LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CLETO CAMARENTA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

An appeal from an order of the Court of First In­stance of Bohol, dated June
1, 1962, in its Civil Case No. 1434, dismissing the case.  Originally brought to the Court of Appeals,
said court certified this case to this Court for the reason that the appeal
simply involves questions of law.

On February 11, 1961,
before the justice of the peace court or Maribojoc, Bohol, plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint
for forcible entry and detainer against here­in
defendants-appellees. 
The original complaint was later superseded by an amended complaint,
dated March 9, 1961.  Plaintiff alleged in his amended complaint
that being one of the heirs of Vicenta Obenza he had been in the lawful and peaceful possession of
a house and five parcels of land, situated at Punta Cruz, Maribojoc,
Bohol, since the death of said Vicenta
Obenza on January 24, 1960; that on or about the 16th
day of September, 1960, the defendants, by means of force, strategy and
stealth, unlawfully took possession of the said house and the aforementioned
par­cels of land, harvested and gathered the fruits or the coconut trees and of
banana plants standing thereon, and illegally deprived plaintiff of the
possession of the premises; and that since that date (September 16, 1960) the
defendants had remained in illegal possession of the said premises, and at the
time of the filing of the com­plaint said defendants were still in possession
of the same.  The complaint prayed that
the defendants be ordered, to vacate the premises and to restore possession to
plaintiff, to pay plaintiff the sum of P75.00 a month from the day of the
illegal entry to the day when possession is restored to plaintiff, to pay P100
as attorney’s fees, and the costs.  On February 25, 1961, the defendants
tiled their answer to the amended complaint, denying the material allegations
or the complaint and setting up a counterclaim in the amount of P250.00.  On March
8, 1961, the plaintiff filed his answer to the counterclaim.

On June 14, 1961, after trial, the justice of the peace court of Maribojoc, Bohol, rendered a
decision, ordering the defendants:  (1)
to vacate and restore to the plaintiff the possession of the five parcels of
land and the house which are the subject of the action; (b) to pay the
plaintiff the amount of P75.00 monthly as compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises from Septem­ber 16, 1960 to the time the possession
is restored to the plaintiff; (c) to pay the amount of P100.00 as attor­ney’s
fees; and (d) to pay the costs of the action.

On June 26, 1961,
the defendants appealed to the Court or First Instance of Bohol.  After the appeal was docketed, the defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground that the action was not
prosecuted in the name of the real parties in interest, it being al­leged in
the amended complaint that the plaintiff was a co-owner or the real properties
described in the complaint.  On July 21, 1961, the Court of First
Instance of Bohol denied the motion upon the ground
that under Article 487 of the new Civil Code any of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment.

On August 11, 1961, the defendants filed their answer in the
Court of First Instance, wherein they re­iterated their denial or the
allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint, set up the defense that they were
mere tenants of one Albina Obenza
who was the owner of the properties in question, having acquired the same as a
donation from the deceased Anastacio Doylabo and Vicenta Obenza on November 9, 1945; and as counterclaim they
alleged that because of the malicious filing of the complaint against them they
had to incur expenses in the amount of P500.00 for attorney’s fees and other
expenses, and had suffered moral damages in the amount of P1,500.00.  The plaintiff duly filed an answer to
defendants’ counter­claim, denying the allegations contained therein.

On March 19, 1962, the plaintiff filed a motion before the Court
of First Instance of Bohol, asking for the execution
of the judgment of the justice or the peace court of Maribojoc
upon the ground that defendants had tailed to make the corresponding deposits
at the rate or P75.00 a month as provided for in the judgment of the inferior
court.  On March 30, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Bohol granted the motion and issued a writ or execution
requiring the defendants to vacate the five parcels of land described in the
complaint and to deliver the possession thereof to plaintiff.  In the same order, the court denied
defendants’ motion of March 28, 1962
for extension of time to deliver the properties involved in the case.

On May 23, 1962, defendants’ counsel filed a motion to dismiss
the case, upon the ground that in the proceedings held before the justice of
the peace court of Maribojoc “the nature or the
proofs or evidence presented by both parties would show that the question or
title is necessa­rily involved and that the question of possession cannot be
properly determined without adjudicating the question of title.”^[1]
On May 29, 1962, the
plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss.  On May
30, 1962, the defendants filed their reply to the opposition filed
by plaintiff.  Hearings on the motion to
dismiss were held on May 11 and 24, 1962. 
On June 1, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Bohol
issued an order dismissing this case upon the ground that it had no appellate
juris­diction to hear and decide the case because the justice of the peace
court of Maribojoc had no jurisdiction to try and
decide the case originally, it being necessary to determine first the question
of ownership before the question of possession could be decided.  Strangely, in its order, the court ruled that
the complaint should have been filed in the name of all the heirs of Vicenta Oben­za, in spite or its
previous ruling that any or the co-owners could file an action for ejectment.  The court
at the same time ordered the return to the defendants or the properties that
had been ordered delivered to the plaintiff by virtue or the writ of execution
it had pre­viously issued.  The court
declared said writ of execu­tion void because it was issued in compliance with
the judgment of the inferior court that had no jurisdiction to render the
judgment.

From the above-mentioned order of dismissal, the plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals.  As
stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Court certified the appeal to this
court.^[2]

In the present appeal, plaintiff-appellant contends that the
lower court erred:  (1) in holding that
the justice of the peace court of Maribojoc had no
original jurisdiction to hear and decide this case; (2) in dis­missing
plaintiff’s complaint without previous trial on the merits when the defendants
raised the question of ownership in the motion to dismiss; and (3) in holding
that in a complaint for forcible entry and detainer
all the co-owners must be made parties plaintiff.

We find merit in plaintiff’s appeal.

1.  We find that the action
filed by plaintiff in the justice of the peace court of Maribojoc
was one of forcible entry and detainer.  This is plainly shown by the allegations of
the amended complaint.  In paragraph 2 of
the amended complaint, it is alleged that the plaintiff had been in the lawful
and peaceful possession of a house and the five parcels of land in question
since January 24, 1960; in paragraph 3, it is alleged that on September 16,
1960, the defendants by means of force, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered
said house and the five parcels of land; harvested and gathered the fruits of
the coconut trees and banana clumps therein and illegally deprived plaintiff of
the posses­sion of the said premises; in paragraph 4, it is alleged that since
that date (September 16, 1960) the defendants had remained in illegal
possession of the premises and were still in possession of the same at the date
of the filing of the complaint.  The
prayer of the complaint clearly shows that the relief sought by the plaintiff
is the restoration to him by the defendants of the posses­sion of the disputed
property, with damages resulting from the illegal detainer
of the property.  It will be noted that
in their answer to the amended complaint in the justice of the peace court the
defendants simply denied the allegations of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, and then set
up a counterclaim for attorney’s fees and for incidental expenses.

As early as 1918, this Court laid down the rule, in the case of Mediran v. Villanueva^[3],
that in a forcible entry and detainer case
jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the action as pleaded in the
complaint, and this rule has been consistently adhered to.  In that case this Court held, among others,
as follows:

“….The simple rule to be applied in all such cases is
therefore this:  If the complaint shows
that the plaintiff had prior possession of the premises and that within the
period of one year he has been deprived thereof by a trespasser, who ex­cludes
him and withholds possession without right, the action must be considered to be
within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, for the purpose of
restoring the plaintiff to possession, regardless of  any claims of ownership put forth by either
party, provided the prayer of the complaint is limited to such relief.”^[4]

While it is true that during the trial of the case in the justice
of the peace court of Maribojoc evidence was
presented which tended to establish ownership of the properties in question,
that evidence of ownership was simply incidental in the effort of the parties
in the case to prove possession on their part. 
Indeed, the justice of the peace court, in its decision, correctly
disregarded the question of ownership and limited itself to deter­mining who
had prior actual possession, and whether that prior possession was
disturbed.  Part of the decision of the
inferior court reads as follows:

“The defendants tried to prove that their entry to the lands
in question is due to the authority given to defendant Cleto
Camarenta by Dionisio Obenza and Ranulfo Kiamco, Sr. (Exh. ‘2’) and also
that given by.Albina Obenza
Alonso to defendant Eugenia Vda. de Camarenta to live in the house subject to this litiga­tion
(Exh. ‘3’).

“It is not our job to determine who are the owners of the
lands and house in question nor to touch on the validity of Exhibit ‘1’, the
alleged last will and testament or the late Vicenta Obenza and that of Exh. ‘4’, the
alleged deed of donation inter vivos.  Ours is only to find out whether plaintiff
had the prior physical possession of the lands before September 16, 1960, and whether the de­fendants
on said date entered the premises in question, harvested and gathered the
fruits thereof as alleged in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s complaint.

“These facts, we believe, were clear­ly proven during the
trial and not con­troverted by any evidence for the
defen­dants.

“The fact that defendants were armed with authorizations (Exh. ‘2’ and Exh. ‘3’) to enter
the lands in question cannot justify their acts of forcibly entering the
premises and depriving the prior pos­sessor thereof who is the plaintiff in
this case even if he has no right to stay there.  If the defendants or anybody else claim to be
entitled to the possession or the said premises, they should first file an
action in a court of justice for the enforcement of their rights.  They cannot just take the law in their
hands.  This is the norm of conduct
adopted in our jurisdiction and sanctioned by series of de­cisions of our
Supreme Court.”^[5]

It is thus clearly seen that what the justice of the peace court
was called upon to determine, and it correctly did so, was the question of
prior physical possession.  The mere
circumstance that proof of title, or evidence of ownership, had been introduced
during the trial before the justice or the peace court did not deprive said
court of jurisdiction to rule on the question of who had the prior physical
possession.

It follows, therefore, that the justice of the peace court of Maribojoc was definitely in the exercise of its
jurisdiction when it decided this case at the original instance.  Because the appeal from the decision of the
justice of the peace court was properly brought to the Court of First Instance
of Bohol, the latter court certainly has jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case on appeal. 
The fact that in their answer to the complaint, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Bohol on appeal, the defendants,
for the first time, asserted that they were mere tenants who were authorized to
enter the pre­mises by the real owner, Albina Obenza, who had acquired the properties by way of donation
from the former owners, did not change the nature of the proceeding before the
Court of First Instance.  The Court of
First Instance of Bohol should have proceeded to
determine the correctness of the decision of the inferior court on the question
of prior physical possession.  The
defendants cannot be al­lowed to defeat the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance by simply raising the question of owner­ship on appeal.^[6]
The defendants, in their answer to the amended complaint in the justice of the
peace court, did not raise any question of ownership at all.  We hold, therefore, that the lower court
erred in dismissing this case upon the ground that it had no appellate
jurisdiction.

2.  Anent the question of
whether an action of for­cible entry and detainer
should be brought in the name of all the co-owners, We hold that under Article
487 of the new Civil Code any of the co-owners may bring the action.  As a matter of fact, the lower court had made
this ruling when the defendants first filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
upon the ground that the action was not prosecuted in the name of the real
parties-in­terest.  We do not see any
reason why the lower court, in dismissing this case, incidentally stated that
be­cause the plaintiff was simply one of the co-heirs of the late Vicenta Obenza this action should
not have been filed by himself alone but by all the co-heirs.  It should be noted that in the amended
complaint, it is alleged that the plaintiff was the lawful and peaceful
possessor of the house and the five parcels of land in question before the
defendants deprived him of that pos­session.^[7]
In this connection, the justice of the peace court found that the five parcels
of land and house subject matter of the action were formerly owned and
possessed by Vicenta Obenza
who died on January 24, 1960 and that after her death the plaintiff
continued to hold possession of the said properties and enjoyed the fruits
thereof consisting or coconuts, bananas, oranges, kamungay,
and on September 16, 1960, the defendants en­tered the land and deprived the
plaintiff of possession of the premises.^[8]
In forcible entry and detainer act­ion, the matter to
be determined is simply the question of prior physical possession.  It having been alleged in the complaint that
the plaintiff was in actual posses­sion of the properties in question, and the
justice of the peace court also found that the plaintiff was in actual
possession of those properties, certainly the plain­tiff alone, who was in
actual possession, could file the complaint.

3.  When the Court of First
Instance of Bohol dis­missed this case, it at the
same time set aside the writ of execution which it had previously issued,
ordering the delivery of the premises in question to the plaintiff pending
appeal before it.  Inasmuch as We hold
now that the order of dismissal was erroneous, it follows that the corollary
order voiding the writ of execution and return­ing the premises to the
defendants was also erroneous.  The
status of the case, and the rights and/or obligation of the parties, before the
order of dismissal, must be res­tored.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol dismissing this case, dated June 1, 1962, appealed from, is set
aside and declared of no effect; and this case is remanded to said court for
trial as a case on appeal from the justice of the peace court of Maribojoc.  The writ
of execution issued by the lower court on March 30, 1962 which required defendants to vacate the five
parcels of land involved in this case and to deliver possession thereof to the
plaintiff is revived, although the court may issue such other and further
orders in the premises as law and/or equity may require.  Costs against the defendants-appel­lants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Fernando,
Capistrano, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

Reyes, JBL, J., on official
leave.

^[1]
As quoted from the motion to dismiss, p. 43, Record on Appeal.

^[2] The
record shows that the defendants-appellees failed to
file their brief.

^[3]
37 Phil. 752.

^[4]
Underscoring supplied.

^[5]
Pages 13-14, Record on Appeal.

^[6]
See:   Liso vs.
Carandang, 73 Phil. 649; Aguilar vs. Cabrera,
et al., 74 Phil. 658; Facundo vs. Santos,
77 Phil. 736.

^[7]
Pages 2-4, Record on Appeal.

^[8]
Pages 12-13, Record on Appeal.