J. M. JAVIER LOGGING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ATANACIO A. MARDO, ACTING CHIEF REFEREE, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION UNIT, REGIONAL OFFICE 4, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, MANILA; NICANOR S…

Petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition against
respondents to review and set aside, for want of jurisdiction, a writ of
execution issued Atanacio Mardo, Chief Hearing Officer, Regional Office No. 4,
and the levy made by the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, through his deputy, pursuant to said writ.

The petition was duly accepted by this Court and a preliminary
injunction issued upon a bond of P5,000.00.

On 13 April 1966, one Jose C. Solomon had filed with the
Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 4, a Notice of Injury or Sickness with
Claim for compensation against J. M. Javier Logging Corporation, a Philippine
corporation.  Upon receipt thereof, the
employer corporation failed to accomplish submit the Employer’s Report, as
required by the Workmen’s Compensation Act the ground that claimant had
resigned from the employ of the Company as of December 1965, and had received
separation pay.

The case was set for hearing, and in due time, on 28 July 1967,
decided in favor of the claimant.  Copy
of the decision was sent on 7 August 1967 to counsel of record for the employer
at Makati, Rizal, by registered mail; but no registry return card showing
receipt appears on record.  Another copy
of the decision was sent to the
employer itself at its recorded address, and admittedly received by it on 9
August 1967.

On 25 August 1967, the
employer, through another counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration.  The deciding officer declined to entertain
it, on the ground that it was filed one day after the 15th day from receipt by
the employer (on 9th August) of a copy of the decision, and that the award had
become final and executory.  In view
thereof, execution was issued by the Chief Referee, through the hearing
officer, and levied by the Provincial Sheriff on 19 September 1967.  The employer appealed to the Commission en
banc, but its appeal was turned down on 25 October 1967, the Commission
being also of the opinion that the decision had become final.  Hence the present petition.    

It is now the petitioning
employer’s position that, because it was represented by counsel, service of a copy of the decision upon the
employer itself was invalid; and that the service by mail upon its original
counsel could be deemed complete only upon the fifth day from the receipt of
the first notice from the postmaster (Rule 13, section 8); that even assuming
that the postmaster of Makati received the mailed copy of the decision on 8
August, the day following its mailing, and issued the notice to the
addressee on that same day, the service
was not complete until 13 August; hence, the motion to reconsider the decision,
filed on 25 August, was timely, and blocked the finality of the referee’s
decision.

Upon the other hand,
respondents anchor their case on the validity of the service of the decision
upon the employer corporation on 9 August, contending that the decision of the
hearing officer became final on 24 August, fifteen days, after said date, for
lack of seasonable appeal.

The issue narrows down to
the validity of the service of the decision upon the employer itself, instead
of its counsel of record.

We find the petition
meritorious.  Rule 13, section 2, of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 2.  Papers to be filed and
served. – Every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the complaint, every written
motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance,
demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the court, and
served upon the parties affected thereby. 
If any of such parties has appeared by an attorney or attorneys, service upon him shall be made upon
his attorneys or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered
by the court.  Where one attorney appears
for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served
upon him by the opposite side.”

In Notor vs. Daze, 76
Phil. 850, this Court ruled that the expression “every written
notice” in the preceding section includes notice of a decision. 
And conformably to the later part of the rule, where a party appears by
attorney, notice to the former is not a notice in law, unless service upon the
party himself is ordered by the court, which does not appear in the case
at bar (Vivero vs.Santos , 98 Phil. 500,504; Chaiuani vs. Judge Tancinco, 90
Phil. 862; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, 52 Off. Gaz. 2582).  This rule is not a mere technicality, but one
founded on considerations of fair play. 
A party engages an attorney of record precisely because it does not feel
competent to deal with the intricacies of law and procedure.  Furthermore, as the party directly served
would have to communicate with its attorney and turn over to him the
notice received, the net result
would be to noticeably shorten the usable period for taking the proper steps
required to protect the party’s interests.

It is regrettable that the respondents’ anxiousness to grant
speedy remedy the claimant has resulted in further prolonging this
litigation.  It should serve as a
reminder of the saying that “haste makes waste”.  We have no alternative but to apply the rule
in the interest of justice and fair play, so the case may be decided on its
actual merits.

The writs applied for are granted.  The writ of execution issued is annulled and
set aside, and implementation thereof prohibited.  The preliminary injunction heretofore issued
is made permanent.  No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Sanchez,
JJ., concur.