BIENVENIDO JORDAN (DECEASED) SUBSTI­TUTED BY HIS WIFE GLORIA R. VDA. DE JORDAN AND HIS PARENTS PORFIRIO JOR­DAN AND BRIGIDA JAMON JORDAN, PETITIONERS, VS. J. DE DIOS ENTERPRISES…

Appeal by certiorari
taken by the heirs of the original claimant, the late Bienvenido Jordan, from a resolution en banc of
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission dated February 29, 1968 setting aside the
decision rendered by its then Chairman, the Honorable N. Baens
del Rosario on July 10, 1967 ordering the respondent J. de Dios
Enterprises, Inc. – hereinafter re­ferred
to as the Company – to pay to the aforesaid
claimant compensation under the provisions
of the Work­men’s Compensation Commission and other benefits under Act
3428, as amended, and remanding the case to the Regional Office, Department of Labor, for another
hearing on the merits.

On February 27, 1964 the now deceased Bienvenido
Jordan filed with Regional Office No. 4, Department of Labor, Manila –
hereinafter referred to simply as Regional Office – a notice of injury or
sickness and claim for compensation against the Company – his employer –
arising from serious physical injuries sustained by him on December 31, 1963 as
a result of an accident that took place in the course of his employment.  As the Company failed to controvert the
claim, an award was made in favor of the claimant on June 3, 1964 by Regional
Administrator F. A. Fuentes, granting disability compensation in the amount of
P4,000.00 and reimbursement of medical, hospital and surgical expenses in the
total amount of P7,388.08.

On June 10, 1964,
the Company filed a petition to set aside the award and to set the claim for
hearing, but the petition was denied in an order of July 13 of the same year.  Thereafter, the records of the case
were elevated to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for review.  As a result thereof the Commission, through
Associate Commissioner Cesareo Perez, issued an order
on September 3, 1964 remanding the case to the Acting Chief of the Regional
Office for the reception of evidence on the nature and extent of the claimant’s
injuries, his wages, and medical, surgical and hospital expenses, and declaring
further that the compensability of the claim
would no longer be disputed in view of the Company’s failure to controvert it
timely.

The Company filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order just
mentioned as well as a petition for the reinstatement of its right to
controvert.  The then mem­bers of the
Commission – Chairman N. Baens del
Rosario and Associate Commissioner Cesareo Perez –
considered the motion and petition aforesaid but did not reach a decision.

Associate Commissioner
Perez issued a so called order dated December
3, 1964, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, let our Order of September
3, 1964, be modified, in the sense that the entire records of this
case should be, as it is hereby ordered, remanded to the Work­men’s
Compensation Unit, Regional Office No. IV, Manila,
for hearing and decision on its merit.”

For her part, Chairman Baens del Rosario rendered her own opinion, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“For all the foregoing considerations, I vote for the denial
of the respondent’s petition to reinstate its right to contro­vert and for the
affirmation of the Order dated September 3, 1964 remanding this case to the Regional office of origin
merely to enable the respondent to be heard in regard to medical, surgical and
hospital expenses allegedly incurred by the claimant.”

A second voting
gave the same result.

Subsequently, the case was remanded to the Regional Office where
herein petitioners filed a motion for partial execution of the award.  As this motion was denied, the case was again
elevated to the Commission pursuant to an order issued on January 10, 1966 by Ata­nacio
A. Mardo, Acting Chief Referee and Chief of
Section.  This second review of the case
ended with the original conflicting positions taken by Chairman Baens del Rosario and Associate
Commissioner Perez.  On June 21, 1966 the former ordered that
the case be remanded to the Regional Office for compliance with the order dated
September 3, 1964 penned by Associate
Commissioner Perez himself.  The latter,
for his part, penned a separate opinion expressing the view that his order of September 3, 1964 had been modified by his other order
of December 3 of the same year which provided for the remanding of
the case to the Regional Office for the latter to hear and decide it on the
merits, without limitation as to the issues that the parties may deem fit to
raise.

It appears, however, that on July 14, 1966, that is, after the issuance of the conflicting
orders just men­tioned, the Chairman of the Commission issued another order,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in accordance with the deliberations had by the
Commission en banc under the provisions of Sec. 4 of Rule 17 of the Rules of
the Commission, the Order dated Sept. 3, 1964,
deemed as original decision of Asso­ciate Commissioner Perez is declared
affirmed and the records of this case remanded to the Acting Chief of Referee
of Regional Office No. 4, Manila, for compliance therewith.”

After the record of the case had once more been remanded to the
Regional Office, the latter, through Acting Referee Pedro P. Pelaez, heard the case pursuant to the order of the
Commission of September 3, 1964, and afterwards rendered judgment on
April 4, 1967 awarding to the claimant disability compensation in the amount of
P4,000.00, medical expenses in the amount of
P10,120.63, and attorney’s fees in the amount of P200.00.

A month thereafter the claimant passed away and was subsequently
substituted by herein petitioners – his surviving widow and parents.

On May 5, 1967
the Company filed a motion for a reconsideration of Referee Pelaez‘
decision, claiming that it was rendered contrary to the order of December 3, 1964.  This motion was denied, and the case was
again elevated to the Commission for review pursuant to law.

After a review of the case on appeal Chairman Baens
del Rosario rendered a decision on July 10, 1967 (a) declaring void Pelaez‘ decision for lack of authority, his authority in the
premises being limited by the order of the Commission dated September 3,
1964 to receiving evidence on the nature and extent of the claimant’s in­juries,
his wages, medical, surgical and hospital expenses, but (b) awarding to the
claimant or his estate disability compensation in the amount of P4,000.00,
reimbursement of medical expenses in the amount of P8,914.90 and attorney’s
fees in the amount of P400.00.

On August 8, 1967,
the Company filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Chairman’s decision
and for the remanding of the case to the Regional Office for full proceedings
pursuant to the order of December
3, 1964 issued by Associate Commissioner Perez.  This motion for reconsideration was resolved
by the Commission en banc after the retirement of Chairman Baens
del Rosario and after the appointment of additional
Associate Commissioners in the persons of Herminia Castelo-Sotto and Paciano C. Villavieja.  The
resolution of the Commission en banc dated February 29, 1968 set aside the
abovementioned decision of Chairman Baens del Rosario
of July 10, 1967 and ordered the
remanding of the case to the Regional Office for full hearing on the merits
pursuant to the Perez’ order of December 3, 1964.  Associate Commissioner Villavieja,
however, dissented
saying the following:

“The subsequent proceedings having been conducted pursuant to
the Order of September 3, 1964,
except as otherwise indicated in the decision in question, and finding the same to be
in accordance with law and
substantial evidence, with­out regard
to technicalities, legal forms, and technical rules of evidence, the decision
sought to be reviewed should be affirmed.”

As the compensability of the claim under consideration is not
questioned, We
are now called upon to determine firstly, whether the controlling order
in the premises is that of September
3, 1964 or that of
December 3 of the same year; secondly,
whether or not Chairman Baens del Rosario’s decision
of July 10, 1967 was rendered in accordance with law and the proceedings had as
mentioned heretofore; and lastly, whether or not the last decision of the Commission en banc remand­ing the case
again to the Regional Office for a full hearing on the merits pursuant to the
Perez’ order of December 3,
1964 should be affirmed or set
aside.

Upon consideration of all the foregoing We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that the order penned by Asso­ciate Commissioner Perez of September 3, 1964
is controlling.  He issued said order in his capacity as reviewing Commissioner
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 16 of the
Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. 
As such, it was subject to appeal to the Commission en banc within 10
days from notice, by means of a motion for its reconsideration in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 17 of the rules of
the Commission.  It was, in fact,
appealed to the Commission en banc when the Company filed on September 25, 1964
a motion for its reconsideration which was to be resolved in accordance with
Section 4, Rule 17 of the Rules of said Commission which provides that, for the
resolution of the appeal (in the form of a motion for reconsideration), two
affirmative or negative votes shall decide the appealed case; that in case of a tie vote due, either to the abstention of a
member of the Commission or to his continued absence for more than one week,
the case shall be calendared for another voting by the Commis­sion en banc, and
if this second vote again results in a tie, the original or appealed decision or order shall  be deemed affirmed.

In the instant
case, the Perez’ order of September 3, 1964 appealed to the Commission
en banc gave rise to a tie vote,
as already mentioned heretofore:  the
Chairman voting for its affirmance and Commissioner
Perez – who was the one who penned the appealed order – voting for its
modification.  As the tie was not broken
with the second vote taken, then, pursuant to the provisions of Section 4, Rule
17 of the Rules of the Commission, the appealed order of September 3, 1964 must be deemed to have
been affirmed.  As a matter of fact, on
July 14, 1966 the Chairman of the Commission issued another order declaring
Commissioner Perez’ order of September 3, 1964 as affirmed and
ordered the remanding of the records of the case to the Acting Chief Referee of
the Regional Office for compliance there­with. 
The record discloses that no appeal from this order was taken.  As a matter of fact, conformably therewith,
the records of the case were again remanded to the Regional Office where a hearing
was held by Acting Referee Pelaez, after which he
rendered his decision of April 4, 1967
in favor of the claimant.

As stated heretofore, the Pelaez‘
decision of April 4, 1967 was set aside on appeal by Chairman Baens del Rosario for the reason stated in her decision of
July 14, 1967.

While in so far as it set aside referee Pelaez‘
decision the correctness of the one rendered on July 10, 1967 by Chairman Baens del Rosario is not entirely free from doubt, We believe
that whatever error in the premises was committed is not fatal nor did it cause
any substantial prejudice to the Company. 
On the assumption that pursuant to the order of the Commission of
September 3, 1964 the referee was authorized not only to receive evidence on
the matters therein mentioned but also to render judgment on the basis thereof,
the Pelaez‘ decision must be necessarily held
legal.  But even in such case, Chairman Baens, de­cision of July
10, 1967 may legitimately be considered as one rendered on appeal therefrom, slightly modifying the relief granted by the
decision of the referee.  On the other
hand, assuming that the decision rendered by referee Pelaez
was not within the scope of his authority as limited by the terms of the order of the Commission of September 3,
1964, it can then be said that Chairman Baens del
Rosario acted correctly in setting it aside and thereafter rendering judgment
on behalf of the Commission strictly in accordance with the evidence of record.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (a) declaring the
order of December 3, 1964 issued by Associate Commis­sioner Cesareo
Perez of no legal effect, and declaring that his own order of September 3, 1964
is valid and controlling as far as subsequent proceedings in the case were
concerned; and (b) reversing and setting aside the resolution of the Commission
en banc issued on February 29, 1968 and affirming the decision rendered by
Chairman Baens del Rosario on July 10, 1967, the same
being in accordance with law and the conditions contained in the order of the
Commission of September 3, 1964.  With costs.

Reyes, Acting C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Villamor, J., took no part.

Concepcion, C.J., on official leave.