maxey, both uncles of Francisco Maguinsawan, to the petition of Paciencia
Lim Serrano for the issuance of letter of administration in her favor. Hermila Cartagena was made to sign Exhibit 2 only to indicate her
conformity to the appointment of oppositor Anatolio Maguinsawan as
administrator of her husband’s estate.
It is not shown that she signed Exhibit 2 with full knowledge or
understanding of the import of the allegations referred to above.
In view of the foregoing consideration, we hold that plaintiff Hermila Cartagena was legally
married to the late Francisco Maguinsawan. And it not
being disputed that plaintiffs Salvacion Maguinsawan, Miraluna Maguinsawan and Hermilina Maguinsawan are the children of Hermila
Cartagena with the deceased Francisco Maguinsawan, we hereby declare them as legitimate children
of the said spouses. As such, they are
entitled to inherit the entire hereditary estate of their deceased estate,4
Francisco Maguinsawan, subject however to the usufructuary right of plaintiff Hermila
Cartagena as surviving spouse of said decedent
pursuant to Article 834 of the old Civil Code.”
Thus, the Court of Appeals found that Francisco Maguinsawan and Hermila Cartagena were legally married and that Salvacion,
Miraluna and Hermilina Maguinsawan are their legitimate children. These findings of fact, which, in the
language of the law, are “final,”5 cannot be disturbed by Us,
particularly because its premises – namely, the testimony of Hermila Cartagena, corroborated
by that of Francisco Sanga, and bolstered up by
Exhibits B, C and F, and by the established fact that Francisco Maguinsawan and Hermila Cartagena had deported themselves as husband and wife from
1935 to the former’s death in 1942 – are borne out by
the record. In other words, the
aforementioned findings of the Court of Appeals are based upon substantial
evidence. What is more, such findings
are correct.
In passing upon the second question, the Court of Appeals
expressed itself as follows:
“In our opinion, Special Cases Nos. 265, 730 and 947 do not
constitute a bar to the present action.
We note that Special Case No. 265 was instituted by defendant Paciencia Lim Serrano in 1948 after she had been designated
by plaintiff Hermila Cartagena
to administer the properties in litigation by virtue of the instrument Exhibit
C. As already stated above, Exhibit C refers to plaintiff Hermila
Cartagena as the widow of Francisco Maguinsawan yet in the petition filed by defendant Paciencia Lim Serrano in Special Case No. 265, no mention
is made about her and the other plaintiffs.
The petition only names defendant Anuncio Delaman and Alberto Maxey as the relatives of the late
Francisco Maguinsawan. Obviously, defendant Paciencia
Lim Serrano intentionally omitted to name the herein plaintiffs in her petition
in order to prevent them from intervening in said proceeding. And this leads
credence to the claim of plaintiffs that the intestate proceedings were had
through the fraudulent machinations of the defendants, resulting in the
adjudication of the properties of the late Francisco Maguinsawan
in favor of defendants Anuncio Delaman
and Gorgonio Delaman, who
are not his legitimate heirs.
“It is true that ‘a final order of distribution of the estate
of a deceased person vests title in the distributees‘
(Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 46 Phil. 875). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
ruled that a party interested in probate proceedings may have a final
liquidation set aside when, as in this case, he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to his negligence (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89
Phil. 720). When Special Cases Nos. 730
and 947 were instituted, plaintiffs Salvacion Maguinsawan, Miraluna Maguinsawan and Hermilina Maguinsawan were still minors, which fact, apart from the
fraudulent machinations employed by the defendants prevented them from
intervening in said proceedings. As to
them, therefore, the final orders of distribution issued therein are not
binding and conclusive and do not constitute a bar to the present action.
“The pretension of the defendant spouses that they are
purchasers in good faith is without merit.
They know or ought to have known that plaintiffs are the legitimate
heirs of the late Francisco Maguinsawan and,
therefore, are the lawful owners of the properties in litigation. In fact, they derived their possession of
said properties from plaintiff Hermila Cartagena who, as widow of Francisco Maguinsawan ,6
designated them as administrators thereof in 1947. Having thus purchased the properties from persons
who are not the lawful owners thereof, with knowledge of this fact, they did
not acquire any valid title thereto.”
We are fully in agreement with the foregoing views. Although it is true that final orders in
probate cases partake of the nature of a judgment in rem,
binding upon the whole world, it does not follow therefrom
that said final orders – like any other judgment or final order – cannot –
within the statutory period of prescription – be annulled upon the ground of
extrinsic fraud. This is especially
true when the subsequent action contests the title to the property adjudicated
in the probate proceedings and the adjudication has taken place – as it did in
Case No. 265 – without the participation of the plaintiffs in the second case.
In this connection, Llanera vs. Logos,7 is squarely in point. That case referred to one Gorgonio
Llanera who had, on October 13, 1942, died single and intestate, leaving an
estate consisting of the proceeds of an insurance policy. On petition of one Remedios
Ayque Altavano, the Court
of First Instance of Albay found that the only
relatives of the deceased were his surviving brothers and sisters, and some
nephews and nieces, among whom said estate was ordered distributed, after which
the court ordered, on May 28, 1949, that the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate be deemed closed. It
appeared, however, that the deceased had had a brother who died on June 19, 1935, leaving a son, Eligio, born in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, on July 17, 1925, not included among those mentioned
above. Eligio
came to know, in 1953, of the death of his uncle, Gorgonio,
and the distribution of the proceeds of his insurance policy in the intestate
proceedings in Albay.
So, on February 21, 1955,
Eligio commenced, in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, an action, to recover said proceeds of the insurance policy, against
those to whom the same had been adjudicated, but, the latter court dismissed
the case, upon the ground of improper venue and prescription of action. On appeal taken by Eligio,
We reversed the decision of the trial court, stating:
“The flaw we find in this reasoning is that it presupposes
that the instant action is for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Gorgonio Llanera. Such is not the case for his estate has
already been settled by the Court of First Instance of Albay
so much so that the proceedings were declared closed and terminated on May 28, 1949. The present action is to recover the property
illegally adjudicated to the defendants on the ground of fraud and being an
action in personam the same can be
filed either at the residence of any of the defendants or at the residence of
the plaintiff, at the election of the latter (sec. 1, Rule 5). Plaintiff chose
to institute the action in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, where he is a
resident, and so it is incorrect to say that the venue of the present case has
been improperly laid.
“In holding that the present action has already prescribed,
the trial court also said: ‘The claim of the plaintiff, in the opinion of the, Court,
was filed out of time. In summary
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, any heir deprived of his lawful
participation therein should file the corresponding petition in the court
having jurisdiction of the estate within two years after the settlement and
distribution thereof (sec. 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court). While the Rules of
Court do not prescribe any time limit during which an heir deprived of his
lawful participation in the estate of a person which was settled in a regular
testate or intestate proceeding, Article 1100 of the Civil Code, however,
provides that action for rescission on account of ‘lesion’ shall prescribe
after four years from the time the partition was made. Considering that
judicial partition of the estate of Gorgonio Llanera was made on May
17, 1949, hence plaintiff’s action was commenced beyond the
prescriptive period provided by law.’
“Again, we find this reasoning incorrect, for it overlooks the
fact that the present action is not for rescission of a contract based on ‘lesion’
but an action to recover property based on fraud which under our law may be
filed within a period of four years from the discovery of the fraud. (sec. 43
par. 3, Act 190). Since, as alleged in the complaint, fraud was discovered only
in 1953 and the action was brought in 1955, it is clear that plaintiff’s action
has not yet prescribed. It is therefore
an error to dismiss the complaint based on prescription.”
In the case at bar, from the moment of the death of Francisco Maguinsawan on February 22, 1942, ownership of his estate
became vested, by operation of law, in his children, Salvacion,
Miraluna and Hermilina Maguinsawan, subject to the right of usufruct of his
widow, Hermila Cartagena,
with no other limitation than the obligation to pay the debt of the deceased in
favor of Mrs. Serrano, amounting to P1,734.64. As such
creditor, the latter instituted, on August
5, 1948, Special Case No. 265 of the Court of First Instance of Davao and prayed that letters of administration be issued
to her. Although she had documentary
evidence in her possession indicating that the deceased had been survived by a
widow, Hermila Cartagena,
and their aforementioned minor children, Mrs. Serrano did not
mention this fact to the probate court and instead alleged that the only
known relatives left by the deceased are Anuncio Delaman, Alberto Maxey and Anatolio
Maguinsawan.
Said omission and this allegation become more significant when we
consider the fact that the status of Mrs. Serrano as creditor of Francisco Maguinsawan was one inherited by her from her father,
Silvestre E. Lim, to whom Antonio Maguinsawan, father
of Francisco Maguinsawan, was originally indebted in
the sum of P1,052.42; that Antonio Maguinsawan died
on June 17, 1941, in view of which, on August 11, 1941, his son, Francisco Maguinsawan, executed the deed Exhibit B, above referred
to, acknowledging the debt of his deceased father, in favor of Silvestre E.
Lim, and promising to pay said debt; that Silvestre E. Lim expressed his
agreement thereto and, likewise, signed Exh. B.,
which states that Francisco Maguinsawan is casado; that, sometime after the latter’s death, Hermila Cartagena executed Exh. C as “Hermila
C. Vda. de Maguinsawan,” stating that, in consideration of the
sum of P1,734. 64 “deuda de mi difunto esposo Francisco Maguinsawan con la Sra. Paciencia
Lim de Serrano (como representante
y heredera de S. E. Lim),” said Hermila Cartagena appointed Mrs.
Serrano as administratrix of the properties in
question and delivered the same to her; and that, “como
esposa del difunto
Francisco Maguinsawan,” said Hermila Cartagena declared that
the aforesaid sum had been received personally by “mi difunto esposo Francisco Maguinsawan.”
Thus, the very muniments of title of
Mrs. Serrano as creditor of Francisco Maguinsawan, showed that he was married; that his wife was Hermila Cartagena; and that she
is his widow. And, Mrs. Serrano must
have believed the same to be true, because, otherwise, she would not have
secured an acknowledgment of her rights, as such creditor of Francisco Maguinsawan, and her designation as administratrix
of his properties, from “Hermila C. Vda. de Maguinsawan x x x como
esposa del
difunto Francisco Maguinsawan.”
The failure of the petition, in Special Case No. 265, to name Hermila Cartagena or to refer to
her, even if only as one who claims to be the wife or widow of Francisco Maguinsawan, and, hence, to have an interest in his
estate, must have been, therefore, deliberate on the part of Mrs. Serrano, for
the purpose of withholding said facts from the Court and of forestalling
service of notice of the proceedings to Hermila Cartagena and her participation or intervention
therein. The indicia
of such purpose is further bolstered up by the allegation in the
petition to the effect that Anuncio Delaman, Alberto Maxey and Anatolio
Maguinsawan “are the relatives of the
deceased.” It is interesting to
note that Mrs. Serrano did not dare testify in the case at bar, to attest that
such was her “best knowledge, information and belief” as alleged in
said petition – as if she had no information about Hermila
Cartagena and her children.
On August 4, 1950, Bruna Dilag and Joaquin Dilag intervened
in Special Case No. 265, alleging that they are the only heirs of Ceferina Dilag, mother of the
deceased; that she is his only heir; and that she had died intestate in
1943. On November 6, 1954, counsel for Bruna Dilag filed with the Court
of First Instance of Davao, Special Case No. 730,
for the settlement of the Intestate Estate of Ceferina
Dilag and the appointment of Antonio Serrano as
administrator thereof. Two (2) days
later, or on November 8, 1954, he was appointed as such. Based upon a stipulation of facts submitted
in Case No. 265, in which Hermila Cartagena and her minor children were neither mentioned nor
represented, said court issued, on the same date, an order declaring Ceferina Dilag the sole heir of
Francisco Maguinsawan. Soon thereafter, or on January 21, 1958, Bruna Dilag was declared, in
Special Case No. 730, the sole heir of Ceferina Dilag.
A little over two (2) weeks prior thereto, or on January 5, 1958,
Bruna Dilag had, however,
died. On January 27, 1958, a petition
was filed with, and docketed as Special Civil Case No. 947 of, the
aforementioned court, on behalf of Anuncio and Gorgonio Delaman, who were said
to be the only heirs of Bruna Dilag,
for the settlement of her intestate estate. In said case, Anuncio
and Gorgonio Delaman
submitted a deed of extrajudicial partition among themselves, which was
approved by the court on October 1, 1958.
On October 30, 1958, the original complaint in the case at bar was filed
against Anuncio and Gorgonio
Delaman. On
November 10, 1958, the court declared Case No. 947 closed. Twelve (12) days later, or on November 22,
1958, Anuncio and Gorgonio Delaman executed a deed of sale of the properties in
question in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Serrano. Hence, the complaint herein was
subsequently amended to include these espouses as defendants. It further appears that Bruna
Dilag and the Delaman’s
were represented in Cases Nos. 730 and 947 by the same lawyers for Mrs.
Serrano in Case No. 265, and that the service of said lawyers in Case No. 947
was engaged by Mrs. Serrano.
In the light of the foregoing facts, We are satisfied that the
Court of Appeals did not err in declaring that Mrs. Serrano had been guilty of
extrinsic fraud, and cannot, accordingly, avail of the benefits of the final
order issued in Case No. 265 adjudicating the properties in question to Ceferina Dilag, the same having
been issued in consequence of said fraud.
At any rate, the deed of conveyance by Anuncio
and Gorgonio Delaman was
executed twenty-three (23) days after the institution of this case
against them. Accordingly, Mrs. Serrano
knew, when she bought the properties in question, that
the title thereto of the Delamans was contested by Hermila Cartagena and her
children. Manifestly, Mrs. Serrano did
not then act in good faith.
Needless to say, the final order in Case No. 730, declaring Bruna Dilag the sole heir of Ceferina Dilag, and that issued
in Case No. 947, declaring Anuncio and Gorgonio Delaman sole heirs of Bruna Dilag, have no bearing upon
the present claim of Hermila Cartagena
and her children, except only insofar as they indicate the chain of events that
explain the conveyance made by the Delamans in favor
of Mrs. Serrano. Then again, the
adjudication in Case No. 265 is impugned in the case at bar, not collaterally,
but directly.
Hermila Cartagena
and her aforementioned children have filed a motion for the appointment of a
receiver during the pendency of this appeal, but, in
view of the disposition thereof, We deem it
unnecessary to act upon said motion, without prejudice to its reiteration,
should the movants deem it fit to do so.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed in toto, with costs against
herein petitioner, Mrs. Paciencia Lim. Vda. de Serrano.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Villamor, J., took no part.
[1]
It should be Aug. 5, 1948.
[2]
It should be 1958.
[3]
It should be Nov. 22, 1958.
4 It should be “father.”
5 R. A. No. 296, Sec. 29.
6 Underscoring supplied.
7 106 Phil. 70.