Adm. Case No. 812. September 30, 1969
GREGORIO CONDE, PETITIONER, VS. CITY JUDGE NICOLAS SUPERABLE, JR., ATTYS. CAMILO SUPERABLE AND ANGEL SUPERABLE, RESPONDENTS.
FERNANDO, J.:
It has been aptly remarked that a judge is not fortune’s
child. His lot is far from easy. It is his duty to decide, a task that invariably
is a test of one’s character. The lower
he is in the judicial hierarchy, the more times he is called upon to do
so. Whatever be his decision,
necessarily one party is disappointed.
Unfortunately, it is a rare litigant who does not feel somehow offended
when he loses; it is human nature to vent his dissatisfaction partly on the
hapless arbiter, whom he may even suspect of partiality.
That brings up a related matter.
Like every human being, a judge is subject to the influence of
prepossessions and preferences, at times deeply and intensely felt. Nonetheless, the moment one wears the
judicial robe, his personal likes and dislikes should be brought under the
strictest control. His guiding principle
should be one of the utmost objectivity.
That is the ideal; it must, as much as possible, be lived up to. Otherwise he fails in his grave responsibility;
he is recreant to his trust.
These observations gain pertinence in the disposition of the
complaint for disbarment principally against City Judge Nicolas Superable, Jr. of Tacloban City,
included in which however are his two brothers, Camilo
Superable and Angel Superable,
both members of the bar filed by one Gregorio A. Conde
with the Court on February 20, 1968. The charge against Judge Superable
was one for gross misconduct in office, impugning alleged acts of harassment,
persecution and oppression, resulting in the filing of an unwarranted complaint
against petitioner and his being cited unjustifiably for contempt for which he
was found guilty without his being accorded due process, resulting in an order
of April 1, 1965 adjudging complainant guilty.
The two other respondents in the petition before us, Attorneys Camilo and Angel Superable, were
accused of collusion with their brother, respondent Judge, in instigating
“persons under their influence and persons whom they knew to be harboring
hatred, envy and jealousy against [petitioner Conde]
to fabricate incriminatory acts against [petitioner]” as well as acting as
“prosecutors” for their brother, respondent City Judge, in an
investigation conducted by an Assistant City Fiscal.[1]
On March 15, 1968,
we issued a resolution requiring the respondents to answer. Such answers were duly filed, all three
respondents denying the charges and seeking the dismissal of the charges
against them. On May 8, 1968, in another resolution, we referred
the charges for investigation to the Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Tacloban City,
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Such report with its recommendation was submitted to us on September 18, 1969 by Executive Judge
Elias B. Asuncion.
The report appears to be characterized by an approach informed by
sympathy and understanding for the actuations of respondent Judge, not
surprising, considering that the Investigator likewise belongs to the judicial
branch. Nonetheless, it is not for that
reason alone to be altogether received with skepticism. For, undoubtedly, there was an effort to be
fair and just in the appraisal of the evidence.
Moreover, its being quite thorough and detailed would dissipate any
suspicion that the charges against respondent Judge were not seriously scrutinized
and inquired into.
It does not follow, though, that we should accept it in its
entirety. Its recommendation of complete
exoneration of respondent Judge is much too generous under the
circumstances. We cannot say, especially
with reference to the contempt incident, that respondent Judge’s behavior
complained of did not lay any basis for the charge against him. At the most, the evidence would not suffice
for a finding of grave misconduct. Thus
it would seem that an admonition at the very least is called for. This would be evident from the appraisal of
what transpired as meticulously set forth in the report.
Insofar, however, as his two brothers, Attys. Camilo
Superable and Angel Superable
are concerned, the recommendation for exoneration by the Investigator is well
taken. In this opinion, the case against
Judge Superable would be taken up first.
1. The charge for grave misconduct against Judge Superable, arising from the filing of a criminal complaint
against petitioner, was disposed of thus in the report of the
Investigator: “In this Criminal
Case No. 11095, the aggrieved parties were Attys. Camilo
Superable and Angel Superable,
as shown in the information quoted in the decision, except for the fact that
the name of City Judge Nicolas Superable, Jr., has
incidentally been mentioned in the supposed libelous statement contained in the
letter of petitioner Gregorio Conde to the President
of the Philippines, which was the subject of the libel charge in said Criminal
Case No. 11095. It does not even appear
that respondent Judge Nicolas Superable, Jr., was
ever a witness in said case. Indeed, the
subject of the libel charge in Criminal Case No. 11095 was the alleged libelous
statement that has reference to Attys. Camilo Superable and Angel Superable. Definitely, there is no concrete and positive
showing from the evidence adduced by the herein petitioner to establish any
collusion between the respondent City Judge Nicolas Superable,
Jr., and his brothers, the respondents Attys. Camilo Superable and Angel Superable,
in the filing of the complaint for libel against the herein petitioner in the
Municipal Court of Babatñgon, Province of Leyte, which generated the filing by the Provincial Fiscal
of Criminal Case No. 11095. It is true
that in the decision of the Court in said case, there is a statement, now
marked Exhibit ‘B-1’, to the effect that ‘this case is a second attempt on the
part of City Judge Superable to hold the accused to
answer the crime of libel arising from the same letter-complaint which the
accused had written to the President’, but it must be noted from the context of
the decision, and especially the explanatory discussion on this point, that
the afore-quoted statement of the Court was predicated merely upon what the
Court termed as a very ‘reasonable suspicion, unless it is by mere coincidence,
that the Avestruz brothers were a willing tool to a
systematic and persistent effort towards the successful filing of a libel case
against the accused for the same letter which was the subject of that libel
charge filed with the City Fiscal’s Office.’ And let
it be said that suspicion alone, without more, could not supply an infallible
premise upon which an incontrovertible conclusion could be made. It would be highly unfair for respondent City
Judge Nicolas Superable, Jr., to suffer conviction of
a charge based merely upon conjectures that are vague and sometimes misleading,
if not treacherous. It is to be stated
in this regard, however, that when the Court in its decision in Criminal Case
No. 11095 made reference to that case being a second attempt on the part of
City Judge Superable to hold the accused for the
crime of libel arising from the same letter-complaint which the accused had
written to the President, that was the seventh of other six converging and
contributory points or factors which the Court had considered in arriving at
the conclusion that the guilt of the accused, Gregorio Conde,
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This Investigator, therefore, concludes that Exhibits ‘B’ and ‘B-1’, for
that matter, cannot, by themselves, establish the charge of collusion between
the respondent Judge Nicolas Superable, Jr., on one
hand, and his brother respondents, on the other, in persecuting or harassing
or oppressing the petitioner. It is to
be further stated here that the filing of Criminal Case No. 949 for libel
against Gregorio Conde, which was docketed in the
Court of First Instance as Criminal Case No. 11095, had also been the
specification of a charge of abuse of authority filed by the petitioner,
Gregorio Conde, against Judge Nicolas Superable, Jr., in Administrative Case No. 27, for which
respondent Judge Superable had been exonerated by the
Department of Justice upon a recommendation of the District Judge who investigated
him.”[2]
The Investigator dealt with the charge of persecution and
oppression based on Judge Superable’s order citing
complainant for contempt thus: “The
Complainant claims in his offer of evidence that that order is an act of
persecution and oppression on the part of the said respondent upon the herein
petitioner. This Investigator does not
see how this order, standing by itself alone, could indicate or show any
persecution or oppression on the part of respondent City Judge Nicolas Superable, Jr. It is
to be noted from the order referred to that said order was made in connection
with a contempt proceedings against Gregorio Conde
arising from a letter sent by Gregorio Conde to the
Secretary of Justice branding the respondent as partial in the adjudication of
a case instituted against him, entitled ‘People of the Philippines versus
Gregorio Conde‘ for grave threats, docketed in the
Court of the respondent as Criminal Case No. R-7056. [At most], if the said order was not proper,
it could only amount to an abuse of authority.
Let it, however, be said that the order (Exhibit ‘C’) referred to had
been issued by respondent Judge Nicolas Superable,
Jr., in the exercise of his judicial authority or in the discharge of his
official function which has nothing to do, strictly speaking with his actuation
as a member of the bar.”[3]
It was moreover noted by the Investigator: “It may be stated at this juncture that
for Gregorio Conde’s having been punished for
contempt of Court by respondent City Judge Nicolas Superable,
Jr., this had been included as one of the charges (in fact, denominated as
Charge 1) in Administrative Case No. 25 * * * which was generated by an
administrative complaint filed by Gregorio Conde
against respondent City Judge Nicolas A. Superable,
Jr. In that Administrative Case No. 25,
the investigator, who happens now to be investigator in this case, made the
following recommendation in so far as this charge is concerned: ‘It is, therefore, recommended that the
respondent Judge Superable be reprimanded and that he
should be admonished to be more tolerant in allowing a party aggrieved or who
believes himself to be aggrieved, by his conduct and actuations as a Judge, and
to be more discreet in the exercise of the coercive power of contempt, the
exercise of which right may unnecessarily, and when without legal basis, bring
about the unjust curtailment of individual freedoms and human rights.’ * * *
This recommendation of the Investigating Judge in Administrative Case No. 25
was approved by the Department of Justice in a 5th Indorsement,
dated September 2, 1966 * * * when it said:
‘Wherefore, this Department hereby approves the recommendation of the
District Judge to reprimand the respondent and to warn him to be more discreet
in the exercise of the drastic power to cite for contempt, otherwise, repetition
of the same or other improper acts will be more severely dealt with.'”[4]
Furthermore concerning this contempt incident resulting in an
order of respondent Judge of May 6,
1965 ordering arrest of petitioner after having been sentenced to
twenty days imprisonment, the report of the Investigator likewise had the
following to say: “This order by respondent
City Judge Nicolas Superable, Jr., was issued in
connection with the contempt proceedings against Gregorio Conde. Now, as the respondent in that contempt
proceedings refused to appear before the Court and had chosen to send his wife
and his counsel only, the respondent Judge [believed he] could compel the
presence of respondent Gregorio Conde by the issuance
of the coercive process of arrest, and as the respondent had believed that it
was an appropriate case for indirect contempt, he necessarily had to compel the
attendance of the respondent with the issuance of the warrant of arrest. In proper proceedings of contempt, Section 3
of Rule 71 authorizes the Court, in contempt proceedings, to issue any process
to bring the accused party into Court.
This is what respondent City Judge Superable
had done in that case. Of course, the
act, constituting what Judge Superable had believed
to be an indirect contempt, had been found in Administrative Case No. 25,
entitled Gregorio Conde, petitioner, versus City
Judge Nicolas Superable, Jr., respondent, to have
been improper. * * *. At any rate, * * *, the respondent City Judge
Nicolas Superable set aside his first decision
declaring Gregorio Conde guilty of contempt of Court
and also set aside the order for his arrest in order to give the respondent Conde another chance to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt of Court. This
contempt proceedings ultimately resulted [in] a decision rendered by respondent
Judge Nicolas Superable, Jr., on May 25, 1965, finding Gregorio Conde guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay
a fine of P25. It must be stated that
this decision holding Gregorio Conde in contempt of
court was never appealed by him but Conde voluntarily
paid the P25 fine. At any rate, it has
already been said that for the indiscreet act of the respondent in finding Conde guilty of indirect contempt of court and in
sentencing him to pay a fine of P25, respondent City Judge Nicolas Superable, Jr., was penalized in Administrative Case No.
25, where Conde, as previously stated, had made this
incident as one of the specifications of a charge of abuse of authority on the
part of respondent City Judge Superable.”[5]
While Judge Superable’s conduct could
stand improvement, to put it at its mildest, the additional penalty of
disbarment sought is not justified. At
the other extreme, exoneration is not warranted either. It does appear that the charge of grave
misconduct allegedly consisting of harassment, oppression and persecution was
not made out, even with the introduction of other documentary evidence
purportedly indicative of the animosity of respondent Judge towards petitioner. Still, he should have taken greater pains to
avoid the impression that his personal feelings were not kept under control, as
is rightfully expected of a judge. That
is an added responsibility of the most serious character assumed by a member of
the bar honored with an appointment to the bench. He should on that account be admonished. He must take pains to assure that thereafter
his conduct would not be thus tainted.
It should not be forgotten either that for the infraction
committed by respondent Judge, he had been administratively made to suffer as
noted above.
2. The imputation of wrongdoing directed at his brothers,
Attorneys Camilo Superable
and Angel Superable suffers, from inherent
frailty. It is no wonder then that the
Investigator recommended their exoneration.
To quote from the report:
“As regards the respondents, Attys. Camilo
Superable and Angel Superable,
as the evidence extent on the record tending to prove the charges against them
consists primarily and [exclusively of] mere allusions and conclusions made by
the counsel of the petitioner in his offer of evidence, the Investigator humbly
concludes that the charges against these particular respondents have not been
established.”[6]
3. A reminder as to the standard of judicial conduct that must be
met is never amiss. It has been aptly
remarked, and quite truly, that adjudication should not only be fair and
just. It must appear to be so. A judge is human, but he is expected to rise
above human frailties. At the very
least, there must be an earnest and sincere effort on his part to do so. When a litigant is therefore an individual
for whom he does not cherish kindly thoughts, he is called upon to show greater
care lest inadvertently he finds himself unable to resist the prompting of his
emotions. Perhaps of no government
official is the truism that a public office is a public trust more
applicable. He dispenses justice for the
community. He is its instrument to
assure that every one be given his due.
He speaks and acts for the state, not for himself. His personal feelings must not get the better
of him. So he must not for a moment
forget.
WHEREFORE, Judge Nicolas Superable,
Jr., is hereby admonished, with the warning that repetition of such conduct as
did mar his actuation as a member of the judiciary would be more severely dealt
with. Attorneys Camilo
Superable and Angel Superable
are exonerated.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, JBL, J., on official
leave.
[1]
Petitioner’s Manifestations, pp. 1-2.
[2]
Investigation Report and Recommendation, pp. 18-21.
[3] Ibid,
p. 22.
[4] Ibid,
pp. 23-24.
[5] Ibid,
pp. 27-29.
[6] Ibid,
p. 40.