MANUEL F. AQUINO AND FELIX PIRANTE, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LEYTE, FIFTH BR. AND MARCIANO S. DU, CITY ATTORNEY, O…

This is an original petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, Branch V, and the City Attorney of Ormoc City, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining said respondents from continuing with the hearing of Criminal Case No.
1415-O in the Court of First Instance of Leyte and for
the annulment of the proceedings so far conducted by the respondent Judge in the
said case.

On January 25, 1962, an information for grave coercion was filed before the City
Court of Ormoc City (Criminal Case No. 5640) by the
respondent City Attorney against petitioner Manuel F. Aquino, which information was subsequently amended to
include petitioner Felix Pirante as co-accused. The
City Court of Ormoc City took cognizance of the case
in the exercise of its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance
of Leyte, pursuant to Section 87 (c) of Republic Act
296 as amended by Sec. 10 of Rep. Act 2613.

On July 21, 1962, judgment was
rendered by the City Court of Ormoc City in Criminal
Case No. 5640, finding the accused (petitioners herein) guilty of the crime of
light coercion and sentencing them to pay a fine of fifty pesos, and damages
amounting to three hundred forty-seven pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

On October 18, 1962, the
petitioners filed with the City Court of Ormoc City a
notice of appeal, stating that they were appealing their case to the Court of
Appeals. In the notice of appeal it is stated:

“It is hereby manifested that in
the hearing of the above-entitled case no stenographic notes were taken as there
was no stenographer in
court.”

The clerk of court of the City
Court of Ormoc City, instead of transmitting the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals; forwarded the same to the Court of
First Instance of Leyte, 5th Branch, at Ormoc City. The respondent City Attorney of Ormoc City filed a new information before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 1415-O, charging the petitioners of the same crime of grave coercion of
which they were previously charged in Criminal Case No. 5640, in the City Court
of Ormoc City.

On November 28, 1962, the
petitioners filed a motion to mash the information in Criminal Case No. 1415-O
on the ground that the Court of First Instance of Leyte has no appellate jurisdiction to try said criminal
case because the petitioners had not appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, but to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Sec. 87
(c) of Republic Act 296 as amended by Republic Act 2613; and that under the law
it was the ministerial duty of the clerk of court of the City Court of Ormoc City to forward the records of the case to the Court
of Appeals and not to the Court of First Instance of Leyte.

On December 13, 1962, the
respondent Judge Numeriano Estenzo denied the motion to quash “for lack of sufficient
merit” and set the arraignment of petitioners for December 28, 1962. The
petitioners did not file any motion for the reconsideration of the order of
respondent Judge denying the motion to quash. Upon motion of the accused
(petitioners) the respondent Judge ordered the arraignment postponed to January
8, 1963.

On January 8, 1963, the
petitioner Manuel Aquino, Jr. entered a plea of “not
guilty” and after entering his plea, he manifested an intention to file with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction. Said petition was filed before this Court on January 28, 1963. Upon
the petitioners having filed a bond in the amount of two hundred pesos this
Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents, as prayed
for in the petition.

The questions for Us to resolve in the present case are:

1.     
Does the Court of First Instance
of Leyte, Branch V, have jurisdiction to try and
decide Criminal Case No. 1415-O pending in said Court?
and

2.     
Has this petition for certiorari
and prohibition been filed in accordance with the Rules of
Court?

The pertinent provision of the
law involved in the present case is as follows:

“Justices of the peace in the
capitals of provinces and Judges of Municipal Courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense committed within the province, in which the penalty provided by law does
not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six yean
or fine not exceeding three thousand pesos or both, and in the absence of the
district judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the province as the Court of
First Instance, to hear applications for bait

All cases filed under the next
preceding paragraph with Justices of the Peace of capitals and municipal court
judges shall be tried and decided on the merits by the respective justices of
the peace or municipal judges. Proceedings had shall be recorded and
decisions therein shall be appealable direct to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be.” (Republic Act
296, Sec. 87 (c) as amended by Rep. Act 2613; Italics
supplied)

The above-quoted provision of
Sec. 87 (c) of Republic Act 296 was the one existing when Criminal Case No. 5640
was commenced in the municipal court of Ormoc City. By
subsequent amendment of Rep. Act 296, the term “Justice of the Peace” has been
changed to “municipal judge” and the term “Judge of municipal court” has been
changed to “City Judge.”

The crime of grave coercion is
punishable by arresto mayor and a fine
not exceeding P500.00. Because of the additional penalty of line, the crime of
grave coercion is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of a municipal court of
the capitals of provinces or a city court. It follows, therefore, that the city
court of Ormoc City had jurisdiction to try the
petitioners herein .of the offense of grave coercion of which they were charged
in Criminal Case No. 5640 before said court in the exercise of its concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance to try cases of the same nature,
as provided in the above-quoted provision of Sec. 87(c) of Republic Act 296, as
amended.

It is admitted that the City
Court of Ormoc City had concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of First Instance of Leyte to try the
criminal case wherein the petitioners were charged of the offense of grave
coercion, and that when the city court assumed said jurisdiction it had thereby
excluded the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the
exercise of its jurisdiction to try the petitioners in a case which they are
charged of the very same offense. It is also admitted that decisions of the City
Court of Ormoc City in the exercise of this concurrent
jurisdiction are directly appealable to the Court of
Appeals as provided for in Sec. 87 (c) of Rep. Act. 296, as
amended. But when the City Court of Ormoc City
tried this Criminal Case No. 5640, it did not proceed in accordance with the
provision of Sec. 87 (c) of Rep. Act. 296, as amended, which requires that
“Proceedings had shall be recorder.” The petitioners themselves admit that the
proceedings had during the trial of this case were not recorder because “no
stenographic notes were taken as there was no stenographer of court.” We hold,
therefore, that the trial of this case in the city court was not conducted in
accordance with the law, and the City Court of Ormoc
City had not exercised its jurisdiction to try and decide this case in
accordance with law. Consequently the decision rendered by the City Court of
Ormoc in Criminal Case No. 5640 of said court can not
be appealed directly to the Court of Appeals because said decision was based on
evidence that was taken during a trial or proceeding
that was not recorded as required by law. It is very elementary that the Court
of Appeals cannot review the findings of facts of the trial court of there is no
record o the evidence taken during the trial of the case.

We hold that the proceedings in
the City Court of Ormoc City, in Criminal Case No.
5640 was a nullity, not because the City Court had no jurisdiction to try the
case but because the requirement of the law that the proceedings be recorded was
not complied with. When it was provided in Sec. 87 (c) of Rep.
296, as amended by Rep Act. 2613, that the city court of chartered cities
have like jurisdiction as the Court of First of Instance to try parties charged
with an offense in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding P3,000.00 or both, the city court thereby acts as a Court of
First Instance and its decisions are appealable
directly to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be.
When the city court tries cases of this nature and its acts as a Court of First
Instance, it must perforce act as a court of record. The very law itself
provides that in the exercise of this jurisdiction by the municipal courts of
provincial capitals and by city courts the proceedings must be recorded.
Certainly, the decisions of the city court or of the municipal court of
provincial capitals in the exercise of this jurisdiction are similar to
decisions of the Court of First Instance, and their decisions, cannot be
appealed to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be, if
there are no records of their proceedings. When a city court, or the municipal
court of provincial capitals, does not record its proceedings in the trial of a
case in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Sec. 87 (c) of Republic Act 296,
as amended, then it does not exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law
and therefore the proceedings had before it are null and
void.

We hold, therefore, that the
decision of the City Court of Ormoc City in its
Criminal Casa No. 5640 is not appealable to the Court
of Appeals, and the clerk of court of the city of Ormoc City acted properly when he remitted the records of
said case to the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Branch V, in Ormoc City.

It is deplorable that the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 0640 before the City Court of Ormoc City were not conducted in a manner as required by
law. The City Judge should know the law, and he should not have allowed said
illegal proceedings to take place before his court. The accused in said case
(petitioners herein), who were assisted by counsel, should have known their
rights- and should have insisted that the proceedings in the trial of the case
against them be recorded. This is more so, because one of the two accused—the
herein petitioner Manuel Aquino, Jr.—is himself a
lawyer.

When the respondent City Attorney
filed a new information in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1415-0,
charging the petitioners of the same offense of which they were charged in
Criminal Case No. 5640 in the City Court of Ormoc
City, said City Attorney actually filed a new criminal case against the
petitioners; and the Court of First Instance of Leyte
took cognizance of the case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to try
the case, and not its appellate jurisdiction over cases coming from the City
Court of Ormoc City. We are of the opinion that the
Court of First Instance of Leyte had not acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it denied
the motion to quash in Criminal Case No. 1415-O, and said court has jurisdiction
to proceed with the hearing of said Criminal Case No. 1415-O. This is more so,
because the records show that petitioner Manuel Aquino, Jr. was already arraigned in said case and he
entered a plea of “not guilty.” As far as the petitioner, Felix Pirante, is concerned the records show that he did not
appear on the day set for arraignment and his arrest was ordered by the
court.

The records show that before the
respondent City Attorney for Ormoc City filed the
information for grave coercion in the City Court of Ormoc City (Criminal Case No. 5640) he had previously
conducted the necessary preliminary investigation. That same preliminary
investigation that was conducted by the respondent City Attorney can serve as
the basis for the filing of the information in Criminal Case No. 1415-O in the
Court of First Instance of Leyte.

We now come to the second
question to be resolved in this case: Whether this petition was filed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

It was brought to the attention
of this Court by the respondents that after pleading not guilty to the crime
charged in the information and thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the
respondent court, by said plea, petitioner Aquino
merely announced his intention to file a Petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Supreme Court. The petitioners had not filed with respondent court any
motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to quash. The
respondents contend that because the petitioners had not filed any motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to quash they did not exhaust
the adequate remedies available to them under the law before filing the present
petition before this Court and, therefore, this petition should be
denied.

We agree with the respondents
that a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to quash
should have been filed with the respondent court before the petitioners proceed
to file the present petition, and their failure to do so is definitely a fatal
defect in the procedure that they had followed.

Because of the numerous decisions^[1] rendered by this Court on this particular
matter, it has become elementary that before filing a petition for certiorari
with the higher court the attention of the lower court should first be called to
its supposed error and its correction asked for, and if this is not done the
petition for certiorari should be denied. Considering that the petitioners
herein had not filed the required motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the motion to quash before the respondent court prior to their filing of
the present petition, this circumstance alone is sufficient reason to deny the
present petition.

Wherefore, this petition for certiorari
and prohibition should be, as it is hereby denied, and the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued is dissolved, with costs against the
petitioners.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Makailintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

^[1] Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245; Uy Chu vs. Imperial, 44 Phil. 27; Amante vs. Sison, 60 Phil.
949, 951-953; Manzanares vs. C.F.I. Batangas, 61 Phil. 850; Manila Post Publishing Co.
vs. Sanchez, 81 Phil. 614; Alvarez vs. Ibañez, 83 Phil. 104; Nicolas vs. Castillo, 97 Phil.
336; Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Reyes, 100 Phil. 822; Ricafort vs. Fernan, 101
Phil. 575; 54 Off. Gaz. 2539; People vs. Palacio, et al., 108 Phil. 220; Cueto vs. Ortiz, 108 Phil. 538; Pagkakaisa vs. Enriquez, 108 Phil. 1010; Santos
vs. Cerdenola, et al., L-18412, July 31, 1962
and Sy vs. Tiangco,
et al., L-18376, Feb. 27, 1962.