CIPRIANO VERASTIGUE, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN VERDAGUER, EMILIO VILLASIN, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

A point of jurisdiction as to the power of a court of first instance sitting as a cadastral court to issue a writ of possession was raised and
an issue of due process invoked in this petition for the review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing a special civil
action for mandamus and certiorari.  As will hereafter be made apparent, neither is sufficiently persuasive to call for a reversal.  We affirm.

The principal question raised in the Court of Appeals according
to the decision sought to be reviewed “is
whether, as claimed by the petitioners, ‘the respondent Court has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in trying the oft-stated cadastral
case for re-opening and review, on account of its special and limited
jurisdiction, because of the pendency of Civil Case
No.211-G before it, between the same parties and over the same land, where the
issue of ownership and possession
is involved.'”^[1]

The question was disposed of in the Court of Appeals decision
thus:  “Upon careful consideration,
we arrived at the conclusion that said question should be answered in the
negative.  Inasmuch as it was the respondent Court,
sitting as Cadastral Court, that handed down the decision sought to be reviewed
in the Petition for Review above-mentioned, it is un­questionable that said
Court did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it entertained
said petition for review based upon the ground that said Court did not have legal authority to award and adjudicate
privately owned lands already covered by Torrens Title.  We are satisfied, under the facts hereinabove
mentioned, that the respondent Court was right in reconsidering and setting
aside its said decision and declaring null and void the decrees as well as the certificates of title
issued in accordance therewith, it appearing that although given a chance to do so, the herein
petitioners had not presented evidence to show, or had not succeeded in
showing, that Certificate of Title No. 75 issued in favor of Andres Villasin of Parafina on September
15, 1914 did not include Lot
No. 5387.  In view hereof, it would
appear that the appeal sought to be taken by the herein petitioners from the
aforementioned orders of the Cadastral Court, even granting that the steps
towards that end were taken within the reglementary
period, would not serve any benefit.”^[2]

Petitioners thus disputed the right of respondents to the
aforementioned lot, but without success. 
They ought to have taken the proper steps to appeal; they failed to do
so within the reglementary period.  They would then rely on the special civil
action for mandamus and certiorari as a substitute measure, having lost the right to appeal.  The Court of Appeals saw through their scheme
and dismissed their petition.

More specifically, insofar as the issue of the writ of possession
is concerned, the version in the brief of petitioners follows:  “After the appeal was dismissed, the
private respondents moved for the issuance of a Writ of Possession to place them in possession of the land in
controversy.  The said Motion was heard on 27
March 1961 and was, with undue haste, granted on the same day, but
a copy thereof was received by the undersigned only on 28 March 1961, or the following day after it had
been heard and granted.  After their
Motion to reconsider the Order of 27
March 1961, granting the issuance of a Writ of Possession, was
denied in the Order of 27 September
1961, the Trial Court issued such Writ.  (Actually, the herein petitioners, however,
still remain in possession of the land.) 
Thus, the Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus, which was dismissed by
the principal respondent.”^[3]

It is in the light of the above facts thus presented that they
would raise the aforementioned jurisdictional and due process questions.  Their contention, as set forth in their lone assignment of error is that the Court
of Appeals erred in not declaring null and void the aforesaid orders with
particular emphasis on the writ of possession thereafter issued.  In their effort to lend substance to the
above allegation, petitioners stressed the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the
court of first instance acting as a cadastral
court to issue a writ of possession and the alleged denial of procedural due
process.

As already indicated, their plea is futile and unavailing,
running counter as it does to controlling decisions of this Court.  The court of first instance sitting as a cadastral court was empowered to
issue a writ of
possession.  Nor was there a failure to
accord petitioners procedural due process.

1.  In Abellera
v. De Guzman,^[4]
we left no doubt about the power of the cadastral court to issue a writ of
possession.  Thus:  “After hearing, the cadastral court may
declare the plaintiff the owner of the lots and entitled to their possession and
may issue a writ directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof, but it
cannot award damages to the plaintiff.” As a matter of fact, the Abellera doctrine has its roots in our opinion rendered 22
years earlier in 1928 in Director of Lands v. Court of First Instance of Tarlac.^[5]
The language used by Justice Laurel in Cordero v. Court of First Instance of
Laguna,^[6]
a 1939 decision, would, if
carefully analyzed, likewise yield an affirmative answer to the question of
whether or not a cadastral court may issue a writ of possession.

In a recent decision, less than three years ago, where the party
adversely affected did not even bother to assail the legality of an order of a
writ of possession coming from a cadastral court, we pointed out, in an opinion
through Justice J. B. L. Reyes, how broad and extensive is the scope of such an
authority.  Thus:  “Neither de respondents dispute the
propriety and validity of the order of the cadastral court, granting the writ
of possession in favor of petitioners as well as its enforcement.  Under these circumstances, we hold that the
order, dated March 20, 1962,
of the cadastral court, granting petitioners’ motion to compel respondents to
remove their respective houses from the disputed lot, is valid and enforceable
against respondents.  In the case of
Marcelo v. Mencias, etc., et al., L-15609, April 29,
1960, 58 O.G. 3349, this Court had already upheld the jurisdiction or authority
of the court of first instance, sitting as a land registration court, to order,
as a consequence of the writ of
possession issued by it, the demolition of improvements introduced by the
successor-in-interest of a defeated
oppositor in the land registration case.”^[7]
The confidence with which therefore petitioners asserted such lack of
jurisdiction in a cadastral court to issue a writ of possession is clearly unjustified.

2.  The due process question
is just as easily disposed
of.  Petitioners, in their brief would
argue thus:  “The herein petitioners
had no chance to object to the private respondents’ Motion for Writ of
Possession because, as hereinbefore discussed, they received a copy thereof
only on 28 March 1961, or on the following day that it was heard and granted by the Court on 27 March
1961.”^[8]

In an earlier page of their brief, they did admit that they had a
motion to reconsider such order of March
27, 1961 which was denied in an order of September 27 of the same
year.  Only then, as admitted by them
likewise, did the lower court issue such a writ of possession.  Where then is the denial of due process?

Our ruling in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Cadiao^[9]
would dispel any doubt that the answer to the above due process question must
be in the negative.  Thus:  “While it is true then that the order of
November 2, 1967 was issued ex parte,
it is equally true that Whatever objections could have been raised by petitioner
were in fact set forth in its petition to set aside and to reconsider and were
inquired into in a hearing held on January 24, 1968.  As far back as 1935, it has already been a
settled doctrine that a plea of denial of procedural due process does not lie where
a defect consisting of an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by
the alleged aggrieved party having had the opportunity to be heard on a motion
for reconsideration. ‘What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous
notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of oppor­tunity to be heard.’
There is then no occasion to
impute deprivation of property without due process where the adverse party was
heard on a motion for reconsideration constituting as it does ‘sufficient
opportunity’ for him to inform the Tribunal concerned of his side of the
controversy.  As was stated in a recent
decision, what ‘due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what
it requires is fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being
paramount,’ the conclusion being that the hearing on a motion for reconsideration
meets the strict requirement of due process.”

3.  The third point raised by
petitioners to the effect that a writ of possession cannot affect parties who
enter the land after the issuance of a decree of registration is equally devoid
of merit.  This is a factual matter, the
determination of which was properly within the cognizance of the Court of
Appeals.  It should there have been
raised.  Apparently, petitioners did not do so.  The invocation of this particular issue at
this stage cannot be characterized as other than a last-ditch attempt of petitioners to impute an aspect of
vulnerability to the decision now on
appeal, when in reality there is none.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of August 28, 1964, dismissing the
petition for mandamus and certiorari, is affirmed.  With costs against petitioners.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., on
official leave.

Capistrano, J., did not take
part.

^[1]
Appendix A, Brief for Petitioners, p. VI.

^[2]
Ibid, pp. VI-VII.

^[3]
Brief for Petitioners, p. 6.

^[4]
85 Phil. 738 (1950).

^[5]
51 Phil. 805.

^[6]
67 Phil. 358.

^[7]
Baltazar v. Caridad,
L-23509, June 23, 1966.

^[8]
Brief for Petitioners, pp. 11-12.

^[9]
L-28725, March 12, 1968,
citing De Borja v. Flores,
62 Phil. 106 (1935); De Borja v. Tan, 93 Phil.
167 (1953); Embate v. Penolio,
93 Phil. 702 (1953); Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v.
Castillo, L-24657, Nov. 27, 1967.