CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., PETITIONER, VS. CALTEX DEALERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., AND THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

Respondent Caltex Dealers Association of the Philippines Inc. is a duly
organized Labor Union composed of operators of company-owned outlets of the
petroleum pro­ducts of petitioner CALTEX (Philippines)
Inc. and is duly registered with the Department of Labor.

Case No. 3970-ULP filed by said Association with the respondent
court against petitioner is for alleged unfair labor practice consisting of the
latter’s refusal to meet, confer and bargain with the complainant.  Petitioner’s defense was that it is not under
any obligation to meet and bargain with the Association because, as between
them, there existed no employer-employee relationship,
said Association being composed of independent entrepreneurs or businessmen
and/or independent contractors.

In
the course of the hearing of said case, the res­pondent court, upon motion of
the Association, issued a subpoena duces tecum
pursuant to which petitioner produced documents known as “DAPLs“, meaning District Authorized Price Letters.

In
a subsequent hearing held on November 29, 1965, upon motion of the Association,
the respondent court again issued, over the objection of herein petitioner,
another subpoena duces tecum
requiring the production in court of similar documents covering the following
dealers of petitioner:  Tian Pian, Tan Bong Tiong, Antonio Nocum, Josefa Tan, Pedro Interior and Torquato
Carlos, for the years 1964 and 1965.  On
December 4, 1965 petitioner moved to quash said subpoena on the
ground that the documents sought to be produced were immaterial and merely
cumulative; that the subpoena was unreasonable and oppressive, and that the
apparent purpose of the Association was merely to “fish for evidence”.  This motion was denied by the trial court in its order of January 6, 1966, and
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed thereafter was likewise denied by
the Court of Industrial Relations en banc on March 12 of the same year.  Thereupon petitioner filed with said court a
notice of appeal, and on March 30, 1966 it filed the
present petition for certiorari
praying that the respondent court’s order of January 6, 1966 and resolution of March 12, 1966 be reversed.

Petitioner’s
contention that the documents which the subpoena duces
tecum requires it to produce are immaterial or, at
best, merely cumulative do not sustain its claim that the respondent court
erred in issuing said process.  In the
first place, if they are of the same nature as the documents which it bad
already produced at a previous hearing of the case before the respondent court
by virtue of a previous subpoena duces tecum, there is every reason to believe that the documents
covered by the second subpoena duces tecum are also material because the petition under
consideration makes no claim or pretense that the documents already pro­duced
are immaterial to the case.  To a certain
extent, therefore, petitioner is already estopped
from raising this question.

As
regards petitioner’s contention that the same documents are merely cumulative,
the following must be taken into consideration: the DAPLs
already produced by petitioner cover the CALTEX service stations in the area
under the supervision of a certain Mr. Rafael Monserrat,
its supervisor for a portion of Manila, Quezon City
and Sun Juan, while the DAPLs sought to he produced
under the questioned subpoena cover service stations located in a different
area of supervision and are intended to prove the extent of the particular
control and supervision of  petitioner
company over the members of the Association in that area – which might or might not be the same as the control
and supervision exercised by the same party over members of the Association in
other areas.  Strictly speak­ing,
therefore, the documents required of petitioner are not purely cumulative in
character.

Petitioner’s
claim that the subpoena is unreasonable and oppressive by reason of the
voluminous documents to be produced thereunder is
likewise untenable.  The Association
alleges – and this has not been sufficiently controverted
– that said documents are definite, particular­ized, refer to specific periods
and, in fact: lesser in number than the documents produced by petitioner heretofore.

As
far as the Association’s purpose “to fish for evidence” is concerned,
it must be observed that “fishing for evidence” is not prohibited but
allowed under the present Rules of Court on Discovery and Deposition, for the
reason that it enables litigants adequately to prepare their pleadings and for
trial, this, in turn, resulting often in the simplification or reduction of triable issues.  If
this is the practice under the Rules of Court, a fortiori it may be allowed in
courts’ of the nature of the respondent court whose proceedings are not even
strictly subject to the ordinary rules of procedure.

WHEREFORE, the order and resolution appealed from are
hereby affirmed, with costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Capistrano, J., did not take
part.

Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., on official leave of absence.