AMBROCIO LACUNA, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. BENJAMIN H. ABES, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from a dismissal, after trial, of a petition for quo
warranto (Civil Case No. 306 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch V, Gapan) challenging the eligibility of the
herein respondent-appellee, Benjamin Abes, to the position of mayor of Peñaranda,
Nueva Ecija, to which he
was duly proclaimed elected in the elections of 14 November 1967.

Mayor-elect Abes (appellee
herein) had been convicted of the crime of counterfeiting treasury warrants and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, eight (8)
months, and (1) day of prision mayor,
and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).  After he had partially served his sentence,
he was released from confinement on 7
April 1959 by virtue of a conditional pardon granted by the
President of the Philippines,
remitting only the unexpired portion of the prison term and fine (Annexes
“F” & “G” to
the Petition for Quo Warranto).  Without the pardon, his maximum sentence
would have been served on 13 October
1961 (Annex “F” to Petition for Quo Warranto,
CFI Record Wrapper, page 12).

With the approach of the 1967 elections, Abes
applied for registration as a voter under the new system of registration, but     the Election Registration Board of the municipality
of Peñaranda
denied his application.  The denial
notwithstanding, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor,
and in the ensuing elections in November, he came out the winner over three
other aspirants.  On 16 November 1967, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed appellee
Abes fully elected mayor.  Petitioner-appellant Lacuna placed second.

On 23 November 1967,
Lacuna filed his petition for quo warranto
with application for preliminary injunction in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija.

On 7 December 1967,
on the same day when hearing was held on the application for preliminary
injunction, the President of the Philippines
granted to the respondent, Benjamin Abes, an absolute
and unconditional pardon and stored to him “full civil and political
rights”.

After the scheduled hearing on 21 December 1967 and the
submission of memoranda, the court, with commendable dispatch, rendered, on 28
December 1967, its decision, dismissing the petition for quo warranto
with application for preliminary injunction and declaring the eligibility of
mayor-elect Abes to the position of mayor, in view of the Presidential full pardon granted him before he qualified
for the office.

Petitioner Lacuna appealed to this Court.

Appellant’s theory is that, by reason of his conviction and
non-registration as a voter, Abes was not a qualified
voter “at the time of the election”, and was therefore, ineligible to
the position of mayor, because Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code
requires the qualifications of a voter for eligibility to an elective municipal
office; that the restoration to him of his civil and political rights by the
presidential plenary pardon on 7 December 1967 did not retroact to move the
disqualification existing anterior to the grant of the pardon.

Appellee’s defense is two-pronged:  first, that at the time of the elections he
was a qualified voter, notwithstanding his non-registration, because
registration as elector is not a qualification and because the term or duration
of his disqualification arising from his conviction has expired; and, second,
that the absolute pardon blotted out all the consequences of his conviction,
including his disqualification.

The lower court rejected the theory of the petitioner, passed sub
silentio the respondent’s first defense, but
sustained him on the second.

 On the first defense of
respondent-appellee Abes, it must be
remembered that appellee’s conviction of a crime
penalized with prision mayor carried the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and
Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if
had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more or
imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary
absolute disqualification disqualifies
the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification
to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, &
Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes,
would have expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right
of suffrage.  This accessory penalty
deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public
office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special
disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence.  Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:

“Art. 32.  Effects of
the penalties of perpetual temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.  – The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term
of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right
to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such
office.  Moreover, the offender shall not
be permitted to hold any public office during the period of disqualification.”

The
word “perpetually” and the phrase “during the term of the
sentence” should be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus the
word “perpetually” refers
to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase
“during the term of the sentence” refers to the temporary special
disqualification.  The duration between
the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily
different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one
period states that such duration is “according to the nature of said
penalty” — which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual
or the temporary special disqualification.

Since, under the criminal code, the second accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage,
deemed imposed on appellee Abes,
did not expire on 13 October
1961, or thereafter, he was, at the time of the election on 14 November 1967,
not qualified to vote or be voted for, or to hold public office, if the effect
of his subsequent absolute pardon is not to be considered.  He is thus thrown back upon his second
defense.

Thus, the decisive issue in the case becomes whether or not a
plenary pardon, granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for
assuming office, had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by
both the criminal and electoral codes.

On this point, appellant Lacuna urges that the presidential
prerogative mercy is prospective in operation and, when granted to Abes on 7 December 1967 did not retroact to the time of the
election; that Abes‘ political and civil rights were
lost through his conviction and were restored, not at the time of the election,
but only upon the grant of the plenary pardon; that, not being a qua lifted
voter at the
time of the election, Abes was not eligible to the
office in question.

Certain authorities (67 C. J. S.578) do hold that a pardon is not
retrospective.^[1]
But the view consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon’s
effects should not be unnecessarily limited as it would lead the impairment of
the pardoning power, which was not contemplated in the Constitution (Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 39; Pelobello vs., Palatino, 72 Phil. 441; Mijares
vs.Custorio,
73 Phil. 507).

More specifically, this Court, in Pelobello
vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441, through Justice Laurel, stated:

“—————— . 
Without the necessity of inquiring into the historical background of the
benign prerogative of mercy, we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador, C.R.No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940^[2]
that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning
power cannot be restricted or controlled by le­gislative action; that an
absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from
conviction; and that
when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes
all that is left of the con­sequences
of conviction.  While there may be force in the
argument which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of
absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the
opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this
jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief
Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty
to atone the rigidity of law to the extant of relieving completely the party or parties
concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.  ———————-.  Under these circumstances, it is
evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to en­able him to
assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus
extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed
————- for assuming office.  We
see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial
interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive.  We, therefore, give efficacy to executive
action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.” (Emphasis supplied)

Upon the authority of the three cases previously cited, we
conclude that the pardon granted to appellee Abes has removed his disqualification, and his election and
assumption of office must be sustained.

Appellant Lacuna emphasizes the non-registration of Abes as a voter in order to differentiate the case at bar from Pelobello
vs. Palatino, 72 Phil, 441.  The fact
stressed does not, however, make the cases dissimilar, because registration as
a voter is not a qualification for a candidate or a voter, within the meaning of “qualified voter” in
Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative
Code it is merely a step towards voting (Rocha vs. Cordis,
103 Phil. 327).  Moreover, the
non-registration of Abes as voter was predicated upon the same
disqualifying effects of his previous conviction that were blotted out by the
plenary pardon.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS,
The appealed decision is hereby affirmed.  No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Applied in
Rep. v. Maglanoc, G.R. No. L-16848, 27 February 1963, a naturalization
case.

^[2]
71 Phil. 34.