MANUEL F. AQUINO AND FELIX PIRANTE, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LEYTE, FIFTH BR. AND MARCIANO S. DU, CITY ATTORNEY, O…

Aquino versus Estenzo

The Case

This is a petition filed directly with the Supreme Court by Manuel Aquino and Felix Pirante against Judge Numeriano Estenzo of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch Five, and against the City Attorney of Ormoc City. The petitioners ask the Court to annul the proceedings in a criminal case for grave coercion pending before the respondent judge and to stop him from hearing it further. The case matters because it teaches two lessons at once: how a city court's concurrent jurisdiction under the old Judiciary Act works, and why a party must first ask the lower court to correct itself before running to a higher court.

Procedural History

The City Court of Ormoc City tried the petitioners for grave coercion in the exercise of its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance. It convicted them of light coercion and sentenced them to a fine and damages. The petitioners filed a notice of appeal stating that they were appealing to the Court of Appeals. The clerk of court, however, forwarded the records to the Court of First Instance of Leyte, and the City Attorney filed a new information there for the same offense of grave coercion. The petitioners moved to quash on the ground that the Court of First Instance had no appellate jurisdiction over them. The respondent judge denied the motion to quash for lack of sufficient merit. The petitioners filed no motion for reconsideration. After one accused entered a plea of not guilty, they filed this original petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, which issued the writ upon a bond of two hundred pesos.

Facts

In January 1962 the City Attorney of Ormoc City filed an information for grave coercion against Manuel Aquino before the City Court of Ormoc City, later amended to include Felix Pirante as co-accused. The city court took cognizance of the case under its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance, as provided in the Judiciary Act as amended.

In July 1962 the city court rendered judgment, finding the accused guilty of light coercion and sentencing them to pay a fine of fifty pesos and damages of three hundred forty-seven pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In October 1962 the petitioners filed a notice of appeal stating that they were appealing to the Court of Appeals, and manifesting that no stenographic notes were taken at the hearing because there was no stenographer in court.

Instead of sending the records to the Court of Appeals, the clerk of court forwarded them to the Court of First Instance of Leyte, where the City Attorney filed a new information for the same grave coercion, docketed as a new criminal case. The petitioners moved to quash, the respondent judge denied the motion, and after Aquino entered a plea of not guilty the petitioners came to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch Five, has jurisdiction to try and decide the new criminal case for grave coercion pending before it.
• Whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 87, paragraph (c) of Republic Act Number 296, as amended by Republic Act Number 2613, provides:

Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and Judges of Municipal Courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within the province, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding three thousand pesos or both, and in the absence of the district judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the province as the Court of First Instance, to hear applications for bail.

This paragraph is the source of the city court's concurrent jurisdiction, and it is the reason the city court could try the grave coercion case at all.

The same provision continues:

All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph with Justices of the Peace of capitals and municipal court judges shall be tried and decided on the merits by the respective justices of the peace or municipal judges. Proceedings had shall be recorded and decisions therein shall be appealable direct to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be.

This is the provision the Court fastens upon: because the proceedings were not recorded, the decision could not be appealed directly to the Court of Appeals, and the trial itself was a nullity.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the city court had jurisdiction, because grave coercion carries arresto mayor and a fine, and so falls within the concurrent jurisdiction conferred by the provision quoted above. But the Court held that the city court did not exercise that jurisdiction in accordance with law, because the law requires that proceedings had shall be recorded, and no stenographic notes were taken. The Court reasoned that when a city court acts with the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance, it must perforce act as a court of record, and the Court of Appeals cannot review findings of fact where there is no record of the evidence. The proceedings were therefore a nullity, not for want of jurisdiction but for failure to comply with the law, and the decision was not appealable to the Court of Appeals. The clerk of court thus acted properly in remitting the records to the Court of First Instance. When the City Attorney filed a new information there, he actually commenced a new criminal case, which the Court of First Instance took cognizance of in the exercise of its original, not appellate, jurisdiction. The respondent judge therefore did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petition must fail for failure to exhaust the remedy of a motion for reconsideration. The petitioners never asked the respondent judge to reconsider his order denying the motion to quash. The Court stated the rule plainly:

Because of the numerous decisions rendered by this Court on this particular matter, it has become elementary that before filing a petition for certiorari with the higher court the attention of the lower court should first be called to its supposed error and its correction asked for, and if this is not done the petition for certiorari should be denied.

The Court called the omission a fatal defect in procedure, and sufficient reason by itself to deny the petition.

Doctrine

First, a city court exercising concurrent jurisdiction under Section 87, paragraph (c) of Republic Act Number 296, as amended, acts with the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance, and its decisions are appealable direct to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Second, because it so acts, it must act as a court of record: the requirement that proceedings had shall be recorded is mandatory, and where it is not complied with the proceedings are null and void, not for lack of jurisdiction but for failure to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with law. Third, the filing of a new information before the Court of First Instance after such a void proceeding is the commencement of a new case in the exercise of original jurisdiction, not an appeal. Fourth, before filing a petition for certiorari, a party must first file a motion for reconsideration with the lower court; failure to do so is a fatal defect that warrants denial of the petition.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari and prohibition was denied, the writ of preliminary injunction was dissolved, and costs were taxed against the petitioners.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a city court acting with the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance must act as a court of record, so that unrecorded proceedings are null and void. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory recording requirement under the old Judiciary Act and the elementary rule that certiorari will not lie without a prior motion for reconsideration.