ELIGIO B. CHAN, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CENENCIA CABEGUIN OMAHOY, DOLORES CABEGUIN ESCALERA, FELINA CABEGUIN BARRIENTOS, ROSARIO CABEGUIN BORROMEO, CESAR CABEGU…

Petitioner in this appeal by certiorari would impart to it due
process overtones by characterizing the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
as harsh and unjust and thus violative of his legal
rights.  That he should so impute to
respondent Court a legal failing of sufficient gravity is under­standable, the
controlling principle as to the finding of facts of respondent Court being
beyond our power to review precluding the giving of due course to his petition
in the absence of a substantial legal question that calls for resolution.  It is one thing, though, to impart to it a
semblance of plausibility.  It is an
entirely different matter to demonstrate that one’s plea should be
granted.  Here, as will be subsequently
shown, it cannot be said that respondent Court of Appeals was remiss in its
duty to weigh carefully and thoroughly the evidence which unfortunately for
petitioner came solely from private respondents,^[1]
who were the plaintiffs in the lower court, in an action for the quieting of
title and damages, as petitioner, defendant in such suit, was declared in
default.  He must have been encouraged by
the belief that the law was on his side as the lower court dismissed the
complaint.  The Court of Appeals, to
which such decision was elevated, reached a different conclusion, the proof
offered by private respondents, after being subjected to scrutiny and analysis,
being deemed sufficient for a judgment in their favor.  Petitioner undoubtedly, to strengthen his
appeal to us, would characterize what respondent Court did as suffering from
the grievous faults above referred to and thus devoid of support in law.  We do not view it that way, the charge of
arbitrariness of respondent Court not being made out, the errors assigned
being, moreover, at bottom, factual.  We
cannot reverse the appealed decision then.

The evidence submitted and the conclusion reached by the lower
court in the action for quieting of title with damages was set forth in the
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Thus:  “[It resulting]:  That the evidence of the plaintiffs consisting
in the testimonies of witnesses Matilde Salva, Teodocia Salva and Rosario Cabeguin and
Exhibits A to K, sought to prove that the land described in the plan, Exhibit
I, consisting of Lots 1 and 2, being a parcel of residential and agricultural
land situated in the poblacion of Mambajao,
Misamis Oriental with an area of about 3, 712 square
meters had originally belonged to their deceased father, Estanislao
Cabeguin, who had tax declarations therein, Exhibits
A, B, C and G; that sometime in 1924, tsn. p. 26, a
Chinese named Make Lim had been permitted by Estanislao
to build his house there without paying any rental and after three (3) years,
that Chinese sold his house to another Chinese named Leon Chan, tsn. 27, and Leon was given the same permission by Estanislao to stay in the land free of charge but after the
death of Leon, his son, herein defendant, Eligio,
built a new house therein because the old one had been destroyed, tsn. 7; and he went further by declaring the portion
occupied by the house with an area of around three hundred (300) square meters,
more or less, in his tax declaration, Exhibit J; and the area by him occupied
is Lot 2 of the plan Exh. I,
so that it was because of this that plaintiffs whose father Estanislao
by the way had died in 1960, tried to talk with defendant, Eligio
Chan, tsn. 29, but since the latter did not accede to
their demand to recognize the ownership of the plaintiffs, that was the reason
why the latter presented this case as has been said on 24 June, 1965, to quiet
their title; but in the face of this evidence, Trial Judge dismissed reasoning
out that, ‘The Court finds the testimonial evidence of plaintiffs too
tangential to conclusively prove their ownership of the “land in
litigation”, and the “papers evidencing the land in question”
are by no means conclusive evidence of ownership.  For, no satisfactory evidence of possession
or acquisition of the land in question having been presented, mere tax
declarations cannot serve as a reliable basis for a finding of ownership in
favor of plaintiffs (see Evangelista vs. Tabayuyong,
7 Phil. 697; Garmo vs. Boyco,
29 Phil. 437), and neither can the survey plan or technical descriptions
prepared at the instance of plaintiffs, the same being self-serving.  (Sec. 1, Rule 131.) (P. 14, R. A.)'”^[2]

Why the lower court could not be sustained in view of the weight
and credence to be given such evidence of record was made clear by respondent
Court of Appeals in the decision now under review.  Thus: 
“[Considering]:  That the
testimony of Rosario Cabeguin, one of the plaintiffs,
is to the effect that she knows the land in litigation, tsn.
18, and described it and that this was ‘our ancestral home’, tsn. 19; and this is corroborated by her witnesses, Matilde Salva and Teodosia Salva and tax
declarations, Exhibits A, B, C and G, and that both Make Lim and his successor,
Leon Chan deceased father of herein defendant, had come to live in the property
occupying a portion thereof by previous permission and free of charge from Estanislao Cabeguin; the
foregoing proofs not having been rebutted, must go to show that Estanislao Cabeguin and after his
death, his heirs, herein plaintiffs, had been the possessors under claim of
ownership of the totality of the property and this must carry with it the
presumption that Estanislao Cabeguin
was the owner, Arts. 433, 541, New Civil Code; it cannot be correct to say, as
trial judge said that there was ‘no satisfactory evidence of possession’
because the testimony of the plaintiff Rosario by itself, has established the
fact that defendant’s predecessor-in-interest had entered the property by
permission from Estanislao Cabeguin
and that must carry with it the corollary that defendant has recognized the
possession and its validity of Estanislao and while
trial judge was correct in saying that ‘mere tax declarations cannot serve as a
reliable basis for a finding of ownership’ (P. 14, R.A.) neither must it be
overlooked that tax declarations prepared ante-litem
motam may well be corroborative proof of the
bona fide claim of ownership by the declarant; nor
was it correct for trial judge to dismiss the case because ‘the testimonial
evidence of plaintiffs too tangential to conclusively prove their ownership of
the ‘land in question’ (P. 14, id.) because neither is necessary to
conclusively prove ownership in a civil action for quieting of title since
under the rules of burden of proof, as appellants correctly contend, mere
preponderance is enough, Rule 133, Sec. 1, New Rules; * * *”^[3]

The lower court judgment was thus reversed, the dispositive portion of the appealed decision of the
respondent Court likewise containing the following:  “the property known as Lot No. 2 in the
plan, Exhibit J, is declared to belong in ownership to the plaintiffs and their
title therein ordered to be recognized by the defendant, who is condemned to
pay unto plaintiffs the sum of P30.00 a month from the date of the filing of
the complaint, plus another sum of P600.00 attorney’s fees and the costs.”^[4]
Hence, this appeal by certiorari.  As
noted at the outset, we sustain respondent Court of Appeals.

1. It bears repeating that this petition was sought to be
bolstered by allegations which, if substantiated would lead to the conclusion
that respondent Court ought to have displayed greater care in the appraisal of
the evidence which, as was previously pointed out, came solely from private
respondents as plaintiffs, as defendant, now petitioner, was declared in
default.  Petitioner would characterize
the appealed decision as being harsh and unjust, thus giving rise to a due
process question, this constitutional mandate being a safeguard against any
oppressive or arbitrary actuation on the part of any official or agency of the
government, the courts certainly not excluded. 
It would appear, though, that such a claim is not borne out. It cannot
be said that respondent Court of Appeals failed to give objective and
dispassionate consideration to the evidence submitted before the lower
court.  No imputation has been made, and
such a thought cannot be entertained, that respondent Court was in any wise
partial to private respondents.  Nor is
there any showing as to its being animated by hostility against
petitioner.  It did what under the law it
was required to do in the consideration of the appeal before it and, after its
careful appraisal of the proof submitted, it reached a conclusion adverse to petitioner.  There is nothing, then, that could justify
the fear apparently entertained by petitioner that its decision now under
review could be characterized as harsh and unjust and therefore in that sense violative of his rights to due process.

2. Nor is the case for petitioner fortified at all by his brief
submitted to us.  He did assign five
errors, but they are primarily factual in character.  He would indict respondent Court for giving
credence to the testimony of certain witnesses for private respondents; for
considering that private respondents had been possessors under claim of
ownership of the land in litigation; for not giving weight to the fact that he
having been declared in default, consequently the proof presented by private
respondents did stand unrebutted; for holding that
the tax declarations of the private respondents sufficed to corroborate their
claim of ownership; and for reaching the conclusion that there was
preponderance of proof in favor of private respondents.  What petitioner ignores is that from Guico v. Mayuga,^[5] a
1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Justice Recto, it has been
well-settled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to us from
the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law
imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive.^[6]
More specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, this Court, speaking
through the then Justice Laurel, it was held that the same principle is
applicable even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower
court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its
findings of fact.  To the same effect is
this excerpt from an opinion of the present Chief Justice:  “The court of first instance sustained
plaintiffs pretense, but the Court of Appeals considered her evidence unworthy
of credence, and, hence, absolved Maximino Quinit. Plaintiff maintains that the Court of Appeals had
erred in the appreciation of the evidence, but the findings of said Court on
the credibility of said evidence are beyond our power of review on appeal by certiorari
and, consequently, conclusive upon us.”^[7]

Only recently, this Court, again through its Chief Justice,
stated:  “Thus the main issue was
one of fact, on which both parties introduced testimonial and documentary
evidence.  His Honor, the trial Judge did
not find the testimony of the witnesses for the defense worthy of belief.  Neither did he give full faith and credence
to the documentary evidence presented by the defendants.  Indeed, ‘the lower court had in effect annulled
six (6) notarial documents, ‘ in the language of the
Court of Appeals.  In a detailed and
carefully prepared decision, the latter, after analyzing that of the Court of
First Instance, as well as the evidence on record, and the arguments pro and
con, reached, however, the opposite conclusion. 
Inasmuch as the same depended upon the credibility of the testimony of
said witnesses and upon an appraisal of the surrounding circumstances, as
factors affecting the faith and credence to be accorded to defendants’
documentary evidence, it is clear that, insofar as the merits of the case, the
decision thereon hinges on the determination of the pertinent facts, the
findings on which of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon us and beyond our
power of review.”^[8]

3. The correctness of the appealed decision is reinforced by its
reliance on the applicable Civil Code provisions.  As specifically pointed out therein, private
respondents “had been the possessors under claim of ownership of the
totality of the property and this must carry with it the presumption that Estanislao Cabeguin [their
deceased father] was the owner, Arts. 433, 531, New Civil Code; * * *.”^[9]  According to Art. 433:  “Actual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership.  The true owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of the property.” 
Art. 531, on the other hand, provides: 
“Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or
the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our
will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right.”  The above provisions
of law are definite and categorical. 
They need no interpretation.  All
they need is application whenever the facts as found call for it.  That is true of the instant case as is so
apparent from the above-cited portion of the appealed decision.^[10]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of March 1, 1967 recognizing the better
right of private respondents as against petitioner and ordering the latter to
pay the former the sums therein specifically mentioned is affirmed.  With costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Villamor, J., did not take part.

^[1]
The following are the private respondents: 
Mrs. Cenencia Cabeguin
Omahoy, Mrs. Dolores Cabeguin
Escalera, Mrs. Felina Cabeguin Barrientos, Mrs. Rosario
Cabeguin Borromeo, Cesar Cabeguin, Faustino Cabeguin,
Vicente Cabeguin, Soledad Cabeguin
Henson, Manuel Cabeguin & Sofia Henson.

^[2]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Appendix A, Petitioner’s Brief, pp. 35-37.

^[3] Ibid,
pp. 38-39.

^[4] Ibid,
p. 40.

^[5]
63 Phil. 328.

^[6]
The later cases to the same effect follow: 
Mamuyac v. Abena,
67 Phil. 289 (1939); Hodges v. People, 68 Phil. 178 (1939); Mora
Electric Co. v. Quiogue Vda.
de Del Rosario, 68 Phil. 356 (1939); Diaz v. People, 68 Phil. 717
(1939); Meneses v. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 647
(1940); Onglengco v. Ozaeta,
70 Phil. 43 (1940); Hernandez v. Manila Electric Co., 71 Phil. 88
(1940); Gerio v. Gerio,
71 Phil. 106 (1940); Garcia de Ramos v. Yatco,
71 Phil. 178 (1940); People v. Benitez, 73 Phil. 671 (1942); Zubiri v. Quijano, 74
Phil. 47 (1942); Tan Si Kiok
v. Tiacho, 79 Phil. 696 (1947); Coingco v. Flores, 82 Phil. 284 (1948); Celino v. Bautista, 82 Phil. 756 (1949); Cristobal v. People, 84 Phil. 473 (1949); Filipinas Compania de Seguros v. Tan
Chauco, 85 Phil. 379 (1950); Velasco v. Court
of Appeals, 90 Phil. 688 (1952); Fonacier v.
Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 417 (1955); Gonzales v. De Leon, L-17250,
Jan. 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 332; Romero v. Palawan
Manganese Mines, L-16998, April 24, 1963, 7 SCRA 747; Hollero
v. Court of Appeals, L-16579, June 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 310; Goduco v. Court of Appeals, L-17647, June 16, 1965,
14 SCRA 282; Phil. Refining Co. v. Garcia, L-21962, Sept. 27, 1966, 18
SCRA 107; Santa Ana, Jr. v. Hernandez, L-16394, Dec. 17, 1966, 18 SCRA
973; Tan v. Court of Appeals, L-22793, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 54; Hawpia v. Court of Appeals, L-20047, June 30, 1967,
20 SCRA 536; Monroy v. Court of Appeals,
L-23258, July 1, 1967, 20 SCRA 620; Alquiza v.
Alquiza, L-23342, Feb. 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 494; Vda. de Arroyo v. El Beaterio
del Santissimo Rosario, L-22005, May 3, 1968, 23 SCRA
525; Jamandre v. Court of Appeals, L-24606,
Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1036; Garcia v. Cruz, L-25790, Sept. 27, 1968, 25
SCRA 224; Bautista v. Court of Appeals, L-18690, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA.
211; Mackay Radio and Tel. Co. v. Rich, L-22608, June 30, 1969, 78 SCRA
699; Ramirez Tel. Corp. v. Bank of America, L-22614, Aug. 29, 1969, 29
SCRA 191.

^[7] Galang v. Court of Appeals, L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962, 4 SCRA 55.

^[8] Alquiza v. Alquiza,
L-23342, Feb. 10, 1968, 22
SCRA 494

^[9]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Appendix A, Petitioner’s Brief, p. 38.

^[10] Cf.
Wright, Jr. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Co., L-18904, July 11, 1964,
11 SCRA 508.